City
of
And
Pullman
Police Officers Guild
Interest
Arbitration
Arbitrator: Janet L. Gaunt
Date
Issued:
Arbitrator:
Gaunt; Janet L.
Case #: 12399-I-96-00269
Employer:
City of
Date Issued:
IN THE MATTER OF THE
ARBITRATION
BETWEEN
_____________________________
THE
GUILD ) INTEREST ARBITRATION
) OPINION AND AWARD
and )
)
CITY OF
_____________________________ )
PERC Case No 12399-I-96-269
ARBITRATION PANEL
Janet L. Gaunt, Neutral
Chairperson
Officer Michael B. Austin,
Guild Member
Joe Gavinski,
City Member
APPEARANCES;
For the Guild: For the City:
Daryl
Hoag, Garrettson,
Goldberg & Labor Consultant
Fenrich ELMS
INC.
1313 NW 19th P.O.
Box 7164
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 1
II. HISTORY OF BARGAINING 2
III. APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 2
A. The Constitutional
Statutory Authority of the Employer 4
B. Stipulations of the
Parties 4
C. Comparable Employers 4
1.
2. Ellensburg and
3.
4. WSU and
5. The List of
Comparable Jurisdictions 13
D. Cost of Living Changes 14
E. Interim Changes 14
F. Traditional Factors 15
1. Ability to Pay 15
2. Wage/Benefit
Packages of Other City Employees 15
3. Local Labor
Market Comparisons 16
IV. THE RESOLUTION OF OUTSTANDING ISSUES 16
A. Duration 16
B. Salaries 17
1. Ranking Within Comparables 20
2. Fiscal Impact
on the City 22
3. Internal Parity 24
4. Local Labor
Market Considerations 25
5. 1997/1998
Adjustments 27
C. Health Insurance 28
D. Shift Differential 31
E. Shift Rotation 34
F. Educational
Incentive/Longevity Pay 37
G. Shared Leave 41
WITNESS LIST
For the City:
Jack Tonkovich,
Finance Director, City of
Stan Finkelstein, Executive
Director, Association of Washington Counties
Theodore Weatherly, Police
Chief, City of
Paul Eichenberg,
Human Resource Manager, City of
For the Guild:
Ronald Miller, President,
Daniel Dornes,
Secretary-Treasurer,
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The
representative
for a unit of uniformed personnel employed by the City of
("City").
The bargaining unit consists of both police officers and police sergeants. At
the
time of the hearing, there were approximately 23 officers and sergeants in the
bargaining
unit. The Chief of Police is William T. Weatherly.
This interest arbitration was initiated in accord with RCW
41.56.450 to resolve
certain
bargaining issues that remained at impasse in 1996 after the parties tried to
negotiated a
new collective bargaining agreement. As its representative on the three
(3) person
Arbitration Panel, the Guild designated Officer Michael Austin. Mr. Joe
Gavinski,
City Manager for the City of Moses Lake, was selected to serve as the City's
representative.
By mutual consent, Janet L. Gaunt was selected to serve as the
neutral
Chairperson (hereinafter "Arbitrator").
On December 19 and 20, 1996, an arbitration hearing was
conducted in
accordance
with RCW 41.56.450 in
by
labor consultant Roy Wesley Of ELMS, Inc. The Guild was represented by Daryl S.
Garrettson
of Hoag, Garrettson, Goldberg & Fenrich. During the hearing, each
party
had
an opportunity to make opening statements, submit documentary evidence,
examine
and cross-examine witnesses (who testified under oath), and argue the issues
in
dispute. The parties elected to make closing arguments in the form of posthearing
briefs,
the last of which was received on
parties,
the Arbitrator drafted the preliminary text of an Award which was then
circulated
to the other panel members for review and comment. Following that
consultation,
this decision was finalized by the Arbitrator.
II. HISTORY OF BARGAINING
The parties have had a collective bargaining relationship for
the City's
uniformed
personnel since approximately 1989. There has been one prior interest
arbitration.
In 1992, Arbitrator Gary Axon issued an award settling unresolved issues
in
the 1990-1992 collective bargaining agreement The term of the parties' most
recent
contract
was
began
bargaining over the terms of a labor contract to take effect on
The parties bargained to impasse regarding a number of issues
that were then
certified
for interest arbitration by the Executive Director of the Public Employment
Relations Commission (PERC).
Prior to or during the interest arbitration, the parties
resolved
the issues of: funeral leave, overtime, vacations, sick leave, uniforms and
equipment,
and training standards. The unresolved issues were submitted to the
arbitration
panel.
III. APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The Panel's authority arises out of RCW 41.56, which prescribes
binding
arbitration
for public employers and uniformed personnel upon declaration by the
PERC
that an impasse in bargaining exists. Relevant provisions of the
statutes
read as follows:
RCW
41.56.030 Definitions. As used in this chapter:
. . . .
(7) "Uniformed personnel" means (a)(I)
Until
enforcement
officers as defined in RCW 41.26.030 employed by the
governing
body of any city or town with a population of seven thousand
five
hundred or more and law enforcement officers employed by the
governing
body of any county with a population of thirty five thousand or
more;
. . . [1995 c 273 §1.]
RCW
41.56.430 Uniformed personnel- Legislative declaration.
The intent and purpose of this 1973 amendatory act is to
recognize that
there
exists a public policy in the state of
uniformed
personnel as a means of settling their labor disputes; that the
uninterrupted
and dedicated service of these classes of employees is vital
to
the welfare and public safety of the state of
promote
such dedicated and uninterrupted public service there should
exist
an effective and adequate means of settling disputes.
[1993 c 131 §1]
RCW
41.56.465. Uniformed personnel- Interest arbitration
panel-
Determinations- Factors to be considered.
(1) In making its determination, the panel shall be mindful of
the
legislative
purpose enumerated in RCW 41.56.430 and, as additional
standards
or guidelines to aid it in reaching a decision, it shall take into
consideration
the following factors:
(a) The constitutional and statutory authority of the
employer;
(b) Stipulations of the parties;
(c)(I) For employees listed in RCW 41.56.030(7)(a) through (d),
comparison
of the wages, hours, and conditions of employment of
personnel
involved in the proceedings with the wages, hours, and
conditions
of employment of like personnel of like employers of similar
size
on the west coast of the
. . . .
(d) The average consumer prices for good and services,
known
as the cost of living;
(e) Changes in any of the circumstances under (a) through
(d) of this
subsection
during the pendency of the proceedings; and
(f) Such other factors, not confined to the factors under
(a) through (e)
of
this subsection, that are normally or traditionally taken into
consideration
in the determination of wages, hours, and conditions of
employment.
For those employees listed in RCW 41.56.030(7)(a) who
are
employed
by the governing body of a city or town with a population of less
than
fifteen thousand, or a county with a population of less than seventy
thousand,
consideration must also be given to regional differences in the
cost
of living.
(2) Subsection (1)(c) of this section may not be construed to authorize
the
panel to require the employer to pay, directly or indirectly, the
increased
employee contributions resulting from chapter 502, Laws of
1993 or chapter 517, Laws of
1993 as required under chapter 41.26 RCW.
[1995
c 273 § 2; 1993 c 398 § 3.]
A. The Constitutional / Statutory Authority of the Employer
Neither party has made any allegation that the proposals of the
other party
exceed
or are otherwise affected by the constitutional and statutory authority of the
employer.
B. Stipulations of the Parties
Because of the timing of posthearing
briefs, the Arbitrator's travel schedule, and
the
desire to allow for adequate consultation with the Panel, the parties agreed to
an
extension
of the statutory requirement that a decision be issued within thirty (30) days
of
the hearing's closure. Further stipulations that relate to particular proposals
are
discussed
in the sections of this decision that deal with those proposals.
