And
Interest
Arbitration
Arbitrator: Gary L. Axon
Date
Issued:
Arbitrator:
Axon; Gary L.
Case #: 11845-I-95-00252
Employer:
Date Issued:
IN THE MATTER OF )
)
INTEREST ARBITRATION ) PERC
NO. 11845-1-95-252
BETWEEN ) ARBITRATOR'S OPINION
)
DEPUTY
SHERIFF'S GUILD, )
) 1995-97 AGREEMENT
Guild, )
)
and )
)
)
County. )
HEARING SITE:
HEARING DATES: February 26, 27,
28, 29, 1996
POST-HEARING BRIEFS DUE: Postmarked April Si 1996
RECORD CLOSED ON RECEIPT OF BRIEFS:
REPRESENTING THE GUILD: Daryl S. Garrettson
Hoag,
Garrettson, Goldberg
&
Fenrich
1313
N.W. 19th
REPRESENTING THE COUNTY: Otto G. Klein, III
Heller,
Ehrman, White
&
McAuliffe
6100
701
INTEREST ARBITRATOR : Gary L. Axon
1465
Pinecrest Terrace
(541)
488-1573
Table
of Contents
ISSUE Page
Introduction 2
1 - Wages/Economics 6
2 - Paid
Days Off/Holidays 43
3 - Incentive
Plan 52
4 - Pay
period/Method of Pay 59
5 - Hours
of Work/Schedules 70
6 - Benefits/Insurance 83
7 - Miscellaneous 87
Conclusion 94
I. INTRODUCTION
This
case is an interest arbitration conducted pursuant
to the public Employees Collective
Bargaining Act. The parties to
this dispute are the
"Guild") and
County and the Guild are parties to an
Agreement that covered the
period from
the first Collective Bargaining Agreement
entered into by the
parties following certification of the Guild
in 1991 as the
representative of the deputies in the
Office. The prior Agreement concluded with
an interest arbitration
in the summer of 1993. The parties were unable to reach final
agreement for the successor contract in
either bargaining or
mediation and submitted their dispute to
interest arbitration. The
parties agreed to waive the provision for
partisan arbitrators and
the case was submitted to this Arbitrator
for a final Award.
Clark
County is located in southwestern Washington,
across the river from
rapidly over the last ten years. The Sheriff's Office is
responsible for providing a variety of
police services within the
633 square miles that encompass
services the unincorporated areas of
current population of about 206,000
people. The total population
of
The
Guild represents approximately 107 deputy sheriffs
and 15 sergeants in the bargaining
unit. During 1995 patrol
officers received approximately 67,944 calls
for service. Thirteen
percent of those calls were priority 1 and 2
which required
immediate response.
citations and wrote over 24,510 original
crime reports. The
Sheriff's Office employs a total of 326
persons in paid positions.
At
the commencement of the arbitration hearing the
parties agreed to a list of comparable
jurisdictions to assist in
the
resolution of this contract
dispute. The jurisdictions
stipulated to as comparable for the purposes
of this interest
arbitration are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
The
hearing in this case took four days for the parties
to
present their evidence
and testimony. Because
of the
stipulation of the parties, it was
unnecessary for the parties to
present evidence on the issue of the
appropriate jurisdictions with
which to compare
terms of the successor Agreement to the
1992-94 contract. The
majority of the hearing time was consumed
with different attempts
by the parties to make comparisons of
compensation among the seven
jurisdictions. The hearing was tape recorded by the
Arbitrator as
an extension of his personal note
taking. Testimony of the
witnesses was received under oath. At the hearing the parties were
given the full opportunity to present
written evidence, oral
testimony and argument. The parties provided the Arbitrator with
substantial written documentation in support
of their respective
cases.
The
parties also submitted comprehensive and lengthy
post-hearing briefs in support of their
respective positions taken
at arbitration. For the purpose of presenting evidence and
argument, the parties categorized the areas
of dispute into seven
issues.
In addition, there were sub-issues included within the
seven areas in dispute. The seven issues identified for an Award
by this Arbitrator are as follows:
1
. Wages/Economics
2. Paid Days Off/Holidays
3
. Incentive Plan
4. Pay period/Method of Pay
5. Hours of Work/Schedules
6
. Benefits/Insurance
7. Miscellaneous
The
approach of this Arbitrator in writing the Award will
be to summarize the major and most
persuasive evidence and argument
presented by the parties on each of the
issues. After the
introduction of the issue and positions of
the parties, I will
state the basic findings and rationale which
caused the Arbitrator
to make the award on the individual
issues. A considerable portion
of the evidence and argument related to more
than one of the issues
and will not be duplicated in its entirety
in the discussion of the
separate issues.
This
Arbitrator carefully reviewed and evaluated all of
the evidence and argument submitted pursuant
to the criteria
established by RCW 41.56.465. Since the record in this case is so
comprehensive it would be impractical for
the Arbitrator in the
discussion and Award to restate and refer to
each and every piece
of evidence and testimony presented. However, when formulating
this Award the Arbitrator did give careful
consideration to all of
the evidence and argument placed into the
record by the parties.
The
statutory factors to be considered by the Arbitrator
may be summarized as follows:
(a) the
constitutional and statutory
authority
of the employer;
(b) the stipulations of the parties;
(c) the wages, hours
and conditions of
employment
of like personnel of like employers
of
similar size on the West Coast of the
United
States;
(d) the average consumer prices for goods
and
services, commonly
known as the
cost of
living;
(e) changes
in any of
the foregoing
circumstances during
the pendency of the
proceedings;
and
(f) such other factors, not confined to the
foregoing,
which are normally or traditionally
taken
into consideration in the determination
of
wages, hours and conditions of employment.
ISSUE
1 - WAGES/ECONOMICS
A. Background
This
contract came to arbitration as the result of the
impasse reached between the parties in
negotiations for a successor
to the 1992-94 Collective Bargaining
Agreement. The top pay for a
40-hour deputy under the 1992-94 contract
was $3,337 per month.
The 48-hour deputy top pay was set at $3,514
per month. The road
deputies work a 48-hour schedule consisting
of four 12 hour shifts.
In the 1992-94 Agreement, the parties added
a 5.28% premium pay for
all of the deputies working on the 48-hour
schedule. This
compensated the road deputies for the
additional time they spent
working for the County. Sixty percent of the Guild members are
road deputies. The pay system for the
48-hour deputies complicated
the ability of the parties to make direct
comparisons with the
other law enforcement agencies stipulated to
by the parties as the
point of comparison.
The
current salary schedule is a six-step system which
provides separate salary ranges for 40-hour
deputies, 48-hour
deputies, 40-hour sergeants and 48-hour
sergeants. A major point
of contention between the parties is a
County proposal to convert
the monthly pay system to an hourly pay
system for the members of
this bargaining unit. This issue will be discussed separately
under Issue 7.
Moreover, the
Guild proposed to
make additional
adjustments to the rates of pay set forth in
Article 11. The
County countered with a number of its own
proposals to change
existing language or to continue current
contract language rather
than adopt the Guild proposals.
B. The Guild
The
Guild proposed to increase the salary schedule over
a two-year Agreement with four separate pay
adjustments. Effective
January 1, 1995, the Guild seeks a 5%
increase plus an amount equal
to the Portland CPI-W for the period July
1993 to July 1994.
Effective July 1, 1995, the salary schedule
would be adjusted by an
additional 5%. Effective January 1, 1996,
the Guild would have the
salary schedule increased by 5% plus an
amount equal to the
Portland CPI-W for the period July 1994 to
July 1995. The final
wage increase would be effective July 1,
1996, with an additional
5%
increase. The Guild proposal would make
the increase
retroactive to January 1, 1995, for all
employees as well as for
those who may have retired in the
interim. The Guild would
continue the 5.28% premium for the 48-hour
deputies.
The
Guild begins by noting that a straightforward top
step analysis reveals that as of the date of
the arbitration the
Clark County deputy sheriffs are paid 5.9%
below the comparable
jurisdictions. Guild Ex. G-1-4. In order to make an accurate
comparison
of the compensation
paid by the
comparator
jurisdictions, the
Guild maintains several
adjustments are
necessary to accurately reflect the true
compensation received by
deputies in the comparable
jurisdictions. In Guild Exhibit G-1-5
wages are projected to December 31, 1996.
The analysis of
projected increases in the comparator
jurisdictions reflects an
adjusted wage deficiency of 8.4%. The Guild reasons that a
straightforward comparability
analysis of the
adjusted wage
indicates a catch-up of 5.9% is necessary on
the date of the
arbitration, and a catch-up of 8.4% is
necessary at the expiration
of the contract.
The
wage increase the Guild is seeking is reinforced by
the total compensation analysis provided in
Guild Exhibit G-1-11.
The Guild notes that a total compensation
analysis is complicated
by the unique system in Clark County
concerning paid days off.
None of the comparable jurisdictions have a
similar paid days off
system.
In essence, the Clark County program provides that holiday
time off, vacation time off and sick time
off all are encompassed
under the paid days off umbrella. Although Clark County does
provide for sick leave at the rate of 4
hours per month, that sick
leave cannot be utilized until the individual
has been sick for
three consecutive days. All of the other
comparators have holidays
off and first day sick leave.
The
normal compensation analysis utilizes the value-of
vacation, sick leave and holidays for the
purpose of developing a
net hourly wage. The methodology used was to reduce the normal
173.3 hours by the value of the time of
holidays and vacation days
off.
This results in a net hours worked a month which is divided
into the monthly salary and the result is
the net hourly wage. In
this case, the Guild undertook a total
compensation analysis that
properly considered the uniqueness of the
paid days off component
of the Clark County compensation
package. The Guild converted
holidays off into a value for holiday pay.
Vacation and sick leave
are then deleted as categories in the
computations. The Guild
reasons that because patrol deputies working
a 4/12 schedule work
approximately 120 hours more per year than
deputies in the
comparator jurisdictions, vacation and sick
leave are properly
deleted from the computations. The extra
hours have been valued at
approximately 5.28% by the Guild.
The
Guild then chose to demonstrate its compensation
analysis based on salaries in existence at
the time of the
arbitration, and not the salaries adjusted
to reflect the increases
which will be received during the term of
the contract as set forth
in Exhibit G-1-5. Based on the total compensation analysis, the
Guild submits that the overall amount of
catch-up necessary to
reach
the average total
compensation in the
comparable
jurisdictions is 8.2%. Guild Ex. G-1-3.
If the
projected salaries for
the comparator
jurisdictions are utilized, the numbers set
forth in Exhibit G-1-3
would increase substantially. In Exhibit
G-1-5 the Guild projected
adjusted wages to December 31, 1996, the end
of the two-year
contract it is seeking. The exhibit reflects that Guild members
are currently 5.9% behind and will be 8.4%
behind the adjusted wage
at the completion of the two-year
contract. In the area of total
compensation they are 8.4% behind as of the
date of arbitration and
will on the expiration of the contract
period be 10.2% behind in
the
overall average compensation
paid in the
comparator
jurisdictions.
Turning
to the County's comparability exhibits, the Guild
argues these exhibits are seriously flawed
in several respects.
First, none of the County exhibits reflect
the salary increases
received by the Oregon jurisdictions on July
1, 1995. Second, the
County compounds its errors in County Exhibit
6 when it seeks to
delineate the value of the PERS pickup by
failing to pickup the
additional 4% of deferred compensation by
Clackamas County. This
results
in the overall
understatement of Clackamas
County
compensation in excess of 7%.
Third, the County consistently failed to take into
account the status of salaries at the time
of arbitration which
understated
the total compensation. Fourth,
the County's
capriciousness in utilization of numbers can
also be found in its
decision to utilize arbitrarily a five year
mark for educational
pay analysis. The failure to recognize the increasing
valuation of
the educational incentive results in further
understatement of
total compensation received incomparable
jurisdictions.
In
sum, the County has plainly understated the total
compensation for the comparable
jurisdictions. The County has also
made certain assumptions which are not
accurate and further
understate the compensation paid in the
comparable jurisdictions.
By the County's own analysis for 1995, the
average increase offered
in the comparable jurisdictions is
2.76%. However, the County
offers only 1.5% to the members of this
bargaining unit.
Regarding
the Consumer Price Index, the percentage of
change for the first half of 1995 was 3.2% and
the percentage of
change for the first half of 1994 was
2.9%. According to the
Guild, the minimum increase necessary for
1995 is 2.9% and the
minimum increase for 1996 would be 3.2% to
keep pace with increases
in the cost of living. A cost of living increase would not catch
the Clark County deputies up with the
comparable jurisdictions or
bring them to a salary appropriate for the
Portland Metropolitan
Area.
The
County's own exhibits on the CPI reflect an increase
of over 6.1%. The County has offered increases amounting to
50% of
the CPI.
No analysis submitted by the County can justify such a
low offer for the members of this bargaining
unit.
With
respect to changes during the pendency of these
proceedings, the only circumstance
applicable to this is the fact
that salary increases have occurred for
comparable jurisdictions up
to the arbitration. Further, salary increases will occur in the
comparable jurisdictions after the rendering
of the Award in this
case.
