And
City of
Interest Arbitration
Arbitrator: Jean A. Savage
Date Issued:
Arbitrator:
Savage; Jean A.
Case #: 16277-I-02-379
Employer:
City of
Date Issued:
In the Matter of an
Interest )
Arbitration )
) Arbitrator’s
Award ) PERC No.
16277-I-02-379
between )
)
City of
(Police Department) )
Employer )
)
and )
)
BEFORE: Jean
A. Savage, Arbitrator
APPEARANCES: For
the Employer:
Bruce
L. Schroeder
Summit
Law Group PLLC
For
the
James
M. Cline
Cline
& Associates
ARBITRATION PANEL: Robert
Smet, Guild President
Appointed
by the Guild
Tom
Robbins, Chief of Police
Appointed
by the City
PLACE OF HEARING:
DATE OF HEARING: September
17, 18 and 19, 2002
POST HEARING BRIEFS:
ARBITRATION
PANEL MEETING: December
16, 17, and 19, 2002
DATE OF AWARD:
SUMMARY OF AWARD
On-Call Premium for Drug
Task Force Sergeant Article 5.8
The arbitrator awards that Article 5.8 shall
remain unchanged in the 2001-2003 collective bargaining agreement.
Bereavement Leave Article
7.3(d)(4)
The arbitrator awards that Article 7.8, as follows, be
added to the collective bargaining agreement:
Article 7.8. Bereavement.
Effective January 1, 2003, employees shall be entitled to paid
bereavement leave for up to five days in each instance of the death of an
immediate family member as defined in Section 7.3(d)(4).
Cost of Corrective
Lenses Article
9.8
The arbitrator awards that Article 9.8 be amended to state:
The City agrees to provide a maximum of Three Hundred
Dollars ($300) every two (2) years toward corrective lenses for LEOFF II
officers and/or legal dependents of all employees.
Duration of Agreement Article
12.1
The arbitrator awards that the contract shall read:
This agreement shall be effective January 1, 2001, through
December 31, 2003.
Wages
Article
12.5
The arbitrator awards the following wage increases:
2001 2002 2003
4.7% 3.3% 2.5%
Shift Differential Article
13.1
The arbitrator awards that Article 13 be
modified to read:
Uniform Personnel assigned to work rotating or straight
night shifts shall receive a monthly premium of Forty Dollars ($40.00).
Respectfully submitted,
Jean Savage, Arbitrator Date
TABLE OF CONTENTS:
I. Introduction: 1
II. Statutory Criteria: 2
III. Background Information: 3
IV. Selection of Comparables: 4
A.
Background Information 4
B.
The Parties’ Positions 5
C.
Analysis and Conclusions 7
V. Article 5.8 – On-Call Premium for Drug Task
Force Sergeant 10
VI. Article 7.3(d)(4) –
Sick Leave (Bereavement Leave) 12
VII. Article 9.8 – Cost of Corrective Lenses 14
VIII. Article 12.1 – Duration of Agreement 16
IX. Article 12.4 – Wages 17
A.
Background Information 17
B.
The City’s Position 18
C.
The Guild’s Position 21
D.
Analysis 23
E.
Conclusion 34
X.
Article 13 – Shift Differential 35
City of
(Employer) Date
of Award:
and
(
ANALYSIS AND AWARD
I. Introduction:
This dispute, between the City of
The most recent collective bargaining
agreement ran from
The arbitrator held a hearing on these issues
in
The parties elected to file briefs and agreed
that they would postmark their briefs by October 30, 2001. The parties’ timely
filed their briefs by electronic mail on and later by regular mail. The parties
chose not to file reply briefs. The arbitrator officially closed the hearing on
receipt of the briefs. The parties and the arbitrator agreed that the
arbitrator would postmark her award by December 6, 2002.
However, on
with PERC involving
two issues in this interest arbitration. According to PERC’s
letter, the
allegations concern:
Employer interference with employee rights in violation of
RCW 41.576.140(1) and refusal to bargain in violation of RCW 41.56.140(4), by
breach of its good faith bargaining obligations in escalating its bargaining
demands concerning duration of the collective bargaining agreement, and by its
refusal to provide relevant collective bargaining information requested by the
union concerning a recruitment problem facing the employer.
PERC Case No. 16840-U-02-4396.1 According
to PERC’s letter, the employer took “the position in
its letter that ‘with this matter [the union’s complaint] pending, it is
impossible for the interest arbitrator to enter an award. WAC
391-55-265.” Subsequently, the parties assured the arbitrator that they
wished her to continue work on an award.
The arbitrator asked the parties to name
members to an interest arbitration panel to meet with her to resolve the
dispute. The parties named Mr. Robert Smet, Guild
President, and Police Chief Tom Robbins as panel members. The arbitration panel
met on December 16, 17, and 19, 2002, in
II. Statutory Criteria:
In
RCW 41.56.465, the
(1) In making its determination, the panel
shall be mindful of the legislative purpose enumerated in RCW 41.56.430 and, as
additional standards or guidelines to aid it in reaching a decision,
it shall take into consideration the following factors:
(a) The constitutional and statutory
authority of the employer;2
(b) Stipulations of the parties;
(c)(i) For employees listed in
RCW 41.56.030(7)(a) through (d), comparison of the wages, hours, and conditions
of employment of personnel involved in the proceedings with the wages, hours,
and conditions of employment of like personnel of like employers of similar
size on the west coast of the United States; 3
(d) The average consumer prices for goods and services,
commonly known as the cost of living;
(e) Changes in any of the circumstances under (a) through
(d) of this subsection during the pendency of the
proceedings; and
(f) Such other factors, not confined to the factors under
(a) through (e) of this subsection, that are normally or traditionally taken
into consideration in the determination of wages, hours, and conditions of
employment. For those employees listed in RCW 41.56.030(7)(a) who are employed
by the governing body of a city or town with a population of less than fifteen
thousand, or a county with a population of less than seventy thousand,
consideration must also be given to regional differences in the cost of living.
In
resolving the issues in this dispute, whether or not fully articulated herein,
the arbitrator has been mindful of these criteria and has considered all of the
evidence and arguments presented by the parties relative to these criteria. The
arbitrator also recognizes that interest arbitration generally is regarded as
an extension of the collective bargaining process. Consequently, “a principled
approach consistent with the legislative intent rejects extreme posturing by
either party.” (Guild’s Brief at 1.) Rather, the arbitrator should endeavor to
approximate the result that reasonable parties themselves would likely have
reached in good faith negotiations. Arbitrator
In interest arbitration, it is the task of an
arbitrator to render an award that applies statutory criteria. If the process
is to work correctly, it should not produce a result that is substantially
different from what would have been obtained had the parties resolved the
dispute at the bargaining table. Interest arbitration is an extension of the
bargaining process, and it is not a forum in which a party should expect to
obtain a novel result.4
III. Background Information:
The City of
The Wenatchee Police Department consists of
37 bargaining unit members, including six sergeants, four corporals and 27
police officers. A chief and two captains supervise the department. The patrol
division captain oversees the patrol shifts and the investigations unit while
the headquarters division captain oversees the Neighborhood Resource Team, the
Bargaining for the current collective
bargaining agreement began in June 2000. A mediator from PERC met with the
parties and recommended that issues be submitted to interest arbitration under
RCW 41.56.450. PERC certified fourteen issues on March 8, 2002. The parties
continued to bargain and reduced the number of outstanding issues to six. The
issues before this arbitrator on
On-Call Premium for Drug Task Force Sergeant Article 5.8
Bereavement Leave Article 7.3(d)(4)
Cost of Corrective Lenses Article
9.8
Duration of Agreement Article 12.1
Wages Article 12.5
Shift Differential Article 13.1
The arbitrator’s approach in writing this
Decision and Award will be to begin with an analysis and decision concerning
comparable jurisdictions because they will be necessary in deciding the six
issues. After stating each issue and the parties’ positions, the arbitrator
will give her analysis and conclusions. On each issue, this arbitrator reviewed
and evaluated the pertinent evidence and argument submitted by the parties. The
record in this matter however is voluminous, so it would be impractical for the
arbitrator to discuss each item of evidence individually.