C. Comparable Employers
One of the statutory criteria which this Panel must consider is
the comparison
of
wages, hours and conditions "of like personnel of like employers of
similar size on
the
west coast of the United States." Both sides agree that comparators should
be
chosen
from jurisdictions east of the Cascades rather than from West Coast sites. They
also
agree that the following Washington cities are properly used as comparables for
the
purpose of RCW 45.56.465(c)(I):
Pasco
Walla Walla
Wenatchee
The parties disagree over the
other comparables that should be considered.
Guild: The Guild contends the Panel should adopt the same
comparables that
were
found appropriate by Arbitrator Gary Axon for the parties first collective
bargaining
agreement (1990-1992). The Guild would thus add Kennewick and
Richland
to the agreed cities shown above. The Guild notes that
Kennewick and
Richland are
adjacent to the agreed city of Pasco and they form part of Pasco's labor
market.
There is considerable arbitral precedent for the grouping of Pasco, Kennewick,
Richland, Walla Walla and Wenatchee with Pullman, and the Guild contends
there has
not
been any substantial change in either population or the relationship between
these
cities
to justify departure from the Axon precedent.
City: The City objects to the use of Kennewick and Richland as
comparators
because
they are so much bigger than Pullman, have grown at a faster rate, and
possess
greater economic resources due to the Hanford Nuclear Reservation, where a
$50 billion dollar nuclear
waste cleanup is now in full swing. In their place, the City
proposes
adding Ellensburg, Moses Lake, WSU Police Services, Whitman County, and
Moscow, Idaho. The cites of
Ellensburg, and Moses Lake, like the agreed cities of
Pasco, Walla Walla and Wenatchee, are the most
similar to Pullman in terms of
population,
assessed valuation, assessed valuation per capita, taxable retail sales,
taxable
retail sales per capita, and per capita state-shared revenues. They are all
located
east of the Cascade Mountains and are rural / agricultural in nature. The City
proposes
the inclusion of WSU Police Services, Whitman County, and Moscow, Idaho
because
they are part of Pullman's local labor market and have close inter-agency
relationship.
The City notes that since the Axon award in 1992, Whitman County's
deputies
and sworn officers in the cities of Ellensburg and Moses Lake have become
eligible
for interest arbitration.
Discussion and Findings: The selection of comparable
jurisdictions is a process
fraught
with imprecision. As one of my colleagues has accurately observed: "The
interest
arbitrator faces the problem of making 'apples to apples' comparisons on the
basis
of imperfect choices and sometimes incomplete data." City of Pasco and
Pasco
Police
Officers Association, 10 (Wilkinson, 1994).
Picking comparables for the City of
Pullman is especially
problematic because Pullman is unique in a number of respects.
The City of Pullman is located approximately 76 miles south of
Spokane, 7
miles
west of the Idaho border, and 100 miles east of the area comprised of Pasco,
Kennewick,
and Richland ("Tri-Cities"). The City is situated in the largely
agricultural
Whitman
County. The major employer in both Pullman and Whitman
County is
Washington State University
(WSU), which occupies 600 acres on the north end of the
City and serves a student body
of approximately 16,000. WSU falls within the
jurisdiction
of the Pullman Police Department, but maintains its own police force.
Pullman officers respond as
needed. The City receives neither property taxes nor
contractual
payments from WSU to support police services.1 Primarily a college
town,
the
City lacks a strong retail or industrial base. In contrast to the Tri-Cities,
Pullman
has a
static economy, slow growth and a largely tax exempt major industry.
1 Because
WSU pays no property tax, the City's assessed value is half the actual value of
property
located within the City of Pullman's jurisdiction. (Tonkovich testimony.) This makes
comparisons
based on assessed value particularly troublesome because although not taxed,
the
property
nevertheless falls within the scope of property interests that City officers
may be
called upon to protect.
When there is a large selection of potential comparators which
must be
narrowed
to a more manageable size, a multi-factor analysis can be a helpful way of
culling
out the most appropriate comparables. In the instant case, the challenge is not
choosing
from among many, it is find enough from among few good choices. In such
circumstances,
the Arbitrator looks for comparables close enough in population and
geographic
location to form a list of at least five (5) comparables and preferably seven
(7) or more. Other demographic
factors used in a multi-factor analysis and statutory
criteria
can then be considered when judging where the subject jurisdiction's wages
should
be placed in relation to the selected list of comparables.
1. Richland and Kennewick Should Be Retained As Comparators.
Richland and Kennewick are clearly much larger than Pullman,
but they were
previously
found appropriate as comparables when the parties' first labor contract was
finalized
in 1992 by Arbitrator Axon. Once appropriate comparators have been
established
through an interest arbitration, it is reasonable to treat those jurisdictions
as
presumptively appropriate in subsequent proceedings; unless and until one party
makes a
compelling case for excluding them. The City failed to do so in the present
case.
The City contends Arbitrator Axon erred in grouping Pullman
with cities as
large
as Kennewick and Richland. If so, he's had plenty of company. Interest
arbitrators
in all of the following cases have found it appropriate to group Pullman
with
Kennewick, Richland and other cities.
See, e.g., Walla Walla and the Walla Walla
Police Guild,
PERC No. 6231-I-86-139 (Levak, 1986); City of
Pasco and Pasco Police
Association,
PERC No. 08062-I-89-00182 (Krebs, 1990); City of Pasco and Pasco Police
Officers
Association (Wilkinson, 1994). The
City did not cite any case in which an
arbitrator
concluded that such a grouping was inconsistent with the "similar
size"
requirement
of RCW 41.56.465(c)(I).
The City contends the Tri-Cities have grown at a faster rate
than Pullman and
possess
greater economic resources due in part to the Hanford Nuclear Reservation.
There is certainly a disparity
in size and resources. When Arbitrator Axon selected
Richland as a comparable
jurisdiction in 1992, that City's population was
approximately
10,000 greater than Pullman. The present disparity has grown to over
11,000. Exs.
C-2, G-15-11.2 Kennewick's population exceeded Pullman's by
approximately
20,000. The disparity in size is now over 23,000.
2 Exhibits are identified as either City (Ex.
C-_) or Guild (Ex. G-_). Witnesses are
identified
by last name in parentheses. References to exhibits or testimony are intended
to be
illustrative,
not all-inclusive, of evidence in the record that supports a particular
statement.
In the case of Kennewick, the disparity is getting close to the
point where future
exclusion
from the list of comparables may well be appropriate. That time has not yet
arrived,
however. Kennewick is still less than twice the size of Pullman and interest
arbitrators
have held that a range from half to twice the size of a subject jurisdiction
can
be acceptable for the purposes of RCW 41.46.465. City of Bellevue and
Bellevue
Firefighters, Local 1604,
PERC Case No. 6811-I-87-162 (Gaunt, 1988); City of Seattle
and
Seattle Police Management Association, PERC No. 4369-I-82-98 (Beck,
1983); City
of
Seattle and Seattle Police Management Association,
PERC No. 5059-I-84-114
(Krebs,
1984).
The size range found appropriate in the foregoing cases can be
demonstrated by
comparing
how the City of Moses Lake stands in relation to Pullman. The City
contends
Moses Lake is an appropriate comparable. According to a 1996 survey by the
Association of Washington
Cities, Moses Lake's population (12,490) is 51% the size of
Pullman (24,360). Ex. G-15-11.3
A the time of the AWC survey, Pullman was 67%
the
size of Richland (36,270) and thus closer in "relative size to that city
than Moses
Lake was to Pullman. Using
either the AWC data or the City's higher figures,
Pullman's population is just
51% the size of Kennewick's (48,130). That is essentially
the
same ratio as the ratio of Moses Lake's population to Pullman (51%). In light
of
the
foregoing, the Arbitrator conclude the disparity in size between Pullman and
the
cities
of Richland and Kennewick is not yet great enough to deviate from the prior
interest
arbitration and exclude Richland and Kennewick from the list of prime
comparables.
3 The City has offered higher population
figure for Moses Lake (13,130) and
Pullman (24,650). Using the
City's population figures, Moses Lake would now be 53%
the
size of Pullman. Ex. C-2.
