And
Amalgamated
Transit
Interest
Arbitration
Arbitrator:
Date
Issued:
Arbitrator:
Snow;
Case #: 15129-I-00-337
Employer:
Date Issued:
IN THE MATTER OF INTEREST )
ARBITRATION )
)
between ) ARBITRATORS' DECISION
) AND AWARD
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT )
Local No. 1015 ) PERC Case No. 15129-I-00-337
) 15031-M-00-5287
and )
)
BEFORE:
John Leinen: Union
Designee
Terry
Novak: Employer
Designee
APPEARANCES: For
the Employer: Thomas S. Kingen
For the
PLACE OF HEARING:
DATE OF HEARING:
RECORDCLOSED:
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I. INTRODUCTION 1
II. CONTEXT OF THE DISPUTE 3
III. THE ISSUE OF COMPARABILITY 6
IV. SPOKANECOMPARABLES 9
V. THE ISSUE OF WAGES 13
A. Introduction 13
B. Position
of the Parties 14
1. The Employer 14
2. The Union 17
C. What
the Evidence Supports 19
AWARD 24
VI. DURATION OF THE CONTRACT 25
A. Introduction 25
B. Position of the Parties 25
1. The Employer 25
2.
The Union 26
C. What
the Evidence Supports 26
AWARD 28
VII. COST OF UNION ACTIVITIES 30
A Introduction 30
B. Position
of the Parties 31
1. The Employer 31
2. The Union 32
C. What
the Evidence Supports 33
AWARD 34
VIII. THE ISSUE OF OVERTIME 35
A. Introduction 35
B. Position
of the Parties 35
1. The Employer 35
2. The Union 37
C. What
the Evidence Supports 38
AWARD 40
IX. LOSS OF COMMERCIAL DRIVER'S LICENSE 41
A. Introduction
41
B. Position
of the Parties 41
1. The Employer 41
2. The Union 41
C. What
the Evidence Supports 42
AWARD 44
X. THE ISSUE OF BIDDING ON TEMPORARY RUNS 45
A Introduction
45
B. Position
of the Parties 46
1. The Employer 46
2. The Union 48
C. What
the Evidence Supports 49
AWARD 50
XI. THE ISSUE OF LATE REPORTS AND MISS OUTS 51
A Introduction 51
B. Position
of the Parties 52
1. The Employer 52
2. The Union 53
C. What
the Evidence Supports 54
AWARD 56
XII . THE ISSUE OF RESTICTIONS ON PART-TIMERS 57
A. Introduction 57
B. Position
of the Parties 58
1. The Employer 58
2. The Union 60
C. What
the Evidence Shows 61
AWARD 63
XIII. ISSUE OF WAGE PARITY 64
A. Introduction 64
B. Position
of the Parties 65
1.
The Union 65 2. The Employer 66
C. What
the Evidence Shows 69
AWARD 70
XIV. SHIFT DIFFERENTIAL FOR MAINTENANCE
WORKERS 71
A. Introduction
71
B. Position
of the Parties 71
1. The Union 71
2. The Employer 72
C. What
the Evidence Shows 73
AWARD 75
XV. THE ISSUE OF MEDICAL INSURANCE FOR RETIREES
A. Introduction
76
B. Position
of the Parties 76
1. The Union 76
2. The Employer 76
C. What
the Evidence Shows 78
AWARD 80
XVI. THE ISSUE OF DENTAL INSURANCE 81
A. Introduction
81
B. Position
of the Parties 81
1. The Union 81
2. The Employer 82
C. What
the Evidence Supports 82
AWARD 83
XVII. THE ISSUE OF ACCRUED SICK DAYS 84
A. Introduction
84
B. Position
of the Parties 84
1. The Union 84
2. The Employer 85
C. What
the Evidence Supports 86
AWARD 87
XVIII. THE ISSUE OF MEDICAL INSURANCE PREMIUMS 88
A Introduction
88
B. Position
of the Parties 88
1. The Union 88
2. The Employer 89
C. What
the Evidence Supports 90
AWARD 93
XIX. BENEFITS FOR PART-TIME OPERATORS 94
A. Introduction 94
B. Position
of the Parties 94
1. The Union 94
2. The Employer 95
C. What
the Evidence Shows 96
1. Death Benefit 96
2. Pension Plan Participation 97
3. Holiday Pay 97
AWARD 99
XX. EXTRA BOARD OPERATOR 100
A.
Introduction 100
B. Position
of the Parties 101
1. The Union 101
2. The Employer 102
C. What
the Evidence Shows 103
AWARD 105
TENTATIVE AWARD
IN THE MATTER OF )
ARBITRATION )
)
BETWEEN )
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT ) ARBITRATORS' DECISION
UNION )
Local No. 1015 ) AND AWARD
)
AND )
)
)
PERC Case No. 15129-1-00-337 )
1503 1
-M-00-5287 )
I. INTRODUCTION
This interest arbitration came before the panel of
arbitrators in
accordance with Section
41.56.492 of the State of Washington Revised
Code of Washington. Mr. Steven A. Crumb of Crumb & Munding
represented Local 1015 of the
Amalgamated Transit Union. Mr. Thomas S.
Kingen,
General Counsel, represented Spokane Transit Authority of
Spokane, Washington. Assisting Professor Snow, neutral
chairperson, as
members of the arbitration
panel were Mr. John Leinen, Union Designee,
and Dr. Terry Novak, Employer
Designee.
The hearing proceeded in an orderly manner. There was a
full
opportunity for the parties to
submit evidence, to examine and cross-
examine witnesses, and to
argue the matter. The advocates agreed to
submit post-hearing briefs in
lieu of closing arguments. All witnesses
testified under oath as
administered by the arbitrators. Ms.
Stephanie L.
Sage and Mr. Michael S. Kuplick, both of Storey & Miller, Court Reporters,
reported the proceeding for
the parties and submitted a transcript of 498
pages. The advocates fully and
fairly represented their respective parties.
The parties stipulated that the matter properly had been
submitted to arbitration, and
there were no challenges to the jurisdiction of
the arbitration panel to
resolve any issues presented in the hearing. The
parties agreed to submit the
matter on the basis of evidence presented at the
hearing as well as
post-hearing briefs, and the neutral chairperson officially
closed the hearing on March
15, 2001 after receipt of final materials from
the parties.
11. CONTEXT OF THE DISPUTE
The Spokane Transit Authority is a public corporation. It
was
formed in 1981 and assumed
responsibility for public transportation in
Spokane County, Washington.
Service had been provided by the City of
Spokane, Washington. A sales
tax levy provided funding for transportation
services when the City of
Spokane provided such services, and the sales tax
continues to be a main source
of funding for Spokane Transit Authority.
Amalgamated Transit Union has represented fixed-route
operators, maintenance
workers, mechanics, and some clerical employees
since well before 1981.
Another bargaining unit represents supervisors, and
the American Federation of
State, County and Municipal Employees
represents Paratransit
employees. Employees in the various
bargaining units
do not engage in coordinated
bargaining with the Employer.
Spokane Transit Authority is directed by a nine-member
goveming
board. It consists of three county commissioners, two city
council members, and five
mayors of cities served by the Authority.
An
area of approximately 370 square
miles constitutes the operating area for
Spokane County Authority. The
Authority serves approximately 365,660
people. In addition to
fixed-route services, the Authority also provides
Paratransit
service for individuals with disabilities who are unable to use
regular bus service.
In 1997, the Spokane Transit Authority and a consultant
conducted a comprehensive
operational analysis of services provided by the
Authority in an effort to
determine needs of the public and to better serve
constituents in the operating
area. The comprehensive operational analysis
focused on only fixed-route
service. Spokane Transit Authority determined
that it would better serve the
public if the Authority moved from a model of
responding to demand to a
model of responding to the public on the basis of
need as well as efficiency.
The Governing Board moved toward its goal by
implementing a new service
plan. Aspects of the new service plan will be
reviewed in relationship to
issues that are directly relevant to it.
Voters passed a number of initiatives in 1999 that
significantly
affected Spokane Transit
Authority. In Initiative 695, voters repealed the
Motor Vehicle Excise Tax. This
tax had provided the Authority with
roughly $16,000,000 a year or
40% of its budget. The Supreme Court of
Washington later held the
initiative to be invalid, but the Washington State
legislature, then, capped the
Motor Vehicle Excise Tax at a flat rate. The
Spokane Transit Authority is
now dependent on sales tax revenues for a
substantial portion of its
operating budget. Initiative 722 was passed by
voters at the same time as
Initiative 695. Initiative 722 requires all increases
in sales taxes or other public
fees, including bus fares, to be approved by
voters before such increases
take effect. Accordingly, the Authority is
unable to raise taxes or fees
without a formal vote of the citizenry.
The Spokane Transit Authority has reduced fixed-route bus
service where management
deemed it reasonable and efficient to do so.
The plan of the Employer is to
continue cutting service and expenses all the
while using up reserves until
they are gone. If no alternative sources of
revenue are found, the intent
of the Spokane Transit Authority is to reduce
service drastically until
management is able to balance its budget.
Paratransit
services cannot be cut. In a negotiated settlement of a class
action lawsuit brought under
the Americans With Disabilities Act by
Paratransit
riders, the Authority agreed to leave Paratransit
services
unchanged until 2004.
Accordingly, all reductions in service must come
from fixed-route services, at
least until the settlement agreement expires and
a new agreement is reached
Since Spokane Transit Authority assumed responsibility
for the
transportation system in the
region, parties to the arbitration proceeding
have negotiated a new contract
approximately every three years. The last
contract between the parties
expired on September 30, 1999, and the parties
have continued operating under
it, pending conclusion of the current interest
arbitration proceeding. In an
effort to negotiate a new collective bargaining
agreement, the parties reached
an impasse. After mediation failed to resolve
all issues in dispute between
the parties, they proceeded to interest
arbitration pursuant to state
law. Mandates of the interest arbitration law
have been met in this
proceeding.
111. THE ISSUE OF
COMPARABILITY
Modern use of interest arbitration reflects a rethinking
of an
earlier assumption about
adversarial labor relations. Unilateral decision-
making with regard to wages
and terms of employment is often inefficient,
and adversarial working
relations often do more harm than good. Interest
arbitration offers an
effective middle ground that permits parties zealously
to advocate their special
interests while providing a mechanism for
balancing the interests of the
parties in conjunction with needs of the public.
Use of interest arbitration in the United States has deep
roots
some going back to the copper
mines of Connecticut in the early 18th
century. American industry has
used interest arbitration for over 100 years,
most notably in public
utilities, railways, glass and the printing industry.
Comparability standards have
been a part of employee compensation in the
federal government since 1862.
The Federal Pay Comparability Act of 1970
continues the use of such
standards. Virtually all states with modern
collective bargaining laws use
interest arbitration to resolve public sector
disputes. Most states
authorizing interest arbitration enact statutory criteria
to be followed in making
decisions. Such criteria typically instruct interest
arbitrators to be guided, in
part, by comparability data.
Comparability data refer to information from other
jurisdictions
involving similarly situated
employees. Such comparisons provide a
significant source of
information for making decisions in an interest
arbitration proceeding. Such
comparisons help provide a relative test of
fairness. Despite, however,
the importance of comparisons in interest
arbitration, they are not dispositive and certainly not problem free.
One difficulty is establishing objective standards for
comparisons. With whom and
what should be the basis of the comparison?
Do inherent differences in
communities justify a difference in the price of
labor? Is it sensible to
compare job titles without an in-depth understanding
of job requirements? What is
the rationality of comparing hourly wages in
the absence of an
understanding of total compensation? Is proof of differ-
entials
between various communities necessarily proof of inequity?
Nor can the ability to pay be understated. What happens
typically is that unions tend
to stress an employer’s ability to pay during
times of prosperity, and
employers tend to emphasize inability to pay during
hard economic times. Ability
to pay is a criterion meriting significant
attention, but it is not the
only factor deserving scrutiny. Likewise, what
happened in the immediate past
cannot be used as an absolute forecast of
future conditions. The past is
not necessarily a prologue to the future.