IV. Selection
of Comparables:
A. Background
Information:
The Washington statute requires that an
interest arbitrator use as a standard or guideline a “comparison of the wages,
hours, and conditions of employment of personnel involved in the proceedings
with the wages, hours, and conditions of employment of like personnel of
like employers of similar size on the west coast of the United States;” RCW
41.56.465(1)(c)(i) (emphasis
added). This statutory section requires that an arbitrator determine an
appropriate list of comparable jurisdictions. Arbitrator
The parties
agreed to the following eleven comparable cities within
Anacortes
Lacey
Marysville
(Guild’s Brief at 14 and City’s Brief at 6.)
In addition, the Guild proposes a variance
range of minus 50% and plus 100%. Using this range, the Guild would add:
The factors,
which the parties agree on are: population and assessed valuation. The City
would add combined property and sales tax, unemployment rate, and median
income. The Guild would add:
Assessed valuation per capita Number of officers
Retail sales Part I crimes
Retail sales per
capita Crimes
per officer
Retail trade Number of officers per 1000
population
Retail trade per
capita
B. The
Parties’ Positions:
1. The Guild’s Position:
The Guild asserts that “[j]urisdictions are identified as ‘comparable’ not because
they ‘seem’ comparable but because statistical studies confirm certain
demographic factors which are known to be predictive of wages and which are
shared in common.” (Guild’s Brief at 6.) The Guild points out that the Guild
and the City concur that population and assessed
valuation are important factors. In addition, the Guild urges the arbitrator to
consider other factors “which are predictive of wages should be used in
selecting comparables because such factors reflect market forces.” (
The Guild also claims that the variance range
the Guild chose is better than the range used by the City because it achieves
balance. In support, the Guild cites Arbitrator Wilkinson:
In my view, the screen utilized is the one needed to
produce an adequate number of (usually in-state or
local labor market) comparators. The objective, in addition to a sufficient
number, is balance. One does not “fine tune” the screen for the sole purpose of
adding or omitting a desirable or undesirable (in terms of pay) jurisdiction.
In questionable cases, one should initially err on the side of inclusion. The
final list should be balanced in terms of population, wealth, degree of rural
isolation and the like. The best argument for using the Association-preferred
approach (-50% to +100%) for the population screen is that in almost all cases,
there are fewer larger jurisdictions from which to choose than there are
smaller. Therefore, this approach is necessary to obtain a population balance.
On the other hand, the debate is academic when the balance can be obtained
without that approach.6
The Guild asserts that plus or minus 50%
results in an “asymmetrical bias toward the selection of smaller
jurisdictions.” (Guild’s Brief at 13.) Applying that variance range, the Guild
asserts that with any city as the focal point, going up or down 50% will result
in a list composed of a greater number of smaller jurisdictions than larger
ones. Using a range of minus 50% and plus 100%, the Guild argues, will produce
a symmetrical list.
The Guild also
asserts that the reasons the City offers for objecting to the Guild’s four
additional cities are insufficiently compelling to justify their rejection. The
Guild asserts that
In summary, the Guild states that “One
significant reason arbitrators try to derive a comparable list for which the
target jurisdiction appears close to the average
on demographic variables is that the stated goal of most arbitrators is
to compare wages and benefits to the
average wages and benefits of the comparables.” (Guild’s Brief at 18.) (italics in original) If the arbitrator rejects
2. The City’s
Position:
The City argues that its methodology, using a
variance range of plus or minus 50% of
The City also notes that arbitrators
generally are wary of methodologies that cannot be explained or easily understood.
The City asserts that the Guild’s “symmetry” argument is a “’smoke screen.’”
(City’s Brief at 7.) Looking at the Guild’s additions to the list, the City
argues that “[t]here can be no ultimate symmetry between the lists of
comparables for cities of such dissimilar size.” (
The City argues against the Guild’s variance
range because it favors much larger jurisdictions and generally richer and
higher paying ones. Kennewick, Richland, and Puyallup, the City argues, skew the comparables’ list toward larger cities and cities inmetropolitan areas. The City points out
that
The City also argues that adding
C. Analysis and
Conclusions:
Initially, the arbitrator notes that the
parties did not direct the arbitrator to any history regarding comparables used
in their prior negotiations. They agree that the arbitrator should not look to
the firefighters’ interest arbitration for comparables. In the
In this dispute, the parties argued that at
various points in their negotiations, the other party changed its position on
which cities are appropriate as comparables. The arbitrator considered these
arguments, but has not given them any weight. It is obvious that negotiators
will change positions many times and for many reasons during negotiations.
There is no requirement in the
Regarding variance ranges, a review of
interest arbitration decisions reveals that arbitrators use a variety of such
ranges. Arbitrator Krebs used a variance range of plus or minus 30%.10
Arbitrators have also used the approach that the Guild urged, a variance of
minus 50% and plus 100%. However, Arbitrator Gaunt stated that this range was
the “outermost limits of what could reasonably be construed as similar size.”11
Arbitral authority suggests that arbitrators use such
a variance range primarily to produce a sufficient number of comparables.
Arbitrator Wilkinson has noted that the debate over a range is academic when
the balance can be obtained without that approach.12 The cases submitted by the
parties and other interest arbitration decisions reveal that the most widely
used range is plus or minus 50% of the target jurisdiction. See, forexample, King County Fire District 44 and
International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 3816, PERC No.
115764-I-01-360 (2002) (Wilkinson, Arb.). Seealso Aitchison, W., Interest Arbitration at 66 (2nd ed.
2000), Labor Relations Information System.
In this dispute, the arbitrator sees no
reason to apply a range other than the plus or minus 50% variance range. Eleven
is a sufficient number of comparable jurisdictions. Moreover, the
Adding the four jurisdictions the Guild proposes--
In this case, the Guild’s additional
comparables serve little purpose other than to justify a higher wage increase,
an approach noted by interest arbitrators. In this regard, it is useful to
remember that the purpose of seeking comparable jurisdictions is “to establish
a test of fairness for proposals parties seek to place in a collective
bargaining agreement. The objective is not to produce a ‘result oriented’ list
of comparable cities.”15 Further, these cities hardly serve to justify a higher
wage increase because with the Guild’s four additional comparables, the
position of
In summary, the
arbitrator finds it appropriate to use the eleven comparables the parties
agreed upon in making comparisons in this dispute. Those jurisdictions are:
Anacortes
Lacey
Marysville
V. Article
5.8 - On-Call Premium for Drug Task Force Sergeant
A. Proposal:
Guild Proposal:
Officers assigned to on-call detective duties, including
narcotics investigations, for more than two (2) consecutive months shall
receive five (5) hours of overtime pay per month in addition to her/her [sic]
overtime hours worked each month.
City Proposal:
The City does not seek a change in Article
5.8. That article states:
Officers assigned to on-call detective duties for more than
two (2) consecutive months shall received [sic] five (5) hours of overtime pay
per month in addition to his/her overtime hours worked each month.
B.
The Parties’ Positions:
1. The City:
The City asserts that detectives are required
to be on-call approximately one week per month on a rotating basis. On-call
status means that a detective may not drink alcohol, must be fit for duty and
must be ready to report within 30 to 45 minutes at any hour. In consideration
for on-call duty, detectives receive five (5) hours of overtime pay per month
above any actual overtime worked. One detective sergeant, is assigned to work
on the Drug Task Force (DTF), a local partnership composed of Wenatchee, East
Wenatchee, Douglas County, and Chelan County.17 Wenatchee is the lead agency
and as such staffs the DTF supervisor position. The City asserts that the DTF
supervisor is not required to serve on-call.