Retaining Kennewick and Richland does not mean their greater
size and
resources
are irrelevant. We have kept distinctions noted by the City in mind when
deciding
where the salaries of Pullman officers should be placed in relation to those
jurisdiction.
Clearly, these two cities sit at the high end of the range of appropriate
comparators.
Their retention, however, serves to balance out the addition of two new
comparators
who clearly fall at the low end of comparators.
2. Ellensburg and Moses Lake Should Be Added As Comparators.
When Arbitrator Axon issued his prior award, Ellensburg and
Moses Lake did
not
meet the 15,000 person test for interest arbitration. For that reason, they
were
excluded
as primary comparators. These two cities were nonetheless given some
consideration
by Axon under the "other factors" part of the statute.
Population thresholds for interest arbitration have since been
lowered. Both
Ellensburg and Moses Lake now
employ "uniformed personnel" as defined by the
Legislature.
Their police officers are "like personnel" covered by the interest
arbitration
provisions of RCW 41.56.465, and the inclusion of Ellensburg would add
another
college town to the list of comparables.4
4 Central Washington University, another
Washington State four (4) year institution of
higher
learning, is located in Ellensburg.
The Guild notes that neither Ellensburg nor Moses Lake has
negotiated a labor
contract
under the amended bargaining law. Their present salary schedules are
instead
the result of bargaining by officers who had no resort to binding arbitration.
The Arbitrator has kept that
fact in mind when deciding where the salaries of Pullman
officers
should be placed in relation to these cities. I do not find it a reason to
disqualifying
either city as a prime comparator, especially since the inclusion of
Ellensburg and Moses Lake at
the lower end of the comparables helps to balance out
the
inclusion of Kennewick and Richland at the upper end of the list. This furthers
the
ultimate
goal when choosing comparable jurisdictions, i.e. getting a balanced list.
3. Moscow, Idaho Is Not A West Coast Employer.
RCW 41.56.465(c)(I) mandates a
comparison to like employers "on the west coast
of
the United State." Noting that arbitrators had customarily interpreted the
statutory
phrase
meaning the states of Washington, Oregon, California and Alaska, Arbitrator
Axon previously found it
inappropriate to include Moscow, Idaho on the list of primary
comparables. Ex. G-1-2. The City has not cited any subsequent precedent
that would
justify a
departure from Axon's 1992 ruling. Moscow, Idaho is part of the City's local
labor
market, and can be considered under the "other factors" part of the
statute, but
it
does not qualify for selection as a prime comparator.
4. WSU and Whitman County Are Not "Like" Employers.
In 1992, the City likewise failed to convince Arbitrator Axon
that WSU and
Whitman were
"like" employers. The current Arbitrator concurs. WSU is a state
university
whose police officers have limited jurisdiction and whose salaries are set by
the
Legislature not through the process of collective bargaining. It is not a
municipality
providing a full range of government services. The City has not offered
any
arbitral precedent to support the conclusion that WSU qualifies for selection
as a
comparable
jurisdiction under RCW 41.56.465(c)(I). Since it is part of the City's local
labor
market, WSU can be considered under the "other factors" part of the
statute, but
it
does not qualify for selection as a prime comparator.
The same is true of Whitman County. Most arbitrators have
refused to consider
county
sheriff's departments as "like employers" with city police
departments. See,
e.g., City of Pasco and
Pasco Police Officers Association, 10 (Wilkinson, 1994) (citing
cases).
The City has offered a 1996 decision by Arbitrator Kenneth Latch in which he
did
add Whatcom County to a list of comparable jurisdictions for the City of
Bellingham. City of
Bellingham and Teamsters Union, Local 231, PERC Case No.
11718-I-95-250.
He did so both because the two jurisdictions shared a common labor
market
and because there was a significant degree of interaction between the two law
enforcement
agencies. That interaction was described as follows:
The City of Bellingham
provides "911" emergency dispatching for the
entire
county, while Whatcom County provides a county-wide criminal
justice
data base in which the Bellingham Police Department records are
kept.
Whatcom County operates a correctional facility in which City
prisoners
are housed. The County provides specialized services such as
marine
patrol upon request from the City, and the record reflects that the
City provides its canine team,
SWAT team and hazardous materials upon
request
from the County
Id.
p.6. The record before this Panel does not
reflect anywhere near the degree of
interaction
that Arbitrator Latsch found significant.5
5 In accordance with a letter of
understanding, Pullman officers back up Whitman
County deputies and the
reverse is true when deputies are in the City.
The record before Arbitrator Latsch
also indicated that the City of Bellingham
and
Whatcom County shared significant economic factors. Arbitrator Axon found the
reverse
was true of Pullman and Whitman County. In 1992, he concluded that the
number
of officers and crime statistics was too disparate to use Whitman County as a
prime
comparable. The City has not shown that those factors have changed in any
significant
respect. The record does not indicate size of the Whitman County
department,
and except for crime statistics Whitman County demographics were not
included
in any of the City's charts re comparability factors. The crime statistics
indicate
Whitman County is way below other comparables in total offenses dealt with.
Exs. C-2 thru C-8; C-9.
The approach of Arbitrator Latsch
still seems to be a minority view. The present
Arbitrator believes the better
approach is to avoid mixing city police departments and
county
sheriff's departments on the list of prime comparators, at least when enough
other
comparators can be found without doing so. The City of Bellingham
decision is
not
persuasive justification for departing from Arbitrator Axon's earlier ruling
that
Whitman County is not a
"like employer". As part of Pullman's local labor market,
Whitman County will be
considered under the "other factors" part of the statute, but
it
is not appropriate for inclusion in the list of prime comparators.
5. The List of Comparable Jurisdictions.
Pursuant to RCW 41.56.465(c)(I), the
Arbitrator finds the following jurisdictions
(listed
in descending order of size) are appropriate comparables:
Officers
in
City Population6 Unit
Kennewick 48,130 537
Richland 36,270 458
Walla Walla 28,870 24
Wenatchee 24,180 26
Pasco 22,500 33
Ellensburg 12,990 10
Moses Lake 12,490 16
___________________________
Pullman 24,360 24
_______________
6 If both sides have agreed on a figure that
number is used. Where there is a dispute, the
figure
used is that shown in the 1996 Association of Washington Cities survey (AWC
survey)
unless
otherwise noted. Ex. G-15-11.
7 There is an unexplained disparity in the
parties' figures for the size of this bargaining
unit.
The number shown here is that which was reported in the AWC survey.
8 In the AWC survey,
Richland is shown as having just 24 police officers, which seems
surprisingly
low The figure used is that shown in City exhibit
C-8.
The foregoing list of
comparables provides a counterbalanced range of jurisdictions
both
smaller and larger than the City of Pullman. It also includes another college
town.
The list maintains the continuity of the comparators used in the parties
initial
contract
while making appropriate adjustments for intervening statutory changes.
D. Cost of Living Changes
RCW 41.56.465 requires consideration of the "average
consumer prices for goods
and
services, commonly known as the cost of living". The consumer price index
used
by
the parties when negotiating their last labor contract was the first half
Seattle CPI-
W
(Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers Index).
That same index was used by
the
City and ATU in their latest contract (Ex. C-32). There has been no contention
that
the CPI should be determined by reference to any other index.
The percentage change in the 1st half Seattle CPI-W from 1995
to 1996 was
2.9%. The percentage change in the 1st half Seattle CPI-W from 1996 to
1997 is not
yet
known. As of 1996, the bargaining unit's salary increases since 1992 have kept
pace
with changes in the cost of living index used as a frame of reference by the
parties. Ex. C-31.
E. Interim Changes
Relevant changes to the interest arbitration provisions of RCW
41.56 have
already
been discussed. Cost of living changes are discussed infra.
F. Traditional Factors
RCW 41.56.465(f) directs the Panel to consider "such other
factors . . . which are
normally
or traditionally taken into consideration in the determination of wages, hours
and
conditions of employment. As Arbitrator Axon observed in his earlier City of
Pullman award, the other
factors category allows considerable latitude in determining
the
relevant facts on which to base an award.