The
Guild asserts the labor market for Clark County is an
integral part of the Portland Metropolitan
Area. The Portland
Metropolitan Area consists of four counties,
with Multnomah County
at the center. If Multnomah County is added to the equation,
then
Clark County is 14.7% behind the projected
salaries. Adding the
cities and counties together for the total
Portland Metropolitan
Area labor market as of the date of the
arbitration, reveals that
Clark County is 14.8% behind It is clear from the evidence that
the labor market analysis establishes Clark
County deputy sheriffs
are paid substantially below the labor
market for police officers
and deputy sheriffs within the Portland
Metropolitan Area. The
members of this bargaining unit need a
substantial increase to
bring them in line with the comparable
jurisdictions, not only
outside the Portland Metropolitan Area, but
more particularly
inside the Portland Metropolitan Area.
Regarding
the ability to pay factor, the Guild suggests
the County's evidence on this factor is
highly suspect. The County
presented no official documents but chose to
rely upon highly
suspicious
working papers for
the purpose of
justifying a
preordained result. While the County relies on projected revenue
losses as the result of annexations, the
County's exhibits do not
reflect any savings in reduced demand for
services as the result of
annexations.
Finally, a County witness testified with respect to
budgeted revenue that there was an apparent
"$400,000 typographical
error" in County Exhibit 42. The error changes the 1995 budget
from a deficit to a surplus. The Guild also offered a statement of
the County manager recorded on video tape
where he states that the
County is not in a state of financial
crisis. The Arbitrator
should conclude from the evidence that the
County does not suffer
from an inability to pay what the Guild is
seeking through this
interest arbitration. Thus, the Guild
submits the County failed to
prove that it had an inability to pay the
wage increase sought by
the Guild over the life of its proposed
two-year Agreement.
The
evidence is undisputed that the County has granted
all other County employees a 3% increase per
year. This is twice
as much as the County has offered the
Guild. When one looks at
internal comparability, the minimum that should
be received by the
Guild should be 3% per year. The data submitted by the Guild
demonstrates that its members are entitled
to an increase of
substantially more than 3% per year.
The
documentary evidence submitted by the Guild proved
that deputy sheriffs are paid 5.9% behind
the current adjusted wage
for the stipulated comparables. Guild Ex. G-1-4. On December 31,
1996, the Guild will be 10.2% behind the
total compensation paid to
deputies in the comparable jurisdictions.
Guild Ex. G-1-5. All of
these numbers speak to a minimum increase of
5% per year just to
come to the average of the comparables. When one takes into
account that all of the comparables in the
stipulated group except
Clackamas
County and Washington County
are outside a major
metropolitan area, the larger labor market dictates a 15.1%
increase by December 31, 1996, is justified.
The Arbitrator should
award 5% retroactive to January 1, 1995, 5%
retroactive to July 1,
1995, and 5% retroactive to January 1, 1996.
The
Guild also proposed under the wage issue that an
employee who left employment with Clark
County should still receive
a retroactive check. To do otherwise would encourage the County to
drag out negotiations.
The
first sub-issue under the wage issue relates to shift
differential. Article 11.3 currently provides for a 30 cent
shift
differential for the swing shift and a 40
cent differential for the
graveyard shift. The Guild would increase the shift
differential
by 20 cents for both shifts. The Guild's justification for this
proposal is based on internal
comparability. The Joint Labor
Coalition contract reflects a shift
differential of 90 cents per
hour. The Joint Labor Coalition increase in
shift differential was
substantial over the previously negotiated
agreement. The Guild
merely seeks to increase its shift
differential by an amount which
reflects the same justification the County
utilized for increasing
the Coalition shift differential. The County's proposal to delete
the shift differential must be viewed as punitive
in nature.
The
Guild next proposed to amend
Article 11.4 to
eliminate
the half shift
qualification for working out-of-
classification premium pay. The Guild also proposed to provide
premium pay of 5% for the SWAT Team and 5%
for those employees
assigned to carry a pager. The Guild would also provide for the
integration of a senior deputy program.
The
evidence revealed that every single day between 3
a.m. and 5 a.m., there is no sergeant
assigned to be on duty. This
results in 2 hours where deputies are
required to function in
essence as deputies in charge without any
additional compensation.
This means that the senior deputy has to
assume the additional
responsibilities that go with the deputy in
charge function without
any additional compensation.
The
5% premium for SWAT Team pay is justified because
they are the only members of the bargaining
unit who are required
to meet a physical fitness standard. As a result, they must work
out on their own time in order to retain
that level of physical
fitness required by the County. When the physical fitness
requirement is coupled with the dangerous
nature of SWAT Team work
and being subject to call out
a 5% premium is appropriate.
Spokane, Thurston and Washington Counties
have all recognized that
SWAT Team assignment calls for additional
compensation.
The
pager pay premium is in essence detective pay.
Because patrol deputies work a 4/12 with
four days off thereby
securing a large number of days off and
because they receive an
additional 5.28% in pay reflecting their
additional hours worked,
it has become more difficult to encourage
patrol deputies to
volunteer for special assignments. If the pager pay is viewed as
a detective incentive, then the Guild's
proposal is in line with
the comparables who provide a detective
premium.
The final
proposal of the
Guild relates to the
institution of a senior deputy program. According to the Guild,
there is a need for an intermediate level of
supervision. The
Guild's proposal will provide the County
with the benefit while
allowing more flexibility in the assignment
of sergeants and
provide a clear chain of command. The creation of a senior deputy
program would recognize that knowledge and
experience of veteran
employees provides an economic benefit to
the County. Four of the
comparables have either a corporal or a
special senior deputy
classification which generates additional
pay.
C. The County
The
County begins by setting the context for a wage award
during the term of the successor Agreement. When the Guild took
over representation of the bargaining unit
from SEIU, Local 11, in
late 1991 they were successful in securing
substantial increases
for the 1992-94 Agreement. The parties agreed on wage increases of
23.9% over the duration of the 1992-94
Agreement. With the "roll-
in" of the 2.4% premium for working on
holidays which was moved
into base salaries, the deputy sheriffs'
wages increased by 29.4%
or 9. 8% per year. In addition, a pay adjustment of nearly 5.3%
was
granted to 4/12 shift employees in the
1992-94 Agreement. This
5.28% premium compensated road deputies on a
hour-for-hour basis
for the additional time they spent working
for the County. As
such, these Guild members which make up 60%
of the Guild, received
increases of about 35% over the three-year
period. County submits
it is quite obvious that the members of this
bargaining unit
enjoyed substantially greater increases than
the CPI, and increases
received in the comparable jurisdictions.
The
County characterized the Guild's "cash cube" approach
to arbitration as a blatant money grab. The Guild is proposing a
12.9% wage increase for 1995 to be followed
by a 12.3% wage
increase in 1996. Further, the Guild seeks to obtain a new
senior
deputy program which is essentially a disguised
longevity pay plan.
Adoption of this plan would yield an
additional 10% on top of the
current and very generous incentive
plan. The Guild also seeks to
obtain pager pay of 5% for almost one-half
of the bargaining unit,
SWAT Team pay of 5% and an increase in shift
differential and
working out-of-class pay on top of this wage
proposal.
The
County asserts the impact of these proposals is
staggering.
The County calculated that by the end of 1996 a 48-
hour deputy would be making over $51000 per
month or over $60,000
per year.
Co. Ex. 3. For a senior master
deputy at the top step,
this would equate to an overall increase of
94.7% since January
1992.
If a member was also on the SWAT Team and carried a pager,
that member would receive an additional 10%
increase. If that same
person would be eligible for the senior
deputy program this would
yield a substantial longevity bonus on top
of the wage increase and
premium pay.
The Arbitrator should reject the Guild's "shoot for
the moon" approach to interest
arbitration.
The
County next asserts that "economic red flags are
waving" with respect to the financial
health of Clark County. The
County has been growing rapidly both in
terms of population and
revenue.
The most significant factor impacting the financial
health of the County is annexation. The City of Vancouver has
embarked on an aggressive plan to annex all
unincorporated areas
within the urban growth boundary. The annexations are in areas of
substantial retail concentration which will
cause a loss in sales
tax revenue. In addition, Vancouver announced that
effective
January
1, 1997, it will
annex a significant part of the
unincorporated eastern Clark County which
includes about 55,000
people.
The bottom line is that this annexation along with others
will bring an additional 50,000 people into
the City.
The
impact in the County is that it will be servicing a
population of one-half the current service
area with an anticipated
drop in revenues from 1996 to 1998 of about
$6,000,000.
Moreover,
three other factors are also impacting the
current budgeting situation. First,
there have been dramatic
increases in the cost of providing mandated
regional services in
the area of corrections. Second, the County is experiencing a
decline in certain special revenues. Third, the last few years
have seen a substantial moderation in
revenue growth at the County.
Given the "red flag" in terms of
the current economic status of the
County, this is not the time for another
substantial wage increase
for the members of this bargaining unit.
The
County next argues that the comparables support the
County's wage proposal. The County has proposed a three-year
contract with a wage increase of 1.5% in
each of the three years of
the contract. Whether one looks at base wages or analyzes
total
cost of compensation, the comparables
strongly support the County's
wage offer.
The
beginning point of the County's analysis was of top
step base wages. The average base wage of the comparables on
July
1, 1995, was $3,333 per month. If the County's 1.5% offer is
accepted, the 40-hour deputies in this unit
will be paid $3,389 per
month.
Adoption of the County's offer would place the members of
this bargaining unit 1.67% above the average
wage paid in the
comparable jurisdictions on January 1, 1995.
The
County recognizes that there is a problem when making
comparisons with the Oregon jurisdictions
because of the PERS
pickup.
Given the uncertainty of the litigation over the PERS
pickup, the County offered alternative wage
comparisons. If the
Oregon Supreme Court upholds Ballot Measure
8, the County's
position on the wage comparables will be
1.7% higher than displayed
in the County data. If Ballot Measure 8 is found
unconstitutional,
then the PERS pickup would have to be added
to the base wages for
Marion and Clackamas Counties. Co. Ex. 7.
If the PERS pickup is
added to base wages, Clark County would be
paying right at the
average of $3,389 on the adjusted base for
the seven comparable
jurisdictions.
Moreover, the County calculated its comparison study
based on the 40-hour deputy. However, the
majority of the deputies
in this unit work a 48-hour workweek, and
receive a base wage which
is 5.28% greater than used in the
comparison. As such, the
majority of the members of this unit receive
pay that is 5.28%
ahead of the comparables in terms of base
wages received for 1995
on the assumption the County's proposal is
adopted.
The
County next argues that base wages alone do not
provide a true picture of the generous compensation
program for
Clark County deputies. The County's
extraordinarily rich incentive
plan is structured in such a way that an
officer cannot help but
receive a generous incentive payment if he
or she attends the basic
training academy and mandatory County
training. When the longevity
pay is computed the County deputies fare
quite well. At the five-
year level the County deputies are .76%
below the average of the
comparable jurisdictions. However,
when the base wage plus
longevity is
looked at the ten-year level, members of
this
bargaining unit are 3.29% above the average
and at the fifteen-year
level members are 7.38% above the
average. Once a deputy reaches
the twenty-year level, the deputy is 6.30% above the average
between Clark County and the
comparables. Co. Ex. 9.
The County
next offered a
series of net
hourly
compensation charts to
compare the wages among
the various
jurisdictions. In computing this data, the County added the
total
medical benefits, various levels of educational
incentives and
total hours worked by deputies in each
department. The County
revised its Exhibits 15 through 26 to
correct mathematical errors
found in the exhibits used at the
hearing. (Attachment A to
Brief).
The
net hourly compensation study prepared by the County
yielded figures that placed Clark County
deputy sheriffs ahead of
their comparables by substantial
amounts. At the fifteen- and
twenty-year level of service with no
educational incentive, members
of this bargaining unit were 11% ahead of
the average of the seven
comparable jurisdictions. At the fifteen- and twenty-year levels
of service with an AA degree, the percentage
differential was 10%
over the comparables. The lowest percentage level was at five
years of service with no education which
placed deputies 3.07%
above the comparables. The remainder of the service levels and
educational levels ranged from 5% to 9.5%
above the comparables.
The
overall average of
the net hourly
compensation study
demonstrates that members of this bargaining
unit are 8.3% ahead of
the comparables. The County concludes this
important wage analysis
strongly favors the County's proposal being
adopted by this
Arbitrator.
Turning
to the Guild's wage studies, the County submits
the Guild's methodology is flawed and should
be rejected. The
Arbitrator should reject the Guild's
analysis which included the
higher paying jurisdictions of Multnomah
County, King County,
Pierce County and Snohomish County because
these counties are
substantially larger than Clark County and
are not among the
stipulated group of comparator
jurisdictions.
The
County summarized its attack on the Guild's wage
study in the post-hearing brief as follows:
This
significant change is attributable
to
six significant and fundamental flaws in
the
methodology used by the Guild in this
proceeding: (1) the Guild has compared 1996
wages
in the other jurisdictions with 1994
wages
in Clark County; (2) the Guild has
ignored
hours of work in this proceeding,
unlike
the documentation it provided during
bargaining;
(3) the Guild did not give Clark
County
appropriate credit for the incentive
program
in existence, while inappropriately
applying community
service credits from
Clackamas
County and inaccurately depicting
Marion
County's
longevity plan, which
is
actually
a blended matrix; (4) an inaccurate
figure
for medical care was used; (5) the
Guild
included a misleading "calculation" of
holiday
pay; and
(6) the Guild's use of
employer
retirement premiums inappropriately
compounds the
actual differential between
comparables.