According to the City, if DTF issues come up
during non-business hours, on-duty officers handle the situation. The DTF
supervisor is not restricted in any personal activities, required to stay in
contact with the department, or required to remain within a certain distance of
the department. If the DTF supervisor is called, he/she is not required to
return the call or to respond to a request to work. If the DTF supervisor goes
out to work, the City pays for any additional hours worked. The City also
asserts that its DTF partners do not require or pay for their representatives
to perform on-call duty. Further, of the other 18 regional task forces in the
state, the City states that only three paid on-call pay to the sergeant in the
lead agency. (City Exh. No. 1.4.) Finally, the City warns that “[s]hould the Guild be awarded a decision on this matter, there
may be an administrative implication that could add costs to other agency
partners.” (City Exh. No. 1.)
2. The Guild:
The Guild explains that originally narcotics
investigators were part of the detective unit and received the on-call premium.
When the work was transferred to the DTF, the premium “was inexplicably taken
away.” (Guild’s Brief at 40.) The Guild tried to negotiate a solution for 12
years, but did not succeed. According to the Guild, on-call pay is “an ad hoc
justification to give the detectives some detective pay.” (
B. Analysis
and Conclusion:
The issue of on-call pay is a question of the
duties performed by the DTF supervisor rather than the practices of comparable
jurisdictions. As to duties, the evidence is that the DTF supervisor does not
rotate on-call as do the
There is, however, clearly an expectation
that the DTF supervisor will respond to after hours
calls. Captain Murray testified that some work could be delayed until the day
shift, but the evidence indicated that delay is not always feasible. Detective
Sergeant Manke testified that when there was an
explosion in methamphetamine laboratories, he got calls almost every night of
the week and testified that “a response was required.” (Testimony
of Detective Sergeant Manke.) Such calls are
an interruption of personal time and are likely to come after work hours.
Captain Murray’s testimony also supports the expectation of a response to off
duty calls. The captain testified that if the DTF sergeant failed to respond to
after hours calls, he would have no way to discipline that person because there
is no formal requirement to be on-call. However, he said that he “possibly”
would consider a reassignment. (Testimony of Captain Murray.)
The Guild suggests that the arbitrator may
remedy this situation by changing contract language. However, the arbitrator
believes that such a change would involve changing the duties of the DTF
detective sergeant. Even if the neutral arbitrator has authority to make such a
change under the certification, the record does not provide sufficientinformation
to do so. Further, consideration must be given to the effect of such a change
on the other DTF agencies. In these circumstances, the arbitrator believes that
the parties should negotiate on-call compensation for the DTF detective
sergeant in future negotiations and make the necessary changes in duties if
they so choose.
D. Award:
The arbitrator
awards that Article 5.8 shall remain unchanged in the 2001-2003 collective
bargaining agreement.
VI. Article 7.3(d)(4) - Sick Leave
(Bereavement Leave):
A. Proposals:
Guild Proposal:
7.8. Bereavement. Employees shall be entitled to paid
bereavement leave for up to five days in each instance of the death of an
immediate family member as defined in Section 7.3(d)(4).
City Proposal:
The City seeks continuation of the current practice of
allowing use of sick leave in bereavement cases.
B. The Parties’
Positions:
1. The City:
The City explains that “[u]nder the current plan police officers receive up to five
days bereavement leave for deaths in the immediate family that will be deducted
from the employee’s sick leave bank. The existing plan also provides an
opportunity for the Chief to grant additional amounts of sick leave for
bereavement.” (City’s Brief at 49.) Other City employees have the same
bereavement leave plan as the police officers. The City argues that the Guild’s
proposal would put the officers at odds with the treatment of other City employees
and that there is no reason to treat police officers differently. In addition,
separate leave policies are difficult for the City to administer.
In support of its argument, the City states
that the collective bargaining now provides generous sick leave provisions and
notes that there is no accrual limit on sick leave. The City asserts that
allowing employees to draw from sick leave for bereavement “does not improperly
impinge on their sick leave balances.” (
2. The Guild:
The Guild argues that 13 of its comparators
specifically designated leave for bereavement purposes. According to the Guild,
“[m]ost employers have seen fit to provide some
measure of support to these employees by allowing them off work without docking
their back pay.” (Guild’s Brief at 41.) The Guild also argues that the City’s
reliance on internal consistency is misplaced. The statute, the Guild asserts,
is clear that an arbitrator should assess benefits in relation to comparable
employers not to other city employees. Further, the Guild states that the fact
that the Police Chief has discretion to extend leave if necessary is immaterial
to its proposal.
C. Analysis and Conclusion:
The
The arbitrator has fully considered the
City’s arguments. First, the City argues vigorously that it is difficult
administratively and possibly unfair to have different benefits in various
departments. Although the arbitrator has considered this argument and
appreciates the added administrative complication of having different benefits
among the City’s employees, the statute’s focus on comparability is more
compelling. The City also argues that there may be reasons and history why
other jurisdictions have a different system for bereavement leave. The
arbitrator does not doubt the truth in this argument, but it is equally
applicable to every article at issue in this dispute and is not a persuasive
argument for retaining the current contract provision. Finally, the City argues
that the police officers accumulate sick leave without restriction. The
arbitrator notes that this sick leave bank constitutes a form of disability
insurance because the Guild’s present benefit system does not provide full
disability insurance. Using sick leave for bereavement purposes reduces this
bank. See Article 14.1.3.
Considering the statutory requirement for
comparability and the need for officers to use their sick leave for disability
purposes, the arbitrator concludes that having specifically designated bereavement
leave is more appropriate than the current system. Consequently, she awards the
Guild’s proposal with the proviso that it is effective
D. Award:
The arbitrator awards that Article 7.8, as follows, be
added to the collective bargaining agreement:
Article 7.8. Bereavement. Effective January 1, 2003, employees shall be
entitled to paid bereavement leave for up to five days in each instance of the
death of an immediate family member as defined in Section 7.3(d)(4).
VII. Article
9.8 - Cost of Corrective Lenses:
A. Proposals:
Guild Proposal:
The City agrees to provide Three Hundred Fifty
Dollars ($350.00) every two (2) years toward corrective lenses for
LEOFFII officers and all legal dependents of all employees (receipts required).
City Proposal:
The City agrees to provide a maximum of Three
Hundred Dollars ($300) every two (2) years toward corrective lenses for LEOFF
II officers and/or legal dependents of all employees.
B. The
Parties’ Positions:
1. The City:
The City seeks only to clarify this benefit
by adding the words “a maximum” and omitting the words “Receipts required.” The
City argues that the words “a maximum” are necessary to clarify that the $300
limit is for an entire family. The City objects to the Guild’s proposal to add
$50 to this benefit. The City points out that the corrective lenses benefit is
in addition to eye exams that the City pays for separately. The City asserts
that the Guild provided no testimony to establish that the current benefit
level, established in 1997, is insufficient.
In addition, the City argues that the Guild’s
proposal would put the Guild’s members “at odds with other City employees who
are currently at the $300 reimbursement level.” (City’s Brief at 20.) According
to the City, having some employees at one level of benefits and other employees
at a different level would cause administrative problems for the Third Party
Administrator (TPA) that handles the medical, dental, and vision plans. (City Exh. No.
6.1.)
2. The
Guild:
According to the Guild, the average vision
benefit provided by the comparable jurisdictions is $176/per year and the
Guild’s proposal would be $175/per year. The Guild also argues that this
benefit has not been increased for a few years. The Guild asserts that internal
equity is not material and that among City employees, the Guild got this
benefit first.
C.
Analysis and Conclusion:
According to
data provided by the Guild, nine of the eleven comparables offer a vision
benefit. However, only one city,
There is
likewise no evidence on which to base an increase in this benefit. The Guild
did not offer any evidence to support its demand other than the information
that the benefit had not improved in several years. Inasmuch as the City pays
100% for a medical, dental, and vision plan for officers and pays 90% of
dependent coverage at a time when medical coverage is becoming increasingly
expensive for employees, this argument is simply inadequate. Moreover, the
Guild did not offer any evidence that the existing corrective lenses benefit
caused a hardship for any officer or was insufficient.
In contrast, the
City argued that the word “maximum” would clarify that the corrective lenses
benefit is a maximum of $300 for the entire family. In support, the City
states, without contradiction by the Guild, that instances
occurred in which the plan administrator applied the $300 limit to multiple
family members instead of requiring that it be shared among them. The City’s
argument that the language needs clarification is persuasive and the arbitrator
awards the modifications proposed by the City.
