And
City
of
Interest
Arbitration
Arbitrator: George Lehleitner
Date
Issued:
Arbitrator: Lehleitner; George
Case #: 06392-I-86-00147
Employer:
City of
Date Issued:
IN THE MATTER OF INTEREST ) OPINION
AND AWARD
ARBITRATION ) OF
BETWEEN ) GEORGE
LEHLEITNER
CITY OF
AND ) ARBITRATOR
WALLA WALLA
FIREFIGHTERS, )
LOCAL 404 )
HEARING:
INTEREST George
Lehleitner
ARBITRATOR: 3348
REPRESENTING THE CITY:
C. Akin Blitz,
Attorney at Law
REPRESENTING THE
Michael
Tedesco, Attorney at Law
I. INTRODUCTION
The undersigned was selected as the neutral interest
arbitrator
by the
and
the City of
was
pursuant to RCW 41.56.030(6) and RCW 41.56.450, et. seq.
At the commencement of the
hearing, both parties formally
waived
their statutory right to appoint advocate arbitrators
and
agreed the undersigned arbitrator was authorized to decide
their
dispute in place of a full arbitration panel.
A hearing was held on
at
Law, and the
Both sides were given a full
opportunity to make presentations
on
each issue in dispute and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses,
as necessary. In addition to the verbal
and docu-
mentary evidence, the arbitrator informed the
parties that he
reserved
the right to officially consider any change in the
Consumer Price Index (CPI) , which occurs between the date of
hearing
and the issuance of his award. Neither
party objected.
The hearing was closed at the
conclusion of the evidentiary
phase
on
II. BACKGROUND
At the outset of the hearing, one of the firefighters
presented a
slide show to help the arbitrator better under-
stand
located
in southeastern
heritage
and has had professional firefighters since the 1880's.
The land around
ing and ranching. However, the City also has a four (4) year
college
and serves as a major medical center for this region.
In addition, there are large
food processing plants near Walla
Walla
and a major correctional facility.
III. ISSUES
The only issues presented to the arbitrator are Salaries
and
Hours of Work. As a practical matter,
the two (2) issues
are
inextricably intertwined inasmuch as the
reduction
in hours represents an additional cost item to the
City.
For purposes of clarity, the arbitrator will discuss the
two
(2) issues separately, but will attempt to explan the
impact
of one on the other.
Issue #1 - Salaries
Firefighters are compensated in accordance with a nego-
tiated salary schedule. For the period from
to
level
monthly wage of $1,592.00 and a top step fireman earns
$2,033.00
per month.
Proportionately higher salaries are
paid
to enginemen, paramedics, lieutenants and captains.
A. The
The
adjustments
in each of the first two (2) years and a wage
reopener in the third year. Under the
wage
adjustment in the first year would be retroactive to
The
1) The
with
its hours of work proposal. Walla
Walla's monthly salary,
unlike
the salary paid by comparable
is
based on a 56 hour week. Therefore, an
important aspect
of
the
hours
per week so as to bring
other
departments. Unfortunately, the City
opted not to accept
a
plan to implement this reduction effective March, 1986 with
the
result that, compared on an hourly basis,
wage
rates are very unfavorable. The
proposal
will not phase in an hours reduction until 1987.
Therefore, it is essential to
grant meaningful wage relief in
the first
two (2) years of the agreement.
2) This is a department
which provides diversified fire
services. Besides the normal supression
and prevention acti-
vities, this department provides sophisticated EMT
services.
In this regard, eleven (11)
employees are qualified as para-
medics. The firefighters should receive compensation commen-
surate with their expertise and job duties.
3) Based on the City's
current payroll costs, including
base
salary, longevity pay, insurance and retirement, the
Union's proposed 7% increases
in each of the first two (2)
years
would cost approximately 6.4% per year. 1 In view of the
City's excellent financial
condition, there is more than enough
money
to pay this increase.
_____
1 The arbitrator's costing figures are taken
from Union Exhibit
7. Those figures have
been modified to reflect the change in
health insurance costs noted by the
City at hearing.
_____
4) There is not an
ability to pay issue in Walla Walla.
The Union's exhibits
demonstrate that this City has done an
excellent
job of maintaining substantial cash reserves.
This
has
been accomplished in large part by consistently underbudget-
ing revenues and overbudgeting
expenditures (Union Exhibits
9-11).
5) The City's own budget
documents show healthy reserves.