When these factors are accounted
for, the Guild's own data leads to a very
different
conclusion: the County's offer is
supported
by the comparables.
Brieff p. 18.
The County
submits the cumulative
effect of the
fundamental flaws in the Guild's data is as
follows:
ADJUSTMENT
BASIS EFFECT
Base
year flaw 6.00%
Understatement
of medical premium 0.75%
Improper
holiday pay credit 3.00%
Overinclusive pension contributions 1.30%
Cumulative
effect on Guild data 11.05%
Brief,
p. 26.
The County
avers the impact
of these changes
is
substantial.
If the Guild's own figures, as contained in Guild
Exhibit 1-11 are changed to reflect the
correct incentive and
medical payments for Clark County, and
exclude holiday pay and
employer
pension contributions, the
wage picture is
quite
different.
Once the correct base year is used and the hours are
factored in, the average wage differential
is only 1.1%. The
bottom line is Clark County is 5% ahead of
the comparables, even
without consideration of net hours. The County submits it is
fairly paying its deputies and that no
catch-up wage adjustment is
required.
The wage data offered by the County establishes that the
members of this unit are over the market
among the stipulated
comparables.
Regarding
the changes in consumer prices, the
Guild
completely ignored this statutory
factor. Whether the Arbitrator
uses a CPI-W or the CPI-U Index, inflation
has been running at less
than 3%.
These averages have been hovering between 2.5% and 3% for
the last couple of years and are both
currently at 2.5%. At the
time the parties would have otherwise
reached agreement for the
1995 wage agreement, the indexes were
increasing at a 2.9% rate.
Given that the CPI overstates inflation by
1% to 1.5%, the actual
increase in consumer prices is only 1% to
2%. The County submits
its wage offer of 1.5% is supported by the
change in consumer
prices as reflected by the CPI.
The
County next argues that deputy sheriffs have fared
well when compared to other County
employees. Co. Ex. 4. If the
County's proposal of 1.5% a year is awarded
for the years 1995
through 1997, Guild members will have
received an increase from
1992 to 1997 which is 6% higher than the
next highest group of
County employees. The difference is even greater for the bulk
of
County employees with the Guild having
received total annual
increases of 29.3% as compared with 22% for
most other employees.
The County conceded that it agreed to a 3%
annual increase for the
Joint Labor Coalition during the three-year
term of that agreement.
However, the County received significant
benefits and concessions
as a result of the bargaining process. Given the 3% wage increase
was part of a balanced package, the County
was able to agree that
a 3% wage increase was appropriate for
employees covered by the
Joint Labor Coalition agreement. The Guild and the County were
unable to agree to many of the very same
concessions that became a
part of the Joint Labor Coalition contract.
The
County also finds support for its proposal from the
wage increases received by comparable
employees. The average
increase for 1995 was 2.76%. Co. Ex. 27.
In addition, wage
increases being paid in the comparables for
1995 are in the 2.5% to
3% category.
Three of the four increases are not known because
they are CPI driven. Given the increases in the CPI, it is likely
that those jurisdictions will receive
increases in the 2.5% to 3%
range.
If the Arbitrator considers the context of the 8.5% this
group of employees received in 1994, the
County's wage proposal is
entirely appropriate.
The
County next pointed to the four items under the
miscellaneous other factors category of the
statute. First,
turnover in the Clark County Sheriff's
Department is virtually non
existent.
Only one deputy has voluntarily left the Department
since 1992.
The low turnover rate reveals the wage level is
sufficiently competitive to attract and
retain qualified officers.
Second, the Arbitrator should reject the
evidence offered
by the Guild on the local labor market. The County produced an
exhibit portraying the wage relationship
between metropolitan
jurisdictions similar to the size of
Vancouver and the county that
jurisdiction is in. In each case, the County wages are about 5%
to
10% behind the wages paid to city police
officers. The County
evidence established the differential is
nothing more than a
standard city-county differential which will
be continued with the
adoption of the County's offer.
Third, the Guild suggested that since Clark County
Sheriff's Department is accredited that
deputies should be paid
more than the average of the comparables.
According to the County,
accreditation measures the Department's
established procedures and
standards set forth by the accreditation
agency. There is no
reason to consider accreditation as a factor
at all relevant to
establishing pay levels
or a basis for determining a wage
adjustment.
Fourth,
the Guild witnesses suggested the number of calls
the County has been responding to have
increased faster than the
number of deputies employed. In the view of the County, this
increase in the number. of calls does not in
any way merit an
extraordinary wage increase sought by the
Guild. The Guild failed
to put on any evidence establishing that
deputies in Clark County
are working harder than deputies in the
comparables.
Turning
to the Guild's proposal for SWAT Team pay and
pager pay premiums, the County asserts these
proposals should be
rejected.
Only two of the comparable jurisdictions pay a SWAT Team
premium.
Even those premiums are lower than the 5% sought by the
Guild.
SWAT Team members already receive a substantial amount of
money for their participation on the SWAT
Team due to the fact that
training is often conducted when the
deputies are on off-duty time
and are paid the minimum callback at the
premium rate. The number
of SWAT Team incidents does not require
premium pay. In 1995 there
were only five incidents and in 1994 there
were eight incidents.
The facts simply do not warrant a 5% premium
for SWAT Team members.
The
pager pay proposal should also be rejected by the
Arbitrator because it is a thinly disguised
mechanism for getting
premium pay to detectives. The evidence reflected that 52 members
of the Guild bargaining unit carry
pagers. This includes all
members of the SWAT Team, hostage
negotiators, DARE officers,
marine patrol, etc. The concept of paying all 52 of these
deputies
a 5% premium pay merely because they carry a
pager is wholly
unfounded and unjustified. Deputies with
pagers are not restricted
in any way in their off-duty
activities. None of the comparable
jurisdictions has pager pay. The proposal should be rejected by
the Arbitrator.
It
is also the position of the County that the Guild's
master deputy program should be rejected
because it is yet another
mechanism for ratcheting up the longevity
component of an already
rich incentive program. While the incentive program is not
literally tied to longevity, as a practical
matter the County's
incentive program is in fact driven by years
with the Department.
Because the training component allows
incentive credits to be
earned by simply attending the training
which is required for all
employees, the incentive flows through to
the deputies based on
years of service.
Seven
of the eight comparables do not have a senior
deputy program. There is nothing in the evidence to support
the
creation of such a program for Clark
County. Adoption of the
master deputy program would result in a
substantial salary
compression within the bargaining unit The 5% pay differential
between a patrol deputy and a sergeant as
the result of the program
is wholly inequitable and not supportable on
the record of this
case.
The proposal should be rejected.
The
County proposed the deletion of the current shift
differential of 30 cents on the swing shift
and 40 cents on the
graveyard shift. Among the comparables, only
a shift differential. Effective
discontinued shift differential pay. According to the County, it
has had no problem getting deputies to
choose swing and graveyard
shifts.
The County spends approximately $40,000 per year on shift
differential. The Guild's
proposal should be rejected
as
unnecessary and would result in increasing
an already unacceptable
cost for shift differential.
Each
party made a proposal to amend Article 11.4 on the
working out-of-classification pay. The County proposed that the
premium would be paid for a full shift
worked in the higher
position.
The County submits this is in line with the threshold
for working out-of-class premium to a level
more closely aligned
with the comparables.
The
Guild has proposed that out-of-class pay be awarded
any time the deputy performs the duties of a
higher ranking
position, even if that occurs for only five
or ten minutes.
Covering for a sergeant for an hour at the
end of a shift is hardly
tantamount to being responsible for the full
range of functions
performed by a sergeant. In addition, the opportunities to work in
a higher classification provides valuable
training and professional
growth opportunities that enhance the
employee's likelihood of
eventual promotion. The Arbitrator should reject the Guild's
proposal and accept the County's proposal as
consistent with the
comparables and as being operationally
sound.
The
County also asks the Arbitrator to dismiss the
Guild's officer-in-charge proposal because
it requires the County
to appoint an officer-in-charge at certain
times and circumstances.
The decision as to the advisability and
necessity of replacing
absent employees should rest with
management. The Guild's proposal
simply does not make operational sense in
light of the needs of the
Sheriff's Office to staff its personnel in
such a manner as to
provide the most efficient and effective law
enforcement service.
The Guild's officer-in-charge proposal
should be rejected.
The
Guild has proposed to change the method by which wage
retroactivity is applied. The current contract provides that
deputies who have retired prior to the
effective date of the
Agreement shall receive a retroactive
adjustment only for the
"minimum period of
time necessary to
guarantee the higher
retirement benefits." The Guild has proposed amending the clause
so that retired employees would receive a
retroactive wage increase
for the entire period of time covered by the
wage increase. The
County reasons that the Guild has proposed a
windfall for retired
members.
The current arrangement is a reasonable deal which should
be continued into the successor Agreement.
The
County proposed to add language to Article 11 which
seeks to ensure that deputies will be paid
only for the time they
work unless specifically provided for in the
Agreement, such as
callback premiums, paid leave, etc. Without this language, the
County asserts the Agreement could be
construed to require Guild
employees,
who are currently salaried, with
pay to continue
regardless of the deputy's duty status. The County's proposal is
reasonable and should be adopted.
D. Discussion and findings
The
Arbitrator finds after review of the evidence and
argument, as applied to the statutory
criteria, that a 3% increase,
effective January 1, 1995, on the existing
salary schedule is
justified for 1995. Further,
an additional increase of 3%,
effective January 1, 1996, is
warranted. The Arbitrator will be
ordering the implementation of a three-year
contract per the
discussion found in Issue 7. The Arbitrator finds for the third
year of the contract, effective January 1,
1997, that the existing
salary schedule shall be adjusted by
4%. The adoption of a 3%
increase will move the top step pay of a
40-hour deputy to $3,437
per month effective January 1, 1995. The top pay for a 40-hour
deputy will be increased to $3,682 per month
in the third year of
the contract. The top pay for a 48-hour deputy will go to
$3,618
per month on January 1, 1995, and $3,727 per
month effective
January 1, 1996. The reasoning of the Arbitrator--as guided by
the
statutory criteria--is set forth in the
discussion which follows.
Constitutional
and Statutory Authority of the Employer
Regarding
the factor of constitutional and statutory
authority of the employer, no issues were
raised with respect to
this factor.
Stipulations
of the Parties
Regarding
the stipulations of the parties, it was agreed
that four Washington counties and three
Oregon counties would serve
as the comparables for this interest
arbitration proceeding. The
seven counties are a reasonable and
appropriate group with which to
measure and assist in defining the wages and
working conditions for
this bargaining unit. Given the stipulation, the Arbitrator
rejects the Guild's attempts to justify its
proposals based on
jurisdictions outside of the stipulation.
Comparability
The
stipulation as to the seven jurisdictions with which
to compare Clark County for the purpose of
determining compensation
and working conditions is a credit to the
parties. However, what
normally would have been a relatively easy
task of reviewing the
wages and other compensation paid in the
comparable jurisdictions
was complicated by the different methodology
employed by the
parties to measure total net hourly
compensation. Each party
vigorously asserted the methodology employed
by the other side was
flawed and should be rejected.
The
Guild asserts the County has plainly understated
total compensation in the comparator
group. The County countered
the Guild's wage comparison data
substantially minimized the net
hourly compensation paid to Guild
members. If the Guild had
accurately accounted for such factors as
hours of work, the
incentive program, holiday pay, medical
insurance, etc., the County
submits a very different picture of
comparability emerges.
Moreover,
the creation of accurate comparability data is
complicated by three primary factors. First, the paid days off
system used in Clark County is unique among
the comparators.
Second, the retirement system in Oregon (PERS)
is different from
the Washington system. The retirement issue
is further complicated
by the ballot measure in Oregon which would
end the PERS pickup and
the pending litigation challenging the
constitutionality of the
ballot measure. Third, over 50% of the members of this unit
work
the 4/12 schedule which materially increases
the deputy base pay.
The parties agreed in the previous contract
that the value of the
extra 8 hours should be set at 5.28% of the
base deputy pay.
This
Arbitrator has previously noted in other arbitration
awards that preparation and evaluation of
compensation studies is
not an exact science. The instant case demonstrates the validity
of this point. The unique nature of the paid days off system
in
Clark County inherently creates a problem in
making accurate
comparisons. It is the opinion of this Arbitrator the
parties
would be better served by narrowing their
differences on the
appropriate methodology to be utilized to
compare total wages and
benefits.
The
Arbitrator has carefully examined the wage comparison
studies developed by the parties. On the whole, I find the
County's approach presents a better picture
of the overall level of
compensation paid to deputies in the
comparator groups with Clark
County.
While County's methodology is not perfect, it properly
takes into account the hours of work and
incentive programs. The
Guild's failure to give credit to the paid
days off program is
unacceptable. The weakness in the County's exhibits is that
they
do not reflect salary increases granted on
July 1, 1995, for the
three Oregon counties. Nor do the exhibits include wage increases
for deputies in the Washington counties over
the term of the
proposed three-year Agreement.
Based
on its wage studies, the Guild concluded that its
members were currently 5.9% behind, and
would be 8.4% behind the
adjusted wage at the completion of the
two-year contract. Guild
Ex. 1-5.
Further, the Guild reasoned Guild members were 8.4%
behind the adjusted wage as of the date of
the arbitration and
would be 10.2% behind at the end of
the proposed two-year
Agreement.