D. Award:
The arbitrator awards that Article 9.8 be amended to state:
The City agrees to provide a maximum of Three
Hundred Dollars ($300) every two (2) years toward corrective lenses for LEOFF
II officers and/or legal dependents of all employees.
VIII. Article 12.1 - Duration of Agreement:
A. Proposals:
Guild Proposal:
The Guild proposes a two (2) year agreement
for the period from
City Proposal:
The City proposes a three (3) year agreement
running from
B. Positions
of the Parties:
1. The City’s Position:
The City argues that a three-year agreement
is consistent with most of the contracts in the comparable jurisdictions and in
line with other City bargaining units. Particularly, the City notes that the
International Association of Fire Fighters agreement expires at the end of 2003
and adds “[i]t is critical that the two jurisdictions
with access to interest arbitration have their contracts on the same cycle.”
(City’s Brief at 22.)
Further, the City argues that the commitment of time and
resources required for negotiations are good reasons for longer agreements. In
this case, the City points out that a two-year agreement would mean that the
contract would expire immediately.
The City also argues that the parties never reached
an agreement reached on this issue. During negotiations, the City argues, the
parties explored a range of options. In June of 2000, when bargaining began, a
two-year agreement would have permitted a break in negotiations. As bargaining
continued into 2002, that benefit disappeared. At the end of 2002, the City’s
representative, Annette Sandberg, approached the Guild’s representative in an
attempt to resolve the contract before her departure for a new job. Part of the
package she offered was a two-year agreement. The City asserts that the Guild’s
representative did not respond timely and that even after certification a
couple of months later, the Guild did not argue there was any agreement on
duration. Finally, the City argues that at the arbitration hearing, the Guild’s
representative admitted “that there had been no communicated agreement on the
duration.” (
2. The Guild’s Position:
The Guild argues that the City offered a
two-year collective bargaining agreement and the Guild accepted, but the City
later changed its position. The Guild asserts that the
City initially proposed a two-year agreement and continued
that proposal into 2002 as the parties prepared lists of issues for
certification. According to the Guild, the dispute was between one year and two
years rather than two or three years. In support, the Guild offers a contract
proposal dated
No. 203.)
C.
Analysis and Conclusion:
Initially, the arbitrator notes that the
parties agreed at the hearing that the arbitrator has jurisdiction to decide
the duration of the collective bargaining agreement despite the existence of a
good faith bargaining issue. The arbitrator, however, will not address directly
the parties’ arguments about their negotiations. The question of the
agreement’s duration is on PERC’s list of certified
issues for interest arbitration and, therefore, it is appropriately resolved in
this decision and award. (City Exh.
A.4.) Furthermore, as noted below, the parties agree that this interest
arbitration award may issue without regard to the pending unfair labor
practice.
Turning to the question of duration, the
arbitrator believes that a three-year contract term is in the best interests of
both parties. If the arbitrator were to award only a two-year agreement, the
agreement would expire immediately. Put differently, the time when the parties
would have bargained for 2003 has passed. In fact, even a three-year collective
bargaining agreement only allows the parties a few months respite before
negotiations must begin for 2004. Arbitrator Beck addressed a similar issue and
found, “[a] two year term, on the other hand, would place the parties
immediately back in negotiations. Such a state of affairs would not promote
collective bargaining as an effective means of resolving disputes, as is
contemplated by the statute.”19
As additional support, the arbitrator notes
that there are eight jurisdictions among the comparables with three-year
agreements. (City Exh. No. 9.2.) Thus, a three-year agreement is not unusual. Only
three jurisdictions, however, have resolved wage issues for the year 2003,
which is the third year of this agreement.
D. Award:
The arbitrator awards that the contract shall read:
This agreement shall be effective January 1, 2001, through
December 31, 2003.
IX. Article
12.4 - Wages
A. Proposals:
The Guild proposes that:
The City shall
pay to the officers in the bargaining unit those rates that are set forth on
Appendix “A”, attached hereto. Wages shall be adjusted above the 2000 rates
across the board five percent (5%)
The City proposes the following cost of
living adjustments for all bargaining unit members:
B. The City’s
Position:
The City argues that its proposed increases
are fair in relationship to its comparables. In examining the comparables, the
City argues that a police officer with five years of service with an AA degree
is an appropriate “model.” The City also focuses on net hourly compensation as
the most appropriate measure. The City calculates the annual scheduled hours
subtracting the vacation and holiday leave hours that a five-year officer would
receive in the comparable jurisdictions. The City argues that the arbitrator
should add longevity, educational incentives, and deferred compensation to the
base wages. According to the City, it is not appropriate to include premiums
for specialty assignments and proficiency payments because not all officers get
them. The City asserts that the Guild includes some premiums and ignores
others. For example, the City points out that the bulk of the Guild’s
bargaining unit get the $30 per month shift differential, but the Guild does
not include it.
Next, the City argues that comparable cities
in the
The City also argues that any wage increase
should be evaluated in light of significant increases in medical costs. The
City notes that it pays 100% of the cost of health insurance for police
officers and 90% for their dependents. Health insurance costs increased by 8%
increase in 2002, and the City projects a 20% increase in 2003. (Testimony of Finance Director Calhoun.) Without these
health insurance increases, the City’s proposals will cost $375,082 over three
years. The City is concerned about a potential increase in its contribution for
LEOFF pensions with the passage of Initiative 790.21 According to the City, the
State Actuary estimated that the passage of this measure would increase the
employer contribution rate from 2.64% to 14.47% on July 1, 2003.
The City also notes that inflation as
measured by the CPI is extremely low with no anticipated significant increase
in sight. In August of 2002, for example, the CPI-W for
Seattle-Tacoma-Bremerton was only 1.8% and the CPI-U was 1.9%. The City asserts
that its proposals for each year exceed the inflation measurements. Finally,
the City argues that its police officers have historically fared well in
relation to the cost of living.
The City also asserts that its wage proposals
are fair when compared to other City employees. From 1993 through 2001, police
officers received 28.6% in wage increases compared to 25.8% for non-represented
employees and 24.5% for employees represented by AFSCME. In 2001, management,
non-represented employees, and AFSCME-represented employees received 2.66%. In
2002, the City froze salaries of management and non-represented employees. The
City rejects the Guild’s argument that the firefighters’ increases should be a
“baseline.” In awarding wages to the firefighters, the City asserts that
Arbitrator Axon considered his award of a reduction from four to three platoons
and his decision not to award a requested buyout for the resulting loss of
promotional opportunities. The City also quotes Arbitrator Axon’s statement
that he was “’essentially awarding cost-of-living increases over the duration
of this 3-year contract.’” (City’s Brief at 36.)
The City also argues that
No. 10.7.10.)
The City argues that the arbitrator should
consider that the cost of living in
The City argues that its wage proposal for
2003 should be “more heavily influenced by the realities of the economy than on
any analysis based on comparables.” (City’s Brief at 31.) In this regard, the
City notes the high unemployment rate in
Finally, the City argues that its fiscal
resources do not support the Guild’s demand and should temper any wage
adjustment. According to the City, it faces “an uncertain financial future.”
(City’s Brief at 42.) The City points to the decline in growth of sales tax
revenues in the past few years. Although the City recognizes that 2002 sales
tax revenues are up 3% from 2% in 2000 and 2001, the City argues that the
increase will be non-recurring. Some of the increase is due to construction at
Valley North Mall. In addition, the move of the Town
Further, the City asserts that it is very
uncertain whether or when Alcoa will reopen and that Pacific Aerospace and
Electronics has suffered significant losses in value. (City Exh. No. 10.7.10.)
Particularly, the City argues that property tax limits resulting from
Initiative 747 should influence any wage increases. According to the City’s
Finance Director, the state monies to compensate the cities for lost revenue
has ended and the full negative effect of this measure will take effect over
ten years. The City also points out that although annexations were discussed,
only one is going forward and it is not large.