The public welfare is also an important factor. In making
decisions based on community
comparisons, an interest arbitrator must
remain sensitive to the fact
that the decision will influence the public’s
welfare. Because of the impact
of a decision on community resources, the
development and viability of
an organization may be directly affected. If an
interest arbitration panel
wrongly allocates public resources, it well may
affect the survival of an
organization. But fairness dictates that a balance be
found, and a community must
not expect public employees to subsidize
services benefiting an entire
geographic region. A blending of economics
and equity needs to co-exist
in an effort to advance the respective interests
of employees, the employer,
and the citizenry.
IV. SPOKANE COMPARABLES
Comparing communities cannot be done with mathematical
precision. The more unique a
community, the more complicated is the
process of comparison. Each
party submitted data from communities it
considers to be comparable to
Spokane Transit Authority. Agreement has
been reached by the parties on
three comparable groups, and each has
offered other comparability
data in addition to the three on which they
agree. The three are:
I . Pierce
Transit (Tacoma and Pierce County,
Washington).
2. Community
Transit (Snohomish County, Washington,
excluding the City of Everett).
3. C-Tran
(Vancouver and Clark County, Washington).
Many factors must be evaluated in determining whether one
community or organization, can be fairly compared with another. Evaluative
criteria may vary depending on
contractual provisions affecting seemingly
similar communities.
Reasonable comparative factors include the size of an
organization, its proximity to
a major metropolitan area, the state where an
organization is located, the
economies of a state as well as the economies of
a local area where an
organization is located, the size of an organization's
service area, and the number
of patrons residing in a service area. An
organization that compares
favorably with regard to some of these factors
may not necessarily compare
favorably with regard to all of them.
Spokane Transit Authority would add five additional
entities of
comparison. They are as
follows:
1. Ben Franklin
Transit (Tri-Cities, Washington).
2. Kitsap
Transit (Bremerton and Kitsap County,
Washington).
3. Fort
Worth Transportation Authority (Fort Worth,
Texas).
4. Madison
Metro Transit (Madison, Wisconsin).
5. Indianapolis
Transportation Corporation
(Indianapolis, Indiana).
Spokane Transit Authority used data obtained from the
1997
National Transit Database.
This is a database compiled by the U.S.
Department of Transportation
Federal Transit Administration. Spokane
Transit Authority compared organizations
according to eleven criteria
selected in discussions with
the Employer’s operating managers. Spokane
Transit Authority chose to use
organizations that fell within a 25% range of
Spokane Transit Authority in
at least six of the eleven criteria. Of the three
comparable entities from
outside the State of Washington, Fort Worth
Transit compared favorably in
ten of the eleven criteria; Madison Metro of
Madison, Wisconsin compared
favorably in seven of eleven; and
Indianapolis Public Transit of
Indianapolis, Indiana compared favorably in
ten of eleven criteria. The
only comparable organization from within the
State of Washington selected
by Spokane Transit Authority that did not
meet the “six of eleven”
standard is Ben Franklin Transit of Tri-Cities,
Washington. It compared favorably in only three of the
eleven criteria. The
Employer, nevertheless,
proposed using Ben Franklin Transit because it is
the closest comparable
organization in Eastern Washington, and
management argued that using a
comparable organization in the same
geographical area is
beneficial.
Spokane Transit Authority asserted that comparable
organizations with more than
twice the population of the Spokane,
Washington service area should
not be used. Likewise, the Employer
contended that comparable
organizations within 50 miles of major
metropolitan areas should not
be used. The Employer contended that a
different type of economy is
to be found in metropolitan areas. It is the
belief of the Employer that
the sort of economy found in a major
metropolitan area has an
impact on collective bargaining agreements
negotiated in the region that
is distinctly different ffom other regions.
The Union also would add a number of comparable
organizations to the list of
comparable jurisdictions. They are as follows:
1. Everett
Transit (Everett, Washington).
2. Intercity
Transit (Olympia, Washington).
3. King
County Metro (Seattle, Washington).
4. Whatcom
Transportation Authority (Bellingham,
Washington) .
5. Tri-Met
(Portland, Oregon).
6. Boise
Urban Stages (Boise, Idaho).
7. Santa
Clara Valley Transportation Authority (Silicon
Valley, California).
Although the Union did not
list Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority
in its official list of
comparable entities, it referred to this organization
throughout its post-hearing
argument. The theoretical basis for the Union's
selection of a particular
comparable entity was not formulaic. Spokane
Transit Authority recognized
Intercity Transit of Olympia, Washington as a
reasonable comparative
jurisdiction. As large cities at the hub of a
megalopolis, it did not seem
reasonable to management to include King
County Metro, Santa Clara
Valley Transportation Authority, and Tri-Met of
Portland, Oregon as comparable
entities.
V. THE ISSUE OF WAGES
A. Introduction
These employees have not had a wage increase for two and
a
half years. The last pay
increase was 2.75% on October 1, 1998. A pay
increase inevitably is
influenced by a blend of principles of equity and
objective measures of salary
criteria. Interest arbitration decisions typically
are influenced by objective
criteria more frequently than by any other
evidence. Comparisons are an
important source of guidance. (See
Kochan,
Thomas A, “Dispute Resolution
Under Factfinding and Arbitration,”
American Arbitration
Association, 1979.)
Comparisons are important because they are viewed as a
principled way of testing
fairness. As the eminent economist, Thorstein
Veblen,
stated, “The propensity for emulation, for invidious comparisons, is
of ancient growth and is a
pervading trait of human nature.” (See Veblen,
The Theory of the Leisure
Class 53 (1934).) Comparisons, however, are
not an absolute guideline and
must be balanced against other relevant
information, and such a
balance has been struck in this report with regard
to wages.
B. Position
of the Parties
1.
The Employer
Spokane Transit Authority proposed a two percent a year
pay
increase. Effective dates of
the increases are in dispute. The effective date
for the wage increase can be
separated from the duration of the contract,
and the issue of duration will
be addressed later in the report. The effective
date of the Employer’s
proposal is unclear. In Exhibit 1.7, dated April 3,
2000, Spokane Transit
Authority proposed:
Wages: 2% effective upon
signing and ratification, 2%
effective 10-11-2001, and 2%
effective 10-1-2002.
In Exhibit 5.10, Spokane
Transit Authority proposed:
Effective October 1, 1999, a
basic wage increase for all
bargaining unit employees of
2%.
The proposal lists the same
increase for October 1, 2000 and also October
1, 2001. The matter was not
clarified at the hearing.
The Employer evaluated a number of factors in
making its
wage proposal. They included:
1. The
Employer’s proposal would maintain its relative
position among comparable employers;
2. The
Employer’s proposal compares favorably with the
Consumer Price Index changes, although the
Employer
argued that the CPI comparison
does not merit
substantial weight;
3. The
Employer’s proposal is equitable when compared
with settlements reached with other employees
of
Spokane Transit Authority;
4. The
Employer’s proposal is equitable when compared to -
wage increases offered to noncontract
employees;
5 The
Employer’s proposal compares favorably with
settlements concluded with other local public
employees;
and
6. The
Employer’s proposal would maintain its leadership
in the local labor market.
Spokane Transit Authority did not rely on
wage settlements
outside of Spokane County in
determining its wage proposal. Mostly,
management relied on local
government wages, such as city and county
employees. In addition to
focusing only on base wages, the Employer
argued that it is also a
useful source of guidance to compare total
compensation packages,
including payments made by the Employer to
Social Security as well as to
the retirement plan. The Employer maintained
that, when comparing total
packages of comparable jurisdiction, only
Community Transit of Snohomish
County, Washington provided a higher
total economic package.
Exhibit 5.10.25 shows that, in comparing total
packages with comparable
jurisdictions put forth by the Union, the only
organization with higher total
packages (that are not part of a major
metropolitan area) are Everett
Transit of Everett, Washington, and
Whatcom Transportation
Authority of Bellinghham, Washington. Excluding
comparable entities put forth
by the Union that have much higher total
packages due to their location
in a major metropolitan area, the Employer
argues that its proposal
compares favorably with the list. When comparing
total compensation packages,
the Employer urges the panel of arbitrators
not to consider insurance
benefits in the calculations. Costs of coverage
and coverage received
allegedly do not compare on the same economic level
as wages and retirement
benefits, and the Employer believes that comparing
them would be “comparing
apples and oranges.”
arbitration is to maintain the
relative wage position of employees in the
bargaining unit vis-a-vis their economic rank in the community. As
management sees it, it is not
the goal of interest arbitration to better
employees’ relative wage
position in the community. The Employer argues
that its proposal is fair and
equitable in view of low inflation rates as well as
the trend of the Consumer
Price Index in recent years. Hence, management
believes its proposal should
be adopted.
2. Position
of the
The
to
contract. It is the belief of
the
what wage increase is
appropriate should be given to internal comparisons,
that is, comparisons among
employees actually working for
Transit Authority. The
1, 1998. Since then,
management itself has received a total increase of
6.5% (2% in early 1999, 2% in
July of 2000, and 2.5% on January 1,
2001). In addition to
management receiving a 6.5% wage increase while
bargaining unit members
received nothing, management is paid on a salary
basis and allegedly already
received considerably higher pay even before the
recent increases. Yet, as the
performing the essential
functions of operating
Without their contribution,
the organization would not function. The
also contends that the
Employer’s argument regarding inability to pay due to
Initiative 695 should receive
little weight. The
management found sufficient
resources to give itself a total pay increase of
4.5% since Initiative 695 took
effect, it should not now be permitted to use
the initiative as a shield
against equitable wage increases for members of the
bargaining unit.
The
compare favorably with other
bargaining units within
Authority. For example,
supervisors of
represented by ATU Local 1598,
and supervisors received a pay increase of
2.85% in 1999 as well as 2.75%
in 2000 and 2001. Paratransit employees
represented by AFSCME Local
3939 received 2.4% for 2000, 2.65% for
2001, and 2.75% for 2002. But
the Employer would limit transit workers
to a 2% a year increase.
The
comparability data from other
bargaining units. For example, Pierce Transit
for
Coach Operators of 3.5% in
1999, 3% in 2000, as well as 3% in 2001.
Both parties agree that Pierce
Transit is a comparable organization.
Moreover, the Consumer Price
Index for most of 1999 and all of 2000 has
been above 2%. Hence, the
be adopted by the panel of
arbitrators.
C. What
the Evidence Supports
pay” argument based on
Initiative 695, although one might be implied. The
Employer did point out various
cost issues that influenced its proposal. For
example, fuel prices are
currently 34% ahead of previous levels, causing the
Employer to be a half million
dollars over its current budget. Likewise, 21%
of the Employer’s budget is
allocated to Paratransit services, and they
cannot be reduced due to a
negotiated settlement of a class action lawsuit.
Such cost considerations are
significant and merit considerable weight. It
would not advance the Union‘s
goals to grant bargaining unit members a
large wage increase, only to
trigger employee layoffs due to a lack of
resources.
An Employer’s duty is to treat its
represented employees fairly
and in the spirit of their
long bargaining history. At the same time,
management has an obligation
to respond to needs of the public by finding
ways to operate the
organization with reduced revenue. Moreover, it is not
consistent with the interest
arbitration process for a panel of arbitrators to
impose on parties contractual
requirements they probably would never have
agreed to accept under any
circumstances. Nor is it the function of interest
arbitration to embark on new
ground which is not related to the bargaining
history of the parties. An
arbitration decision ought to be a natural
extension of where parties
found themselves at the point of impasse. An
interest arbitration award
ought to flow naturally from the unique
relationship parties have
nurtured in the years before they arrived in interest
arbitration. Any other approach
undermines the incentive of the parties to
engage in the collective
bargaining process.
In reviewing data of proposed comparable
organizations, it is
not prudent to compare
straight percentages. Each of the organizations has
a somewhat different wage
structure. Moreover, the
Coach Operators, maintenance
workers, mechanics and some clerical
employees. Comparable
jurisdictions have devised different ratios of pay
between these positions than
the one used by
The
entity among many for an
economic issue, when that comparable
organization is in a slightly
different type of economy than
Authority, fails to provide
the most insightful comparative guideline.