This leaves the City with a
substantial fund balance in the general
fund. For instance, from 1983 through 1985, the
fund balance
in
the general fund increased from 5.96% to 17.34% (Exhibit
U-16). Some of these funds should be used to pay a
competitive
wage
rate to Walla Walla firefighters.
6) The factor of
comparability strongly favors the Union.
In assessing this factor, the
parties have agreed to use the
list
of comparables developed by Arbitrator Levak in a
recent
interest
arbitration award involving the Walla Walla police.
However, in order to make a
meaningful comparison with these
comparators,
it is necessary to calculate the Walla Walla wage
rate
on an hourly basis. This is necessarily
so because Walla
Walla firefighters work 56
hours, as against an average of 53.7
in
the comparator cities. It is also
necessary to factor in
pension
pick up, where applicable. When these
adjustments are
made,
a comparison of wage rates among the agreed to comparables
reveals
the following, as of June 30, 1985:
__________
SALARY COMPARED BY HOURLY RATE
AS OF JUNE 30, 1985
SUPPRESSION HOURLY
JURISDICTION TOTAL HOURS
WORKED RATE
Albany, OR $2,084 56 $8.59
Hanford, CA $1,726 56 $8.35
Kennewick, WA $2,247 50 $8.92
Klamath Falls, OR $1,819 50.3 $10.37
Pasco, WA $2,164 56 $7.90
Pendleton, OR $1,918 56 $7.11
Pullman, WA $1,872 53 $8.15
Richland, WA $2,226 50.9 $10.09
Turlock, CA $2,202 56 $9.07
Wenachee,
WA $2,231 53 $9.71
Average $2,049 53.7 $8.83
Walla Walla,
WA $2,033 56 $8.38
Variation -.78% 2.3 -5.09%
__________
7) The wage disparity as of June 30, 1985, widens
considerably
when one compares salaries as of June 30, 1986.
Comparisons as of this date
reveal the following:
__________
SALARY COMPARED ON AN HOURLY
RATE AS OF JUNE 30, 1986
SUPPRESSION HOURLY
JURISDICTION TOTAL HOURS
WORKED RATE
Albany, OR $2,163 56 $8.91
Hanford, CA $1,776 56 $7.32
Kennewick, WA $2,359 50.3 $10.82
Klamath Falls, OR $1,910 56 $7.87
Pasco, WA $2,296 50 $10.60
Pendleton, OR $1,982 56 $8.17
Pullman, WA $1,928 53 $8.39
Richland, WA $2,226 50.9 $10.09
Turlock, CA $2,267 56 $9.34
Wenachee,
WA $2,362 53 $10.28
Average $2,127 53.7 $9.18
Walla Walla,
WA $2,033 56 $8.38
Variation -4.41% 2.3 -8.74%
__________
If these comparisons were
projected further until June 30, 1987,
the
disparity would increase to 8.28% on a monthly basis and
12.43% on an hourly basis,
assuming an increase among the com-
parator cities of 4%. In sum, it is apparent that, even when
salaries
are compared on a monthly basis, Walla Walla has a
com-
parability problem that is increasing. Now is the time
to address this problem.
8) Percentage increases among the comparator cities in
1985-86 averaged 3.81%. The City cannot afford to lose further
ground
in view of these increases. The theory
behind the
Union's proposed increases is
to bring Walla Walla wages in
line
in 1986 and then conform hours to those utilized in the
comparator
cities in the final year of the contract (1987)
9) Economic data indicates that economic conditions in
this
area have remained relatively stable from 1982 to the
present. In fact, the unemployment rate has steadily
declined
during
this period (Exhibit U-26) . Meanwhile,
assessed values
have
steadily increased (Exhibit U-29).
10) Interestingly, the cost of living in Walla Walla is
higher
than it is in the Tri-Cities area. Thus,
it is more
meaningful
to compare costs in Walla Walla with those in
Seattle
than with those in the Tri-Cities area.
11) The City's threat to
RIF employees in the event its
wage
proposal is exceeded is ridiculous in view of this City's
substantial
cash reserves.
12) The cost of living
data offered by the City is largely
irrelevant
because Walla Walla is in an obvious catch up situa-
tion.
Moreover, firefighter increases on the west coast have
traditionally
exceeded the CPI. If the City fails to
make
similar
adjustments, the catch up problem will be exacerbated.
13) Overtime costs under
the FLSA are not considered by
interest
arbitrators when they develop a wage award.
This is
because
FLSA costs are statutorily mandated.