The City asserts that it has spent money to
improve the City’s infrastructure to attract visitors and business in order to
generate higher sales taxes. According to the City’s witnesses, the City has
not spent large sums of money from the general fund. The City spent about
$100,000 to $130,000 from the general fund to build a bridge connecting the
City’s retail area to the riverfront park. In addition, the City believes it
must improve the ice arena to maintain competitiveness for tournaments. To fund
this improvement, the City changed the life expectancy of police cars from
three to four years and put money from the equipment reserve into the general
fund. The City also hopes to build a water slide, but the Mayor testified that
the City would seek grant money instead of using money from the general fund.
The City has provided a minor amount of money for improvements to the
convention center and will sell bonds for other improvements. In addition, the
City is seeking to purchase
Finally, the City disputes the Guild’s
assertion that it has been unable to attract a sufficient number of qualified
candidates. The City asserts that the City’s police department has not had
substantial turnover. According to the City’s records, eight officers have left
in the past 10 years. According to City witnesses, no officer left because of
the pay in
C.
The Guild’s Position:
The Guild asserts that wage comparisons
should be made using a methodology that allows for a fair “apples-to-apples”
comparison. The Guild also argues that the arbitrator should make a base wage
analysis rather than use the City’s modified “net wage” analysis. According to
the Guild, most arbitrators examine the top step wages from each of the
comparables without comparing additional premiums and adding all forms of
compensation to the base wage. The Guild recognizes that the net hourly
computation method is common in firefighter interest arbitrations. However, the
Guild asserts that it is “unaware of police awards which have adopted the net
hourly wage analysis suggested by the City.” (Guild’s Brief at 21.)
The Guild argues against including deferred
compensation in the wage calculations on the basis that it is a benefit. One
reason, the Guild notes, is that it is difficult to compare accurately the cost
or value of benefits. If deferred compensation is included, the Guild asserts
that the arbitrator should also include proficiency pays that are available in
the comparables. The Guild states that “[w]age comparisons which take into
consideration all the various points in a pay plan for which an employee is
eligible will provide a truer reading of the competitiveness of a pay plan.” (
The Guild asserts that a significant wage gap
exists. The Guild argues that even using the City’s data; the police officers
are over 8.2% behind for a two-year period, 2001 and 2002. Further, the Guild
states that the City’s wage proposals for 2001 and 2002 would leave them
behind. Using the Guild’s additions to the list of comparables shows that the
officers are 9.2% behind without factoring in that the
Regarding cost of living issues, the Guild
argues that the CPI should be given some weight. Where the index is rising
slowly, the Guild asserts that it should get less weight. Further, where there
is a wage gap, the Guild argues that arbitrators give the CPI factor
“significantly less weight.” (Guild’s Brief at 26.) The Guild also asserts that
in the present labor market where there is a shortage of qualified applicants,
settlement trends eclipse the CPI factor. Currently, other settlements do not
indicate any type of substantial wage restraint or uniform settlement pattern,
according to the Guild.
The Guild notes that the parties agreed
previously to use the
The Guild also argues that the City’s
anecdotal evidence regarding regional differences in the cost of living and
wages are inconclusive at best. Specifically, the Guild rejects the City’s
attempt to show that median income and wages are lower in
Turning to other considerations, the Guild
asserts that the arbitrator should give internal wage comparisons little or no
weight. Even where an employer is under severe fiscal stress, internal
settlements are not controlling, according to the Guild. In this case, the
Guild argues that there is no inability to pay. Moreover, the statute is clear
that an arbitrator is to compare employers, not internal settlements.
Particularly, the Guild argues that an award
for police officers should not be constrained by the interest arbitration award
to firefighters. The Guild points out that the firefighters asked only for 100%
of the cost of living index because their pay rates were already above average.
Further, the Guild asserts that firefighter raises in recent years exceeded
those of police officers, the firefighters have low turnover, and they do not
have retention and recruitment problems. With promotional opportunities,
specialty positions, and overtime opportunities, the Guild asserts that the
City pays firefighters well above police officers, nearly 6% higher. (Guild Exh. No.
115.) The Guild claims that analysts who have studied the question of
firefighter and police parity recommend against attempts to achieve such
parity.
Economic trends, the Guild argues, are a
secondary factor that arbitrators consider. Granting that the national and
According to the Guild, a city’s fiscal
condition is a factor that arbitrators say is a relevant and even important
factor and that the most weight is given when a jurisdiction’s fiscal condition
is either very good or very poor. As the Guild describes it,
“[h]ere, the conditions are fairly described as middling.” (
The Guild disputes the City’s cost estimates
for Initiative 790. The Guild’s witness on the effect of the initiative was
Barbara Chadwick, campaign manager for the initiative. According to Ms.
Chadwick, the initiative creates a governance board for fire fighters’ and
police pensions to give them a voice in matters concerning their pensions. Ms.
Chadwick testified a new board would be able to propose changes in the
contribution rates of cities, but the legislature or the governor could veto
those changes. According to Ms. Chadwick, it is unlikely that a reconstituted
board would increase pension rates to the maximum because firefighters and
police must contribute 50% of the rate. (City Exh. No. 10.6.7, p. 5.)
The Guild also argues that officer workload
in addition to recruitment and retention problems support its wage demands.
First, the Guild claims that among its comparables, the number of officers is
below average while the number of Part I, more labor intensive, crimes is high.
(Guild Exh. Nos. 30 and 31.) The Guild also asserts that the number of
officers on a per capita basis is below average. (Guild Exh. No. 33.)
The Guild argues vigorously that recruitment
and retention problems are a matter of concern. Arbitrators consider very high
and very low turnover, according to the Guild. Although the City refused to
furnish complete data, the Guild asserts that the City is hiring from the
bottom of candidate lists. Further, the Guild asserts that the City is having
no success getting laterals who require significantly
less training dollars than new recruits do. While the Guild admits that many
factors are at work, the Guild argues that pay is “significant.” (Guild’s Brief
at 29.) Testimony shows that the number of applicants has “fallen
dramatically.” (
D. Analysis:
1. Basis for Salary
Comparisons:
The
In comparing wages, the first consideration
is which wage level to use as a benchmark. The Guild refers to the “top step”
as the one traditionally used by arbitrators. (Guild’s Brief at 20.) In
The Wenatchee department requires that a
candidate have an Associate of Arts (AA) degree as a qualification for hire at
the entry level and does not offer an educational incentive. (City
Exh. No. A.9.) In contrast, seven of the
comparables offer such incentives. That is, if an entry-level officer has an AA
degree, he/she will receive additional payments for that degree. For example,
an officer in
Therefore, the
A second consideration is whether to include
other wage-related payments and benefits for comparison purposes. The City
would include deferred compensation, offered by
For several reasons, the arbitrator has
decided not to include deferred compensation or any “proficiency pays” in
comparing jurisdictions. First, these additions to wages require that employees
take specific actions to participate. A police officer must choose to
participate in a deferred compensation plan. If he/she does, the City withholds
2% from wages and provides matching funds. The officer has the benefit of a
type of savings plan for retirement and the employer’s assistance in funding
the plan. Although the deferred compensation plan has a wage component because
the officer will get the income at some point, it also may be a benefit for
employees. The City pays $83 per month for each enrolled officer at the 5/AA
level. (City Exh. No.
10.3.1, Updated.) The record does not disclose how many officers take advantage
of this benefit. In contrast, every officer earns longevity pay simply by
staying on the job.
Second, the Guild presented data showing that
deferred compensation and proficiency premiums, if they were included, would
“essentially neutralize” each other in this dispute. (Guild’s Brief at 25 and
Guild Exh. No. 76.) In addition,
the arbitrator recognizes that the data to compare incentive pays and
proficiency pays is difficult to determine and these payments are not readily
comparable. Third, neither party attempted to include the monthly shift
differential in their comparisons. The City notes that most officers receive
the differential, but the City does not include it in its comparisons. (City Exh. No. 10.3.1, Updated.)
The parties’ willingness to exclude this wage-related payment for comparison
purposes shows their acceptance of comparisons that exclude some wage-related
payments.