1. Ability to Pay. The
City does not claim an inability to pay the wage
increases
sought by the Guild. It does claim that declining sources of revenue and
projected
future demands on the City's General Fund make it unreasonable to offer
more
of an increase than equates to the change in the cost of living. The Guild
contends
the City can reasonably afford an increase that raises the top step
classification
to a more competitive level vis-a-vis comparable
jurisdictions. These
arguments
are discussed further herein.
2. Wage/Benefit Packages
of Other City Employees. A factor commonly
considered
under RCW 41.56.465(f) is settlements reached by an employer with its
other
bargaining units. The City of Pullman has a total of six (6) represented
bargaining
units. It negotiated with the Guild for the sworn officers unit and also for
a
unit of non-uniformed support personnel (Support Services Unit). The
Amalgamated
Transit Union (ATU) represents
a unit of transportation employees. The International
Association of Firefighters
(IAFF) represents a unit of firefighters, and the
International Brotherhood of
Teamsters (Teamsters) represents two (2) units: one of
library
personnel and another unit of employees in the Department of Public Works.
3. Local Labor Market
Comparisons. Anyone who has negotiated collective
bargaining
agreements as this Arbitrator has in her prior life as an advocate is well
aware
of the impact that local labor markets can have on the setting of wage rates
and
benefits.
The consideration of a subject jurisdiction's local labor market is thus fully
sanctioned
by RCW 41.56.465(f). The reasons for this have been well described by
UCLA Professor Irving
Bernstein:
[Local labor market]
comparisons are preeminent in wage determination
because
all parties at interest derive benefit from them. To the worker
they
permit a decision on the adequacy of his income. He feels no
discrimination
if he stays abreast of other workers in his industry, his
locality,
his neighborhood. They are vital to the union because they
provide
guidance to its officials on what must be insisted upon and a
yardstick
for measuring their bargaining skill. In the presence of
internal
factionalism or rival unionism, the power of comparisons is
enhanced.
The employer is drawn to them because they assure him that
competitors
will not gain a wage cost advantage and that he will be able
to
recruit in the local labor market. . . . Arbitrators benefit no less from
comparisons.
They have "the appeal of precedent and. . . awards
based
thereon
are apt to satisfy the normal expectations of the parties and to
appear
just to the public.
Arbitration of Wages,
Publications of the
(Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1954). The City of
market
includes WSU,
IV. THE RESOLUTION OF OUTSTANDING ISSUES
A. Duration
The parties' first collective bargaining agreement, finalized
through interest
arbitration,
was for a three year term (1990-1992). The next contract, reached through
successful
collective bargaining, was also for a three year term (1993-1995).
Guild: The Guild is
proposing a three (3) year contract covering calendar years
1996,
1997 and 1998. It notes that a one year contract will have
already expired by the
time
this arbitration decision is issued, whereas granting the Guild's proposal
allows
the
parties a period of stability before entering into renewed negotiations. Since
the
City has already adopted a
budget for 1997, the Guild feels any financial
uncertainty
is
not so great as to preclude a 3 year contract.
City: The City is
proposing a one (1) year contract for the period of 1996.
Fearing the impact of reduced
revenues and legislative changes, the City resists a
longer
term contract. The City contends all its other bargaining units ratified a 1
year
contract
for 1996 because they realized the City faced an uncertain future.
Discussion and Findings: When a collective bargaining
agreement for uniformed
personnel
is finalized through the process of interest arbitration, arbitrators generally
award a
contract for three years duration. To do anything less in this case would leave
the
parties right back at the bargaining table, having to negotiate for either the
current
year and beyond, or for 1998 (if a two year contract were awarded). I agree
with
the Guild that such a result makes little sense. Both sides could benefit from
having
the bargaining unit's wages, hours and working conditions fixed through 1998.
A three year contract will
allow the Guild and City a year to evaluate how things are
working
out under the contract finalized herein. The record is not persuasive that the
City's financial future is so
dire that it should not be constrained with a three (3) year
contract.
The Arbitrator concludes the contract should be applicable for the calendar
years
1996 through 1998.
B. Salaries
The current salary schedule for
one
(1) year between each step. An officer's progression on the schedule thus ends
after
five
(5) years of experience. When the parties have negotiated in the past, the
traditional
benchmark comparison has been the top step of the police officer
classification.
Guild: The Guild proposes
that salaries be adjusted as follows:
The salary schedule for first class police officer shall
be increased by
that
percentage which places the top step of the pay scale with the top
25% of comparator cities (
current
percentage difference. The salary schedules for the remaining
classifications
shall be adjusted by a like percentage. The salary schedule
shall
be adjusted retroactive to January 1, 1996, and a similar
adjustment
shall occur on January 1 of each year of this contract.
The stated purpose of the
Guild's proposal is to place the top step salary at the average
of
the top two of the five listed cities, i.e. $3,630 per month, which represents
a 13.8%
increase
for 1996.
City: The City proposes a 2.9% across the board increase for
1996. The City's
proposal
would place the top step salary at $3,283 per month for 1996. The City
contends
its offered increase would keep salaries in line with the pay for top step
officers
in its selected comparators. In the City's view, the total compensation
received
by
Pullman officers is more than competitive, especially in the local labor market
which
includes the law enforcement agencies of Washington State University,
Whitman
County and Moscow, Idaho. The City notes that firefighters, transit
employees,
public works and parks employees, library employees and police support
services
employees all accepted the City's offered 2.9% across the board wage increase
for
1996. A higher award to the City's police force will distort historic pay
relationships
that currently exist between police officers and firefighters. The City
contends
the award proposed by the Guild would be excessive and unjustified in light
of
the City's future fiscal uncertainty. The City has enough cash on hand for the
present
but must harbor those funds to help cover budgeted expenditures that will
exceed
projected future revenues.
Discussion and Findings: In 1996, the comparable jurisdictions
are paying the
following
top step base wage:
1996
Monthly
Top
Step
__________ Ellensburg $2889
9 The Guild describes this top step as $3694
(Ex. G-2-3); the City sets it at $3568
(posthearing brief p.25). The figure used is that
shown in the 1996 AWC survey as the top of
the
formal salary range. Ex. G-15-11, p.2.
In setting a wage rate for
two
comparators. There is an obvious problem with the Guild's methodology.
Computing an average for only
the top 2 comparators effectively limits any comparison
to
the cities of
resources
and are the least similar to
Guild's suggested approach
also departs from the methodology the Guild found suitable
during
the last interest arbitration before Arbitrator Gary Axon. On that occasion,
the
Guild used the average top
step salary for all comparators selected by the Guild. Ex.
G-1-2.
The Guild's attempt to have
comparables
for the life of the contract was rejected by Arbitrator Axon in 1992. Axon
concluded
that neither the statute nor arbitral authority supported such an automatic
connection.
This Arbitrator concurs. The 1996 average top step for all the selected
comparables
is $3326, an amount 4.27% higher than the current
This average is an appropriate
starting point, but should not be the only consideration.
One should also consider where
a potential salary increase would place the bargaining
unit
in relation to particular comparables.
1. Ranking Within Comparables.
The Guild's proposed salary of $3630 would place
below
resources
between
unreasonable.
Just as the Guild's requested increase is too high, the record is
persuasive
that the City's offered increase is too low. A 2.9% increase for 1996 would
result
in a top step wage of $3283. That salary would place the Pullman top step
behind
all other comparable jurisdictions except Moses Lake and Ellensburg. Such
positioning
would cause Pullman officers to lose ground they effectively gained during
the
last collective bargaining agreement
In the 1993-1995 labor contract, the
City agreed to a wage scale that placed
Pullman's top step below Pasco
and slightly above Walla Walla. Walla Walla's 1995
top
step was $3158. At $3190, Pullman's top step was 101% that of Walla Walla. The
City has not made a persuasive
case that at the outset of this new labor agreement,
Pullman officers should be
awarded a top step salary that causes them to again fall
back
below Walla Walla.