B. The City
The City proposes a two (2) year agreement with a 1.5%
increase
on the base in the first year. The
City's proposal
in
the second year, as the arbitrator understands it, is to
use
the same methodology Arbitrator Levak used in the
recent
Walla
Walla police award. 2
_____
2 The City did not specifically propose a
figure for the second
year, but mentioned that, if this
methodology is used, the
City may find itself with a "catch up" problem
amounting to
approximately 1%. Apparently, the City is amenable to adding
this 1% to the second year adjustment.
_____
The City's arguments are summarized as follows:
1) The City's proposed 1.5% increase in the first year
actually
amounts to an increase of 3% due to the increased
costs
of implementing FLSA.
2) The fund balances shown by the Union for 1984 and 1985
have
declined dramatically. The 1985 figure
of $907,297.00
has
dropped to $757,452.00 for 1986 and is projected to drop
further
to $538,000.00 by 1987.
3) The City Manager's 1987 budget message speaks to some
of
the economic realities facing the City.
In a word, the City
is
experiencing declining revenues, resulting in less money
to
pay employee salaries. Projected
increases are not budgeted
for
the fire department and any increases awarded in interest
arbitration
will have to come out of the fire department's bud-
get. This would mean firefighter layoffs.
4) Another indicator of
the City's financial condition
and
its inability to pay a wage adjustment of the magnitude
proposed
by the Union is the decline in the 1987 general
fund
budget from $7,678,300.00 in 1986 to $7,252,600.00 in
1987.
5) The arbitrator should
adopt Arbitrator Levak's method-
ology for comparing relevant jurisdictions as
well as the com-
parators he selected. In his police award, Arbitrator Levak
found
that Walla Walla was 5.5% below the 1985 average wage
of
the comparator jurisdictions. Thus, a
5.5% adjustment,
effective
December 25, 1985, was awarded to bring Walla Walla
in
line with the average 1985 wage paid in the comparator
jurisdictions. Applying this same methodology to the fire-
fighters
reveals the following:
__________
TOP STEP FIRE FIGHTER WAGE
(Highest wage paid 7/1/85 -
12/31/85)
JURISDICTION WAGE PERS TOTAL
Albany 2041* 6% 2163
Pendleton 1870 6% 1982
Klamath Falls 1716 6% 1819
Hanford 1660 4% 1726
Kennewick 2247 2247
Pasco 2164 2164
Pullman 1872 1872
Richland 2226 2226
Turlock 2202 2202
Wenatchee 2250 2250
Average 2025 2065
Walla Walla 2033 2033
Variation +.4% -1.5%($32)
_____
* includes EMT pay
__________
The above comparisons indicate
the firefighters are only
1.5% below the 1985 wage rate
paid by the comparator cities.
Thus, only a 1.5% adjustment
is needed to bring Walla Walla
wage
rates in line with those paid by the comparator cities.
This is precisely what the
City is proposing.
6) Looking at wage
comparisons among the same compara-
tors in a different way, the following chart
reflects calendar
1986 wage adjustments for all
California and Washington cities,
except
Richland and Walla Walla, which are not settled. The
chart
also shows the highest FY 1985-86 Oregon wage.
__________
Wage Comparison for Top Step
Fire Fighter Positions
JUNE 30
JURSIDICTION 1986 PERS TOTAL
Albany $2,041* 6% $2,163
Pendleton 1,870 6% 1,982
Klamath Falls 1,802 6% 1,910
Hanford 1,708 4% 1,776
Kennewick 2,359 2,359
Pasco 2,296 2,296
Pullman 1,928 1,928
Richland 2,226 2,226
Turlock 2,267 2,267
Wenatchee 2,362 2,362
Average $2,086 $2,127
Walla Walla $2,033 $2,033
Variation -2.5% -4.4%
_____
* includes EMT pay
__________
Even using this method, which was not done by Arbitrator Levak,
the
City is only 4.4% behind the average of the comparator
cities. Obviously, the Union's wage demand exceeds
this
differential.
7) The CPI projections cited by Arbitrator Levak
to
support a
wage increase in the second year are too high.
First, wage adjustments paid
to firefighters from 1981 to the
present
indicate firefighter wage rates track almost precisely
with
increases in the CPI. Second, a review
of the CPI data
for
1986 reveals the cost of living has remained remarkably
flat
during this period. More specifically,
the index (US CPI-W)
stood
at 324.9 in September, 1986, which was only 1.5% higher
than
the 324.3 figure for December, 1985.
Even assuming the
CPI increases by as much as 2%
in 1986, this would indicate
that
at most a 2% adjustment is warranted to keep up with the
cost
of living. A 4% figure may be more
realistic for 1987.