Additionally, the cost of
living in
higher than in
comparisons as well as public
employee comparisons within the
community to find an
appropriate solution to the dispute.
The Employer deals with other represented employees, and
wage increases granted to
other bargaining units point toward an
appropriate determination. All
increases for both bargaining units over the
course of their current
contracts are between 2.4% and 2.75%. The
average increase for these
employees during the relevant time period is
2.69%. The Union’s proposal is
closer to the increases of Spokane Transit
Authority’s other bargaining
units, but the average falls between the two
proposals.
With respect to noncontract
employees of the Employer,
management received 2% in
1999, 2% in 2000, and 2.5% in 2001. The
Union failed to discuss the
fact that it seeks retroactivity when it compares
management’s increases. What
the Union failed to explore is the fact that,
if management’s proposal were
to be awarded and made retroactive to the
effective date it would have
enjoyed if the initial bargaining had been
successful, bargaining unit
members would be within a half percent of
management’s pay increases
during that time. Management’s proposal
compares most favorably with noncontract Spokane Transit Authority pay
increases.
Guidance is also found in pay rates for local public
employees.
Various Spokane County
employees received 2% in 1998, 2% in 1999,
1.5% on January 1, 2000; and
1.5% on July 1; 2000. Spokane Correctional
Supervisors, Spokane County
Public Works Department, and Spokane
County Sheriffs support personnel
received the same pay increases. Those
increases averaged 2.33%.
Management's proposal is closer: although the
average falls between the two.
With regard to the effective dates of the increases, it
is
appropriate to make the
increases effective on October 1, 1999, October 1,
2000, and October 1, 2001.
These are the dates proposed by the Union as
well as one of the conflicting
proposals outlined by Spokane Transit
Authority. Members of the
bargaining unit should not be penalized by the
delay in reaching an
agreement. To do so would encourage dilatory
practices. Bargaining unit
members already have been penalized by being
without a pay increase for two
and a half years. It is reasonable for the
increases to be retroactive to
that time. No persuasive justification was put
forth for not making increases
retroactive to October 1, 1999. The
increases should have no
impact on employees who have retired since
October 1, 1998. Accordingly,
the effective dates of the increases will be
October 1, 1999, October 1,
2000, and October 1, 2001.
The amount of the increase still must be addressed. The
Employer proposed 2% a year,
and the Union sought 3% a year. While 2%
is almost exactly what
managerial employees have received during the
time
in question and is close to
other public employees in Spokane County, 2.4%
is a more precise amount and
is even closer to the wage increase for other
bargaining units with which
the Employer negotiates.
AWARD
Having carefully considered all evidence submitted by the
parties concerning this
matter, the arbitrators concludes that the Employer
shall grant pay increases on
October 1, 1999, October 1, 2000, and October
1 2001 in the amount of 2.4%
each year. It is so ordered and awarded.
Respectfully
submitted,
__________________________
Carlton
J. Snow
Professor
of Law
Date: _____________________
__________________________
John
Leinen
Union
Designee
Date: _____________________
__________________________
Terry Novak
Employer
Designee
Date: _____________________
AWARD
Having carefully considered all evidence
submitted by the
parties concerning this
matter, the arbitrators concludes that the Employer
shall grant pay increases on
October 1, 1999, October 1, 2000, and October
1, 2001 in the amount of 2.4%
each year. It is so ordered and awarded.
Respectfully
submitted,
__________________________
Carlton J. Snow
Professor of Law
Date: _____________________
__________________________
John Leinen
Union Designee
Date: _____________________
__________________________
Terry
Novak
Employer
Designee
Date: _____________________
VI. DURATION OF THE CONTRACT
A. Introduction
The parties are in dispute with regard to the
length of the
contract. All prior contracts
between the parties have been for a term of
three years.
B. Position
of the Parties
1. The
Employer
The Employer asked both for a three year
contract term
beginning on October 1, 1999
as well as for a three year term beginning on
the first of the month
following the effective date of the arbitration decision.
In a letter dated December 14,
2000, the Employer sought the “first of the
month following the
arbitration award” as the term of the contract. (See
Exhibit No. 1.9, Item 9.) At
the arbitration hearing, the Employer sought
the same resolution. (See Tr. 82.) In its post-hearing
brief, however, the
Employer asked for an
effective date of October 1,1999. (See
Employer’s
Post-hearing Brief, p. 11.) No
doubt, a degree of ambiguity arose as a result
of discussing both contract
duration as well as the effective dates for wage
increases.
2. The
Union
The Union seeks a three year term for the
parties’ agreement,
with monetary issues
retroactive to October 1, 1999. The Union never
stated explicitly when the
agreement should become effective apart from the
matter of retroactivity for
monetary issues. If the Union is seeking a three
year contract term starting at
the date of the arbitration decision as well as
retroactivity for wage
increases to October 1, 1999, what, in effect, is
being sought is a six year
agreement with regard to wage increases.
C. What
the Evidence Supports
As indicated earlier, wage increases will be effective
on
October I, 1999, October 1,
2000, and October 1; 2001. It is highly
inefficient to have the
contract expire in October, 2001 or even in
September of 2002, for that
matter. All the effort of the parties would have
produced a contract that lasted
only six months or, at most, one and a half
years. It is more sensible for
the contract to extend to three years from the
date of the arbitration
decision, while making wage increases retroactive to
October of 1999. The dilemma
is that such an approach leaves unresolved
wage increases during ensuing
years of the parties’ agreement. All work
rule changes proposed by the
parties obviously cannot be made retroactive.
One solution is to provide a reopener provision, and it seems a sensible
resolution in this case.
AWARD
Having carefully considered all evidence
submitted by the
parties concerning this
matter, the arbitrators concludes that the following
provision shall become a part
of the next agreement between the parties:
Duration, Termination and Renewal
A. The
term of this agreement shall be through the
close of September 30, 2004.
Since, however, wages have not
been set in the agreement
beyond October 1, 2001, either party
may reopen the agreement no
earlier than August 1, 2002 and
no later than August 15, 2002
to negotiate wage increases for
the duration of the agreement
plus any two additional contract
articles either party desires
to reopen.
B. For
the overall contract between the parties,
negotiations on proposed
changes to terms of this collective
bargaining agreement shalI begin not later than fifteen (15) days
prior to the expiration date
of any subsequent yearly period.
Should terms of this agreement
expire while ongoing contract
negotiations are taking place,
no changes in terms of this
agreement will be implemented
until and unless an impasse has
been declared by the parties.
Signature Page: Duration Award
Respectfully
submitted,
_________________________
Carlton
J. Snow
Professor
of Law
Date:
_____________________
__________________________
John
Leinen
Union
Designee
Date: _____________________
__________________________
Terry Novak
Employer Designee
Date: _____________________
Signature Page: Duration Award
Respectfully
submitted,
___________________________
Carlton
J. Snow
Professor
of Law
Date: ______________________
___________________________
John Leinen
Union Designee
Date: ______________________
___________________________
Terry Novak
Employer Designee
Date: ______________________
VII. COST OF UNION ACTIVITIES
A. Introduction
The parties are in disagreement with regard to costs
related to
the administration of the
collective bargaining agreement. The current
agreement between the parties
caps the number of hours union members
may perform contract
administration during regular work time. The
number of hours depends on an
employee’s position in the Union. Spokane
Transit Authority pays an
employee’s wages for time spent on contract
administration, and the Union
reimburses the Employer for the employee’s
wages plus 25%. The purpose of
this provision was to enable union
officers to continue receiving
retirement contributions and other benefits for
the time they performed union
duties. If the Union paid employee wages
outright, these Union
officials would not receive benefits for the time they
spent on contract
administration. The extra 25% above wages that the
Union reimbursed the Employer
was designed to cover costs to the
Employer of providing
benefits.
B. Position
of the Parties
1. The
Employer.
The Employer proposed to eliminate the limit
on the number of
hours a Union officer could
devote to union work during his or her regular
schedule. Likewise, management
proposed to eliminate any subsidy by the
Employer for time spent on
union duties. Such duties have more than
doubled since 1986. The
Employer also maintains that the 25% over an
employee’s wages that the
Union currently reimburses the Employer is
completely inadequate. The
actual cost of benefits is roughly 55% of an
employee’s wages. Thus, the
Employer maintains that increased union time
has undermined the Employer’s
productivity by taking employees from their
regular work. As the Employer
sees it, the increasing cost of benefits has
created a subsidy for the
Union by enabling it to pay less for an employee’s
time than the Employer must
pay. Recognizing that Union officials need
sufficient time to conduct
contract administration, the Employer proposed
removing any limitation on
hours while also discontinuing any subsidization
of any such activities.
Spokane Transit Authority maintains that comparability
data
support its proposal. For
example, Pierce Transit in Tacoma and Pierce
County, Washington gives
management the option of granting paid leave for
union work, but the Union
fully reimburses Pierce Transit for the time.
Community Transit in Snohomish
County, Washington offers employees
paid time off only for
contract negotiations, and the Union fully reimburses
Community Transit for the
time.
2. TheUnion
The Union argued against the Employer’s proposal on the
theory that, if implemented,
it would compel union officials to perform
contract administration after
working hours. It is the belief of the Union
that permitting employees to
complete such duties during the work day is a
benefit to both employees and
the Employer. If management were
compelled to meet with union
officials in order to conduct contract
administration on weekends and
evenings, it would undermine their
efficiency as well by
eliminating much free time in their personal schedule.
It is the belief of the Union
that the Employer’s proposal removes necessaty
flexibility in the system. According
to the Union, the cost of the proposal is
only approximately $14,000 a
year; and management seeks to eliminate a
program with a long history
dating back to at least 1986.
C. What
the Evidence Supports
Interest Arbitration is essentially a conservative
process where
innovative procedures
unrelated to the parties’ bargaining relationship
generally are not adopted.
Changes in this forum are generally linked to
proof of problems. In this
instance, the Employer failed to demonstrate a
sufficiently significant
problem to change a long-standing system. The
Union established that the
current system had worked well and had
benefited the parties for many
years. If Union officials no longer received
retirement and medical
benefits for contract administration, it is reasonable
to believe that they would use
personal time to perform the work. It is far
more important for the parties
to find a mutually agreeable compromise
using traditional methods of
negotiation. Without more of a showing that
the current program is
unworkable and has been the cause of documented
problems, the Employer’s
proposal should not become a part of the next
agreement between the parties.
AWARD
Having carefully considered all evidence
submitted by the
parties concerning this matter,
the arbitrators conclude that the proposal for
changing time off and
compensation for union officials must be denied. It
is so ordered and awarded.
Respectfully
submitted,
_____________________
Carlton J. Snow
Professor of Law
Date: ________________
_____________________
John Leinen
Union Designee
Date: ________________
_____________________
Terry Novak
Employer Designee
Date: ________________
AWARD
Having carefully considered all evidence submitted
by the
parties concerning this
matter, the arbitrators conclude that the proposal for
changing time off and
compensation for union officials must be denied. It
is so ordered and awarded.
Respectfully
submitted,
______________________
Carlton J. Snow
Professor of Law
Date: _________________
______________________
John Leinen
Union Designee
Date: _________________
______________________
Terry Novak
Employer Designee
Date: _________________
VIII. THE ISSUE OF OVERTIME
A. Introduction
Coach Operators and shop employees currently
receive
overtime when they exceed
eight hours of work in a day. Clerical Workers,
also represented by this
Union, receive overtime when they exceed 40 hours
in a week.
B. Position
of the Parties
1. The
Employer
Management consistently has brought this proposal to the
bargaining table in
negotiations for the last several collective bargaining
agreements. The Employer
proposes that Coach Operators move from a
system of receiving overtime
pay after working eight hours in one day to a
system of receiving overtime
pay after working 40 hours in one week.
Spokane Transit Authority's
reason for proposing the change is to reduce
absenteeism. The parties
agreed that the issue has little monetary
significance.