The city of Walla Walla is very close
to Pullman both in population and size of
their
police department. Its locale, like that of Pullman, is agricultural, but Walla
Walla is not the site of the
state's second largest institution of higher learning. As
Chief Weatherly acknowledged
during his testimony, WSU's presence in Pullman
causes
the City to expect more of its officers than in other jurisdictions. Pullman
has
a
highly educated populace and that populace expects a highly professional police
force.
As is evident from the way the
City favors salary enhancements that require higher
education
instead of providing longevity, the City wants its uniformed officers to be
well
educated themselves.10
10 Walla Walla has an
education incentive, but it also provides its officers with longevity
increases.
If Pullman officers are placed in the same relative position vis-a-vis Walla
Walla as they were at the end
of 1995, i.e. at 101% of the Walla Walla top step
wage,
the
1996 top step salary for Pullman officers becomes $3324. The resulting
percentage
increase
is 4.2%, an increase close to but slightly below the average increase for all
the
comparables.11
11 The City offered evidence that the salaries
for City Supervisor, Finance Director, Police
Chief,
and Human Resource Manager all fall below the average for the same positions in
Eastern
Washington Cities ranging in population from 10,000 to 30,000. Ex. C-33. The
comparable
jurisdictions used by the City differ from those selected here, so this
evidence did
not
provide persuasive justification for setting the Pullman top step lower than
the amount
needed
to keep that rate above Walla Walla.
Other Statutory Considerations: The foregoing analysis has been
used to
determine
what wage increase will maintain the bargaining unit within a reasonable
range
of the other comparable jurisdictions The inquiry does not end at this point.
One must next consider if the
other statutory factors merit an upward or downward
adjustment
in the wage increase being considered.
2. Fiscal impact on the City
A 1996 top step wage of $3324 is $41 more per month than the
$3283 wage
offered
by the City. According to the City's Finance Director, each dollar increase in
salaries
currently produces, on average, an additional "roll-up" cost to the
City of 33.9
cents.12
With this roll-up cost factored in, an approximation of the added cost to the
City of increasing the 1996
top step to $3324 is $15,152 more than the cost of the 2.9%
increase
it was already offering.13
12 The roll-up cost includes the percentage
paid for educational incentive, shift differentials
(when
applicable), average overtime, holiday pay, the LEOFF contribution, Social
Security, and
Medicare. Ex. C-28.
13 This figure results from taking the monthly
difference in the top step wage ($41),
annualized
(x12), increased by 33.9% (for the roll-up cost), and multiplied by 23 (the
number
of
bargaining unit positions filled in 1996).
The City has followed a practice of building up large reserves
as a method of
funding
the following year's budget. The City normally tries to carry a General Fund
reserve
of 13%. Because of cost cutting measures implemented in 1995 and revenues
that
exceeded budget projections, the City began 1996 with a cash reserve of
$2,865,544
(39.9% of the proposed 1996 General Fund budget). Ex. C-42. The City
clearly
has enough available funds to cover an increase in the top step by 4.2%.
The City offered testimony regarding a variety of pending
fiscal concerns.
Revenue has been falling or is
projected to fall because of a decline in the City's portion
of
the Motor Vehicle Excise Tax (MVET), a reduction in utility taxes from WSU, a
reduction
in the amount of state shared revenues; a potential property tax reduction
mandated
by the state legislature, and other potential legislative actions. At the same
time
that it is losing some of these funding sources, the City is incurring costs it
did not
previously
have to cover. An example of the latter is the state mandated pickup of
certain
criminal justice costs projected to total $200,000 in 1996.
The City's concerns are no doubt genuine, but the Guild
established that the
City has underestimated
revenues and over-estimated expenses for six (6) years in a
row.
Even if one ignores the savings achieved through cost-cutting measures that
cannot
be continued indefinitely, Finance Director Jack Tonkovich
acknowledged that
on
average the City has ended up underestimating its revenues by 5% each year. Its
available
fund balances have certainly tended to be far higher than initially projected.
At one point, the City
estimated its available fund balance at the end of 1996 would be
$1,843,661.
In actuality, the City ended with a balance over $3 million. For the years
1991 through 1995, it finished
each year with a surplus ranging from $224,453 to
$887,742. Ex. G-2-15. Those surpluses have been achieved even though
the City
Council has chosen to draw on
its General Fund for many capital projects instead of
raising
money for those projects through bond issues.
In light of positive developments, such as the better than
anticipated increase
in
City sales tax revenue, and the speculative nature of some of the City's future
concerns,
the record leads the Arbitrator to conclude that a 1996 wage increase of 4.2%
will
not have a deleterious effect on the City's ability to maintain essential and
desired
governmental
services. I am mindful of future demands on the City's General Fund
Reserves but do not find those
demands significant enough to deny the bargaining unit
a
fair and competitive wage.
3. Internal Parity.
The City would have the bargaining unit limited to a 2.9%
increase for 1996
because
that is what other bargaining units and unrepresented employees have
received
for that year. There are a number of reasons why the City's parity argument
is
not persuasive. First, with regard to represented employees, arbitrators
recognize
that
the particulars of other settlements are affected by concerns unique to each
bargaining
unit. One unit may give a higher priority to achieving step adjustments in
a
wage schedule than to gaining a higher across the board increase. For another
unit,
the
reverse may be true. One unit may accept a lower wage increase because that
increase
maintains the bargaining unit's wages at a level competitive with the wages
in
other jurisdictions. Another unit may find the same percentage increase
unacceptable
because it does not result in a competitive wage. Those bargaining units
that
accepted the offered 2.9% increase for 1996 may have done so because that
percentage
increase maintained their wages at a level comparable to their counterparts
in
other jurisdictions.
The ATU accepted a 2.9% across the board wage increase for
1996, but that
increase
was accompanied by another significant concession of special interest to the
ATU
unit. The City agreed to continue paying the full
health insurance premium for
bargaining
unit employees laid off or having their hours reduced during the summer.
The IAFF likewise achieved a
concession that its bargaining unit particularly valued.
Wages were increased by 2.9%
in 1996, but that increase was also accompanied by a
reduction
in the hourly work week. There is no evidence the City offered the Guild's
bargaining
unit some comparable concession as an inducement to accept 2.9% for 1996.
Employee groups that accepted
the City's offer did so at a time when there was
a
lot more uncertainty about 1996 projected revenues and expenses. Guild members,
in
comparison, were willing to give up immediate increases and take their chances
on
how
convincing the City's fiscal situation would be by the time of an interest
arbitration.
Now that some of the projected revenue shortfalls have not proven as
extensive
as first believed, the Guild can rightfully expect a wage package that is set
in
light of the situation now known to exist.
4. Local Labor Market Considerations.
Arbitrators recognize that an award of wages falling below
those in the local
labor
market will cause turnover and low morale. Such awards are generally avoided,
so
long as a subject jurisdiction has the ability to pay a greater amount. In the
instant
case,
the City's offered 1996 wage of $3283 clearly exceeds that of the other local
law
enforcement
agencies. The question is whether more of a differential is justified than
the
amount the City now offers.
The record indicates the City has historically paid its work
force a wage
significantly
higher than that of the local law enforcement agencies. As noted earlier,
these
other agencies differ from the City in some significant respects. For 1995, the
Guild bargained a top step
Pullman wage that was 13% higher than Moscow, Idaho,
20%
higher than at WSU, and almost 39% higher than Whitman County.
The City has
not
offered a compelling reason why the Arbitrator should award a top step that
does
not
maintain the kind of premium that the City has previously paid over local labor
market
wages.