8) As the Union
acknowledges, the Union's wage demands
must
be considered in conjunction with its proposal to reduce
the
work week from 56 hours to 53. Without
getting into all
the
specifics at this time, the City estimates the unbudgeted
overtime
impact of this proposal amounts to $43,340.00.
9) The impact of the Union's proposed 7% increases in
the
1986 and 1987 can be illustrated by reviewing the effect
of
the Levak police award on the City's budgetary
process. To
summarize,
the City budgeted 2.4% for salary costs in 1986
and
nothing in 1987, as compared with Levak's award of
5.5% in
1986
and 4.5% in 1987. Even
with a reduction of one (1)
position
in 1986, the end result is a 1987 shortfall of
$39,740.00
and a likelihood of additional employee layoffs.
10) An award equal to or even close to the Union's pro-
posed
7% increases in the first two (2) years would cause
similar
problems. In this regard, the City
budgeted 2.4%
for
increased public safety salary costs in 1986 (the City's
proposed
1.5% adjustment plus an additional 1.5% in FLSA costs
more
than exhausts this amount) and nothing in 1987.
Accord-
ing to the City's estimates, an award of 7% in
each of the
first
two (2) years would result in net unbudgeted costs of
$134,582.00. Moreover, when the $43,340.00 unbudgeted costs
associated
with the Union's reduction in hours proposal is
factored
in, the total in unbudgeted costs amounts to $177,922. 3
Obviously, this is entirely
unacceptable to the City.
_____
3 The arbitrator has modified the figures
contained in Exhibit
C-10
to reflect 7% adjustments for 1986 and 1987.
_____
11) Internal consistency (i.e., wage parity) supports
the
City's proposal. The City's
non-represented and general
unit
employees both received 1.5% in 1986.
Moreover, applying
the
same methodology used by Arbitrator Levak to develop
the
police
award leads one to this same 1.5% figure.
C. Discussion
The Washington Statute (RCW 41.56.450(a)-(f)) sets forth
the
criteria to be applied by interest arbitrators in develop-
ing interest awards. The arbitrator's award is based on
an
application of these criteria to the facts in this
case. What follows is a summary of the focal points
in that
analysis.
The Constitutional & Statutory Authority of the
Employer
This factor was not an issue.
Stipulations of the Parties
The parties agreed to use the comparables developed by
Arbitrator Levak
in the recent interest arbitration award involv-
ing the City and its police officer bargaining
unit.
The parties also agreed that the arbitrator could officially
notice
and consider CPI figures issued subsequent to the hearing
date,
but prior to the issuance of his award.
Finally, the City agreed to make every reasonable effort to
issue a
paycheck including whatever adjustments are awarded prior
to
Christmas.
Comparability
(1) Methodology
Comparability is one of the key statutory factors in this
case. The parties managed to narrow the scope of
the arbitra-
tor's inquiry considerably by stipulating to a
list of compar-
able
jurisdictions. More specifically, this
was accomplished
by
agreeing to use the comparables developed by Arbitrator
Levak in the recent police award. What the parties did not
agree
to, however, is the methodology to be applied in com-
paring
Walla Walla wage rates with those paid by the compar-
ator departments.
Both parties use top step firefighter wage rates for
comparative
purposes, but the Union does so by comparing
salaries
on an hourly basis, whereas the City compares monthly
wage
rates. According to the Union, it is
necessary to compare
hourly
wage rates in the firefighters' case because in Walla
Walla, unlike in most of the
agreed upon comparator jurisdic-
tions, firefighters work a 56 hour week.
The arbitrator agrees with the Union's argument on this
point. For reasons explained in another section of
this award,
the
arbitrator has not awarded a reduction in hours, as pro-
posed
by the Union. Consequently, Walla Walla firefighters are
in
the position of working 56 hour weeks, as distinguished
from
the 53.7 average among the comparator departments.
This being so, the only apples
and apples comparison is one in
which
hourly, not monthly, wage rates are compared.
It should also be pointed out that an hourly wage rate com-
parison for firefighters is not contrary to the
police award
rendered
by Arbitrator Levak.
Simply stated, there was no indi-
cation in the police award that hourly versus
monthly wage rate
comparisons
was an issue. Stated another way, there
was no
indication
in the police award that Walla Walla police officers
work
different hours than their counterparts in the comparator
jurisdictions.
Another interesting methodology question is whether the
arbitrator,
in developing his award for 1986 (i.e., December
26, 1985 through December 26,
1986) should use 1985 or 1986
wage
rates. The City, citing the Levak award, argues that
1985 wage rates should be
used.