The Employer wants to encourage Coach
Operators to work all
five days in a week by
changing the system so that, if an employee has
worked more than eight hours
in one or more days already in the week, the
employee will lose the
overtime pay if he or she fails to come to work on
the last day of the week and
thus, does not work over 40 hours. If a week
includes a paid holiday or an
employee’s vacation time, it will count toward
worked time when calculating
overtime hours worked. The Employer
urges that this change is one
of fairness to employees who regularly attend-
work five days a week.
The type of work done by Coach Operators does
not fit neatly into
eight hour increments. Thus,
many operators work regular schedules that
involve some overtime.
Furthermore, if operators receive overtime after 40
hours of work, more flexible
operator schedules would be possible, such as
working four ten-hour days.
Focusing on other employees of Spokane
Transit Authority; AFSCME
Local 3939 agreed to an over 40 hours system
in 2000. Since then, overtime
in that employee group has been reduced by
20%. (See Tr. 215.) In 1993; Local 1015 agreed to a 40 hour system for
clerical employees. Management
argues that, if the system works for
clerical workers, the same
union ought to agree to it for Coach Operators.
“Among Washington properties,
the only properties that strictly pay
overtime after eight hours are
Spokane Transit Authority and Whatcom
Transportation Authority.” (See Employer’s Posthearing
Brief, 50.) Both
Pierce Transit of Tacoma and
Pierce County as well as Intercity Transit of
Olympia, Washington offer
overtime after 40 hours.
2. The
Union
The Union argues that the current system has
been in place for
one and a half decades. While
conceding that the nature of
the work in question does not
always allow for eight hour shifts, the Union
maintains that it is a
managerial prerogative of the Employer to set work
schedules so that overtime is
minimized. If the Employer concedes that the
issue is really about
attendance and not about money, then the Employer,
according to the Union, ought
to be focused on the attendance policy. At
the same time, the Union is
quick to respond that absenteeism is not really a
problem in this bargaining
unit. It is the belief of the Union that the
Employer seeks to obtain in
interest arbitration what it has been unable to
obtain at the bargaining table
but that management has failed to carry its
burden of showing that the
current overtime system constitutes a significant
problem.
The Union concedes that, in 1993, it approved
a change in
overtime for clerical
employees it represents. They now receive overtime
after 40 hours in a week. The
Union rejects any suggestion that its
approach to this issue is
discriminatory. In fact, the Union asserts that it
approved the change for
clerical employees at the request of those
employees. It was a
bargained-for change in which clerical employees
received something in return
for agreeing to the change.
C. What
the Evidence Supports
The Employer’s proposal has a fiscal impact,
but the problem
to be solved by the proposal
is mainly an attendance issue. In other words,
the Employer proposed an
overtime pay solution in an effort to solve what it
views as an attendance problem.
The internal point of comparison is an
important source of guidance
with regard to this issue.
Of all internal comparability data, the most
important comes
from maintenance workers. They
receive overtime after eight hours of
work, and management did not
propose a change for them. CIerical
workers chose to move to a 40
hour overtime system. They are not as
useful a source of
comparability because of inherent differences in the work
they perform and because of
structural differences in work hours required
of Coach Operators compared
with clerical positions. Management argued
that granting its proposal
would allow for more scheduling flexibility by
allowing management to
schedule work weeks of four ten-hour days. This
type of work schedule is one
that can be bargained into existence by the -
parties. An arbitration award
ought to flow naturally from the point where
the parties found themselves
when negotiating face to face. Implementing
the Employer’s proposal would
take the parties well beyond that point.
In support of its proposal that operators
work forty hours in an
assigned workweek before
receiving overtime, the Employer pointed to
Community Transit, Everett
Transit, and King County Metro as
organizations “that pay
overtime after eight hours on a five-day-per-week
schedule and 10 hours on a
four-days-per-week schedule.” (See
Employer‘s Posthearing
Brief, 50.) What, however, the Employer pointed
to as a comparable system was
one not like what the Employer is
proposing. If the Employer had
proposed the Comunity Transit, Everett
Transit, King County Metro
system, it might have produced an agreement
on this issue at the
bargaining table. If a 4/10 work schedule is to be
implemented, it is a
sufficiently unique change in the organization of work
by the parties that it ought
to be brought into existence at the bargaining
table and not through interest
arbitration.
AWARD
Having carefully considered all evidence
submitted by the
parties conceming
the issue of overtime, the arbitrators conclude that the
Employer’s proposal must be
denied. It is so ordered and awarded.
Respectfully submitted,
_______________________
Carlton J. Snow
Professor of Law
Date: __________________
_______________________
John
Leinen
Union
Designee
Date: __________________
_______________________
Terry Novak
Employer Designee
Date: __________________
IX. LOSS OF COMMERCIAL DRIVER'S LICENSE
A.
Introduction
As it currently stands, the Employer must
create a position for
an operator if he or she loses
the Commercial Driver’s License and must
provide the Coach Operator
with modified duties until the license is
restored. The Employer need
only provide one such position at a time. A
Coach Operator is required by
law to have a Commercial Driver’s License
to perform duties of the
position.
B. Position
of the Parties
1.
The Employer
The Employer wants to remove
the current provision from the
parties’ collective bargaining
agreement. Since the program never has been
used, the Employer argues that
it is unnecessary. The only way a Coach
Operator could lose his or her
Commercial Driver’s License is through a
violation of law and not
through improperly performing duties of the job.
The Employer argued that it no
longer desires to be responsible for
subsidizing a bargaining unit
member’s illegal activities. No other bargaining
unit enjoys its benefit, and
no comparable organization on which either
party relies it as a benefit.
2. The
Union
The Union argues that the effect on the
Employer, if the benefit
were used, would be slight.
The parties’ agreement has required the
Employer to create only one
such modified position. Moreover, the
Employer has never been
inconvenienced by the program due to its lack of
use.
C. What
the Evidence Supports
Interest arbitration is not typically a place
of innovation. The
presumption is that a party in
interest arbitration who seeks a change needs
to carry the burden of proving
a substantial need for the change. Parties to
this particular bargaining
relationship in good faith have agreed in the past
on a method of doing business
with regard to what happens if a Coach
Operator should lose his or
her Commercial Driver’s License. That prior
agreement merits strong
consideration. To do otherwise invites damage to
the negotiation process. A
party seeking a change in interest arbitration has
considerable burden of demonstratrating a compelling reason for the
arbitration panel to deviate
from established procedures on which the parties
previousIy
agreed. Absent a compelling need, interest arbitrators ought to
be cautious about removing
benefits previously secured through negotiation.
Numerous arbitrators have used
this “compelling need” standard as a
means of testing proposed
changes in the status quo. (See, e.g, City of
Blaine,
90 LA 549, 552 (1988); Williamson Central School District, 63 LA
1087, 1090 (1974); and Adam County Highway Department, 91 LA
1340,
1342 (1988).)
The Employer proposed cancellation of the CDL
benefits. It
was management‘s burden to
justify the proposed change. The benefit has
never been used. Accordingly,
management was unable to establish any
problem with it. The proposal
must be denied.
AWARD
Having carefully considered all evidence
submitted by the
parties concerning this
matter, the arbitrators conclude that the Employer’s
proposal with regard to loss
of a Commercial Driver’s License must be
denied. It is so ordered and awarded.
Respectfully
submitted,
________________________
Carlton J. Snow
Professor of Law
Date: ___________________
________________________
John Leinen
Union Designee
Date: ___________________
________________________
Terry Novak
Employer Designee
Date: ___________________
AWARD
Having carefully considered all evidence
submitted by the
parties concerning this
matter, the arbitrators conclude that the Employer’s
proposal with regard to loss
of a Commercial Driver’s License must be
denied. It is so ordered and
awarded.
Respectfully submitted,
_________________________
Carlton J. Snow
Professor of Law
Date: ____________________
_________________________
John Leinen
Union Designee
Date: ____________________
_________________________
Terry Novak
Employer Designee
Date:
____________________
X. THE ISSUE OF BIDDING ON TEMPORARY RUNS
A. Introduction
As it currently stands, when a Coach Operator
is absent from
work for a period of over two
weeks, the run is designated as a “temporary
run.” The Employer need not
create more than ten temporary runs at one
time. To fill temporary runs,
operators bid on them according to straight
seniority. An operator with
the highest seniority has an opportunity to bid
the run being vacated. If this
most senior operator chooses not to submit a
bid, the opportunity moves
down the seniority list. When an operator
successfully bids a temporary
run, the operator’s regular in turn,
becomes a temporary run,
unless there are already ten runs in the bid
process. The Employer
sometimes creates more than ten temporary runs in
order to fill each run. If a
temporary run is not filled through the bidding
process, it moves to the Extra
Board. If the regular operator of a temporary
run returns to work earlier
than expected, the regular operator may resume
the run on the first of the
week, provided that the regular operator gave the
Employer notice by the
previous Wednesday. If the operator gave notice
after the previous Wednesday,
then the regular operator works the Extra
Board until the following
week.
B. Position
of the Parties
1. The
Employer
The Employer proposes to remove the
contractual requirement
for bidding on temporary runs
by seniority. Spokane Transit
Authority would like to place
all temporary runs directly on the Extra Board
as is the current process for
runs vacant for less than two weeks. In the
view of the Employer, such a
procedure would increase the efficiency and
effectiveness of the work
force. When an operator with high seniority
vacates a temporary run, it
creates a domino effect. An operator with
relatively high seniority
would be able to bid the vacant run. The successful
bidder, then, leaves a run,
and it must become a temporary run and go
through the bidding process
the same way. The result can be the bidding of
many temporary runs based on
only one operator's absence. The process
requires a considerable amount
of supervisory time which could be more
efficiently used on other
projects.
The Employer also argues that removing this
contractual
provision would reduce
absenteeism. Currently, if an operator wants to
return to work earlier than
expected, he or she must notify the Employer by
the previous Wednesday in
order to resume regular runs at the first of the
week. If operators do not know
that they will be returning by Wednesday
but still return the following
Monday, they must work the Extra Board for
that week and resume regular
runs the following week. If this requirement
were removed from the parties’
agreement and all vacant runs were moved
to the Extra Board, regular
operators could return to their regular runs
whenever they returned with
less notice. Thus, operators would not be
tempted to stay out of work
the full time of their planned absence, even if
they were able to return early.
Otherwise, they might do so in order to
avoid a week of working the
Extra Board.
The Employer argues that removing the
“temporary run”
bidding requirement would also
improve the quality of work on the Extra
Board. If all vacant runs went
to the Extra Board, operators on the Extra
Board occasionally would have
an opportunity to work better pieces of
work. As it currently stands,
Extra Board operators are able to bid regular
runs ifthey
have sufficient seniority. Successfully bidding on a temporary
m might change an Extra Board
operator‘s scheduled days off. The
Employer, then, would need to
create additional temporary runs to
encourage other Extra Board
operators to change their days off to insure
coverage every day. The
Employer maintains that the process is inefficient
and operationally unnecessary.
If temporary runs moved directly to the
Extra Board, they could be
assigned in a way to minimize confusion and
work shifting, in the view of
the Employer.
2. The
Union
The Union argues that the current system has
been in place
since before Spokane Transit
Authority itself came into existence. In the
view of the Union, the
existing system is not broken and therefore, should
not be “fixed" by the
arbitration panel. The current system is one of the
benefits of seniority. Every
benefit that comes with seniority allegedly
benefits the Employer by
encouraging employees to remain with the
Employer for a longer period
of time. The main concern of the Union with
regard to this proposal is
rooted in the issue of seniority and having a
benefit removed that senior
employees rely on and from which they benefit.
Moreover, the Union argues
that it has been highly flexible in working with
the Employer with regard to
implementing the existing system. When a run
is to be vacant for only three
or four weeks, the Union frequently waives
the need to have it hid as a
temporary run and allows it to move straight to
the Extra Board. The Employer
allegedly never has complained to the Union
about its need for greater
flexibility with regard to this issue. (See
Tr. 291.)