The Arbitrator finds the Guild's conclusions overstate
the disparity in total compensation between
Clark County and the
comparators.
The County's data proved members of this unit enjoy
a competitive and reasonable total
compensation package.
The
adoption of the 3% wage increase effective January 1,
1995, will set the top step base wage at
$3,437 or $104 above the
average of the seven comparators. At the
beginning of the contract
term on January 1, 1995, the base wage for
Clark County deputy
sheriffs will be in a virtual tie with the
two top paying counties
of Kitsap and Marion. Even with mid-year adjustments for the
Oregon
counties, Clark County will
maintain its competitive
position in the rankings.
The
Guild projected wages to December 31, 1996.
Guild
Ex. 1-5.
The Guild exhibit reflects an average top step wage as of
December 31, 1996, of $3,535 per month and
an adjusted wage of
$3,616.
The implementation of a 3% increase effective January 1,
1996, will set the top step base wage for
Clark County at $3,540
per month or $5 above the average wage. Even using the Guild's
adjusted
wage, Clark County
deputies would be
comfortably
positioned in the middle of the comparator
group. It should be
noted that the Guild's own figures projected
1996 wage increases in
the 3% range for the comparator group. The 3% award for each of
the first two years of the contract is
consistent with actual and
projected improvements in the wage levels of
the comparator group.
The
Arbitrator was persuaded that a 4% increase effective
January 1, 1997, is necessary and
appropriate to maintain Clark
County's competitive position among the
comparator group. The top
step for a 40-hour deputy would rise to
$3,682. Adoption of the
County's i.5% per year increase for three
years would certainly
cause a deterioration in the total
compensation package paid to the
members of this group. The Arbitrator holds there is absolutely no
justification for adoption of a three-year
package that would drive
the wages paid to the members of this unit
to the bottom end of the
comparator group.
The
Arbitrator has made no attempt to reconcile the
parties' divergent total compensation wage
studies or to apply the
3% award to the wage studies offered by the
parties. In the
judgment of this Arbitrator, the three-year
increase of 10% over
the term of the 1995-97 contract will flow
through to the total
compensation analysis performed by the
County necessary to maintain
a reasonable and competitive compensation
package through December
31, 1997.
The three-year adjustment awarded by this Arbitrator is
consistent with both the internal and
external comparators and the
increase in the cost of living as measured
by the CPI.
In
reaching
a conclusion on the
wage issue, the
Arbitrator was mindful of the additional pay
members of this unit
earn under the incentive plan. The Arbitrator rejected the
County's proposal to drastically change the
incentive plan. The
continuation of a generous incentive plan
will provide additional
dollars for the members of this unit.
Cost
of Living
Turning
to the factor of cost of living, the evidence
overwhelmingly supports a wage settlement
closer to the County's
offer.
The cost of living standard provides absolutely no support
for the Guild's proposed wage increase
exceeding 15% over the
duration of a two-year contract. In fact, the cost of living
factor argues strongly against the Guild's
proposal.
The
national CPI-W and CPI-U has been running between
2.5% and 3% for the past couple of
years. The Portland area CPI-W
and CPI-U figures are at about 3%. Further,
the 23.9% wage
increase the members of this unit received
during the life of the
1992-94.
Collective Bargaining Agreement clearly protected them from
any loss
of purchasing power due to
inflation. Thus, the
Arbitrator must hold that a substantial wage
increase over the
recorded CPI figures is unnecessary to keep
pace with the cost of
living.
If
the evidence on comparables demonstrated Clark County
was paying a substandard level of
compensation, then the CPI
figures would assume a smaller role in
establishing the overall
compensation package. However, as previously discussed in the
comparability section of this Award, members
of this bargaining
unit enjoy a competitive and generous total
compensation package.
In
sum, the 3%, 3% and 4% wage increases awarded over the
term of the 1995-97 contract by the
Arbitrator are consistent with
past and projected increases in the cost of
living.
Changes in Circumstances During the Pendency of the Proceedings
The
only relevant change in circumstances is the salary
increases enjoyed by deputies in the
comparable counties. As noted
in the comparability discussion, wage
increases for 1995 were
running in the 3% to 4% range. For 1996, negotiated increases and
CPI driven wage adjustments will be in the
area of 3%.
Other
Factors
The
single most important "other factor" relevant to this
case is internal comparability. The County agreed to a 3% annual
increase for the Joint Labor Coalition
during the term of their
three-year contract. The Joint Labor
Coalition contract covers the
majority of County employees. While the focus of this case is to
decide the appropriate compensation level
for deputy sheriffs; the
Arbitrator cannot totally ignore internal
comparability. In
crafting an Award for the members of this
bargaining unit, the
Arbitrator must avoid a result that is out
of touch with other
County wage settlements.
The
Guild's proposal to increase base wages by over 15%
in two years was not supported by compelling
evidence to justify an
increase of this magnitude. On the other hand, the Guild's
evidence on overall compensation did show
that the increases for
its members need not be identical to that of
the Joint Labor
Coalition
contract. The Guild is
a separate and distinct
bargaining unit with its own needs and
issues unique to law
enforcement.
The
lack of turnover in this unit also reflects a
compensation package that is sufficiently
competitive to attract
and retain qualified deputies.
The
County did not make a straightforward inability to
pay argument. Instead, the County asserted the
"economic red flags
are waiving." The impact of the City of Vancouver's aggressive
annexation plan on County services and
revenue was a primary
concern of the County. In addition, the County sees a substantial
moderation in its revenue growth over the
next few years. The
Arbitrator concurs with the Guild that the
County's evidence did
not establish an inability to pay defense.
The
Arbitrator accepts the County's argument that this
County is in a period of rapid transition
and should operate with
caution concerning wage settlements. Given the absence of hard
evidence to support the substantial wage
increase sought by the
Guild, the Arbitrator holds it would be
inappropriate to grant the
15% plus increase proposed by the Guild over
the term of a two-year
Agreement.
Wage
Retroactivity
The
Guild proposal to amend Article 11.1.7 to grant full
retroactivity for retired members is without
merit. Current
contract language provides retroactivity for
the "minimum period of
time to guarantee the higher retirement
benefits." This language
strikes an appropriate balance on the issue
for retirees.
Shift
Differential
The
Guild proposed to increase the shift differential by
20 cents per hour. The County proposed to delete the 30 cents
per
hour premium for the swing shift and the 40
cents per hour
differential for the graveyard shift. The
Arbitrator finds neither
party made a convincing case to change
current contract language.
The
total compensation package for members of this
bargaining unit argues against a shift
differential similar to that
found in the Joint Labor Coalition contract. While comparability
supports the County's position, the
Arbitrator was not persuaded
sufficient reasons exist to remove the shift
differential premium
from Article 11.3.
Working
Out-of-Classification Premium Pay
Article
11.4 grants premium pay when a member works in a
higher classification for one-half
shift. Both parties proposed
changes to this section. The Guild proposed to require premium pay
whenever a member worked the higher
classification. The County
countered with a proposal to increase the
time worked to one. shift
before premium pay was due.
The
Arbitrator finds the Guild's position to be excessive
and unworkable. The Arbitrator concurs with the County that a
brief period of performance in a higher
position should not warrant
extra compensation. Filling in for a sergeant for a brief period
does not require a deputy to perform the
full range of a sergeant's
duties.
It is often true that lines of division between work
classifications are not sharply defined and
working the higher job
for brief periods of time does not justify
premium pay.
The
County's proposal to increase the time necessary to
qualify for premium pay to a full shift is
reasonable. Where an
employee
is assigned to
work a full
shift in a
higher
classification, the lines of demarcation
between the two jobs are
clearly defined. Operationally, the assignment to a full shift
expressly places the employee in the higher
rated job for a
measurable period of time.
Moreover,
the working out-of-classification threshold of
one shift is the standard in the comparator
group. Therefore, the
Arbitrator concludes the County's proposal
should be adopted.
The
Guild also proposed to add a new sentence to Article
11.4.1 that
when no sergeant is on duty the "senior deputy on duty"
shall be appointed the
officer-in-charge. For the reasons set
forth in the discussion of the "senior
deputy" program, this
language should not be added to Article
11.4.1.
Senior
Deputy Pay
The
Guild proposed the addition of new language to
Article 11 which would create a senior
deputy program. Pursuant to
the Guild's offer, a deputy completing ten
years of service and the
required training would automatically be
designated as a senior
deputy.
Senior deputies would be eligible for premium pay ranging
from 2.5% to 10%, depending on the length of
service. The County
opposes. the creation of a senior deputy
program because it sees the
proposal as a method of "ratcheting up
the longevity component of
an already rich incentive program."
Based
on the evidence presented, the Arbitrator concludes
the Guild failed to demonstrate any
substantial need for an
intermediate level of supervision in the
Sheriff's Office. Thus,
the Arbitrator was not persuaded to add a
senior deputy program,
which in essence, would provide additional
premium pay for veteran
employees.
SWAT
Team and Payer Pay Premiums
The
Guild proposed a 5% premium for each shift a deputy
is assigned to the SWAT Team. Further, deputies required to carry
a pager would receive a 5% premium. If a deputy was assigned to
the SWAT Team and required to carry a pager,
the premium would be
10% pursuant to the Guild's language set
forth in Article 11.4.2.
Regarding
the SWAT Team pay, the Arbitrator finds the 5%
premium unwarranted and unnecessary. SWAT
Team members were called
out five times in 1995 and eight times in
1994. If a SWAT Team
member is called back to work for an
incident, each member receives
the minimum callback pay at time and
one-half. If a SWAT Team
member is called back for training outside
of their regular shift,
the same callback and overtime premiums
apply.
Turning
to the issue of pager pay, there is even less
justification for this 5% premium than for
the SWAT Team premium.
Deputies who carry a pager are not
restricted in their off-duty
activities.
None of the comparables have a pager pay provision.
The
Guild's main argument for this premium was that
detectives normally carry a pager. A detective works a 40-hour
week and thereby earns less than a road
deputy who works a 48-hour
week.
The longer workweek generates an additional 5.28% in pay.
According to the Guild, this disparity has created animosity
between detective assignments and patrol
deputies. The Guild also
argued the lower pay reduces the incentive
for members to move into
specialty positions.
The
Arbitrator finds the pager pay proposal should not
become a part of the contract for two main
reasons. First, the
Guild's proposal does not limit the premium
to detectives who are
required to carry a pager. Any employee who carried a pager would
qualify for the 5% premium. Second, if the detectives are under
compensated for their work, a pay increase
should be justified on
the basis of the merits of detective
work. The Arbitrator rejects
the back door approach to securing
additional pay for detectives by
means of pager pay.
Pay
for Time Worked
The
County submitted a new Article 11.8 which would
purport to ensure deputies are paid
consistent with the Agreement.
According to the County, deputies should be
paid only for time they
work or when using an established paid leave
program. The County
reasoned that "salaried" deputies
might assert their pay should be
continued regardless of their work status.
The
County produced no evidence there was a problem that
needed fixing. No past practices or provisions of the
contract
were cited by County as arguably requiring
that it pay for time not
worked.
The hours and days of work are established by other
provisions.
When paid time off is due, the contract expressly
denotes when
it is permitted and paid for
by the
County.
Therefore, the Arbitrator rejects the
County's proposal to add
Article 11.8 to the successor Agreement.
The
County's proposals for Articles 11.2.2 and 11.7 will
be discussed in Issue 4. In Issue 4, the Arbitrator awarded the
County's proposal to amend Section 11.2.2 in
order to pay all
personnel on an hourly basis. The Arbitrator ordered this switch
from monthly to an hourly pay basis to be
effective January 1,
1997.
AWARD
The
Arbitrator awards that Article 11 be modified as
follows:
11.1 Salary Schedule Increases
11.1.1 Effective January 1, i995, the salary
schedule
shall be adjusted by 3%.
11.1.2 Effective January 1, 1996, the salary
schedule
shall be adjusted by 3%.
11.1.3 Effective January 1, 1997, the salary
schedule
shall be adjusted by 4%.
11.2 Other Salary Adjustments
11.2.1 Forty-eight (48) hour personnel shall
be
paid an adjustment of 5.28% effective
January
1, 1995, and January 1, 1996.
11.4 Any regular full-time employee who is
assigned
to perform substantially all the
duties
of a budgeted position in a higher
classification
for one shift or more shall be
paid
according to the promotional formula in
Section 11.5.1
for the duration
of the
assignment.
Except
as agreed to by the parties, the remainder of
Article 11 shall remain unchanged. The issues concerning Section
11.2.2 and Section 11.7 (Currently Section
3.5) will be discussed
in Issue 4, Pay period/Method of Pay.
ISSUE
2 - PAID DAYS OFF/HOLIDAYS
A. Background
Article
7 is entitled "Paid Days Off."
pursuant to this
Agreement each employee is granted a number
of paid days off to be
used during the year for vacation, illness,
holidays or personal
business time off. Maternity, bereavement,
military leave and sick
leave are covered by other provisions of the
Agreement. The PDO
system consolidates multiple leave programs
into a single account
which provides a specified number of PDO
time each year. The PDO
system replaces the more conventual
vacation and holiday benefits,
and a portion of the sick leave system, that
is commonly found in
other law enforcement departments. Article 7.2 established a two-
tier system.. The two-tier system was placed in the
Collective
Bargaining Agreement in the mid-19805 The lower tier was created
and applied only to new employees hired
after January 1, 1985.