Finally, and most significantly, including
the deferred compensation benefit and ignoring health insurance, as well as
other benefits, makes little sense. Generally, it is the compensation package
that is important to employees. That is, employees are concerned not only with
wages, but with benefits, principally health care insurance. Health insurance
is not a benefit that results in a payment to an employee. However, it is such
a significant cost item for the City, about $972,000 in 2002, and so critically
important to most employees that many wage benefits pale in comparison.
A third
consideration is whether to compare monthly or hourly wages. Again, the
arbitrator notes that the statute speaks of “wages, hours, and
conditions of employment.” Obviously, wages alone do not provide a complete
picture for comparison. Arbitrators differ on the appropriate approach although
the issue is more critical in comparisons of firefighters’ wages because their
hours differ dramatically among jurisdictions. Here, the City advocates
excluding holiday and annual leave hours to arrive at a net hourly wage while
the Guild advocates comparing monthly wages.
Among the comparables, the average hours
worked after subtracting vacation and holiday time is 1883. The range of hours
worked is spread from a low of 1864 to 1912 hours per year. Police officers in
2. Wage Comparison:
Initially, the arbitrator rejects the City’s
assertion that the
The following
tables show the base wages plus longevity and educational pay for the
comparables in 2001, 2002, and 2003:
Table for Contract Year
2001:
|
|
2001 base monthly wage |
Longevity Pay (1) |
Educational Incentive (2) |
Base wages + (1), (2) |
|
|
4187 |
0 |
0 |
4187 |
|
Anacortes |
4189 |
0 |
0 |
4189 |
|
|
4521 |
57 |
0 |
4578 |
|
Lacey |
4411 |
0 |
66 |
4477 |
|
|
4585 |
0 |
0 |
4585 |
|
Marysville |
4305 |
43 |
256 |
4604 |
|
|
3788 |
0 |
76 |
3864 |
|
|
4277 |
0 |
60 |
4337 |
|
|
4128 |
0 |
121 |
4249 |
|
|
4012 |
80 |
121 |
4213 |
|
|
3916 |
35 |
117 |
4068 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Average |
|
|
|
4305 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
4033* |
40 |
0 |
4073 |
*Year 2000 base wage for Police Officer, First Class.
Table for Contract Year
2002:
|
City |
Base Wage 2002 |
Longevity Pay (1) |
Educational Incentive
(2) |
Base wages + (1), (2) |
|
|
4354 |
0 |
0 |
4354 |
|
Anacortes |
4358 |
0 |
0 |
4358 |
|
|
4680 |
59 |
0 |
4739 |
|
Lacey |
4565 |
0 |
68 |
4633 |
|
|
4709 |
0 |
0 |
4709 |
|
Marysville |
4434 |
44 |
266 |
4744 |
|
|
3921 |
0 |
78 |
3999 |
|
Mt.Vernon |
4448 |
0 |
62 |
4510 |
|
|
4253 |
0 |
129 |
4382 |
|
|
4138 |
83 |
121 |
4342 |
|
|
4012 |
35 |
120 |
4167 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Average |
|
|
|
4449 |
Table for Contract Year
2003:
|
City |
Base Wages in 2002 |
Percentage Increase in 2003 |
Base Wages In 2003 |
Longevity |
Educational Incentive |
2003 |
|
|
4354 |
4% |
4528 |
0 |
0 |
4529 |
|
Anacortes |
4358 |
3.25% |
4500 |
0 |
0 |
4500 |
|
|
4680 |
NS |
|
|
|
|
|
Lacey |
4565 |
2.5% |
4793 |
0 |
68 |
4861 |
|
|
4709 |
NS |
|
|
|
|
|
Marysville |
4434 |
NS |
|
|
|
|
|
|
3921 |
NS |
|
|
|
|
|
|
4448 |
NS |
|
|
|
|
|
|
4253 |
NS |
|
|
|
|
|
|
4138 |
2% |
4221 |
84 |
121 |
4426 |
|
|
4012 |
NS |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Average |
|
3% |
|
|
|
4579 |
NS = No settlement
Before determining appropriate wage increases
it is necessary to apply the other considerations in the interest arbitration
statute.
3.
Cost of Living Issues:
One of the statutory considerations in
interest arbitration is “[t]he average consumer prices for goods and services,
commonly known as the cost of living." RCW 41.56.465(1)(d).
Arbitrator Wilkinson noted in Pasco, that “[t]here are three aspects to
cost of living: 1) whether the increase
in wages over time have kept pace with (or outpaced) changes in the cost of
living; 2) how the cost of living in the subject jurisdiction compares to its
comparators; and 3) the appropriate measure of cost of living for computing any
cost of living increases.”24 Neither party addressed the first aspect and the arbitrator will not discuss it here.
Turning first to the appropriate measure, the
parties assert that they agree on the appropriate measure of cost of living,
but it is unclear which measure they have chosen. In their last agreement, the
parties used 85% of the “Seattle-Tacoma-Bremerton All Urban Consumer CPI index”
for a wage adjustment with an additional 2% mid-year increase. (City Exh. No. A.3.) The Guild appears to advocate continuing to use that
measure. (Guild’s Brief at 27.) However, in the prior agreement they used 100%
of the
August (% increase over the prior year)
2000 3.9% 4.0%
2001 3.5% 3.6%
2002 1.8% 1.9%
Source:
The parties disagree about whether a wage
increase tied to a CPI measure should be 85% of the increase in the CPI. The
parties used the 85% figure in the last contract. However, the Guild claims
that the City imposed that limit after negotiations closed and at a time when
the Guild was anxious to implement the contract. The City treats the 85% figure
as a benchmark.
The arbitrator finds it inappropriate to
continue the 85% benchmark figure in considering CPI figures against wage
increases because the origins of the 85% figure are unclear. Sandra Smeller,
Director of Human Resources, recalled that the City’s fiscal department
suggested it. Terry Pippin, who was the Guild’s representative at the time,
testified that he saw the 85% figure for the first time when he met with Ms.
Smeller to sign the agreement. Officer Pippin wanted to get the agreement
implemented and decided to sign. From this testimony, it appears that the 85%
figure was not a negotiated addition to the contract. While some of the
comparables use a percentage of the Seattle-Tacoma-Bremerton CPI indexes, the
arbitrator finds that this option is one the parties should negotiate. Consequently,
to the extent that the CPI is applicable in this dispute, the arbitrator finds
it inappropriate to continue that reduction in the CPI in the 2001-2003
collective bargaining agreement.
Without using 85% of the CPI measures, the
City’s wage offers for 2001, 3%, and 2002, 2.5%, are not as high as the CPI
measures and the Guild’s demands are higher. In 2003, the City is offering a 2%
wage increase, slightly higher than the rate of inflation as measured by either
index. If the CPI were down weighted, the City’s proposal for 2001 is close to
the CPI, but for 2002, it is one-half a percentage point less.
The parties vigorously dispute whether the
cost of living in
|
City |
County |
Median Home Prices (1) |
Average Apartment Rental (2) |
|
|
|
85,100 |
No data |
|
|
Grant |
93,000 |
303 |
|
|
|
105,000 |
447 |
|
|
|
125,900 |
No data |
|
|
Clallam |
132,000 |
No data |
|
|
Benton/Franklin |
134,200 |
493 |
|
|
Chelan/Douglas |
134,900 |
452 |
|
Lacey |
Thurston |
150,000 |
536 |
|
|
Kitsap |
162,900 |
576 |
|
|
|
171,000 |
557 |
|
Anacortes |
|
171,000 |
557 |
|
Marysville |
Snohomish |
218,000 |
678 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Average |
|
|
518 |
1 Source:
City Exh. No. 10.4.5 at 2.
Washington Center for Real Estate Research/Washington State University, Median
Price in second quarter 2002, in dollars.
2 Source:
City Exh. No. 10.4.6, at 5, Apartment Summary
Statistics, March 2002, one-bedroom/one bath units, cost per month in dollars.