C. What
the Evidence Supports
The
existing program has constituted a method of organizing
work throughout the duration
of the relationship between the parties. The
requirement covers only ten
runs at a time, and any additional runs are
created at the Employer’s
option. The program clearly creates a significant
benefit for more senior
employees. There was no rebuttal to the contention
that the Union has shown
itself to be highly flexible and reasonable in
working with management to
minimize any disruptions the program might
cause. Management has not
previously complained to the Union about
alleged inefficiencies with
regard to the program. The program is an
important aspect of prior
bargains between the parties. It should not be
changed in interest
arbitration without a substantial showing of hardship on
the part of the Employer No
such burden has been carried in this case.
AWARD
Having carefully considered all evidence
submitted by the
parties concerning this
matter, the arbitrators conclude that the Employer's
proposal with regard to
bidding on temporary runs should not become a
part of the next agreement
between the parties. It is so ordered and
awarded.
Respectfully
submitted,
________________________
Carlton J. Snow
Professor of Law
Date: ___________________
________________________
John
Leinen
Union
Designee
Date: ____________________
_________________________
Terry Novak
Employer Designee
Date: ____________________
AWARD
Having carefully considered all evidence
submitted by the
parties concerning this
matter, the arbitrators conclude that the Employer’s
proposal with regard to
bidding on temporary runs should not become a
part of the next agreement
between the parties. It is so ordered and
awarded.
Respectfully
submitted,
_________________________
Carlton J. Snow
Professor of Law
Date:
____________________
_________________________
John Leinen
Union Designee
Date: ____________________
_________________________
Terry Novak
Employer Designee
Date: ____________________
XI. THE
ISSUE OF LATE REPORTS AND MISS OUTS
A. Introduction
A “Late Report” is a failure to report in
person to the dispatcher
by the time an employee‘s
assigned duties are scheduled to start by no later
than 60 minutes thereafter. A
“Miss Out” is a failure of any Coach
Operator to report in person
to the dispatcher by 61 minutes past the time
his or her assigned duties are
scheduled to start. (See Art.
15, 1996-99
Contract, p. 40-41.) Two Late
Reports are the equivalent of one Miss Out.
If an operator has a Late
Report, the employee is allowed to join his or her
regular run at the next available
relief point. The parties’ agreement
contains special rules
regarding when Extra Board operators have Late
Reports.
If an operator has a Miss Out, the operator
loses the run and
pay for the day. In the past,
missing the run and pay were the only
penalties for a Miss Out.
Currently, if an employee has six Miss Outs in a
rolling 12-month period, the
individual is subject to dismissal without
cause. The system of Late
Reports and Miss Outs currently used by the
parties is separate &om the attendance policy covering employees. A 1986
arbitration decision validated
this separation.
B. Position
of the Parties
1. The
Employer
The Employer proposes to reduce the threshold
number at
which an employee would be
subject to termination. It currently is six in a
rolling 12-month period, and
the Employer would reduce it to two in the
same period of time. In the
Employer’s view, the current Miss Out and
Late Reports system provides
unworkable rules. The system gives
employees the ability to fail
to show up for work and fail to call the
Employer five times in 12
months without imposing any consequences and
without permitting such
conduct to be the basis of discipline through the
attendance policy. EmpIoyees also could arrive at work up to 59 minutes
late eleven times in a year
without consequences.
From the Employer’s perspective, the problem
is that a handfd
of employees take advantage of
the system. They have the equivalent of an
extra week of vacation each
year because of Miss Outs. Both management
and union workers have been
known to refer to Miss Outs as “fishing
days.” Contrary to what the
Union asserts, the Employer maintains there is
no great chance that an
employee will lose his or her job without just cause.
To avoid the risk of dismissal
under the Miss Out or Late Report systems,
employees need only call to
report that they will be late or not at work that
day. These employees, then,
would enter the regular attendance program
and would go through
progressive discipline, if necessary. A system
allowing employees to miss
work without sanctions and without notifying
management of impending
absences is a system designed to undermine the
efficiency of an organization.
No other employees of Spokane Transit
Authority enjoy such a loose
system. The only other comparable
jurisdiction with a Miss Out
system is Ben Franklin Transit of Tri-Cities,
Washington, and even their
system provides for a potential termination after
two Miss Outs or five Late
Reports.
2. The
Union
The Union argues that the Employer again is
attempting to fix a
problem that does not exist.
Few employees allegedly use the Miss Out and
Late Report systems. The
Union’s main concern with the low threshold
proposed by management is that
employees who violate the Miss Out and
Late Report systems are
subject to discipline without just cause, as the
Union sees it. Thus, if an
employee experienced an emergency that
prevented his or her calling
or coming to work within an hour of the
scheduled time to report and
did so twice in a year or were even one minute
late for reporting to work
four times a year, the individual could be
discharged; and the Union
argued that it would have no recourse to a
grievance because there is no
contractual requirement that an individual be
discharged for under such circumstances.
Because of such
draconian consequences, the
Union urged that the Employer's proposal be
rejected.
C. What
the Evidence Supports
The Union emphasized at the arbitration
hearing the dire
consequences of adopting such
a proposal. Although the Union listed many
circumstances that might
result in dismissal without just cause or recourse
to the grievance procedure,
such conclusions were hypothetical and
speculative. The arbitration
panel received no data with regard to how
many employees might have been
fired to this point in time if the proposed
system previously had been
used. The objective fact is that in other
comparable work places,
employees are not permitted so much missed
work without even telephone
calls and without incurring some sort of
potential sanction. Abusers of
the existing system seem to be using Miss
Outs to avoid reasonable
consequences under the attendance policy.
Hypothetical situations
described by then Union involved emergencies where
an employee simply was unable
to reach a telephone before his or her report
time.
The fact that the problem described by the
Employer involved a
relatively small number of
employees does not undermine the reasonableness
of the proposal. It continues
to be a notable problem that merits a solution.
If the Union remains strongly
opposed to the modified Miss Out and Late
Report systems, it will be
possible to negotiate this system into the current
attendance policy. Such an
adjustment, of course, would overcome the
Union’s concern that the system
is outside just cause protection.
AWARD
Having carefully considered all evidence
submitted by the
parties concerning this
matter, the arbitrators conclude that the Employer’s
proposal regarding Late
Reports and Miss Outs shall become a part of the
next ageement
between the parties and shall be subsumed under the just ,
cause provision in the
collective bargaining agreement. It is so ordered and
awarded.
Respectfully
submitted
________________________
Carlton
J. Snow
Professor of Law
Date: ___________________
________________________
John Leinen
Union Designee
Date: ___________________
________________________
Terry Novak
Employer Designee
Date: ___________________
AWARD
Having carefully considered all evidence
submitted by the
parties concerning this
matter, the arbitrators conclude that the Employer’s
proposal regarding Late
Reports and Miss Outs shall become a part of the
next ageement
between the parties and shall be subsumed under the just
cause provision in the
collective bargaining agreement. It is so ordered and
awarded.
Respectfully
submitted,
__________________________
Carlton
J. Snow
Professor
of Law
Date: _____________________
__________________________
John Leinen
Union Designee
Date: _____________________
__________________________
Terry Novak
Employer Designee
Date: _____________________
XII. THE
ISSUE OF RESTRICTIONS ON PART-TIMERS
A.
Introduction
The current agreement between the parties
limits part-time
employees to a schedule of no
more than 27.5 hours a week. Article XV(5)
contains many other
limitations on part-time employees. The number of
part-time employees allowed at
any time is 15% of the work force, plus
seven. Part-time employees may
only work 5.5 hours a day and are
guaranteed two hours of pay
for each pull out, even if they do not perform
their duties for the full two
hours. They may work trippers, except
weekends and week days between
1:45 p.m. and 8:OO p.m. “Trippers” are
“extra service provided during
the a.m. and p.m. peak hours on any and all
routes to assist regular
scheduled coaches.” (See
1996-99 Agreement, art.
XV(5)(L)( 1). It is important
to note that Spokane Transit employees
regularly use the word
“tripper” to define short pieces of work in general.
Contract restrictions on
part-time employees use the contract definition of
"tripper.”
B. Position
of the Parties
I . The
Employer
The Employer proposes to remove all
restrictions on the use of
part-time employees except a
requirement that they work only a maximum
of 27 hours a week and a
requirement that the number of part-time
employees not exceed 15% of
the full-time work force plus seven. It is the
belief of the Employer that
additional rules have become too cumbersome
and unworkable due to changes
made after implementation of the
Comprehensive Operational
Analysis. The original purpose of the system
was to let part-time operators
run trippers. They were also allowed to work
any evening and weekend
shifts.
A result of the Comprehensive Operational
Analysis was the
elimination of “trippers,” as
defined in the parties’ agreement. In an effort
to better serve the community,
the Employer eliminated extra, nonscheduled
uses during peak time and,
instead, increased the number and frequency of
regularly scheduled runs.
Thus, part-time workers are no longer able to
help alleviate peak time
loads, in spite of the fact that allowing part-time
workers to help at those times
was the reason for incorporating the current
limitation into the parties’
agreement. As the Employer sees it, the purpose
of allowing part-time workers
to run trippers has been frustrated by giving
increased peak runs the name
of “regular service,” instead of “tripper.” The
Employer contends that the
parties‘ agreement should be adjusted to reflect
this change and to maintain
the spirit of the provision. The Union
consistently has been willing
to waive morning limitations and to let part-
time employees work some
morning runs. It is the belief of the Employer
at the Union’s current refusal
to accept this proposal is inconsistent with
such frequent waivers.
Removing current restrictions from the
parties’ agreement
would also benefit fulI-time employees without taking any work from them,
in the opinion of the
Employer. Because management still could work part-
time employees only 27.5 hours
a week, the Employer could not treat part-
time workers as full-timers.
Removing the restriction would result in a
more efficient use of
part-time employees, thus, heiping to reduce spread
time in full-time runs.
Full-time runs are sometimes manipulated to work
around part-time restrictions.
The Employer also contends that removing
the restrictions would not
reduce the quality of full-time work because
management is still required
to maximize straight runs, make all night runs
straight time, and offer
overtime to employees according to seniority. (See
Employer’s Post-hearing Brief,
p. 59.) Part-time operators would also
benefit by having more work,
gaining more experience, and having a greater
opportunity to advance on the
job ladder. The Employer contends that its
proposal would reduce
operating costs by reducing overtime.
2. The
Union
The Union contends that Spokane Transit
Authority’s unstated
purpose behind its proposal is
to gain the contractual right to use part-time
employees the same way
management uses full-time employees, without,
however, any requirement of
paying full-time benefits. “The STA is
apparently attempting to
convert part-time operators into potential full-time
operators without having to
pay certain benefits.” (See
Union’s Post-
hearing Brief, p. 46.) If the
Employer was able to remove the requirement
that part-time employees be
paid for a minimum of two hours for each pull
out, then management could
schedule part-time workers for abnormally
short shifts, in the view of
the Union. Such scheduling would be
unreasonably disruptive to
part-time employees. The Union contends that
management has not put forth
any good reason for needing to make
changes in the provision which
the parties previously bargained into their
agreement.
C. What
the Evidence Shows
No empirical evidence’validated
benefits the Employer expected
to reap from its proposal. The
expected benefits of the proposal are
speculative. When Mr. Don
Reimer, Transportation Manager for the Fixed
Route Division, testified
regarding the proposal, he failed to be persuasive
about the fact that expected
benefits from the proposal would materialize.
He stated:
QUESTION: So
what’s the benefit to the employer if you
eliminate the
restrictions on what you can use
part-timers for?
ANSWER: For
right now, there’s (sic) a lot of restrictions
that are not, that we’re
not being held to. If we
were ever, we would have less
opportunity to
work these people. There would
just be more
flexibility with our proposal
to utilize these
people to possibly be more
efficient, to reduce
possibly overtime through
utilizing them more.
Possibly to reduce spread
time. There could be
some benefits here that we’re
not even able to
look at or investigate because
of the restrictions.
(See Tr. 179, emphasis added.)