If one adjusts the local labor market's 1996 top step wages by
the same
differential
the parties accepted at the bargaining table in 1995, the resulting average
wage
for the three local labor market jurisdictions is as follows:
Premium Over
Local Labor Market14
1995 Pullman 1996 1996
Top Step
Top Step '95
Premium Top Step w/95 Premium
Pullman $3190
Moscow, ID $2825 +12.9% $2881 $3317
WSU $2660 +19.9% $2766 $3253
Whitman Co. $2302 +38.6% $2455 $3402
______________________________________________
________ LLM Ave. $2596 +23.8% $3324
14 Ex. C-29.
After factoring in the same
relative differential that the City and Guild bargained in
1995, the average 1996 wage
for the 3 jurisdictions comes to the same wage rate
arrived
at by reference to the prime comparables. An awarded top step of $3324 would
thus
be consistent with the kind of premium that the City has previously agreed to
pay
over
local labor market wages
With all of the foregoing considerations in mind, the
Arbitrator awards a 1996
top
step base wage of $3324, representing an increase of 4.2%. That increase is
larger
than
the increase provided to other City employees, but necessary to place the
City's
uniformed
personnel at a reasonable level in relation to their counterparts in
comparable
jurisdictions.
5. 1997/1998 Adjustments.
If the Arbitrator decided to award a multi-year contract, the
City has sought an
award
patterned after that adopted in a three (3) year contract finalized with the
ATU.
That contract based wage
increases in 1997-1999 on 90% of the first half Seattle CPI
(Urban Wage Earners and
Clerical Workers Index) with a minimum increase of 2.5%
and
maximum of 7.5%. For the second and third years of the ATU contract, the City
can
reopen wages due to financial considerations. The Guild has sought a wage
increase
that maintains salaries at the average for the top two comparable
jurisdictions.
Interest arbitration awards frequently tie wage increases in
the second and third
years
of a multi-year contract to changes in a selected cost of living index. That
has
sometimes
been the practice of the City and its bargaining units. For the Guild's 1993-
1995 labor contract, salary
increases in the second and third years of the contract were
tied
to 90% of the first half Seattle CPI (Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers
Index).
That same CPI adjustment was used in the collective bargaining agreement
the
City negotiated with the ATU for 1997-1999.
It is consistent with the parties' prior practice and
reasonable to use the same
CPI adjustment for the third
year of this contract as is used in the ATU labor contract.
However, the purpose of the
awarded 1996 wage increase was to maintain
step
wages at 1% above those of
is
$3431. To ensure Guild members maintain their position vis-a-vis
at
least the first 2 years of this contract, the Arbitrator finds it appropriate
to award
a
1997 top step wage rate of $3465.
The City's request for a wage reopener
is denied. The cost of the awarded wage
increases
is a very small percentage of the City's budget. Even if expected revenue
shortfalls
occur in 1997 and/or 1998, the awarded increases would still appear to be
well
within the City's ability to pay and they are necessary to keep the salaries of
jurisdictions
and equitable in light of the City's expectations for its police force.
C. HEALTH INSURANCE
The City presently pays the full health insurance premium for
regular full-time
employees
and their dependents. The insurance provides medical, dental and vision
coverage.
The current employee-paid deductible for this insurance is $50 per
individual
and $100 per family.
City: The City proposes
that effective
be
increased to $100 per individual and $200 per family. It also proposes the
addition
of
co-payments. The City seeks a co-payment of $10.00 on all medical and vision
coverage,
$10.00 on prescription generic drugs, and $20 on prescription brand name
drugs.
The City argues that higher deductibles and co-payments are necessary to keep
rate
increases down by making employees conscious of the costs of medical services
According to the City, all
other bargaining units and City employees will be paying the
higher
deductibles and co-payments, and the City notes that many other jurisdictions
have
higher deductibles and co-payments than contained in the City's proposal.
Guild: The Guild objects
to any increases, contending there is no demonstrated
need
for them.
Discussion and Findings: Arbitrators are always loathe to award
the "take
back"
of a benefit previously gained by a bargaining unit. No individual is very
willing
to
give up a benefit they've been enjoying. Perceived "take backs" thus
tend to be
contentious
issues which bargaining units will vigorously resist. With that in mind,
interest
arbitrators generally expect the party proposing a reduction in a previously
gained
benefit to bear the burden of persuasion. That burden was not met by the City
as
to its proposed health insurance change.
The Guild has cooperated with City in past when there were
dramatic premium
increases.
To avoid the imposition of higher deductibles and co-payments, the Guild
has
encouraged its bargaining unit members to follow good health habits and use
medical
services judiciously. They appear to have been doing so. The City certainly
did
not demonstrate that the bargaining unit's experience rating would justify any
significant
premium increase. Co-payments do help to reduce the over utilization of
services.
Experts generally agree that employees will use health care services more
judiciously
if they have to pay some of their own funds (even a small amount) when
visiting a
doctor or provider. As of this point in time, however, the record indicates
over
utilization is being held in check.
The main reason for the City's proposal seems to be a desire to
pocket some cost
savings.
An employer is always going to cut costs where it can but compared to
comparable
jurisdictions, the City's premium costs are quite reasonable. In 1996, the
monthly
insurance premium paid by the City was $375.00. Of the comparators, only
Pasco paid a lower rate. On
average, the monthly premium paid by the comparators
was
17% higher than Pullman is paying.
MONTHLY PREMIUMS PAID
BY COMPARABLES
1996 1997
Wenatchee $603 unknown
Kennewick $454 $439
Moses Lake $433 unknown
Ellensburg $421 unknown
Richland $417 unknown
Walla Walla $396 $441
Pullman $375 $375
Pasco $348 unknown
Average for Comps $439
The City Council is said to
feel that it is providing the bargaining unit with a
"Cadillac" plan. The plan is a very good one, but it is also one the
City has been able
to
provide at considerably less cost than jurisdictions that are using the kinds
of higher
deductibles
and co-payments the City wants to institute. The City worries that
premium
increases are occurring generally throughout the state and will inevitably
strike
Pullman. Maybe so, but the City has already been notified that there will no
premium
increase for 1997. That fact reinforces the conclusion that the changes
sought
by the City are not yet sufficiently justified.
The City's only other justification for imposing the higher
deductibles and co-
payments
is the fact that it is instituting them for the rest of the City. One can
appreciate
why the City would prefer the ease of administering uniform deductibles
and
co-payments. Its inducements to other bargaining units such as the IAFF and
ATU no doubt facilitated
acceptance of the proposed change to deductibles and co-
payments.
For the Guild, the City has only suggested "take backs". In light of
that
fact
and the unchanged insurance premium applicable in 1997, the record provides
insufficient
reason to change the status quo regarding applicable deductibles and co-
payments
for the bargaining unit. If the City experiences a significant premium
increase
in 1998, it will have a stronger argument for making the proposed changes in
the
next labor contract. For now those changes are premature.
D. SHIFT DIFFERENTIAL
Pullman police officers currently work three
shift's: days, swing, and night. For
the
latter two shifts, officers receive premium pay at a rate of $35.00 per month
for
swing
shift and $60.00 per month for graveyard. The City wants to eliminate this
premium.
City: The City contends
the shift differential is an anachronism. If officers
have
enough seniority, they can bid for shifts they want so the City objects to
providing
extra
pay for working preferred shifts. The City feels it gets no credit from the
Guild
for
the extra money the City pays for this benefit, and it notes that a majority of
the
comparables
do not offer a shift differential The City says the shift differential is
costly
and difficult to administer so it wants to eliminate that present wage
enhancement.
Guild: The Guild proposes
to retain the current shift differential. The
differential
was awarded as part of the 1992 Axon interest arbitration award and the
controlling
factor was internal parity. The only other City employees who work
differing
shifts are firefighters and the police support personnel. A shift differential
is
not applicable to the firefighters because they work 24 hour shifts. Arbitrator
Axon
decided
it would create an internal inequity if sworn officers did not receive a
differential
while police support personnel did. That issue of internal parity has not
changed
since the Axon decision and whether comparators pay a shift differential or
not
is likewise unchanged.