Generally, the cost of living in rural
4. Other considerations:
The statute
requires that interest arbitrators consider “[s]uch
other factors, that are normally or traditionally taken into consideration in
the determination of wages, hours, and conditions of employment.” RCW
41.56.465(1)(f). In this case, factors that the
arbitrator will consider are internal parity, the economy in general in Chelan
and
Turning first to
internal parity, arbitrators generally examine the increases of other employee
groups. The theory is that it is understandable that employers desire
consistency while unions want to gain increases at least as good as other employee
unions have achieved. Arbitrator Krebs has stated that “[a]t the bargaining
table, the settlements reached by the Employer with other unions are likely to
be brought up by one side or the other. Thus, it is a factor which should be
considered by the Arbitrator.”25
As to wage settlements in
|
|
Police |
Fire |
Mgt/Non-rep |
AFSCME |
|
1993 |
2.30% |
6.39% |
3.00% |
3.00% |
|
1994 |
2.50% |
* |
2.59% |
2.59% |
|
1995 |
2.60% |
5.50% |
3.25% |
2.25% |
|
1996 |
2.70% |
4.05% |
3.40% |
3.40% |
|
1997 |
3.30% |
3.60% |
3.40% |
2.88% |
|
1998 |
3.70% |
** |
2.50% |
2.50% |
|
1999 |
2.50% |
3.00% |
2.5% Directors/ Mgrs 1.5% |
2.50% |
|
2000 |
3.40% |
3.00% |
2.50% |
2.57% |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Totals |
23.00% |
25.54% |
23.14% Directors/ Mgrs 22.14% |
|
|
Average |
2.88% |
3.19% |
2.89% Directors/ Mgrs 2.77% |
|
*
Received inflated increase in 1993 in error, thus did not receive
increase in 1994.
** Negotiated medical enhancement in lieu of increase.
Sources: City Exh. No. 10.5.1, Guild Exh. No. 109.
Looking at the years from 1993 through 2000,
it is evident that the police officers and the firefighters have not received
the same percentage increases. The most striking example is 1993 when the
firefighters received a 6.39% increase. However, the evidence does not show
what circumstances led to that increase. Similarly, in 1998, the firefighters
received a medical enhancement in lieu of an increase. The record does not
disclose whether the police officers already had that enhancement. What is
clear from this chart is that the police officers have not kept pace with the
firefighters from 1993 to 2000.
It is also useful to review how other groups
of City employees have fared, particularly the represented employees. In 2001,
the AFSCME bargaining unit got a 2.66% increase as did non-represented
employees and management. In 2002, the City cut seven positions and laid off some employees. The City also froze wage increases
for those groups at the 2001 level. (City Exh.
No. 10.6.8 and Testimony of Finance Director Calhoun.)
Turning to general economic considerations,
it is well known that the national economy and that of
The economy in Chelan and
As to fiscal resources, both parties
emphasized the importance of retail sales taxes to the City. In this regard,
the loss of a
The City also relies on property tax
revenues. In that area, another negative force is the
property tax levy lid imposed on
In addition to increases in base wages, the
City is also anticipating increases in health insurance, already a substantial
cost item. Such health insurance increases may be as much as 20% next year. (Testimony of Finance Director Calhoun.) Guild President Smet admitted that double-digit increases in health
insurance costs are not uncommon.27 (Testimony of President Smet.)
Presently, full family coverage for medical, dental, and vision care is $811.80
per month and an employee pays $43.15. Thus, the health insurance benefit, as
presently constituted, is a very important one for employees. In the
firefighters’ arbitration, Arbitrator Axon noted the significance of health
care costs.28 Frequently, employers seek to increase
the amounts that employees contribute to health insurance premiums, but the
City has not suggested this action. The City also emphasizes that the shift
differential, which goes directly into officers’ income, is also significant.
The arbitrator notes the possibility of increases in the retirement system
because Initiative 790 passed and that measure adds another element of
uncertainty. Considering the requirement that employees contribute 50% of the
cost, the arbitrator concludes that it is unlikely that pension rates will
increase greatly.
The City’s
ability to recruit police officers was a hotly contested issue between the
parties. The parties agree that turnover is low. The City notes that there is a
“mixed bag” of reasons that officers leave. (City’s Brief at 16.) There is no
evidence that any officer left because of wages. Nevertheless, the Guild is
concerned about the small number of qualified candidates and asserts that wages
are an important factor. The parties agree that the City has been able to fill
all vacancies to date with well-qualified applicants. However, the Guild argues
that the number of applicants is such that the City has an inadequate pool of
candidates to draw from while the City denies that there is a problem.
Concerning recruitment, the Guild claimed at
the hearing that the City had not furnished all of the information that the
Guild requested about the issue. Apparently, the City did not supply certain
civil service records that would have shown the size of the original applicant
pool. (Guild’s Brief at 30.) Before the hearing, the Guild sued the City under
the Public Disclosure Act, RCW 41.17.250. Although the City apparently agreed
to produce the requested information, complete information was not available to
the arbitrator. The suit remains unresolved.29
In arbitration, an arbitrator may give such
weight as is appropriate to a party’s failure to provide requested information.
Elkouri & Elkouri,
How Arbitration Works
427-29 (Marlin M. Volz
& Edward P. Goggin 5th ed. 1997). In this case,
the requested data appears to be relevant. The City’s representative stated at
the hearing that the City would produce any missing information, but to the
arbitrator’s knowledge, the City provided no additional materials. Curiously,
the City did not call Sergeant Kruse, who is in charge of police recruitment
for the City, but the Guild did. Given his testimony and supporting
documentation, it is unclear what additional material would add. (Guild Exh. No.
87.)
Reviewing the available information, the
arbitrator finds that a critical recruiting problem does not appear to exist
presently, but the City appears close to such a problem. In 2001, the City sent
121 applications to prospective candidates for police officer. (Guild Exh. No.
87.) Twenty-one candidates appeared for the examination and ten passed.
In 2002, sixteen candidates took the examination and ten passed. Despite
vigorous recruiting efforts, the number of qualified candidates remains small.
Candidates who pass the examination must still undergo background checks. In
2000, the City hired three new officers and in 2001, two officers were hired.
These results followed an aggressive
recruiting plan in effect since 1999 when six applicants took the examination
and only one candidate was on the hiring list. Sergeant Kruse proposed and
developed a recruiting plan that includes fliers, college visits, and
advertising on the web. Despite these efforts, the number of applicants did not
markedly increase. Sergeant Kruse attributes the low number of applicants
partly to pay and/or opportunities in the department; however, he noted many
other reasons for a lower level of interest in addition to pay. The job
requires an AA degree and is increasingly more challenging and complex.
Officers face greater legal liability, danger in the job, a greater diversity
in the population, and language challenges. In the arbitrator’s opinion, these
factors are another reason for being attentive to pay to attract highly
qualified candidates.
Pay is likely a factor in the City’s ability
to attract lateral hires. Such hires do not attend the training academy, which
saves the City $20,000 to $25,000. Also, they are on the job much sooner after
hire than trainees. The City has apparently not been able to hire lateral
candidates.
The arbitrator finds it likely that pay is a
significant factor in the City’s ability to attract candidates. Considering
that an applicant who is successful on the examination also has to pass a
background check, there is a need to have more than a minimal number of
applicants. Even with few vacancies, a short list could result in an
insufficient number of qualified candidates. Further, if there are unexpected
resignations and/or injuries on the police force, the number of qualified
candidates might be inadequate to fill vacancies. Simply conducting another
examination will not necessarily solve that problem. Most importantly, the City
and the Guild place a high priority on maintaining the quality of candidates.
E. Conclusion:
Considering
Wages:
2001 2002 2003
4.7% 3.3% 2.5%
In determining these percentages, the arbitrator has
factored in the dollar amount of the increase in the shift differential awarded
in this decision, $40 per month. As previously noted, 31 of
37 officers get this differential. Further, the arbitrator understands
that shift work is to some extent an integral part of a police officer’s job.
Therefore, any additional payment for that aspect of the work can be considered
as part of a police officer’s wages. These increases will bring the Guild to
the average wages of the comparables for 2001 and 2002.