It is true that Mr. Levak's 5.5%
award in the first year
took,
in his words, "the City in 1986 only to the average of
the
1985 wage." (Levak award at page 27.) However, in this
arbitrator's view, it would be a misreading of
Arbitrator Levak's
award
to say he thereby precluded the consideration of 1986
settlements
in developing as award. That simply is
not what he
said. Moreover, a reading of the entire award
reveals that Mr.
Levak,
in accordance with the statutory mandate, did not limit
his
analysis to the factor of comparability.
He also considered
the
other statutory criteria.
The question of using 1986 settlements is particularly inter-
esting in this case because the Walla Walla contract runs from
December 26 to December 26, as
distinguished from some of the
comparator
cities, which run from July to July.
Under these cir-
cumstances, a logical approach is to average wage
rates among the
comparator
departments as of both 1985 and 1986.
More specifi-
cally, the arbitrator will average the hourly
wage rates as of
June 30, 1985, and June 30,
1986, and compare that average with
the
hourly wage rate paid to Walla Walla firefighters.
4
_____
4 The 1985 wage comparisons cited by the
Union are as of June 30,
1986, as opposed to the 1985 City figures, which are as of Decem-
ber 31,
1985. For obvious reasons, the
arbitrator will average
the 1985 and 1986 figures as of June
30th in each year.
_____
(2) The Comparisons
Once the methodology is determined, the comparisons
themselves
are relatively straightforward.
The average monthly wage among the comparator cities as
of
June 30, 1985, is $2,049.00 and the hourly rate is $8.83.
As of June 30, 1986, the
average monthly rate increases to
$2,127.00
and the hourly rate to $9.18. If the wage rates
as
of these two (2) dates are averaged, the new monthly figure
becomes
$2,088.00 and the hourly rate becomes $8.97.
Compar-
mg
this figure ($8.97) with the Walla Walla hourly rate
of
$8.38 indicates that Walla Walla is 6.57% behind the average
wage
rate paid by the comparator cities. 5
_____
5 Interestingly, wage rate comparisons using
slightly different
time periods result in similar
figures. Thus, for example, if
hourly wage rates as of December 31,
1985, only are used, Walla Walla
is 5.57% behind the average. And, if the average of wage rates
as of December 31, 1985 and June 30,
1986 are used, the differ-
ence
increases to 6.97%. Finally, if wage
rates as of June 30,
1986, only are used, the differential increases further to
8.7%.
_____
(3) Other Considerations
Without question, comparability is one of the most impor-
tant statutory factors. This is particularly true in a "catch
up"
situation because the need for ''catch up'', if shown, tends
to
render the cost of living factor less important. Moreover,
the
apparent absence of an inability to pay a reasonable, but
not
excessive, wage increase in Walla Walla also tends to
make
the
comparability factor more paramount.
Nevertheless, the arbitrator's analysis should not be
based
entirely on comparability and the perceived need for
"catch
up''. Simply stated, the statute directs
interest arbi-
trators to consider all of the relevant statutory
criteria.
Thus, for example, if a public
employer has limited financial
resources
or the CPI is flat, these factors would militate
in
favor of a more conservative approach.
Stated another way,
a
wage adjustment that may seem appropriate on the basis of
a
straight comparability analysis may no longer be appropriate
after
all of the statutory criteria are considered.
The Cost of Living
The cost of living, as measured by the CPI, is another of
the
statutory factors the arbitrator is required to consider.
A review of the All Cities CPI-W (the index referenced by
Arbitrator Levak
in the recent police award) shows that the
index
remained flat during 1986. Even assuming
a healthy
increase
in the index during the last two (2) months of the
year,
the increases over last year are going to be minimal. On
the
other side of the coin, the arbitrator is of the opinion
that
rapidly fluctuating oil prices and a recessionary economy
over
the last several years make the index more unreliable
than
might otherwise be the case. Finally, as
the Union correctly
points
out, firefighter wage settlements statewide have out-
stripped
the CPI on a consistent basis. Thus, to
the extent
Walla Walla
firefighters receive less, the City will be faced
with a
serious "catch up" problem.
The CPI is particularly useful in terms of projecting
on
appropriate wage adjustments in the second or third year
of a
multi-year agreement. In this regard,
the City acknow-
ledges
that growth of approximately 4% is projected for 1987.