Discussion and Findings: As in the case of insurance benefits,
the City proposes
to
change a benefit the Guild gained for its members through prior bargaining. The
City has not made a persuasive
case for doing so. The ATU bargaining unit apparently
works a
swing shift without receiving a differential, but it is uncontested that police
department
personnel have received a differential for many years. The record does not
reveal
how early the payment of shift differential started, but judging from the Axon
arbitration
award, it predated 1990.
In his 1992 award, Arbitrator Axon found an existing
differential was "meager
and
inadequate compensation for officers working non-traditional hours". Ex. G-1-2.
p. 58.15 Axon noted
that police support personnel received a significantly higher
differential
so to ensure more parity within the department, he awarded Guild
members
an increase in their differential to $35 per month for swing and $60 per
month
for graveyard.16
15 The differential at this point was $15 per
month for swing and $20 per month for
graveyard.
16 Arbitrator Axon narrowed the difference but
did not award a shift differential identical
to
that received by the support personnel because he recognized there were
differences in the
total
compensation packages available to the two groups of employees.
Although prior interest arbitration awards are not controlling
precedent, neither
side
is well served by subsequent decisions that do not give considerable deference
to
the
carefully reasoned judgments of prior awards. Officers are still working non-
traditional
hours, and they are doing so regardless of personal preference. Even those
officers
with high seniority can hold the shift they bid for just two (2) consecutive
rotations.
They must then change to a different shift. In some cases, that might fit an
officer's
preference, in others it no doubt does not. Officers with low seniority clearly
do
not get to pick the shift they prefer. Yet the City would eliminate all shift
differentials
on the unproven assumption that most officers get to work the shifts that
they
prefer.
The payment of an even higher shift differential to police
support personnel has
not
changed since the Axon award. Non-uniformed support personnel still work in
conjunction
with uniformed officers on the swing and graveyard shift. In light of that,
there
seems little justification for providing shift differentials to the
department's non-
uniformed
work force and not to the uniformed officers. As Arbitrator Axon noted, the
controlling
consideration is the issue of internal parity within the same department.
The City notes that few comparators pay any shift differential.
Only two (2) of
the
seven (7) primary comparables do so and those two (Walla Walla
and Wenatchee)
apparently
pay only for the graveyard shift. The other comparators still have not
added
shift differentials to their benefit package, but they may not have rules that
require
officers to change shifts periodically as the City of Pullman does. The lack of
support
among comparables might have been a persuasive consideration if the Guild
were
seeking to now add the premiums at issue. It is not a persuasive reason for
allowing
the City to take away a benefit gained through prior bargaining.
A final reason for denying the City's proposal is its own
desire to alter the
existing
schedule by which officer rotate shifts The City's shift rotation proposal will
impact
officers' personnel lives. At a time when the City proposes a change that could
detrimentally
impact some officers, it is incongruous to remove a wage differential
whose
purpose is to provide some compensation for the personal inconvenience that
may
result. The City's proposed elimination of a shift differential is rejected.
The
current
contract language will be retained.
E. SHIFT ROTATION
Every four (4) months, officers bid for one of the three shifts
based upon their
seniority.
After two (2) cycles on the same shift, i.e. a maximum of eight (8) months,
officers
must rotate to a different shift. The cycles were originally tied into the WSU
semester
schedule but they now deviate from that schedule somewhat.18
17 This 4 month period is referred to as a
shift "cycle".
18 The current rotation requires shift changes
on September 1, January 1 and May 1 of each
year.
WSU classes begin in late August, end in December, begin again in January and
end in
mid
May.
City: The City wants to
lengthen the shift cycle to six (6) months. It proposes
new
contract language for Article 8 (Hours of Work) as follows: "Shift
rotations shall
be
six months in length. The rotations shall occur on January 1 and July 1 of each
calendar
year. " Ex. C-10. The purpose of this change is
to better implement a problem
solving
approach that is part of the Department's emphasis on community policing.
Guild: The Guild has a
number of objections to changing the existing rotation.
It contends the proposed
change would affect the ability of officers to adjust their
schedules
to fit with family life. It would require officers, who bid a certain shift in
order
to attend school, to take a break from school when the third cycle came and a
change
in shift was mandated. The change would also lengthen the time that an
officer
would be stuck on an undesirable shift from eight months to one year. The
Guild worries that if the
change is allowed and does not prove practical, the Guild then
incurs
the burden of removing it from the status quo ante.
Discussion and Findings: The City's proposed change could
certainly
inconvenience
some members of the bargaining unit. That by itself is not sufficient
reason
to reject it. The testimony of Chief Weatherly was convincing that he has
legitimate
managerial reasons for wanting to try the lengthened rotations, i.e. to
enhance
department efficiency and improve crime prevention and control.
The City is committed to a community policing approach that
includes patrol
team
problem solving. Chief Weatherly believes four months is not enough time for
shifts
to develop problem-solving goals and strategies and see them through. The
City's proposal would allow
each shift to identify problems and plan problem solving
strategies
before each WSU semester begins, allow the strategies to be implemented
during
periods of peak student activity, and then provide a time to critique the
strategies
after WSU semesters have ended. The Chief thus wants to try the six month
rotation
for a trial period to evaluate its advantages and disadvantages.
The Guild contends that even a trial period should not be
allowed because there
are
too many unanswered questions about the impact of the change on child care
arrangements,
school attendance and the commitment of shift supervisors to the
problem
solving approach. The Guild suggests that a preferable approach would be a
contractual reopener. The problem with this suggestion is that it is
already too late
in
the contract for a reopener to have any practical
chance of allowing the City a
meaningful
trial before the contract would end. Moreover, it appears there has already
been
considerable discussion of the proposed change both with supervisors and
bargaining
unit personnel. At this point, minds are not likely to be changed until it
can
be seen how the lengthened cycles work in actual practice.
If a trial period were allowed for the remainder of the
contract, the lengthened
rotations
would not start before July 1, 1997. Beginning the trial period at that point
would
allow three lengthened cycles before the collective bargaining agreement ends.
Weighing the extent to which a
trial will serve the interests of the public against the
potential
inconvenience to the bargaining unit (some of whom may in fact find the
lengthened
cycles to be preferable), the Arbitrator concludes the City's proposed change
should
be allowed on a trial basis. The Guild's concern about incurring the burden of
removing
the change from the contract if it proves highly unpopular will be addressed
by
specifying that the six (6) month cycles end on December 31, 1998 after which
rotations
shall return to their earlier length until a different outcome is either
bargained
as part of the next contract or directed as part of a future interest
arbitration
award.
F. EDUCATIONAL INCENTIVE/LONGEVITY PAY
The parties' 1993-1995 collective bargaining agreement contains
an educational
incentive.
The incentive provides the following additional percentage of base pay:
Completion of Incentive Pay
30 semester hours (45 quarter) 2%
60 semester (90 quarter) 4%
90 semester (135 quarter) 6%
Bachelor's Degree 8%
Master's Degree 10%
Once an officer reaches the
top step of the salary schedule, the collective bargaining
agreement
does not provide any additional salary based purely on longevity.
Guild: The Guild proposes
the addition of longevity pay for those employees
who
do not qualify for the educational incentive. The Guild's proposal reads as
follows:
At the officer's option he/she may convert their Educational
Incentive at an equal percent(%), i.e. 1% College Incentive - 1%
Longevity.
Employee's Educational Incentive (total percentage) will at the
employee's
request, automatically convert to Longevity (same percentage
as
Educational Incentive) during their last thirty (30) days of service with
the
City.
Longevity may be accrued at two and one-half percent (2.5%) of
base
salary for each five (5) years of service. The maximum accrual of
longevity
pay will be ten percent (10%).
At no time will the combined total of Education Incentive and
Longevity exceed
ten percent (10%).
The Guild says its proposal
would bring parity between those officers who retire under
LEOFF
I and those who retire under LEOFF II. The Guild contends longevity
pay is
also
needed to recognize the value and skill of experienced officers. Based upon
1995
salaries,
the Guild calculated the additional cost to the City at $18,285 per year, which
it
characterized as minimal.