Wage increases for 2003 are not as
susceptible to comparisons. As the table for 2003 shows, only four of the
comparators reported settlements. The average percentage increase of those
settlements is 3%. Further, Arbitrator Axon awarded the firefighters “a flat 3%
increase for 2003 rather than linking the increase to the CPI.”30 Three
percent, however, exceeds the increases in the cost of living indexes that the
parties have used. Both the CPI-W and the CPI-U were at less than 2% for August
2002. A 2.5% increase puts the
In awarding
these wage increases, the arbitrator considered the generally poor economic
climate in the state. She also concluded that the City’s financial resources
are limited due to the impact of tax initiatives, particularly Initiative 747,
and the uncertainty of sales tax revenues. Further, the arbitrator notes that
in 2002, the City laid off some employees and
restricted raises. In 2003, the City will incur substantial cost increases to
fund health insurance. In addition, the City offers the police officers a
deferred compensation plan. The City’s financial resources, however, must be
balanced with the need for wage levels that enable
X. Article 13 - Shift Differential
A.
Proposals:
Guild Proposal:
Uniform Personnel assigned to work rotating or straight
night shifts shall receive a monthly premium equal to one percent (1%) of base
wage.
City Proposal:
This is a Guild issue. The City seeks continuation of the
current practice of paying $30 per month to personnel working rotating shifts
or straight night shifts.
B. The
Parties’ Positions:
1. The
City’s Position:
The City argues that it is ahead of
comparables in paying any form of shift differential. The term “shift
differential” is a misnomer, according to the City, because 84% of the
department, 31 members of the Patrol division and Neighborhood Resource Team,
receive the differential. According to the City, only three of 11 comparables
have any differential and those cities pay an additional flat amount per hour
worked.
The City points out that making the
differential a percentage of the base wage has the effect of tying the two
together. The City argues that this tie will exacerbate the expense of base
wage adjustments because the differential will automatically increase with base
wage adjustments. Based on the wages of a fifth year officer at the expiration
of the current contract in December 2000, $4038 per month, the differential
would increase to $40 per month. (City’s Brief at 48.) The City figures its
cost at $11,160 annually. (City Exh.
No. 10.6.9, at 2.)
2. The
Guild:
The Guild argues that inflation has eroded this
benefit. The Guild asserts that it proposed to change the amount of the shift
differential to 1% when 1% equaled $30. Effectively, the Guild argues, this
benefit changes every year to a lesser amount. In addition, the Guild asserts
that arbitrators generally prefer to tie benefits into a percentage rather than
a flat dollar amount “to avoid the perpetual bargaining over the benefit which
has occurred here.” (Guild’s Brief at 43.) The Guild also argues that the
comparables who offer this benefit do so at a much higher level.
C. Analysis and
Conclusion:
The analysis of this benefit starts with an
examination of its purpose. Although neither party discussed the purpose of the
differential, it is well known that differentials are meant to compensate
employees for working shifts other than days. It is recognized generally that
rotating and night shifts are burdensome because on swing and night shifts
employees are working when many people, particularly their family members, are
not. Swing shift, for example, interferes with family activities, such as
children’s after school activities and with the dinner hour. Night shift means
not being available for normal day time activities. Further, shift changes
interrupt sleeping patterns and for some people changes in sleeping time are
difficult.
The
current shift differential erodes yearly in monetary value. Consequently, its
benefit to the City as a means to compensate police officers for the burden of
working these shifts is also eroding. It is true that only three of the 11
comparables have a shift differential benefit. However, the question here is
not whether there will be a shift differential. The parties have made
that decision. Rather, the issue is what amount the shift differential should
be.
A precise comparison
of the monetary value of
|
Jurisdiction |
Swing Shift |
Graveyard |
Annual Compensation |
|
|
- - |
- - |
$360/year |
|
Anacortes |
.60/hr
$415 |
.75/hr
$519 |
$934/year |
|
|
.40/hr
$277 |
.55/hr
$381 |
$658/year |
|
|
.25/hr
$173 |
.50/hr
$346 |
$519/year |
Source: Collective Bargaining Contracts, Guild Exh. Nos. 39, 46, and 51.
Based on this comparison, the arbitrator
finds raising the amount paid for a shift differential is warranted. Even if
there are variations in the shift operations affecting pay among these
jurisdictions that are unaccounted for, this chart shows that the
This comparison suggests that an alternative
is to convert to an additional amount per hour when an officer works another
shift. Neither party explored that possibility at the hearing
or in its briefs, and therefore the arbitrator does not have sufficient
information to consider that option. Further, the arbitrator is mindful that
the interest arbitration process is designed to be an extension of the
bargaining process. In this instance, the parties apparently did not consider
additional payments per hour worked.
Another option is to adopt the Guild’s
proposal. Pegging the differential to a percentage of wages would stop the
erosion of this benefit. Also, a percentage increase is consistent with the
detective premium. The parties’ agreement pegs the detective premium to an
amount that rises with wages. The detectives receive five hours of overtime pay
per month for on-call rotation. As wages rise, so does the detectives’ pay.
Consequently, this type of increase would be consistent with the parties’ prior
agreements on premiums. Further, resolution of this issue would eliminate
conflict over it in future to the benefit of both parties. It would also
preserve a system that is simple to administer.
The arbitrator
believes that it is not appropriate for her to make this change. As the City
argued, a change to a percentage increase would affect the City’s wage costs in
future. In the arbitrator’s opinion, such a change should remain subject to the
give and take of bargaining. In bargaining, the parties may weigh other
proposals against the Guild’s proposed change to a percentage figure and
determine whether and when a change is warranted.
Given the issue as presented, the arbitrator
believes that she must decide the issue on the basis the parties currently
use—a fixed dollar amount added to base wages. Recognizing the City’s financial
resources, as discussed fully above, the arbitrator, therefore, will raise the
amount of the shift differential to $40 per month, which is approximately 1% of
base wages in the year 2000.
D. Award:
The arbitrator
awards that Article 13 be modified to read:
Uniform Personnel assigned to work rotating or straight
night shifts shall receive a monthly premium of Forty Dollars ($40.00).
It is so ordered and awarded.
Jean
Savage, Arbitrator Date
_______________________________________________________
1 To the arbitrator’s knowledge,
this charge remains unresolved.
2 The parties did not raise any issues concerning this
factor.
3 RCW 41.56.030(7) provides “Uniformed personnel”
means: (a) Law enforcement officers as
defined in RCW 41.26.030 employed by the governing body of any city or town
with a population of two thousand five hundred or more and …”
4International Association of
Firefighters, Local 1758 and
5International Association of
Firefighters, Local 2053 and City of
7The International Association of
Firefighters, Local 453 and
8City of
9Aberdeen Police Association and City of
10City of
at 14 (1997) (Krebs, Arb.)
(
11City of
12Pasco and
13City of
14 Arbitral authority holds that
these two factors and geographic proximity are critical. See, for
example, Port Angeles and IBT Local 589 at 10.
15IAFF, Local 2053 and
16 The arbitrator notes that the Guild is using Wenatchee
wages in 2000 whereas, except for Kennewick, the wages of the comparables are
for 2002.
17 At the time of the hearing,
18 The Guild cited to Guild Exh.
No. 199, however that exhibit was not in the materials given to the arbitrator.
Further, according to the Guild’s representative, Guild Exh. No. 198, was to be
submitted with the Guild’s brief. However, the arbitrator did not receive that
exhibit.
19City of
20Pasco and
21 Initiative 790 passed in the November 5, 2002 election
and takes effect on July 1, 2003. Seewww.wa.gov and
City Exh. No. 10.6.7.
23Pasco and
24Pasco and
25Kennewick and IAFF Local 1296 at 26.
26Wenatchee and Firefighters, Local 453
at 33.
27 President Smet is on the East
Wenatchee City Council, involved with the Housing Authority, and very active in
the community.
28Wenatchee and Firefighters, Local 453
at 28.
29 As noted in Section I of this
decision, the Guild filed an unfair labor practice with PERC on
30Firefighters, Local 453 and