Arbitrator Levak
projected similar growth in the cost of
living
and awarded a 4.5% for 1987. And
finally, a review
of
recent settlements suggests to this arbitrator that a 4%
increase
in the second year is appropriate for Walla Walla
firefighters.
Changes During the Pendancy
of the Proceedings
Other than newly issued CPI figures for October, 1986,
which
the arbitrator noticed and considered, this factor has
no
bearing on the arbitrator's award.
Other Factors Traditionally Considered
The Washington interest arbitration statute, unlike its
counterpart
in Oregon, does not specifically identify ability
to
pay as one of the applicable criteria.
Nevertheless, the
ability
to pay and the interest and welfare of the public is
certainly
one of the factors traditionally considered by arbi-
trators in fashioning interest awards.
This factor need not be discussed at great length, under
the
circumstances of this case. The
undersigned arbitrator
agrees
with the analysis of Arbitrator Levak on this point.
Essentially, he concluded that
the City had sufficient funds
in
its budget to pay a reasonable wage adjustment without
affecting
service levels. However, the arbitrator
will award
split
increases in the first year solely for the purpose of
minimizing
the fiscal impact on the City, while at the same
time
maximizing the amount of "catch up".
Summary
The arbitrator's award is designed to bring Walla Walla
firefighter
wage rates in line as much as possible with the
average
paid by the comparator cities. To
accomplish this with
the
least amount of fiscal impact, the arbitrator will spread
the
increases in the first year into adjustments effective
December 26, 1985, and June
26, 1986.
The arbitrator will award a two (2) year agreement with a
4% increase in the second
year. The arbitrator is unwilling
to
award a two (2) year agreement with a reopener in the
third
year
because of the outstanding "hours of work" issue. A two
(2) year
agreement provides sufficient stability, while at the
same
time giving both sides an opportunity to address the hours
of
work issue, if desired, during the next round of negotiations
D. Award
Based on an application of the statutory criteria to the
facts
of this case, the neutral arbitrator makes the following:
1) Effective December
26, 1985, increase all bargaining
unit
wage rates by 3.25%.
2) Effective June 26,
1986, increase all bargaining
unit
wage rates an additional 3.25%.
3) Effective December
26, 1986, increase all bargaining
unit
wage rates by 4%.
Issue #2 - Hours of Work
Article 20 of the current agreement contains the following
relevant
contract language:
ARTICLE 20 - HOURS OF WORK AND OVERTIME
20.01 Employees assigned to a twenty-seven (27) day
work
cycle shall have an average annual week of fifty-
six (56) hours. The work force shall consist of
three (3) shifts, designated as
"A" shift, "B" shift,
and "C" shift. Each shift shall work twenty-four
(24) hours from 0730 to
0730. The configuration of
the twenty-seven (27) day work
cycle shall be shown
in Appendix A.
Employees not assigned to the twenty-seven (27) day
work cycle (Appendix A) shall
work forty (40) hours
per week, Monday through Friday,
8:00 a.m. to 5:00
p.m., except exempt holidays, unless alternative
work hours and days are mutually
agreed to by the
employee and the City.
20.02 All hours worked in excess of an employee's
regularly scheduled shift shall
be paid at an over-
time rate of one and one-half
(1-1/2) times his regu-
lar
rate of pay which will be computed by dividing his
regular annual salary by 2912
hours.
20.03 In an overtime period, employees will be
guar-
anteed a minimum of two (2)
hours overtime pay. In
any overtime situation, the
employee may, at the
discretion of the shift
commander, be required to
work the minimum paid time. ...
__________
APPENDIX "A"
Shift Schedules
_____
Day # 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Shift
Working A C A B A B C B C
_____
Day # 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Shift
Working A C A B A B C B C
_____
Day # 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
Shift
Working A C A B A B C B C
__________
The current contract also contains language in Section
21.01(B) whereby individuals
using less than 36 hours of sick
or
disability leave per calendar year receive twelve (12)
additional
vacation hours.
Finally, under current contract language, permanent
employees
enjoy one "floating holiday" per year, which can be
taken
at the time of their choice, subject to departmental
approval
(Section 18.02).
A. The Union
to The Union proposes to reduce the average
fifty-six (56)
hour
week referred to in Section 20.01 to a fifty-three (53)
hour
week effective October 1, 1987. The
Union further pro-
poses
to reduce the "2912 hours" referred to in Section 21.02
to
"2756 hours." To describe the
method of implementing its
proposal,
the Union offers the following new contract language:
" 20.07 The
decrease in hours from a 56 hour work
week to a 53 hour work week will
be accomplished
through the use of Kelly
Days. A calendar with
kelly
day scheduling will be made available to the
City by the Union prior to the scheduling of vaca-
tions.