Employees employed before January 1, 1985,
earned a higher level of
PDO system.
The Guild proposed to delete the lower tier for
deputies employed after January 1, 1985, and
to amend the upper
tier by adding a twenty-five year accrual
rate. The Guild would
also increase the number of PDO hours that
may be accrued. The
County would continue current contract
language as amended by the
parties.
During
the course of negotiations and this arbitration
the parties were able to resolve the holiday
issue covered by
Article 7.4
The parties also reached an agreement on Article 7.7
The issues left for the Arbitrator center on
the Guild's proposals
to change Article 7.2 and Article 7.3.
B. The Guild
The
Guild begins by noting that the PDO system was
established to create an incentive for
employees to reduce their
sick leave.
Under Article 8.5 any sick leave which requires a
leave of two full working days or less shall
be charged to the PDO
account.
A leave beyond the second full day shall be charged to
the employee's sick leave account. The evidence reflects that the
system has worked to create an incentive for
employees to reduce
their unplanned absences. According to the Guild, the system has
clearly worked in that the number of unpaid
absences has been
severely reduced. Because employee attendance has become more
reliable, the Sheriff's staffing and
overtime problems have been
minimized.
At
the time the two-tier system was adopted no one in the
bargaining unit was affected since all
employees were pre-January
1, 1985.
With the hiring of new employees after January 1, 1985,
and the retirement of pre-1985
employees, the bargaining unit
eventually reached the point where the new
employees outnumbered
the pre-1985 employees. The Guild submits that a higher level of
dissatisfaction has developed because the
pre-January 1, 1985,
deputies
earn more PDO time than the
post-January 1, 1985,
employees who are now in the majority. The Guild's solution to
this growing dissatisfaction and
accompanying morale problem is to
restore the pre-January 1, 1985, status quo
by eliminating the
lower tier.
In the view of the Guild, the schedule is consistent
with the stipulated comparable
jurisdictions. A review of Exhibit
G-2-3 reveals that at every five-year
interval deputies in this
unit are substantially below the combined
vacation/sick leave and
holiday time granted to comparable
jurisdictions. The Guild noted
that the County in preparation of. its
economic exhibits chose to
utilize the higher tier, even though over
half the employees are in
the lower PDO tier. The County did not factor in the savings they
realized by having the two-tiered system.
The
Guild points to Exhibits G-2-3 and G-2-4 to establish
that the post-January 1, 1985, deputies are
substantially behind
their counterparts in paid time off. Even if the 48 hours of sick
leave deputies receive each year are added
in they still would be
20 hours behind at ten years, 47 hours
behind at fifteen years and
20 hours behind at twenty years. However,
the Guild argues that it
is inappropriate to add in sick leave
because it is not available
for usage unless someone has a substantial
illness. Therefore, the
Guild concludes that some relief is required
for the post-January
1, 1985, deputies.
The
Guild proposed to add a new twenty-five year accrual
rate to the first tier. A review of Exhibit G-2-3 establishes that
pre-January 1, 1985, deputies are
substantially behind at twenty
years among the comparable
jurisdictions. The Guild's proposal to
add a twenty-five year step merely brings
them in line with their
comparables
at twenty-five years. Since few
law enforcement
employees work twenty-five years or more, the
twenty-five year step
is not going to be a substantial economic
hardship on the County.
The
Guild also proposed to increase the maximum amount of
accumulation from 1.25 times the annual rate
to 2 times the rate
and that employees be paid rather than lose
paid days off. From
the viewpoint of the Guild,
there are employees within the
bargaining unit who are not able to go on
paid leave status. By
eliminating the amount of paid days off that
can be accumulated,
the employee is placed in the situation where
if they suffer from
repeat illnesses of a short duration, they
will end up spending all
of their paid days for that without the
ability to save up for
further protection. The rate of 1.25 times the annual
accumulation
rate is substantially below that of the
comparable jurisdictions.
The average of the maximum rates of
accumulation is approximately
1.58 times the annual rate. Clark County's accumulation rate is
substantially behind and therefore it is
appropriate to award the
Guild's proposal.
C. The County
The
County takes the position that the Guild's proposal
to eliminate the post-January 1, 1985, tier
should be rejected. In
the mid-19805 the parties agreed on a
two-tiered system. The
deputies who came to work with the County
accepted this second tier
will full knowledge of the PDO benefit
available to them. The two-
tier system has been in place for ten years
and should be
continued.
In addition, Guild members separately accrue six days
of sick leave which is available when a
Guild member is absent for
three days or more due to illness.
In
order to make an apples-to-apples comparison of PDO
plans with conventional vacation, holiday
and sick leave programs,
it is necessary to add together vested
leaves such as vacation and
holiday pay to the calculation. Using that method of comparison
the total paid vacation days and holidays
each year grants Guild
deputies substantially more days off of
vacation and holiday leave
than their counterparts.
Regarding the
Guild's attempt to
play down the
substantial differential by focusing on the
fact that Guild members
use some PDO time for sick leave, while
comparable jurisdictions do
not, the County suggests this method of
calculation is erroneous.
Creation of the PDO system was accomplished
by moving six days of
the sick leave into the new PDO
account. The rest of the sick
leave became available for any use. The gain to employees became
six days per year, less any PDO time used
for sick days. The
remaining six days or 48 hours continues to
accrue for conventional
sick leave use. In other jurisdictions, sick leave time can
only
be used for sick leave. The Guild's combination of vacation and
sick leave blends a restricted use leave
with traditional vested
vacation type of leave. This is an apples-to-oranges comparison
which should not be accepted by the
Arbitrator.
The
County calculated that the accruals compare very
favorably with the comparables. At all levels deputies in the
lower tier have more days off than their
counterparts. For those
deputies in the upper tier; they are with
one exception better off
than any of their counterparts.
Moreover,
the County's position is further buttressed by
an examination of the number of days off
enjoyed by employees
working patrol who are in the upper tier. Because of the 12 hour
schedule, a ten-year employee has 7 calendar
weeks off per year.
At fifteen years, the patrol deputy has 7.6
weeks off per year. By
twenty years, the patrol deputy is off 8.2
weeks per year. A
twenty-five year patrol deputy has 8.8 weeks
off per year. Co. Ex.
47.
This exhibit makes it patently clear why the County bargained
for and achieved the gradual phase out of
the top tier. The
Guild's belated effort to resurrect that
tier should be rejected by
the Arbitrator.
The
County asserts the Guild's data is misleading because
it includes all vacation, sick leave and
holiday time for the
comparables.
However, for
hours of sick leave earned by deputies
because the restrictions on
its use are misleading. The bottom line is that all Guild
employees, regardless of the tier they are
on, enjoy a substantial
amount of time off. The Guild's proposal to have the Arbitrator
undue the 1985 Agreement should be rejected.
Present
contract language permits accrual of PDO time to
a maximum of 1.25 times the employee's
current annual accrual rate.
The Guild's proposal to raise the cap to 2
times the employee's
accrual rate should not be adopted by the
Arbitrator. The proposal
is not supported by the comparables or the
circumstances in Clark
County.
Clark County deputies already accrue more time than
deputies in the comparable
jurisdictions. Co. Ex. 50. There is no
reason for the Arbitrator to change the
status quo. It is also the
position of the County that the Arbitrator
should reject the
Guild's proposal to require the County to
pay for all paid days off
in excess of the maximum accrual
ceiling. The County has already
agreed to a limited and restricted PDO
sell-back program because it
wants to ensure that deputies actually use
their PDO for time off.
There is no need to add a new means for
cashing out deputies at the
maximum accrual rate. The one example cited by the Guild occurred
in the late 1980s and there is no evidence
that the situation has
been repeated.
In
sum, the Arbitrator should continue current contract
language except as agreed to by the parties
in the negotiations.
D. Discussion and Findings
The
Arbitrator finds the Guild's proposal to eliminate
the lower tier should not be included in the
1995-97 contract.
Once again the Guild fails to give credit
for the 48 hours of sick
leave members of this unit earn under this
contract. The sick
leave benefit cannot be ignored simply
because there are some
restrictions on its use. The sick leave benefit is part of the
contract which members utilize when they are
sick. The evidence
reflects members used approximately 3,000
hours of sick leave from
January 1994 through August 1995. In addition, members used 3,500
hours of PDO time for sick leave purposes.
Moreover,
patrol deputies working the 12 hour schedule--
in the upper tier--at ten years have 7 weeks
off per year. At
fifteen years the employee has 7.6 weeks off
per year. By twenty
years the amount of time off increases to
8.2 weeks per year. The
phasing out of the upper tier is
understandable in light of the
significant amount of time a deputy is not
available for work.
The two-tiered system went into the contract
in 1985.
The evidence proved the PDO system generates
substantial paid and
unpaid time off from work. Based on the record before this
Arbitrator, the deletion of the two-tier
system is not justified at
the
present time. As
the pre-1985 deputies
leave County
employment, modification of the two-tier
system during the next
round of bargaining maybe appropriate.
In
reaching the conclusion to retain the two-tiered
system,
the Arbitrator took into account that in Issue 5, I
rejected a County proposal to change the
length of the work day to
an 11.5 hour day. Thus, the amount of time off for patrol
deputies
will remain undisturbed through December
1997.
The
Guild's proposal to increase the accumulative rate
from 1.25 to 2 times the deputy's annual
accrual rate is excessive
and unsupported by the record.
the accumulation rate for vacation time
already compares favorably
with the seven other jurisdictions. The PDO system applies to more
days than the pure vacation systems
contained in the contracts of
the comparables.
The
need for the Guild's proposal to require the County
to pay employees for all paid days off in
excess of the maximum
accrual ceiling was not substantiated.
AWARD
The
Arbitrator awards that Article 7 shall continue
unchanged except where the parties have
reached agreement to modify
the language.
ISSUE
3 - INCENTIVE PLAN
A. Background
Article
12 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement refers
to an incentive plan. During the 1992 contract negotiations the
parties attempted to reach agreement on a
change in the incentive
plan found in Article 12. The parties were unable to reach
agreement on a new incentive plan. The parties agreed to submit
the incentive plan to last-best offer
arbitration. The Guild
prevailed in that arbitration
proceeding. On
arbitrator Eric Lindauer
issued an award that established the
incentive plan for the 1992-94
contract. The Guild proposed to
incorporate the Lindauer
award into the Collective Bargaining
Agreement.
The County proposed a substantial modification of the
current incentive plan.
B. The County
The
County set two primary goals for proposing a change
to the incentive program. First, the County seeks to establish a
program that actually creates an incentive
for bargaining unit
members to get additional education. Second, the County believes
it is necessary to establish a program that
is comparable in its
payouts and eligibility criteria to those of
the comparable
jurisdictions. According to the County, the incentive
program now
in place is essentially a disguised form of
longevity pay. While
the current program rewards training,
longevity and education, the
County argues that the present system does
not serve as an
incentive to secure additional education
because the rewards accrue
automatically based on longevity and
mandatory training.
The
County believes it is inappropriate to have an
incentive program in which the incentive can
be earned by simply
attending mandatory and required training
classes. The County
believes its proposal encourages all employees
to get additional
education.
If an employee does not obtain an AA degree or the
equivalent, that employee would never be
able to attain the 10%
premium.
An employee with five years experience would be able to
receive a 5% premium for a BA degree or
equivalent and a 10%
premium by the fifteenth year. In essence,
the County would
reserve
the 10% premium to
employees with a BA degree or
equivalent.
The
County seeks to eliminate financial recognition for
attending internal training and change the
threshold qualifiers to
more in keeping with what it asserts are the
external norms. The
County argues that the system needs an
overhaul because the
training/longevity component overwhelms the
educational component.
The result is the current incentive program
is not working as a
means for encouraging deputies to take
college classes. Thus, the
County submits the incentive system needs a
complete revision.
The
County next argues that the current incentive program
is far and away the richest of any incentive
program among the
comparables.
From the viewpoint of the County, the Clark County
deputy sheriffs have a program which pays
more and requires less
than in the comparable jurisdictions. Since the current program is
too far removed from even the most generous
law enforcement
incentive plans, it should be replaced.
The
County displayed the maximum incentive that could be
attained in the comparators as follows:
Comparables Maximum
Kitsap 2 .2%
Thurston 5.5%
Clackamas 9.9%
AVERAGE 7.5%
The
exhibit also reveals that for an employee to attain
the maximum incentive they must hold
bachelors or MA degrees in
those counties. In contrast, a
receive a 10% incentive in just six years.
The
County is not seeking to create an average plan but
one that will still remain the
"richest" of all the plans in place
among the comparable employers. Nor does the County propose to
take away any current deputy's incentive pay
because it has
provided a "grandfather" provision
in the plan to ensure a smooth
transition into the new incentive program.
The County submits this
will guarantee deputy sheriffs do not
actually lose money while the
transition into the new program is
completed.
Regarding
the Lindauer award, the County argues that its
proposal was rejected because the arbitrator
in that case found
several technical and substantive problems
with the County's plan.
According to the County, it has cured the
"warts" of the plan that
arbitrator Lindauer
rejected in 1993. The County concludes
that
the time has come to create a new plan which
actually encourages
deputies to achieve additional education.