As the testimony highlighted, the Employer
failed to establish
the existence of a problem to
be resolved. Management speculated about
what would happen if the Union
stopped cooperating with the Employer in
ways that allow managers to
work part-time workers in a certain way, but
the Union has not proposed to
discontinue its cooperation. The Employer
hinted that, since the Union
frequently waived the provision, rights under
them have been lost. The Union, of course, has the right expressly
to waive
contractual rights without
absolutely losing the benefits of those rights.
No
persuasive data submitted to
the panel of arbitrators described the existence
of any sort of substantial
problem with regard to this issue.
AWARD
Having carefully considered all evidence
submitted by the
parties concerning this
matter, the arbitrators conclude that the Employer's
proposal on restrictions for
part-timers must be denied. It is so ordered and
awarded.
Respectfully
submitted,
_______________________
Carlton J. Snow
Professor of Law
Date: __________________
_______________________
John Leinen
Union Designee
Date: __________________
_______________________
Terry Novak
Employer Designee
Date: _________________
AWARD
Having carefully considered all evidence
submitted by the
parties concerning this
matter, the arbitrators conclude that the Employer's
proposal on restrictions for
part-timers must be denied. It is so ordered and
awarded.
Respectfully
submitted,
_______________________
Carlton J. Snow
Professor of Law
Date: __________________
_______________________
John Leinen
Union Designee
Date: __________________
_______________________
Terry Novak
Employer Designee
Date: __________________
XIII. THE ISSUE OF WAGE PARITY
A. Introduction
Currently, bargaining unit members who work
as Customer
Service Representatives are
paid the 1999 rate of $9.06 an hour. The
Paratransit
Division has employees with the job titles of Telephone Operator
and Reservationist.
These employees are represented by AFSCME Local
3939. Reservationists are paid
the 1999 rate of $12.33 an hour. Telephone
Operators receive less per
hour than do Customer Service Representatives.
In its list of issues to be submitted to
arbitration, the Union
proposed that Customer Service
Representatives receive a “wage equal [to]
that of Paratransit
Telephone Operators.” (See
Exhibit No. 1.8.) At the
arbitration hearing, the Union
clarified its position by stating that it proposes
the same wage for Customer
Service Representatives as that paid to
Reservationists. Some
confusion was caused by the fact that the former
name for Reservationists was
Telephone Operator. The Union argues that
the Employer understood the
intent of the Union’s proposal because
management prepared Exhibit
6.2.1, which compares Customer Service
Representative wage rates with
those of Receptionists. The Union included
job descriptions for each
position in Exhibit 6.2.3.
B. Position of the Parties
1. The
Union
The Union argues that no other ATU Local
1015 bargaining unit
members are paid less than
Customer Service Representatives, although
Data Technicians receive the
same wage. It is the contention of the Union
that jobs of Customer Service
Representatives and Reservationists are
sufficiently similar that they
merit equal pay. It is the belief of the Union
that the current system of
unequal pay for equal work breeds disharmony
within the work force. Mr.
Lonny Olson, a current Customer Service
Representative, also asserted
in his testimony that positions of Customer
Service Representative and
Reservationists are simiIar. Before he began
working as a Customer Service
Representative, Mr. Olson was a scheduler
for the Paratransit
Division; and he testified that, based on his work
experience, he knew the duties
of the two positions to be reasonably similar.
Pierce County Transit, a comparable
jurisdiction with which
both parties are in agreement
has three levels of Customer Service
Representatives. Their wages
as of January 1, 2000 are $14.42, $15.29,
and $16.62 an hour. The Union,
accordingly, believes its proposal is
eminently reasonable.
2. The
Employer
It is the position of the Employer that the
Union is not clear
about the nature of its
proposal. There was ambiguity in Mr.
Olson's
testimony with respect to
whether he testified about what formerly was called
a Telephone Operator and is
now called a Reservationist or whether he
described what is now called a
Telephone Operator. It is the belief of
the Employer that the Union
attempted to gain special sympathy for
Customer Service
Representatives as some of the lowest paid members of
the bargaining unit. In fact, the Employer contends that Data
Technicians
receive the same wage as
Customer Service Representatives and that the
Union has not sought an
increase for Data Technicians beyond the yearly
percentage. The Employer also argues that other positions
in the Paratransit
Division receive a lower wage
than Reservationists and that this
is another point of difference
between Reservationists and Customer
Service Representatives.
It is the belief of the Employer that the
Union failed to establish
the similarily
of the two positions with sufficient precision to warrant equal wages.
Mr. Olson's testimony revealed
that he had not worked with nor visited
Reservationists in the Paratransit Division for over nine years. (See
Tr. 352.)
It is the belief of the
Employer that he did not qualify to testify about the nature
of duties currently performed
by Reservationiist.
As the Employer views
it, Mr. Olson is not qualified to compare job
descriptions and to draw
conclusions from the
comparisons because such work is an area
requiring special skill and
training which Mr. Olson has not received.
In asking for the special wage
increase, the Union is seeking compensation
for Customer Service
Representatives above that received by Reservationists,
in the opinion of the
Employer.
The Employer contends that Reservationists
and Customer
Service Representatives are
not comparable for a number of reasons. First,
Reservationists must exercise
discretion in their job duties. Customer
Service Representatives do not
have similar requirements. Because the
Paratransit
Division provides rides to disabled customers, it is necessary to
comply with the ADA.
Additionally, the Paratransit Division also must
comply with a negotiated
settlement agreement that resolved a class action
lawsuit against Spokane
Transit Authority, a lawsuit that alleged violations
of the ADA. If Reservationists
fail to comply with the ADA when
scheduling rides, they could
expose the Employer to another lawsuit.
Moreover, the Employer
contends that comparing wages of only the two
positions does not constitute
a fair comparison. For example, Paratransit
employees do not receive
Social Security. Customer Service
Representatives receive not
only Social Security but also a retirement
benefit. A comparison of total
compensation packages of the two positions
shows distinctions between the
two.
The Employer also contends that wage
comparisons with
Customer Service
Representatives should be limited to Spokane County. In
Spokane County, the median
wage for a Receptionist or an Information
Clerk is $8.39. The wage for a
Customer Service Representative in
Spokane Transit Authority is
higher. As the Employer sees it, wages of
proposed comparable
organizations outside of eastern Washington should
not be taken into account.
First, the economy of Pierce County Transit, a
comparable entity the Union
would use, is influenced by its proximity to
Seattle and the higher cost of
living there. Second, although the Union listed
wages for Customer Service
Representatives in Pierce County Transit, it
included no job description.
It is imprudent, according to the Employer to
make comparisons of wages
without an understanding of relevant job
duties.
C. What
the Evidence Shows
It cannot be that the Union is asking for
parity with Paratransit
Telephone Operators since
their wages are lower than those of Customer
Service Representatives. Yet,
after addressing the issue in arbitration, the
Union suggested that it sought
equal wages to those provided Telephone
Operators. (See Union’s Post-hearing Brief p.
13.) The Union also
referenced Telephone Operators
when discussing the merits of the issue.
(See Union’s Post-hearing Brief, p. 29.) Although the arbitration
panel
received a description of Mr. Olson’s
job, there was no effective
comparison made with his job
and that of a Reservationist. (See Vol. 2,
Exhibit 2.) Using Pierce
Transit for Tacoma and Pierce Counties,
Washington, an organization
located in a major metropolitan area, as the sole
comparable entity failed to be
persuasive. There was no job description
from that organization.
Without more data and a more detailed comparison,
the proposal must be denied.
AWARD
Having carefully considered all evidence submitted by the
parties
concerning this matter, the
arbitrators concludes that the Union's proposal
with regard to wage parity
between Customer Service Representatives and
Paratransit
Reservationists shall not become a part of the next agreement
between the parties. It is so ordered and awarded.
Respectfully
submitted,
_____________________
Carlton J. Snow
Professor of Law
Date: ________________
_____________________
John Leinen
Union Designee
Date: ________________
_____________________
Terry Novak
Employer Designee
AWARD
Having carefully considered all evidence submitted by the
parties
concerning this matter, the
arbitrators concludes that the Union's proposal
with regard to wage parity
between Customer Service Representatives and
Paratransit
Reservationists shall not become a part of the next agreement
between the parties. It is so ordered and awarded.
Respectfully
submitted,
_____________________
Carlton J. Snow
Professor of Law
Date: ________________
Date: ________________
_____________________
John Leinen
Union Designee
Date: ________________
_____________________
Terry Novak
Employer Designee
XIV. SHIFT DIFFERENTIAL FOR MAINTENANCE WORKERS
A. Introduction
Currently, there is no shift
differential for employees working in
a shift.
B. Position
of the Parties
1. The
Union
The Union proposes that Maintenance Employees
receive a pay
differential of $.25 an hour
for swing shift and $.50 an hour for the
graveyard shift. Its reasoning is that a shift differential is
fair in view of the
fact that these shifts are
more difficult than the day shift.
Working later
hours significantly interferes
with personal and family life and may have an
impact on health of employees.
The Union believes that employees who
incur such risks and losses
should be rewarded. Pierce Transit, a
comparable entity on which the
parties agree, pays a $25 per hour
differential for swing shift
and a $S O per hour differential for the graveyard
shift.
2. The
Employer
The Employer argues that one of its
fundamental goals is to
maintain equal pay for equal
work in order to decrease opportunities for
employees to feel unfairly
treated. It is management’s view that this
proposal from the Union
expressly provides unequal pay for equal work.
Shifts are bid on the basis of
seniority. All employees currently working
swing and graveyard shifts bid
to those shifts. If they are working those
shifts because of lower seniority
and are unable to bid to a day shift, they
will gain more seniority as
they work longer for the Employer and be eligible
to bid to the day shift at a
later time.
It is important to note that internal
comparisons favor the
Employer’s opposition to this
proposal. No Spokane Transit Authority
workers receive a shift
differential. Data from external comparable
organizations show a mixed
response to paying a shift differential.
Comparability data, in the
opinion of the Employer, failed to provide a useful
guideline with regard to this
issue.
C. What
the Evidence Shows
It is for the party seeking changes in a past
approach to pay
rates to carry the burden of
proving the reasonableness of its proposal. In
prior good faith agreements
arrived at by negotiating between the parties,
they never included a shift
differential as a part of the compensation
package. The burden was on the
Union to show a change in circumstances
that justified altering the
practice of the parties and to prove that such a
result flowed naturally from
the prior relationship of the parties.
The Union argued, in effect, it was the “nightness” of the work
hours that justified providing
a shift differential. Its abstract argument was
that a penalty premium ought
to be attached to nondaytime work hours on
the theory that discouraging
night work is good public policy. In other
words, an employer ought to do
what it can to avoid scheduling work at
night so that workers can
spend time with family and friends who typically
work a day schedule. The Union
argues that swing and graveyard shift
workers should be rewarded
with premium pay for foregoing social benefits
connected with a daytime work
schedule.
While on an abstract level, the Union’s
theory might have
coherency, no data supported
it. Work schedules have changed
significantly in the last half
century. It is reasonable to believe that some
workers now prefer swing and
graveyard work as much as others desire
day work. While swing and gaveyard shift work might be disruptive in the
lives of some; it might permit
a rational schedule to emerge in the lives of
others. Nor did data submitted
by the Union establish the existence of an
industry standard with regard
to premium pay for shift work. In the
absence of evidence
demonstrating a significant problem, the Union's
proposal must be denied.
AWARD
Having carefully considered all evidence
submitted by the
parties concerning this
matter, the arbitrators concludes that the Union's
proposal seeking a shift
differential for Maintenance Employees shall not
become a part of the next agreement
between the parties. It is so ordered
and awarded.
Respectfully
submitted,
__________________________
Carlton J. Snow
Professor of Law
Date: _____________________
__________________________
John Leinen
Union Designee
Date: _____________________
__________________________
Teny Novak
Employer
Designee
Date: _____________________
AWARD
Having carefully considered all evidence
submitted by the
parties concerning this
matter, the arbitrators concludes that the Union's
proposal seeking a shift
differential for Maintenance Employees shall not
become a part of the next agreement
between the parties. It is so ordered
and awarded.