City: The City says
there is no persuasive reason for making the proposed
change.
It notes that only a small group of officers are covered by LEOFF I, and the
proposed
conversion of educational incentive pay to longevity is not a prevailing
practice
of comparable jurisdictions. The City contends that time in service does not
automatically
guarantee greater officer effectiveness. Without further education,
officer
effectiveness may actually plateau or drop. In the City's view, a
better-educated
officer
is unquestionably more prepared to carry out a community-oriented policing
program
in a highly educated community such as Pullman. The City therefore
contends
that pay for additional education rather than just for time in service is the
better
approach; one that most effectively serves the interests of Pullman citizens.
Discussion and Findings: The Guild's proposal is admittedly an
attempt to
boost
the retirement for LEOFF I officers. Under the LEOFF I plan, an officer's
retirement
benefit is based upon a final average salary that includes longevity pay but
not
special salary or wages such as educational incentive pay. In comparison, the
current
educational incentive is includable in the final average salary for officers
covered
under LEOFF II.
The Guild claims its proposal is designed to bring
"parity" between the two
LEOFF plans. It judges parity,
however, by focusing on only one distinction between
the
two plans. The two LEOFF plans vary in a number of respects, and many of the
distinctions
favor LEOFF I officers. LEOFF I officers cannot include educational
incentive
in their final average salary, but they can retire with full benefits at age 50
after
20 years of work. LEOFF II officers get the benefit of the educational
incentive
but
they have to be five (5) years older and work five (5) years longer to receive
full
benefits.
For LEOFF I officers, the final average salary computation uses a salary
earned
closer to retirement, and thus more likely to be higher, than the 5 year
average
used
by LEOFF II. As is evident from the foregoing, and other distinctions we need
not
belabor,
each plan has its relative advantages and disadvantages. As the Guild's
witness
was forced to acknowledge, the ability to count wage premiums could have
been a
partial trade off for less desirable features of LEOFF II. The Guild thus did
not
make a
persuasive case that the City should be required, as a matter of LEOFF equity,
to
adopt the conversion plan.
The Guild also seeks a longevity accrual to provide additional
salary to officers
who
do not qualify for the educational incentive. Once an officer tops out on the
salary
schedule,
the City of Pullman has chosen to tie additional salary incentives to
education.
Chief Weatherly acknowledged there are some fine officers on the force who
do
not qualify for the educational incentive. He articulated reasonable grounds
for
believing
such officers could be even better with further education. The City feels that
adding
the requested longevity will reduce the incentive for bargaining employees to
take
advantage of the proximity of WSU and the courses available there. An accrual
at
the level the Guild seeks could well have that effect.
Only two (2) members of the Department are not receiving an
educational
incentive.19
Of those who receive the incentive, over two-thirds qualify for a salary
premium
of 8% by having a Bachelor's degree. There are five (5) listed fields of study
that
are viewed as having a direct relationship to police service. The educational
incentive
plan also allows credit for "other fields that are mutually
approved". The
Guild did not establish that
the City has been unreasonably withholding approval of
credit
for course work that would appear to be of beneficial use. For those who may
not
have
had the right type of qualifying courses when they first joined the Department,
returning
to school is never easy, but the work force at least has the proximity of WSU
at
which it can take qualifying courses.
19 A Guild exhibit shows 3 officers without
incentive pay, but City records indicate that
during
1996 one of those officers became eligible and began receiving the added pay. (Ex. C-26).
The practice of the comparable jurisdictions is quite varied.
Three of the
jurisdictions
(Walla Walla, Richland, and Ellensburg) provide both
longevity and
educational
incentive. Pasco offers just incentive pay for education like Pullman does;
Wenatchee pays for longevity
but not education; Moses Lake provides neither type of
incentive
pay, and Kennewick has recently adopted a Master Police Officer plan whose
eligibility
requirements combine a certain amount of longevity with a college degree
or
equivalent college credits. None of the comparators allow the conversion of
educational
incentive so as to allow LEOFF I officers to raise their final salary for
retirement
benefit purposes. As for internal parity, the City is consistent in not
allowing
the conversion of educational incentive pay to longevity pay. We conclude
that
neither a comparison with the comparable cities, nor other sufficient reasons,
supports
the Guild's proposal.
G. SHARED LEAVE
Guild: The Guild proposes
the addition of a new article to the contract entitled
"Shared
Leave." The provisions of this article would allow
employees to donate sick
leave
compensatory time, and/or annual leave hours to fellow employees based upon
certain
described criteria. Those eligible to receive the leave would be employees who
are
suffering from, or have a relative or household member suffering from "an
extraordinary
or severe illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition".
The Guild's proposal is based
upon a policy in place for employees of the State of
bargaining
unit employees to help their colleagues and by helping the City to retain
valued
employees who need time to deal with a significant personal health condition.
The Guild views its proposal
as a zero cost item for the City.
City: The City feels
the proposed leave plan would be administratively clumsy
and
costly to administer. It notes that there has been little demonstrated need for
the
shared
leave program and that details of the plan were never presented to the City
during
negotiations; they were introduced only in the arbitration hearing. The City
is
willing to continue exploring the issue with the Guild but contends
implementation
of
any shared leave program is premature.
Discussion and Findings: The Guild's proposal is worthy of
continued discussion
but
it needs further study. The record indicates there have been few (perhaps only
one)
instances
in the past seventeen years when the Guild's proposal would have provided
assistance
to a bargaining unit member. The problem the Guild seeks to address has
arisen
few times in the past and is not likely to be frequent in the future. There
thus
seems
no reason to rush into adoption of a new leave program without more complete
discussion
of its administrative details.
The City has a legitimate concern about increasing the demands
on its very
small
finance office staff. It may be possible to minimize those demands through the
use
of computer programs such as one WSU is apparently using. Walla Walla is
apparently
beginning a shared leave program of some sort. The parties may well be
able
to learn from that jurisdiction's experience. Further investigation into the
experience
of other jurisdictions is needed as is further discussion regarding how
various
aspects of the proposed program would be handled. The Guild's proposed
shared
leave proposal is not adopted.
IN THE MATTER OF THE
ARBITRATION
BETWEEN
)
THE PULLMAN POLICE OFFICERS )
GUILD ) INTEREST
ARBITRATION
and ) AWARD
)
CITY OF
)
PERC Case No.12399-I-96-269
After careful consideration of all arguments and evidence and
in accordance with
the
statutory criteria of RCW 41.56.465, the following award is made:
Article 8 Hours of Work
For the period July 1, 1997
through December 31, 1998, shift
rotations
shall be increased to six months in length. The rotations
shall
occur on January 1 and July 1 of each calendar year.
Effective January 1, 1999, the
status quo for bargaining shall
return
to the practice in effect prior to the July 1, 1997 change.
Article 17 Health Insurance
No change to current contract
language.
Article 25 Shift Differential
No change to current contract
language.
Article 28 Education
Incentive/Longevity
No change to current contract
language.
Article 29 Salaries and Wages
1. Effective January 1, 1996, the top step base salary shall be
increased
by 4.2% to $3324 per month
2. Effective January 1, 1997, the top step base salary shall be
further
increased to $3465 per month.
3. Effective January 1, 1998, the top step base salary shall be
increased
by 90% of the first half Seattle CPI (Urban Wage
Earners and Clerical Workers
Index) with a minimum increase of
2.5% and a maximum increase of
7.5%.
4. The wage increases for other classifications in the bargaining
unit
shall be set at a level that maintains the current differential
from
the top step benchmark rate.
Proposed new Article Shared
Leave
Not adopted.
Article 33
Duration
The Agreement shall be
effective retroactive to January 1, 1996
and
remain in full force through December 31, 1998 and thereafter
to
the extent required by law.
Dated this 21st day of March
1997 by
Janet
L. Gaunt, Neutral Chairperson