C. The Guild
The
Guild proposes to continue the incentive plan as
awarded by arbitrator Lindauer
in Exhibit G-3-3. The Guild argues
that the County is unhappy with the
arbitration decision and seeks
to overturn it by its new proposal. Since the County is proposing
substantial changes to the existing program,
it is incumbent upon
the County to present persuasive reasons for
the elimination of the
existing incentive program. The Guild
submits the County failed to
meet its burden of proof on this proposal.
The
Guild characterized the County's proposal as merely
a cost saving measure. Given the County proposal of only a 1.5%
across the board wage increase, the essence
of its proposal on the
incentive plan is to take that money back
through modifications of
the incentive plan. The testimony of Steve Foster, Human
Relations
Manager, demonstrated that what the County
really objects to is the
cost of the plan because it believes it is
too generous.
Contrary
to the County's position that the incentive
program has not worked, the Guild asserts
that the program has
served to encourage behavior and has worked
extremely well. The
County now seeks to undo a successful
program. The Arbitrator
should see the County's proposal as purely
an economic issue that
has nothing to do with the merits of the
current incentive program.
Arbitrator
Lindauer wrote in his award that the County
presented no Substantial evidence to justify
changing an incentive
program that has existed, in essence, since
1980 in its current
form
The Guild submits the County has presented no evidence in
the instant arbitration to indicate that
less than three years
after the Lindauer
award the incentive plan should be radically
revised. Therefore, the Arbitrator should
incorporate the language
awarded by arbitrator Lindauer
into Article 12 of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement.
D. Discussion and Findings
The
Arbitrator concurs with the Guild that the County has
failed to present persuasive evidence to
totally revise the
incentive program. Arbitrator Lindauer
in his 1993 award cogently
detailed the reasons why he favored the
Guild's proposed incentive
program.
In the judgment of this Arbitrator, Lindauer's
stated
reasons
for adopting the
incentive program in 1993
remain
applicable
for continuing the incentive plan in the 1995-97
contract.
The Arbitrator does find that there are areas of the
current incentive plan which could be
improved to deliver what the
County seeks. However, this Arbitrator is unwilling to
overturn
the incentive program and adopt a totally
different approach less
than three years after arbitrator Lindauer affirmed the incentive
program in his 1993 award.
Moreover, the
current incentive plan
does deliver
continuing education to the members of this
bargaining unit which
enables
them to perform
their jobs more
efficiently and
effectively.
The questions raised by the County about the current
program center more on the type of
continuing education that will
be offered to the members rather than the
effectiveness of the
training.
In order to attain the incentive pay, members of this
bargaining unit do in fact have to
participate in educational
training activities.
The
Arbitrator in issuing the Award on the wage issue
took into account the members of this
bargaining unit do in fact
enjoy a generous incentive program that
delivers additional dollars
over the base pay. One of the reasons for rejecting the Guild's
wage proposal was the fact the incentive
program is relatively easy
to participate in, in order to attain the
incentive pay.
AWARD
The Arbitrator awards that the Guild's
proposal to
incorporate
the existing incentive
program--as awarded by
arbitrator
Lindauer
in 1993--into the
Collective Bargaining
Agreement should be adopted.
ISSUE
4 - PAY PERIOD/METHOD OF PAY
A. Background
The
primary focus of this issue is a County proposal that
bargaining unit members be moved into the
County's new payroll
software system. The new payroll system is structured to pay
nonexempt employees on an hourly basis. The County proposed that
the members of this bargaining unit be
changed from a monthly
salary to an hourly basis for pay. Under the current payroll
system, employees are paid on the 1st of the
month with a draw on
the 15th of the month. The employees are paid for the previous
month salary on the 1st of the month. The County's proposal would
switch to a semi-monthly pay cycle, with pay
days on the 10th and
25th of each month. The Guild objects to the County's proposal to
switch from a monthly salary to an hourly
rate of pay.
B. The
County
The
County begins by noting that it provides service to
over 1,200
from a number of outside entities. The County's payroll system
includes five local fire districts, the local
health district and
a number of regional employers. There are a total of 28 different
employers and/or bargaining units which are
paid by the County's
payroll system. As of the date of the arbitration, all County
employees except for three of the four
bargaining units in the
Sheriff's Office have been converted to the
new hourly system.
This means that about 1,000 of the 1,2000
County employees have
made the conversion to an hourly rate of
pay.
The
County's proposal is driven by what it asserts is a
payroll system that is out of date. The vendor which supplied the
Proprietary system to the County is out of
business which makes
support
and upgrades extremely
difficult. Maintenance and
manipulation of the old system has become
very expensive. The
County selected a new state-of-the-art
Oracle database, which is
the industry standard. The system is a combined personnel and
payroll database which directly interfaces
to the general ledger
and budgetary process. The system has built-in FLSA compliance
features as well as many other features
which will be a benefit to
the County for obtaining business records
about its employees.
Under
the new system employees are paid for their time
from the 1st through the 15th of the month
on the 25th, and for
time from the 16th to the end of the month
on the 10th of the
following month. The pay is based on actual hours and leave
used
each pay period. The new system improves the old system in
that
overtime and premium pay are calculated each
time a paycheck is
processed.
The
County next argues that the system should be upgraded
because there is a conflict between
Internal Revenue Code. According to the County, state law
prohibits the County from making any
withholdings at the time of
the "draw" under the current
system On the other hand, the
Internal Revenue Service requires the County
to withhold taxes and
FICA payments at the time any payment is
made to an employee. Then
the County pays on a semi-monthly basis they
are not required to
offer a draw, thus solving the IRS
issue. The County submits the
conversion to semi-monthly pay was
significantly motivated by this
feature.
The County would accomplish this change by two major
modifications of the current Collective
Bargaining Agreement.
First, the County would delete the last
sentence of Section 3.5 of
the Agreement and move it to Section
11.7. The proposed Section
11.7 would state:
11.7 The employer reserves the right to
modify its
payroll system and procedures
during
the term of this agreement, including
but
not limited to changes of system hardware
and software,
and timekeeping forms
and
procedures.
The
second change would be to modify Section 11.2.2 to
state:
11.2.2 All personnel shall be paid on an
hourly
basis.
The
Guild has proposed that deputies continue to be paid
on a monthly, salaried basis. According to the County, the
continuation of the current system would
require the County to
maintain two. separate and distinct payroll
systems. It would
require that two payrolls be run with a
total of four paydays each
month.
The County is strongly opposed to this idea because the
estimated additional cost
of maintaining the former payroll
software is about $67,000 per year. The County submits the old
payroll system will be completely
dysfunctional by the year 2000.
The
Guild resisted the change to the hourly pay system
based on two primary objections. The County asserts the Guild's
reasons to continue the old system are
insufficient to require the
maintenance of two payroll systems. The first concern of the Guild
is that hourly pay of deputy sheriffs will
fluctuate from month to
month.
The County concedes that in a particular month deputies on
one shift will earn more than deputies on
another shift. However,
the County asserts that over time everything
will come out even.
Deputies will be paid for each and every
hour of service, and their
long range, annual earnings will not be
impacted by the change in
the payroll system. Any reduction in pay due to the shift loss
will be minimal
The
Arbitrator should reject the Guild's claim that some
members will make less than others. The only reason a deputy would
make less in a particular month is that he
or she has worked fewer
hours.
The bottom line is pay is keyed to the amount of time a
deputy works during the pay period.
The
second concern of the Guild is that members will lose
pay as the result of the lag inherent in the
new payroll system.
The County counters that deputies will not
lose any money. Rather,
the County avers the new payroll system will
simply pay the money
out to employees at different times. In addition, the system will
deliver premium and overtime pay quicker to
employees as they will
be paid in the payroll period when the premium
pay was earned.
While there will be a slight lag in the
receipt of some pay, no one
will actually "lose" money as the
result of the "lag" in pay.
Section
3.5 of the 1992 Agreement explicitly gave the
County the right to purchase new payroll
software. The decisions
to pay all employees on a semi-monthly basis
and to pay nonexempt
employees on an hourly basis were made in
the context of the
features of the software ultimately
purchased by the County. The
County bargained with the Guild over the impact
of that purchase
decision and forestalled implementation
pending bargaining. The
approach taken by the County was entirely
appropriate in this case.
The
County also rejects the Guild's proposal to adopt the
"
substantial number of employees, and most
bargaining units to move
to the hourly pay system. It is not appropriate to use an
alternative system for this bargaining
unit. The County is now
down to only two bargaining units, other than
the Guild, which are
not on the new system. The transition into the new system has been
successful,
and problems with
it are being worked
out as
implementation goes forward. .
In
sum, the County submits the new system is working and
there is no reason the 122 Guild members
should not be paid on a
semi-monthly, hourly basis, the same as
other employees of the
County.
The County's proposal should be adopted by the Arbitrator.
C. The Guild
The Guild
sees the County proposal as making two
fundamental changes in the system. First, the County is Proposing
to change the paydays to the 10th and the
25th of the month.
According to the Guild the effect of this
change is that employees
would no longer receive their full pay at
the end of the month
worked.
In the view of the Guild, members will only receive
approximately 50% of their normal salary in
the month it was
earned.
The
second fundamental change is to eliminate the monthly
salary, and pay on a purely hourly system.
According to the Guild,
this will result in fluctuating pay again
causing severe economic
hardship to the members. The Guild proposes to delete Article 3.5
from the contract and thereby eliminate any
issue as to whether or
not the County can change the payroll system The Guild also
proposes to eliminate the reference to
"hourly" in Article 11.2
relating to the 48-hour deputies'
compensation. The Guild has
never viewed this language to authorize
hourly pay. The County's
proposal to move Article 3.5 into Article 11.7
would amend it so
the County would have the unilateral right
to change payroll at
will, with no obligation to bargain.
The
Guild's arguments against the County's proposal may
be summarized as follows:
1. The Guild questions the legality of the
County's
proposal to switch to an hourly pay
rate. RCW 49.28.010 is the 8-hour day law
which
applies to municipalities. The statute
has
been construed by the
Court to
mean that it
only applied to
contracted
labor and day labor done. In
essence,
the County seeks to convert deputy
sheriffs to
day labor- -which is
of
questionable
legality- -under the 8-hour law.
2. The Guild points out that none of the
comparable
jurisdictions pay by the hour. The
County was unable
to cite a
single
jurisdiction
in either the state of
or
the state of
The proposal
of the County
is simply
unprecedented.
3. The City of
computer
program as
system
which functions under that computer
system
to avoid switching to an hourly pay
system.
4. The County's strongest argument in
support
of
their proposal is that the Coalition has
agreed
to an hourly pay system. It is the
Guild's
position that in this case and under
the
facts and circumstances in existence, this
factor
should be given little or no weight.
The
members of the Joint Labor Coalition
cannot
strike under
County
could have unilaterally implemented the
payroll system,
regardless of whether the
Coalition
agreed to it or not.
5. The implementation of an hourly pay
system
will cause
substantial variations in the
amount
of the checks members receive from
month
to month. Further, depending on the
shift
an employee works, the deputy may earn
more
or less than a coworker on another shift.
The
members of this bargaining unit should not
bear
the brunt of a self-created situation by
the
County's purchase of a payroll system that
does
not account for these variances.
The
Guild concludes that the County has not produced
sufficiently strong evidence to justify the
novel change it is
proposing in the way the payroll system is
administered. Thus, the
Arbitrator should reject the County's
proposal to convert from a
monthly salary system to an hourly pay
program.
D. Discussion and Findings
The Arbitrator
finds that the
County has made a
convincing case for a revision in the
payroll system. The
Arbitrator will award the County's proposal
for Section 11.2.2 with
a modification that it shall be effective
Arbitrator will also award the continuance
of Section 3.5 50 that
it will be clear that any future changes
will be subject to
bargaining.
The Arbitrator will move Section 3.5 into the County's
proposed Section 11.7.
The
County's proposal is based on the sound premise that
employees will be paid for all time
worked. The principle of pay
for time worked is fundamental
to any collective bargaining
agreement.
While the Guild went to great lengths to demonstrate
that deputies will "lose" money
under the hourly system, the bottom
line is that deputies will be paid for each
and every hour of work
performed for the County and that their
long-range earnings will
not be impacted by the change.
Moreover,
the only reason a deputy would make less money
in a particular month is that he or she has
worked fewer hours than
a coworker.
There is nothing inequitable about a system that
accurately pays for time worked. The prime example in this
contract is that 48-hour employees make more
money than 40-hour
employees.
The sole reason for that is the additional 8 hours of
work performed by the road deputies. This does not violate the
sound principle of equal pay for time
worked.
The
Guild's concern that members will "lose" pay as
result of the time lag inherent in the new
payroll system is
inaccurate.
The deputies will not lose any money as the result of
the adoption of the new payroll system. The only difference is
that money will be received at different
times during the month.
The new payroll system will actually deliver
premium pay and
overtime pay quicker than the old system.
The
Arbitrator was persuaded by the County's arguments
that there is absolutely no justification
for maintaining an
outdated and expensive payroll system for
the exclusive use of the
members of this bargaining unit. The County estimated the annual
cost of maintaining a separate system for
this group of employees
at $67,000.
In addition, the County's argument that the old system
will be totally outdated by the year 2000
lends further credence to
the County's position that change is in
order.
The
County presented solid proof that it needs to update
its payroll system to deliver an efficient
and effective payroll to
the 17,000 individuals employed or paid by
the County. The
administration of the payroll system is
complex and should not be
burdened by a separate system for the
members of this bargaining
unit.