Respectfully
submitted,
__________________________
Carlton J. Snow
Professor of Law
Date: _____________________
__________________________
John Leinen
Union Designee
Date: _____________________
__________________________
Teny Novak
Employer
Designee
Date: _____________________
XV. THE ISSUE OF MEDICAL I NSURANCE FOR RETIREES
A Introduction
Currently, the parties’ agreement states that
“the Authority
agrees to accept medical
insurance payments &om persons who retire with
25 years or more of service
and who are not on the payroll.” (See
1996-99
Agreement, art. XIV(4)(E).)
Retirees who elect to obtain medical insurance
throagh
this provision pay 100% of their health insurance premium.
B. Position
of the Parties
1. The
Union
The Union proposes that the “length of
service’’ requirement
which must be met before
employees may elect to remain with Spokane
Transit Authority’s medical
insurance after retirement should be lowered
from 25 to 20 years of
service. The Union’s proposal is rooted in its belief
that an employee who remains
with Spokane Transit Authority for 20 years
deserves this benefit. Of
importance in justifying the proposal is the
Union’s explanation that the
Employer pays no portion of premiums for
retirees who elect to remain
with the Spokane Transit Authority medical
insurance. Accordingly, the
Union believes that the proposal is without
cost to the Employer. Because
the Employer is now hiring an older work
force, fewer employees have an
opportunity to work for 25 years before
retirement, according to the
Union.
2.
The Employer
According to the Employer, lowering the
“length of service”
requirement for the medical
insurance program would undermine the
efficiency of the Employer’s
operation by increasing the probability that
younger retirees would make
use of the program. If younger employees
could elect to retire and use
the benefit, the Employer believes it is more
likely that people in poorer
health could make use of the program and, thus,
cause premiums to increase in
cost. Any cost increase in premiums is
shared between the Employer
and bargaining unit members. Accordingly,
the Employer concludes that if
premium fees rise, everyone will be
compelled to pay more.
Additionally, the Employer argues that just making
the change, even if no more
employees elect to use the system, likely would
cause costs to increase.
The Employer also contends that, if the
Union’s proposal were
accepted, other employees
within Spokane Transit Authority would be
treated unequally, since they
would continue to face a 25-year requirement.
None of the comparable
organizations on which the Employer relied offer
this benefit for any length of
service. Of Union comparable organizations,
King County Metro, Tri-Met of
Portland, Oregon, and Santa Clara Valley
Transportation Authority of
Silicon Valley, California make some use of
employer-paid medical benefits
in retirement. It is the position of the
Employer that all these Union
comparable jurisdictions are inapposite in this
circumstance because of their
size and the nature of the major metropolitan
areas in which they are
located.
C. What
the Evidence Shows
The Union argued that its proposal would cost
the Employer
nothing. The Employer
responded that the change would increase costs.
Neither party offered
persuasive data in support of their respective
contentions. The Employer's suggestion that the proposal
would cause a
significant number of people
in poorer health to opt into the system was
farfetched, but it was the
Union that needed to carry the burden of proof
with regard to the proposed
change. No persuasive data submitted to
the panel
arbitrators enabled the Union
to carry its burdenof proof. Overall, the Union
failed to justify its
proposal, and it must be denied.
AWARD
Having carefully considered all evidence
submitted by the
parties concerning this
matter, the arbitrators conclude that the Union's
proposed provision covering
medical insurance for retirees must be denied
and not made a part of the
next agreement between the parties. It
is so
ordered and awarded.
Respectfully
submitted,
_________________________
Carlton
J. Snow
Professor
of Law
Date:
_____________________
__________________________
John
Leinen
Union
Designee
Date: _____________________
__________________________
Terry Novak
Employer Designee
Date: _____________________
AWARD
Having carefully considered all evidence
submitted by the
parties concerning this
matter, the arbitrators concludes that the Union's
proposed provision covering
medical insurance for retirees must be denied
and not made a part of the
next agreement between the parties. It
is so
ordered and awarded.
Respectfully
submitted,
_________________________
Carlton
J. Snow
Professor
of Law
Date:
_____________________
__________________________
John
Leinen
Union
Designee
Date: _____________________
__________________________
Terry Novak
Employer Designee
Date: _____________________
XVI. THE ISSUE OF DENTAL INSURANCE
A. Introduction
In the 1996-99 agreement between the parties,
“the Authority
agrees to provide Washington
Dental Insurance, to include adults and child
orthodontia coverage with a
benefit equal to 50% of covered costs, to a
maximum of $750 per covered
participant, per dental contract year.” (See
art. XIV(4)(F).)
B. Position
of the Parties
1. The
Union
The Union proposes that the amount of
dental/orthodontic
coverage be increased in the
next agreement between the parties from $750
a year to $1500 a year. The
Union maintains that this increase is needed in
order to cover rising costs of
orthodontic care. It is the belief of the Union
that the cost to the Employer
would be minimal.
2. The
Employer
The Employer argued that the Union’s proposal
is not
supported by internal
comparative data nor by external comparability
information.
C. What
the Evidence Supports
The Employer maintained without rebuttal that
the Union’s
proposal would cost over
$18,000, and this cannot be considered an
inconsequential expenditure.
Most comparability data support either no
orthodontic coverage or a
limit of $750. The arbitration panel received
insufficient economic data to
justify this proposal.
AWARD
Having carefully considered all evidence
submitted by the
parties concerning this
matter, the arbitrators conclude that the Union's
proposal with regard to dental
insurance must be denied and not made a part
of the next agreement between
the parties. It is so ordered and
awarded.
Respectfully
submitted,
_________________________
Carlton
J. Snow
Professor
of Law
Date:
_____________________
__________________________
John
Leinen
Union
Designee
Date: _____________________
__________________________
Terry Novak
Employer Designee
Date: _____________________
AWARD
Having carefully considered all evidence
submitted by the
parties concerning this
matter, the arbitrators conclude that the Union's
proposal with regard to dental
insurance must be denied and not made a part
of the next agreement between
the parties. It is so ordered and
awarded.
Respectfully
submitted,
_________________________
Carlton
J. Snow
Professor
of Law
Date:
_____________________
__________________________
John
Leinen
Union
Designee
Date: _____________________
__________________________
Terry Novak
Employer Designee
Date: _____________________
XVII. THE ISSUE OF ACCRUED SICKDAYS
A. Introduction
The current agreement between the
parties states:
Under the conditions and per
the schedule as follows, employees who
elect to retire will be eligble to collect pay at their prevailing rate and on
the basis of eight (8) hours
per day, to a maximum of eighty (80) days (six
hundred forty (640) hours),for
their accrued and unused sick leave.
Employees who are a
Minimum of age 60 with 30 yrs
of service/AccruaI up to 80 days
Minimum of age 65 with 25 yrs
of service/Accrual up to 80 days
Minimum of age 62 with 22 yrs
of service/Accrual up to 60 days
(See 1996-99 Agreement, p. 30.)
B. Position
of the Parties
1. The
Union
The Union proposes to remove age requirements
in the sick
leave buy-out program
contained in Article XIII( 1)(C) of the current
ageement
between the parties. Thus, length of service alone would
determine whether an employee
was eligible to receive sick-leave buy-out
pay. The progam
is already capped at 80 days, while the contract allows
up to 80 days of accrual.
Thus, employees using this program could
already receive less than half
of their accrued sick leave. The Union
contends that removing the age
requirement would encourage employees to
be absent fiom
work less. If they could receive a sick-leave buy-out with a
certain “length of service”
requirement only, then employees would be more
likely to receive it at some point, according
to the Union. Knowing that they
would be paid for those
accrued days, employees, the Union argues, would
use fewer sick days and allow
them to accrue. The increased attendance
rate would be a benefit to the
Employer. The Union argues that this
proposal would be of no cost
to Spokane Transit Authority.
2. The
Employer
The Employer maintains that the Union has
misconstrued the
purpose of this benefit. The
purpose, in part, is to provide a retirement
benefit. It also is designed
to encourage longevity with the Employer. As
the Employer sees it, the
Union has proposed a change that would
encourage early retirement;
and this is exactly the opposite of what the
program is intended to
accomplish. No other employees of Spokane Transit
Authority enjoy this benefit
without an age requirement in addition to the
“length of service”
requirement. It is the belief of the Employer that
comparability data supports
its rejection of this proposal.
C. What
the Evidence Supports
Comparability data failed to establish that
the only purpose of
permitting employees to cash
in accrued sick leave days is to provide a
retirement benefit. For
example, Pierce Transit permits an employee to
cash out sick leave at at the time of resignation. A number of other
comparable organizations on
which the Union relied permit the benefit to be
used at resignation. Moreover,
data submitted to the arbitrators failed to
show that comparable
organizations tie the benefit to a minimum age the
way it is done by Spokane
Transit Authority. It is recognized that adopting
the Union’s proposal might
create some internal inconsistencies among
employees of Spokane Transit
Authority, but internal comparisons are I
generally viewed as being
especially important in resolving noneconomic
issues. When evaluating the
impact of standard operating policies within an
organization or some language
components, a more persuasive case can be
made for relying on the
importance of internal comparisons. External
comparisons with regard to
economic benefits lend rationality and
objectivity to a party’s
proposal, and the Union’s proposal is more
consistent with external
comparability data in this case.
AWARD
Having carefully considered all evidence
submitted by the
parties concerning this
matter, the arbitrators concludes that the Union's
proposal with regard to
cashing in accrued sick days shall become a part of
the next agreement between the
parties. It is so ordered and awarded.
AWARD
Having carefully considered all evidence
submitted by the
parties concerning this
matter, the arbitrators conclude that the Union's
proposal with regard to
cashing in accrued sick days shall become a part
of the next agreement between
the parties. It is so ordered and
awarded.
Respectfully
submitted,
_________________________
Carlton
J. Snow
Professor
of Law
Date:
_____________________
__________________________
John
Leinen
Union
Designee
Date: _____________________
__________________________
Terry Novak
Employer Designee
Date: ____________________
AWARD
Having carefully considered all evidence
submitted by the
parties concerning this
matter, the arbitrators conclude that the Union's
proposal with regard to
cashing in accrued sick days shall become a part
of the next agreement between
the parties. It is so ordered and
awarded.
Respectfully
submitted,
_________________________
Carlton
J. Snow
Professor
of Law
Date:
_____________________
__________________________
John
Leinen
Union
Designee
Date: _____________________
__________________________
Terry Novak
Employer Designee
Date: _____________________
XVIII. THE ISSUE OF MEDICAL INSURANCE PREMIUMS
A. Introduction
Under the 1996-99 agreement
between the parties;bargaining
unit members could select
between two health plans, namely, the Group
Health Plan and the PP04 Plan.
Some more senior bargaining unit members
continue to be covered by the PPOl Plan, but it is no longer an option for
nonmanagement
employees. The PP04 and Group Health Plans have co-
pay and deductible features.
The Employer pays 100% of the cost of the
plans for an employee and 90%
of the cost for the family plan. Managerial
officials are covered by the PPOl Plan, and it has no co-pay or deductible
features. The Employer pays
100% of the premium for its managers and
their familes,
as well as for the few bargaining unit members still on the
B. Position
of the Parties
1. The
The
plan for both PP04 and Group
Health Plans and that these additional
contributions be retroactive
to
even though employees who are
members of the bargaining unit are the
backbone of
when compared with managerial
employees. Not only do bargaining unit
members have a plan with
co-pay and deductible features but also they
must contribute to the cost of
family premiums. Management pays none of
these costs and enjoys higher
salaries. The
comparability data support its
proposal. Moreover, the
management offers no
legitimate explanation to explain why the Employer
treats managerial officials
and bargaining unit members differently with
regard to health plan
contributions. (See Tr. 482.)