The kelly
day scheduling will be such as to provide
12 hours of time off during each 27 day cycle. The
27 day cycle will begin for all shifts on April 15,
1986 and carry on from that date to infinity.
Kelly days will be scheduled on the beginning and end
shifts of each shift's three day
go around.
The use of pre scheduled kelly days will be suspended
for the double vacation periods
in the summer months.
These suspended kelly
days will be placed in compen-
satory
time banks at time and one half. (for use of
the comp time banks see the comp
time article).
Kelly days are regularly scheduled days off. They
are not holidays or bonus days
off but are the same
as any other day that an
employee is not scheduled
to work.
Vacations may not be taken in lieu of kelly days
except during the summer months.
NEW ARTICLE -- COMPENSATORY TIME
Compensatory time will be accrued through non use
of kelly
days during the four cycles of double vaca-
tion
slots in the summer months.
Accrued comp time must be scheduled between double
slot vacation periods (ie September to June) so as
to eliminate any comp time banks
before the start
of another double summer
vacation period.
The employee will schedule the comp time in his
bank
by seniority in the same way as
vacations are picked.
This pick will take place so as to facilitate use of
all available time slots
immediately following the
double summer vacation slots.
If the Fire Chief finds an employee is failing to
deplete his comp time bank, the
Chief may appoint
mandatory days off so as to
eliminate any carry over
of accrued comp time."
Finally, as part of its proposed "hours of work"
package,
the
Union is willing to drop the "floating holiday" and the
12 hour non use of sick leave
bonus for fifty-three (53) hour
personnel.
The Union's arguments are summarized as follows:
1) The Union has gone to great lengths to be flexible on
this
issue. First, the Union has modified its
initial proposal
for a
fifty (50) hour week and has also agreed to reduce the
hours
factor in Section 21.02 from 2912 to 2756.
Second, the
Union, as part of its
"hours of work" proposal, has agreed
to
relinquish the special 12 hour non sick leave usage bonus
as
well as the "floating holiday".
Third, the Union has pro-
posed new
"compensatory time" language, which limits employee
use
of comp time. And finally, the so-called
"kelly day"
method
of implementing the 53 hour work week is specifically
designed
to minimize the impact on the City. In
this regard,
the
Union's willingness not to take "kelly
days" during the
peak
vacation period demonstrates the flexibility of its
approach.
2) The factor of comparability strongly supports the
Union's proposal. Among the comparator cities used in the
police
award and agreed to by both sides in this case, the
average
suppression hours worked is 53.7, as against the 56
worked
by Walla Walla firefighters. Even more to the point,
all
of the comparable Washington jurisdictions work 53 hours
or
less. 6 Simply stated, the 56 hour week is not the
norm
for
firefighters in Washington.
_____
6 In Pullman,
firefighters are assigned to work a 56 hour shift
schedule, but are entitled to take 12
hours off per month, as
assigned by the City or as mutually
agreed (see, Exhibit C-8).
The practical effect of this arrangement is that firefighters
in Pullman have an average 56 hour
work week.
_____
3) The Union estimates under the current 56 hour schedule
the
City's FLSA costs will amount to approximately $15,000.00.
This cost will be eliminated
if the Union's kelly day
proposal
is
implemented, thereby saving the City this amount of money
in
FLSA costs.
4) The most credible evidence suggests
the City would be
able
to implement the Union's proposal without undue disruption
or
expense. In fact, during bargaining, the
matter was discussed
at
some length with the Fire Chief and he came back to the
Union with the plan the Union
is now proposing. Moreover, even
assuming
the City's estimate of $43,340.00 in additional over-
time
costs is accurate, that figure must be reduced by $15,000,
which
is the amount the City would save in FLSA costs. The
end
result would be a cost factor of $27,500.00 or 2.5%.
B. The City
The City adamantly opposes the Union's "kelly day"
proposal.
The City's arguments are summarized below:
1) The fact that the
Fire Chief discussed the Union's
proposal
with the firefighters and suggested how the work
schedule
would have to be adjusted to accomplish their goal is
irrelevant. The more important point is that the Union's
pro-
posal was taken to the City Manager and was
rejected because
it
was unworkable and far too expensive.
2) The fire department
is currently staffed at minimum
levels,
as evidenced by a net reduction of seven (7) positions
over
the last seven (7) years. A review of
this year's calendar
shows
that at any given time at least one firefighter is sched-
uled for vacation and during the summer months
two (2) people
are
normally scheduled off for this purpose.