The status quo should not prevent the full implementation of
the state-of-the-art Oracle database payroll
system.
Regarding
the Guild's questions about the legality of the
hourly pay system, the Arbitrator will make
no attempt to access
the legality of the proposal. The County has presented a proposal
to change to an hourly system and the
Arbitrator has been persuaded
to adopt that proposal. The constitutional
and statutory questions
raised by the Guild will have to be decided
in another forum.
The
strongest argument in support of the Guild's Position
is based on the fact none of the comparable
jurisdictions pay on an hourly basis.
In the judgment of this Arbitrator,
the real question is the total amount of pay earned by the members of
this unit as compared to that of the
deputies in the comparable
jurisdictions The fact that compensation is paid on an
hourly
basis is irrelevant, if the total amount of
dollars delivered are
reasonable and competitive. The decisive factor is the amount of
pay received by the deputies in this unit,
as compared to those in
the other units, not the manner in which the
pay is computed.
The
Arbitrator recognizes that this Award represents a
Significant change in the way the earnings
will be computed and
paid to members of this bargaining
unit. For this reason, I am
delaying the effective date of this change
until January 1, 1997,
so that time will be available to make the
necessary adjustments in
order to accomplish the transition from a
monthly salary to an
hourly wage as easy as possible. The Arbitrator will retain the
language included in Section 3.5 to
guarantee that any future
changes of this sort will be subject to
bargaining.
AWARD
The
Arbitrator awards with respect to the payroll system
issue as follows:
1. Section 11.2.2 shall be amended to
read:
11.2.2 Effective
shall
be paid on an hourly basis.
2. Section 3.5 of the current contract
shall
be
moved and renumbered as Section 11.7.
The
current contract
language shall continue
unchanged
in the new Section 11.7.
ISSUE
5 - HOURS OF WORK/SCHEDULES
A. Background
Article
10 of the current Agreement contains the matters
pertaining to hours of work and
overtime. Section 10.1 establishes
a shift schedule of 8 hour, 10 hour and 12
hour shifts as the
County determines to be in the best interest
of effective service.
The County proposed to amend Section 10.1 to
allow for the
implementation of an 11.5 hour shift
effective
has been previously noted, the standard
shift for road deputies is
12 hours.
The additional 8 hours of work are paid with an
adjustment of 5.28% on the base salary.
The
County also proposed to move Section 10.2 to 10.1 and
insert a clarification. The County announced in its post-hearing
brief that it has withdrawn this proposal
and the Arbitrator does
not need to address this part of the
County's proposal. Post-
Hearing Brief p. 69.
Patrol
deputies working a four on/four off schedule, work
12 hours a day. They work a total of 2,190 hours per
year. The
5.28% payment for the additional hours is
based on a straight time
calculation.
The tradeoff for accepting those straight time hours
was the ability to have four days off in a
row. The Guild objects
to the ability of the County to implement an
11.5 hour work shift
because it will reduce the amount of time
off.
B. The County
The
County proposed to amend Article 10.1 to include a
sentence which states
Effective
implement
an 11.5 hour shift.
The
County also proposed modifications of other sections
of Article 10 to accommodate the adoption of
the 11.5 hour work
schedule.
Pursuant to Section 10.7 the 11.5 hour schedule will
rotate on a 23-day repeating cycle of four
on/four off, four
on/four off, four on/three off, beginning
with the first shift
following the employee's three days of rest.
The
County proposes to restructure the 2,190 hours to
improve the Department's efficiency and
facilitate the County's
ability to provide training. Under the
County's proposal, deputies
will continue to work the same number of
annual hours (2,190) that
they currently work. The .5 hour less each shift is offset by an
additional workday every 24th day. The County maintains that the
additional workday is intended to be used
primarily for training.
Chief
Criminal Deputy Mike Brown testified about the
benefits of the new training schedule. According to Brown, the
Sheriff's Office has had a very difficult
time finding the time to
adequately train deputies. The Sheriff's Department uses a "mini-
academy" which blocks out time early in
the year which is used for
training purposes. The deputies are taken out of their regular
assignment and given an extensive week of
training. The maximum
amount of training which can be scheduled is
about 40 hours. The
problem comes when large blocks of deputies
are pulled from the
field
for training and
are unable to perform their
normal
functions. Deputies are required to change
their schedule in order
to provide coverage in the field. The Sheriff's Office must
restrict the number of vacations during the
mini-academy so that it
will be able to cover field operations while
deputies are in
training.
Chief Brown estimated that the overtime costs incurred
by this process were over $15,000 per year.
The
adoption of the new 11.5 hour schedule will create a
total of eight overlap days each year where
there would be twice
the number of deputy sheriffs on duty. The Sheriff's Office could
maintain coverage while at the same time
provide training without
incurring substantial overtime costs.
The
County next argues that if the new schedule were
implemented deputies would still have a
substantial number of days
off each year. Under the new schedule they would have about
174
days scheduled off per year. Under the 4/12
schedule, the deputies
average 182.5 days off per year. The County suggests the reduction
in days off is minimal. Further, the new schedule would allow
deputies to return to their families .5 hour earlier on 191
scheduled workdays.
The
County next argues that the reduced shift provides
additional safety and operational
benefits. According to the
County, a 12 hour shift is extremely long,
especially when worked
four days in a row. The Department continues to be concerned
about
what might happen late in the shift of a
tired patrol deputy who is
on his or her fourth straight scheduled day
of work. The County
submits the movement to an 11.5 hour shift
is a significant
movement in the right direction. The implementation of the 11.5
hour shift will be for a one year trial
period to give the parties
an opportunity to test the new schedule
during the final year of
the Agreement. If the parties do not like the new schedule,
they
will be free to bargain over it for the
successor Agreement.
The
Arbitrator should reject the Guild's argument that
the County would not make good use of the
overlap days. It is the
County's responsibility to determine how to
best provide police
protection within the County. The
Sheriff's Office should be
trusted to. make productive use of the time
during this one year
trial period. The County concludes that a minimal reduction
of
workdays off per year, when combined with a
shorter workday, is a
reasonable compromise on the work schedule
issue.
The
County also proposed to revise the callback pay
provision found in Section 10.11.1. The County would revise
Section 10.11.1 to read:
10.11.1 Callbacks on the employee's regular
day
off shall be compensated at the rate of
time
and one-half the employee's regular rate
of
pay with a minimum of three (3) hours.
According to the
County, bargaining unit employees
currently receive 2 "bonus" hours
of compensation whenever they are
called back to work. Specifically, the deputies receive the actual
time spent on the callback, plus 2
additional hours of pay at time
and one-half. The County is proposing a system where
deputies
receive the actual time spent on the
callback, with a minimum of 3
hours.
The
County reasons that the purpose of callback pay is to
provide adequate compensation to an employee
who is inconvenienced
by having been called back to work outside
of their regular
schedule.
The systems used in the comparators establish a payment
based on a minimum number of hours
threshold, as is proposed by the
County.
a callback system like that in Clark County,
which pays additional
bonus hours, all at time and one-half,
regardless of the length of
the callback.
The County
also proposed language
to modify the
definition of callback with new language to
state:
10.11.3 "Required" to return to
work shall
exclude
all voluntary overtime assignments and
overtime
which is scheduled more than 72 hours
in
advance.
The County reasons that callback pay should
not apply to those
situations where the deputy sheriff receives
substantial advance
notice
of the callback.
The County asserts
the primary
inconvenience comes from being called back
to work on short notice.
With at least three days advance notice,
this inconvenience factor
is generally de minimis. The County understands that on many
occasions the deputies will be required to
report to court with a
long period of notice and yet will only be
obligated to appear for
a short period of time. The County took this into account and
excluded callback for court appearances from
this proviso.
The
Arbitrator should reject the Guild's proposal to
expand the definition of callback so that
PDO and compensatory days
off would be included. The Guild incorrectly seeks to overturn an
arbitration decision which held that the
callback provision only
applies to a deputy's regularly scheduled
day off, and not the PDO
or comp time days. The County submits there is no reason to
overturn the decision.
C. The Guild
The
Guild begins with the observation that the County
currently has a goal of providing 40 hours
of training a year. The
shift proposed by the County would create
sixteen overlap days, or
128 hours.
This is substantially more hours than needed for
training.
The Guild has two primary objections to the proposed
11.5 hour shift. First, the Guild has serious concerns whether
or
not the sixteen overlap days would be
properly utilized. Second,
the Guild is concerned that the proposed
11.5 hour schedule would
result in more hours worked at the straight
time rate, without the
accompanying benefit of days off. The Guild next argues that-it
accepted the 4/12 shift schedule which
reduced compensation for the
additional 128 hours because the 4/12
schedule maximizes days off.
Deputies who work the 4/12 schedule receive
a significantly greater
number of days off during the course of the
year than the 40-hour
employees.
The County's proposal takes away sixteen of those days
off but continues to expect those employees
to work 2,200 hours and
to compensate the additional 120 hours at
straight time rates. The
County has provided in its proposal no
benefit to its employees for
the reduction of the number of days off.
The
Guild also asks the Arbitrator to reject the County's
reliance on the cost of overtime to provide
training because the
problem with the overtime is not the 4/12
schedule, but rather
because the people on the 40-hour overtime
threshold were placed
into a 48-hour workweek. The problem with overtime will continue
regardless of whether the Arbitrator grants
the 11.5 hour workday.
The overtime problem was aggravated because
the County chose to
unilaterally adjust those schedules, as
opposed to coming to the
Guild and negotiating the change.
Turning
to the issue of safety, the Guild submits that
the reduction of the 12 hour shift by a half
hour would not improve
the safety conditions for members. The Guild reasons that the
reduction of sixteen fewer days in the recycling
of an employee on
only three-days rest would more than offset
any safety improvements
by a half hour reduction in the shift. The Guild concludes the
County has failed to present any strong or
cogent evidence to
justify its proposed change in the work
schedule.
The
Guild also objected to the County's proposal to
change Section 10.1 and Section 10.1.1. The County sought to move
a 48-hour notice provision into Section 10.1
so as to provide that
employees shall be afforded the 48-hour
notice of any temporary
change of four weeks or more. The County withdrew this proposal in
the post-hearing brief so this objection is
noted for the record
only.
The Guild also objects to the County's proposal to delete
Section 10.1.1 which affirms the continuing
duty to bargain over
changes in the work schedule. The Arbitrator should not force the
Guild to waive its right to bargain. The Guild also objects to the
County's proposal to delete the last
sentence from Section 10.2
because it would allow the county to change-
- on a moments notice- -
for up to four weeks a deputy's work
schedule.
The
Guild points out that if the Arbitrator chooses to
award the 11.5 hour day, the County's
proposed language for Section
10.1, Section 10.4 and Section 1.7 and part
of Section 10.8 is
acceptable in order to implement the 11.5
hour shift. However, the
change proposed by the County to Section
10.8 is an attempt to
alter the current overtime threshold. The
County's proposal should
be rejected because it fails to deal with
the question of work on
a regularly scheduled day off.
Regarding
the County's proposal to amend the callback
provision, the Guild submits the County
presented no justification
beyond the fact they do not believe it is in
line with the
comparable jurisdictions. The Guild alleges this provision is of
long duration and should not be changed
without substantial
evidence.
The Guild submits
the County has presented no
significant evidence to change the callback
language.
The
final County proposed change is a new Section 10.11.3
wherein they seek to define the term
"Required" to exclude
voluntary overtime assignments which are
scheduled 72 hours in
advance.
In the view of the Guild, the County is seeking to get
around the callback requirements. Adoption of this proposal would
open the door to the potential for abuse of
the rest time of the
deputies.
The County presented no evidence to justify the addition
of its proposed language to the successor
Agreement.
The
Guild submits that its one proposal to amend Section
10.11.1 concerning callback should be
adopted. An arbitrator
interpreted Section 10.11.1 to mean that the
callback provision did
not apply to paid days off or compensatory
days off that had been
scheduled in advance. The Guild believes the purpose of callback
pay on a day off is to protect the
employee's leisure time. That
justification is equally applicable to both
regular scheduled days
off and a paid day off that has been
scheduled in advance. The
Guild's proposal would merely provide that
any PDO or compensatory
time which had been pre-approved, would be
part of the definition
of a regular day off.
In
sum, the Guild asks the Arbitrator to
reject the
County's proposals to amend Article 10 to
allow for an 11.5 hour
shift and to adopt the Guild's single
proposal to modify Section
10 .11.1.
D. Discussion and Findings
Present
contract language provides for three alternative
types of shifts. The options available to the Sheriff's
Department
are 8 hour, 10 hour and 12 hour shifts. The Arbitrator finds that
the County's proposal to add a fourth option
of an 11.5 hour shift
should not be included in the 1995-97
contract. With the exception
of the difficulties the County asserts it
has with scheduling
training, the 4/12 system has served the
parties well. The County
offered no examples of problems where the
4/12 schedule impeded the
operations and effectiveness of the
Sheriff's Department.
The
County's concern with the amount of overtime required
to accomplish training is understandable.
However, this Arbitrator
remains unconvinced that the training issue
should form the basis
to eliminate the 4/12 schedule that has
worked to the advantage of
the parties to this Agreement for several
years. County's evidence
for making such a substantial change in the
4/12 scheduling system
was insufficient to compel this Arbitrator
to adopt the County's
proposal.