2. The
Employer
The Employer maintains that it is an industry
standard for
employees to contribute to
health coverage. In the opinion of the Employer,
there is no incentive for
employees to help hold down spiraling costs if the
Employer pays 100% of medical
insurance costs. According to the
Employer, the proposal put
forth by the
insurance is the most
expensive proposal in its entire package. Moreover,
management beIieves
that the
Group Health coverage if union
negotiators had agreed to the Employer's
language for the current
contract, instead of insisting on its own. (See Tr.
470-472.) The Employer
believes it should not now be penalized because
union negotiators made a bad
judgment when bringing the current
agreement into existence,
especially in view of the fact that the Employer
warned the
C. What
the Evidence Shows
Evidence submitted to the arbitrators makes
it reasonable to
conclude that the bargain
struck by the parties in the last round of
negotiations helped contribute
to the current dilemma with respect to the
cost of an insurance program.
To the extent that the current problem is a
result of a bad judgment in
the past, it is reasonable to expect the
help share responsibility for
that decision. It is inconsistent for the
argue that the current plan is
too expensive when its own contractual
language is part of the reason
for the expense.
No other represented employees within
Authority enjoy family medical
coverage paid at 100% by the Employer.
Nonunion and managed employees
have 100% family coverage, but they
do not provide an accurate
source of comparison. While a comparative
analysis of employees doing
similar work in similar benchmark jurisdictions
is generally a useful source
of guidance, numerous interest arbitrators have
urged caution when comparing
nonunion work groups with unionized work
groups. (See, e.g.,
and City of
officials do not provide the
best source of comparison with regard to this
issue. Job duties are
different, and historic methods of compensation are
different. In order to make an
accurate comparison, many more factors
than economic benefits need to
be taken into account.
Nor does external comparability data support
the
proposal. Community Transit,
Pierce Transit, Intercity Transit, Kitsap
Transit, and Ben Franklin
Transit all have a flat employer contribution.
(See Exhibits Nos. 6.7.2 and 6.7.3.) A flat contribution places
the burden
of premium increases solely on
employees. In this regard, the Employer's
program is better for
employees than a flat rate. Of the comparable
organizations that the
five of the six are located in
major metropolitan areas. The sixth is within
50 miles of a major
metropolitan area. A legitimate argument
can be made
that they enjoy a different
kind of economy from that of the
AWARD
Having carefully considered all evidence
submitted by the
parties concerning this
matter, the arbitrators conclude that the
medical insurance premium
proposal shall not become a part of the next
agreement between the parties.
It is so ordered and awarded
Respectfully
submitted,
_________________________
Professor
of Law
Date:
_____________________
__________________________
John
Leinen
Union
Designee
Date: _____________________
__________________________
Terry Novak
Employer Designee
Date: _____________________
AWARD
Having carefully considered all evidence
submitted by the
parties conceming
this matter, the arbitrators conclude that the
medical insurance premium
proposal shall not become a part of the next
agreement between the parties.
It is so ordered and awarded.
Respectfully
submitted,
_________________________
Professor
of Law
Date:
_____________________
__________________________
John
Leinen
Union
Designee
Date: _____________________
__________________________
Terry Novak
Employer Designee
Date: _____________________
XIX. BENEFITS FOR PART-TIME OPERATORS
A. Introduction
The current agreement between the parties
states:
Eligibility for fringe benefits for part-time operators
is limited to
vacations, medical-dental plan participation, dependent
passes
and uniform allowances, but does not include
participation in
the pension plan. (See
1996-99 Agreement, Art. XV(5)(O).)
B. Position
of the Parties
1. The
The
Part-time employees shall
receive vacation benefits,
medical/dental plan
participation, dependent passes, and
uniform allowance. Part-time
employees shall receive a
$10,000 death benefit, along
with participation in the pension
plan after two years of
continuous service. Additionally, part-
time employees shall receive
six prorated holidays per year
after 180 days of senice. (See
Exhibit No. 1.10.)
The
employees work on a part-time
basis for many years. Paratransit part-time
employees are eligible to participate
in their retirement plan after two years
of service. The
opportunity. (See Union's Post-hearing Brief, p.
37.) Because part-time
employees work up to 27.5
hours a week, the
deserve to participate in
benefits on a pro rata basis. Half of the comparable
jurisdictions on which the
Employer itself relies gives part-time operators
pro rata holiday benefits.
2. The
Employer
The Employer argues that it is discriminatory
for part-time
operators and not part-time
clerical employees to receive the proposed new
benefits. As management sees
it, the position of a part-time operator is not
long term and is merely an
entry level position. The Employer argues that
part-time employees who remain
in part-time status for years often do so by
choice and that most are able
to leave part-time work after two or three
years based on their
seniority. It is the belief of the Employer that the
eliminate the training
opportunity of using part-time work as an entry level
position. Part-time operators
already receive vacation, medical-dental
benefits, a uniform allowance,
and employee and dependent transit passes.
The Employer concedes that part-time
employees in the
Paratransit
Division receive pension benefits after two years of service, but
they also receive a much lower
hourly wage at the top step of their wage
scale when compared with
regular, fixed-route, part-time operators.
Comparability data allegedly
do not support the
over, the Employer maintains
that it pays its part-time operators a higher
wage than most comparable
organizations.
C. What
the Evidence Shows
1. Death
Benefit
None of the comparable organizations on which the
Employer
relies provides a death
benefit to part-time operators. Of the comparable
entities on which the
sort of insurance benefit,
although the extent of those benefits is not
consistent. King County Metro
and
instructive comparable
jurisdictions because of the notably different
metropolitan area when compared
to the
standard does not seem to be
one of providing death benefits for part-time
employees.
2. Pension
Plan Participation
Two of the Employer's comparable organizations, namely,
Kitsap Transit and
retirement for part-time
employees. Excluding King County Metro and
Santa Clara Valley
Transportation Authority, the only
organization with a retirement
benefit for part-time employees is Intercity
Transit. The industry standard
does not seem to be one of extending
pension plan participation to
part-time employees. Moreover, there was no
rebuttal to the contention
that the
expensive during the life of
the contract. The additional benefit would
approximately $183,593.
3.
All three of the comprrrable
organizations on which both parties
reIy
extend holiday benefits to part-time employees. Of the comparable
entities on which the
benefits. The only comparable organization in eastern
Washington, Ben
Franklin Transit, offers pro
rata holiday pay to part-time employees.
In
fact, all the Employer's
comparable organizations within the State of
The statewide industry appears
to be that of offering some sort of
holiday pay for part-time
employees.
AWARD
Having carefully considered all evidence
submitted by the
parties concerning this
matter, the arbitrators conclude that the Union‘s
death benefit proposal shall
not become a part of the next agreement
between the parties; the
become a part of the next
agreement between the parties; and the
pro rata holiday pay
proposal for part-time employees shall
become a part of
the parties’ next agreement.
It is so ordered and awarded.
Respectfully
submitted,
_________________________
Professor
of Law
Date:
_____________________
__________________________
John
Leinen
Union
Designee
Date: _____________________
__________________________
Terry Novak
Employer Designee
Date: _____________________
AWARD
Having carefully considered
all evidence submitted by the
parties concerning this
matter, the arbitrators conclude that the
death benefit proposal shall
not become a part of the next agreement
between the parties; the
become a part of the next
agreement between the parties; and the
pro rata holiday pay proposal
for part-time employees shall become a part of
the parties’ next agreement.
It is so ordered and awarded.
Respectfully
submitted,
_________________________
Professor
of Law
Date:
_____________________
__________________________
John
Leinen
Union
Designee
Date: _____________________
__________________________
Terry Novak
Employer Designee
Date: _____________________
XX. EXTRA BOARD OPERATORS
A. Introduction
The current agreement between the parties
permits Extra Board
Operators to refuse work after
12 hours of work or a spread of 14 hours
within a day. Time and a half
wages are paid to Extra Board Operators for
work performed after 12 hours
spread time. "Spread time" is the amount
of time from an employee's
first report time to the time when the employee
leaves work for the day,
without continuous work in between.
Extra Board Operators receive their position
on the Extra Board
either by bidding to the Extra
Board through seniority or, more commonly,
by being compelled to join the
Extra Board because employees do not have
sufficient seniority to bid a
regular route. The maximum amount of work to
which management may assign an
Extra Board employee is 12 hours in a 14
hour period per day. Extra
Board employees work a regular five-day week,
although their days off vary.
The hours that these employees may work
can vary day-to-day. Employees
find out what hours they are assigned to
work by 3:OO P.M. the
preceding day. The earliest possible time is
A.M. If an employee were
assigned to start work at
still would not know of the
time until 3:OO P.M. the day before. For each
report time, an Extra Board
employee is guaranteed two hours of pay. Each
day an Extra Board employee is
guaranteed eight hours of pay. All P.M.
Extra Board Operators have a
maximum work spread of 13 hours because
of the timing of the P.M.
runs. (See Tr. 373-380.)
B. Position
of the Parties
1. The
The
Board Operators be reduced to
13 hours in a day. According to the
the issue is one of safety.
Working employees for greater spread time
increases their level of
fatigue, and this can lead to safety risks as well as to
a lower quality of customer
service. The average spread time for
comparable organizations is
12.38 hours or 12.59 hours, depending on the
set of comparable
organizations on which one relies. Only C-Tran has a
larger spread time than
maximum.
2. The
Employer
The Employer argues that spread time is not
explained so much
by managerial prerogative as
it is by the nature of the work. According to
the Employer, "pieces of
work" in the transportation industry do not fit into
neat eight-hour packages.
Often, splitting shifts is the most efficient way to
schedule employees. The
Employer contends that management does its
best to keep spread time
within 12 hours because of a requirement that
overtime be paid for each half
hour over 12 hours of spread time. The
Union contends that its
proposal is rooted in a concern for safety, but no
evidence of a safety problem
has been brought forth to the arbitrators.
Moreover, the Employer
believes that decreasing Extra Board maximum
spread time would increase
full-time and part-time overtime. Arguably, this
result would create a safety
issue for full-time and part-time operators. In
fact, no other full-time or
part-time operators with the Employer have any
spread time restrictions, and
the
any other employees. According
to the Employer, comparable organizations
provide no definitive
guidelines with regard to this issue.
C. What
the Evidence Shows
It is accurate to conclude that the issue of
spread time does not
result from management's
haphazard scheduling practices as much as from
the nature of the work. This
is an area in which there is a considerable
need for cooperation between
the parties in order to make the system as
workable as possible. What the
evidence failed to show is the existence of
a significant problem with the
current system. The Employer has a built-in
incentive to minimize spread
time because of its impact on overtime wages.
Management also has a
contractual obligation to maximize straight runs , and
the
It is reasonable to conclude that granting
this proposal would
create more overtime for
non-Extra Board employees. Exhibit 6.9.3
demonstrates the increased
overtime that would result from such a change
on a specific day. Although
the day represented in the exhibit is not a
typical day, the point is
still instructive. Other days might not demonstrate
as dramatic an impact on
overtime, but increases would result nonetheless.
It is also significant that
full-time regular operators do not have spread time
limits, and the
a significant impact on the
parties, both in terms of scheduling as well as in
terms of the amount of
overtime needed to cover all pieces of work. It is
the sort of substantial change
that is not a natural extension of where the
parties found themselves at
the point of impasse and is a change better
accomplishied
in face-to-face negotiations.
AWARD
Having carefully considered all evidence
submitted by the
parties concerning this
matter, the arbitrators conclude that the
proposal with regard to the
Extra Board work spread is denied. It is so
ordered and awarded.
Respectfully
submitted,
_________________________
Professor
of Law
Date:
_____________________
__________________________
John
Leinen
Union
Designee
Date: _____________________
__________________________
Terry Novak
Employer Designee
Date: _____________________
AWARD
Having carefully considered all evidence
submitted by the
parties concerning this
matter, the arbitrators conclude that the
proposal with regard to the
Extra Board work spread is denied. It is so
ordered and awarded.
Respectfully
submitted,
_________________________
Professor
of Law
Date:
_____________________
__________________________
John
Leinen
Union
Designee
Date: _____________________
__________________________
Terry Novak
Employer Designee
Date: _____________________