This means that
each
shift is left at minimum manning levels, so that absences
created
by sick leave have to be filled on an overtime basis.
Last year, this amounted to 76
days a year in
which the City
had
to pay overtime. The City estimates the
Union's "kelly
day"
proposal, if implemented, would increase this usage to
201 days a year, at an
increased cost of approximately $42,500.
Even without considering the
scheduling nightmare created by
such a
proposal, the increased cost is clearly unacceptable.
3) There are a host of
other problems with the Union's
"kelly day" proposal. Simply stated, it severely limits
management's
ability to assign and direct work. For
instance,
it
increases the complexity of deciding how to transfer
employees
between shifts. It also creates the
potential
problem
of having inexperienced people assigned to a particu-
lar shift and in some cases would result in the
City having
to
pay "out of position" premiums.
4) The Union's "kelly day" proposal is not properly
before
the arbitrator. Under WAC 391-55-220,
neither party
is
permitted to arbitrate issue(s) not among the issues pre-
sented to the mediator. The letter from PERC Executive Director
Marvin Schurke
to the parties directing them to proceed to arbi-
tration does not include the Union's "kelly day" proposal as
an
issue in dispute. 7
_____
7 The May 19, 1986, letter from PERC
Executive Director Marvin
Schurke to the parties lists
"Article 20 - Hours in Work Week"
and "Article 20.02 - Hours of
Work" as outstanding issues. The
credible evidence established that the
Union's "kelly day"
proposal was raised before and during
mediation (testimony of
City Negotiator Thomas Steele).
_____
C. Discussion
The jurisdictional argument raised by the City need only
be
discussed briefly. Apparently, the City
contends the "kelly
day"
proposal was not among the issues presented by the Union
in
mediation. Unfortunately for the City,
the credible evidence
does
not support this contention (see, Footnote 7).
Turning to the merits of the "kelly
day" proposal,
the
Union's comparability data is extremely persuasive.
More to the point, the average
work week among the agreed
upon
comparators is 53.7, as compared with 56 in Walla Walla,
and
all of the Washington cities on the list work 53 hours
or
less. In view of this comparability
data, the arbitrator
would
be inclined to go along with the Union's proposed reduc-
tion in work hours, if it could be accomplished
without too
much
disruption and/or fiscal impact.
However, given current
manning
levels in Walla Walla, the arbitrator is persuaded
the
proposal would be too costly and disruptive at this time.
In analyzing the Union's "kelly
day" proposal, it is
appropriate
at the outset to draw a distinction. The
obvious
objective
of the proposal is to reduce the average work assign-
ments from 56 hours per week to 53 hours per
week. As indicated
previously,
this objective is understanable in view of the agreed
upon
comparability data. What is more
troubling, however, is
the
Union's proposed plan for implementing the proposal. The
arbitrator
is well aware that many, if not most, of the refine-
ments contained in the plan were a result of the
Fire Chief's
input. The arbitrator also recognizes that the plan
represents
a
good faith effort on the part of the firefighters to be as
flexible
as possible, while at the same time achieving their
objective
of reduced hours. Be that as it may, the
plan, if
implemented,
would necessarily limit management's prerogative
to
assign work. This being so, it seems to
this arbitrator
that
it would be preferable to simply award a reduction in
hours
and leave it to management's discretion how that would
be
implemented.
However, the arbitrator is unwilling to award the proposed
reduction
in work hours at this time. While such
an award
would
certainly not be out of line with hours worked in com-
parator departments, existing circumstances in
Walla Walla
indicate
reduced work hours would create more problems than
they
would solve. This conclusion is based
primarily on
current
manning levels, which would likely result in substan-
tial overtime costs, if the
In this regard, it is
difficult to draw meaningful comparisons
with
the comparator cities on this issue because the arbitra-
tor does not know what the manning levels are
in each of these
departments. Moreover, as a practical matter, the fact
that
various
shifts could also make scheduling substantially more
difficult
under the
Based on the foregoing, the arbitrator will not award
the
reduction in work hours proposed by the
However, the City must
understand that it is not the same as
the
other
to
be faced with a strong comparability argument in future
negotiations. Moreover, the City must also understand the
relationship
between hours of work and salaries.
Simply stated,
if
their
counterparts in the comparator departments, then this
difference
has to be reflected in their wage rates.
D. Award
Reject the
Respectfully submitted this
3rd day of December, 1986,
/s/
George Lehleitner
Arbitrator