Moreover, the Arbitrator in rejecting the County's
proposal for an 11.5 hour shift took into
account that I did award
the County's proposal to convert the pay to
an hourly system. Two
substantial changes in the way the parties
to this Collective
Bargaining Agreement have scheduled and paid
for deputy time in a
single year would not be in the best
interest of stable labor
relations.
This Arbitrator is not necessarily holding that
alternatives' to the 4/12 scheduling should
not be considered.
However,
the time is not right to modify the current 4/12
scheduling system during the term of the
1995-97 Collective
Bargaining Agreement.
The
parties will have the opportunity to negotiate this
issue for future Agreements. The Arbitrator will award the
continuation of Section 10.1.1. which
recognizes the continuing
duty to bargain over issues relating to the
work schedule. Given
the rejection of the 11.5 hour shift
schedule, the Arbitrator will
not award the proposed changes to Section
10.4, Section 10.7 and
Section 10.8 concerning the 11.5 hour work
schedule.
The
Arbitrator concurs with the County that Section
10.11.1
should be modified
to eliminate "bonus" hours
of
compensation whenever a deputy is called
back. The County's
proposal to require compensation at the rate
of time and one-half
the employee's regular rate of pay with a
minimum of 3 hours is
adequate recognition for the disruption of
the employee's off-duty
time.
The revision of the callback provision will bring it into
line with the callback compensation provided
in the comparator
jurisdictions.
The
County's proposal to add the new language contained
in Section 10.11.3 to the Collective Bargaining
Agreement which
would eliminate callback pay to situations
where the deputy
receives substantial advance notice of the
callback is without
merit.
Whether the employee receives a 72-hour notice of the
callback or a shorter period of time, the impact
on the employee's
off-duty time is the same. Specifically, the employee has to
interrupt their off-duty time to perform
services for the County.
The fact that the employee received a
72-hour notice of the loss of
off-duty time does not change the fact the
employee's personal life
is disrupted.
The
Arbitrator finds the Guild's arguments to expand the
definition of callback to include paid days
off or compensatory
days off that have been scheduled in advance
to be well founded.
The purpose of callback pay on a day off is
to protect the
employee's personal time. The Arbitrator concurs with the Guild
that the justification is equally applicable
to both the regularly
scheduled day off and a paid day off that
has been scheduled in
advance.
There is no reason to distinguish between paid days off
or compensatory time and a regular day
off. The Arbitrator will
award the Guild's proposed addition to
Section 10.11.1.
AWARD
The
Arbitrator awards that current contract language
contained in Article 10 shall be continued
with the modification to
Section 10.11.1 as follows:
10.11.1 Callbacks on the employee's regular
work
day shall be compensated at the rate of
time
and one-half the employee's regular rate
of
pay with a minimum of three (3) hours.
For
the
purposes of this section regular day off
means
the employee's scheduled days off and
any
paid leave (PDO and compensatory time)
which
has been preapproved.
ISSUE
6 - BENEFITS/INSURANCE
A. Background
The
only issue remaining for the Arbitrator relates to
the "buy-up" for the Blue Cross
Indemnity Plan 100/80 coverage for
the third year of the contract. The Arbitrator awarded a three-
year contract so it is necessary to
determine this remaining issue.
The parties agreed during negotiations that
the buy-up will be at
$10 for single coverage, $20 for two-party
coverage and $30 for the
family coverage rate for both 1995 and
1996. Article 13.1.1.F
contains the current language on the buy-up
for the 100/80 plan.
B. The Guild
The Guild sought
a two-year contract through
this
interest arbitration. The Arbitrator
rejected the Guild's proposal
for a two-year contract and accepted the
County's offer of a three-
year contract. The Guild proposed that in the event the
Arbitrator
awarded a three-year contract that the
current formula of $10, $20
and $30 or a reopener
on the buy-up rate be applicable in 1997.
According to the Guild, the County presented
no real justification
for its proposed change in the buy-up
formula from the 1995 and
1996 agreed upon rates. The Arbitrator should reject the County's
proposal to deviate from the existing
formula.
C. The County
The
County proposes that the buy-up formula in the
existing Agreement remain in place for
1997. The County notes that
the 100/80 plan is a costly program because
of its high level of
benefits.
Beginning in 1994 employees who wanted to participate in
the Blue Cross 100/80 plan were required to "buy-up" their
participation in that plan pursuant to a
formula agreed upon by the
parties. When the parties reached the 1992-94
Agreement, they
agreed upon a buy-up formula. That formula was applicable in 1994
and used to calculate the 1995 contribution
rate. While the
parties deviated from that formula for 1996,
the County requests
that the formula once again be applicable
for 1997 The County
asserts that all employee groups and
unrepresented employees who
are still participating in the Blue Cross
100/80 plan are basing
employee contributions on this formula.
The
County submits there is no reason to treat the deputy
sheriff's bargaining unit any different than
the other units. The
County submits its proposal to continue the existing buy-up
agreement should control for 1997.
D. Discussion and Findings
The
Arbitrator holds that the County's proposal to have
the existing buy-up formula control the
employee participation for
1997 should be adopted. The Arbitrator concurs with the County
that the formula which is applicable to all
other employee groups
and unrepresented employees who are still
participating in the Blue
Cross 100/80 plan should be identical. The Guild offered no
persuasive reasons why the deputy sheriff's
bargaining unit should
be treated any different than the other
units.
The
$30 payment for the 1996 buy-up was agreed to through
negotiations because the overall contract
had not been settled.
The Award of this Arbitrator will bring the
negotiations over the
1995-97 contract to a close. Therefore, it
is appropriate that the
existing formula for determining the level
of participation in the
Blue Cross 100/80 plan should be governed by
existing contract
language.
AWARD
The
Arbitrator awards that Article 13.1.1.F shall be
included in the contract to state:
13.1.1.F For calendar year 1996, the monthly
buy-up
amounts for employees electing the Blue
Cross
100%/80% plan are
$10,
$20, and $30 at
the single,
2-party, and family
coverage
levels. In 1997, if an employee wishes to
continue
participating in the current Blue
Cross
l00%/80% plan, the employee shall pay
the
difference in premiums between the Blue
Cross
100%/80% plan and the highest priced of
the three County--paid plans. The
determination
of the highest priced plan shall
be
based on the family coverage premium.
Buy-
up costs
shall be based
on the premium
differential
at each level of coverage.
ISSUE
7 - MISCELLANEOUS
A. Background
Two
items remain in dispute between the parties which are
included under this category. The first issue which divides the
parties is a Guild proposal to add a new
article providing tuition
reimbursement to deputies who seek
continuing education.
The
second issue is the duration of the contract.
The
County is proposing a three-year contract
through December 31,
1997, and the Guild proposed a two-year contract
effective through
B. The Guild
The
Guild submits that its tuition reimbursement proposal
would result in a direct benefit to the
County by educating its
officers. The Guild's evidence shows that if
tuition reimbursement
was allowed, the members would utilize this
program aggressively to
further their education. The Guild reasons there is a direct
correlation
between advanced education
and effective law
enforcement.
The County should support this goal by participating
in a tuition reimbursement program.
Turning
to the Guild's proposed two-year Agreement, the
Guild avers there are many unresolved issues
that can only be
settled at the bargaining table. The Guild cites the hourly pay
proposal of the County as a prime example of
an issue that needs
further discussion between the parties. This issue alone dictates
the imposition of a two-year contract as
opposed to a three-year
contract.
Moreover,
the County's desire to implement the 11.5 hour
shift requires further exploration at the
bargaining table. The
County refused to consider other options to
its 11.5 hour shift
schedule.
Since these are issues the County wants to have
resolved, the Arbitrator should send a
message to the County that
they need to bargain openly, honestly and in
good faith in order to
attain these significant changes to the
current Agreement. Hence,
a
two-year Agreement is
reasonable and appropriate
to be
implemented for the successor contract.
C. The County
The County
characterized the Guild's
tuition
reimbursement proposal as little more than a
request for a blank
check.
The Guild proposal does not in any way give the County
discretion to reject requests for tuition
reimbursement based on
budget or operational considerations. The County submits that all
tuition reimbursement programs grant the
employer some ability to
evaluate the request in light of its
operational needs.
The
County next argues that the tuition reimbursement
program goes beyond payment for college
classes and would demand
the County pay for any and all seminars
which are in any way job
related.
The County would have no ability under the Guild's
proposal to evaluate a program and determine
whether or not it is
worthy of County financial support. The virtual unrestricted
ability of deputies to take any class they
so elect is a flaw which
by itself is enough to reject the proposal.
It
is also the position of the County that it already
rewards deputies for attending college. Under the incentive
program, each college class completed gives
the deputy a point.
These points can be added with training
points in order to more
quickly achieve the 5% and 10% incentive
payments. The evidence
reflects the County is committed to training
its deputy sheriffs
and offers programs which deputies
participate in to enhance their
professional skills.
Turning
to the issue of duration, the County submits "the
parties need a rest." The record reflects that these parties have
engaged in almost nonstop bargaining since
the Guild was voted in
as
the exclusive bargaining
representative in late
1991.
Bargaining for the initial contract was
prolonged, and the final
Agreement was not reached until the spring
of 1993. The remaining
issue of the incentive plan was resolved by
the arbitration award
dated
in bargaining for a successor
Agreement. The parties bargained
through 1994 and into early 1995. Mediation failed to produce an
agreement. The interest arbitration was
conducted in February 1996
and by the time the arbitration Award is
issued there would be
approximately seven months left, if a two-year Agreement was
awarded.
The Arbitrator should order a three-year contract in
order to provide a period of labor stability
free from the
conflicts of continuous negotiations.
D. Discussion and Findings
Tuition
Reimbursement
This
Arbitrator has a history of supporting continuing
education programs included in collective
bargaining agreements.
In addition,
the Arbitrator accepts the logic of the Guild's
argument in support of its proposal that
continuing education has
value both to the employee and the employer.
However, the language
contained in the Guild's proposal is
unacceptable and will not be
awarded by this Arbitrator. The proposal is so extreme that I will
not attempt to modify it to an acceptable
format.
The County correctly pointed out that
the Guild's
proposal, if adopted, would create a blank
check on which members
could take college classes or other
educational programs that would
be required to be paid for by the
County. There is no maximum
amount of money that would be required to be
allotted.
The
complete disregard for the financial implications of
the program and operational impact on the
County is illustrated by
a sentence in the proposal which reads:
Request
for reimbursement shall be denied only
upon
the basis that the seminar or class is
not
related to the employee's job and career
development,
or is not related to the securing
of
a college degree.
The broadly worded language would create a
potential for grievances
when the County denies requests for tuition
reimbursement.
The
Arbitrator also notes that Guild members currently
receive rewards for attending college under
the existing incentive
program.
The incentive points earned by taking college credits
benefit the employee by moving them into the
5% and 10% incentive
payments
under the program.
The Arbitrator awarded
the
continuation of the current incentive plan
so members will continue
to enjoy the financial rewards of continuing
education. For all of
the above reasons, the Arbitrator rejects the Guild's tuition
reimbursement proposal.
Duration
The
Arbitrator finds that the County's proposal for a
contract extending through
The unending bargaining which these parties
have been engaged in
since 1991 must come to an end for the good
of labor relations
between Clark County and the Clark County
Deputy Sheriff's Guild.
The parties to this Agreement need a
reprieve from the time
consuming and often emotional aspects of the
bargaining process.
Mature
and stable labor
relations will not be attained by
continuing the constant turmoil of
collective bargaining.
The
Arbitrator can think of no valid reason for awarding
a contract which would compel the parties to
immediately begin
negotiations for a successor to the Guild's
proposed 1995-96
Agreement.
If the Arbitrator were to adopt a two-year Agreement,
approximately 75% of the contract's duration
would fall prior to
the signing of the Agreement. As the County
correctly pointed out,
the "shelf-life" would be
approximately seven months. The idea of
compelling these parties to turn right
around and begin bargaining
for a successor Agreement is totally without
merit. The delay in
bargaining will allow the County to work
through some of the
uncertainties created by the impending
annexation issues. The
impact of the annexations on the County and
this bargaining unit
will be better understood at the end of
1997. The imposition of a
three-year Agreement will give the parties
the opportunity to
reconsider the issue concerning changes in
the hours of work.
AWARD
The
Guild's proposal to add new language providing for
tuition reimbursement is rejected. The County's proposal for a
three-year Agreement is accepted. Article 24, Duration, should be
amended to state:
Except
as specifically provided herein, this
Agreement
shall be effective as of the date it
is
ratified by the parties and shall remain in
full
force and effect through the 31st day of
December,
1997. If either the Employer or the
Guild
desires to modify this Agreement for any
reason,
they shall give written notice to the
other
not later than
CONCLUSION
The
parties have continued to work under a Collective
Bargaining Agreement which expired on
December 31, 1994. The
parties negotiated without success for over
a period of several
years to reach a new Agreement. The Arbitrator has awarded some
changes in contract language. With the
exception of the move to an
hourly pay system, the Arbitrator has
awarded no radical or drastic
changes for the 1995-97 Agreement. For the most part, I have
attempted td be careful to use basic and
conservative language in
order to preserve what has served the
parties well in the past.
The time has come to put negotiations to an
end, and concentrate on
improving the working relationship between
the parties as defined
in the terms of the 1995-97 Collective
Bargaining Agreement.
Respectfully
submitted,
Gary
L. Axon
Arbitrator
Dated: