City
of
And
International
Association of Fire Fighters, Local 1758
Interest
Arbitration
Arbitrator:
Date
Issued:
Arbitrator:
Snow;
Case #: 09140-I-91--00202
Employer:
City of
Date Issued:
IN THE MATTER CF INTEREST )
ARBITRATION )
)
BETWEEN )
) ANALYSIS
AND AWARD
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF )
FIREFIGHTERS, LOCAL 1758 )
)
AND )
)
BEFORE: Professor
Neutral
Chairperson
Ms.
Glenna Bradley-House,
City's
Party-appointed Arbitrator
Mr.
Danny Downs, Association's
Party-appointed
Arbitrator
APPEARANCES: For
the Employer:
Mr.
Otto G. Klein, III
For
the Association:
Mr.
Alex Skalbania
HEARING DATES:
POST-HEARING BRIEFS: March 4, 1992
TENTATIVE AWARD:
EXECUTIVE SESSION:
Table
of Contents
Page
I. Introduction 1
II. The
Nature of Interest Arbitration 3
A. An Extension of Collective Bargaining 3
B Avoiding the Charade of Comparability 4
C. The Imprecision of Comparisons 7
D. Standards of Comparison 9
III. Cost of Living 11
IV. Setting
for the Dispute 14
V. External
Comparability 17
VI. Award
on Wages 24
VII. Duration
of the Collective Bargaining Agreement 24
VIII. Award
on Duration of Contract 25
IX. Deferred
Compensation 26
X. Award
on Deferred Compensation 27
XI. The Issue of Structured Duty Hours 27
XII. Award
on Structured Duty Hours 31
XIII. Summary 32
A. Award on Wages 32
B. Award on Duration of Contract 32
C. Award on Deferred Compensation 33
D. Award on Structured Duty Hours 33
IN THE MATTER OF INTEREST )
ARBITRATION )
) ANALYSIS
AND
BETWEEN ) AWARD
) Professor
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF )
FIREFIGHTERS, Local 1758 ) Neutral
Chairperson
AND )
)
CITY OF
I. INTRODUCTION
This
matter came for hearing pursuant to RCW 41.56.450,
and the interest arbitrators have
complied with all statutory
and administrative requirements
in making determinations set
forth in this report. Hearings took place on October 18,
1991 and
the
There
was a full opportunity for the parties to submit
evidence,
to examine and cross-examine witnesses and to argue
the matter. Mr. Otto G. Klein, III of the Heller, Ehrman,
White, and McAuliffe law firm in Seattle,
sented
the City of
Skalbania
of the Critchlow, Williams, Schuster, Malone and
Skalbania
law firm in Richland, Washington, represented Local
1758 of the International Association of
Firefighters. Ms.
Susan E. Haney, a certified shorthand
reporter in Yakima,
a transcript of 579 pages.
There
were no challenges to the substantive or procedu-
ral arbitrability of the dispute, and any objections raised
during the course of the hearing
were withdrawn by its cul-
nimation. (See, Tr. 550). Although the arbitrator tape-
recorded
the proceeding at the request of one of the parties,
there ultimately was a decision to
make available a transcript
of the proceeding; and the
arbitrator has relied on extensive
personal
notes as well as the transcript, evidence presented
at the hearing, and post-hearing
briefs. In this case, the
parties
elected to submit their respective cases entirely
instead
of proceeding on an issue by issue basis.
The arbi-
trator
officially closed the hearing on
the executive session of the
arbitration panel.
The
parties waived statutory time limitations by permit-
ting the arbitration panel
extensively to explore the dispute
in executive session. They also selected the neutral chair
of the panel after statutory
time limitations had passed.
There were no objections to the extension of
time limits in
the case.
On
tion
panel by the IAFF requested an executive session of the
panel. There was no protest from anyone to meeting
in execu-
tive
session, but the Employer stated its clear preference for
the tentative award as it had
been drafted. The parties held
a long executive session in a
conference room of the
Inn located at the Portland, Oregon Airport
at which time the
arbitrator
appointed to the panel by the IAFF engaged in an
extensive,
highly detailed review of the report; and all
parties
had an unfettered opportunity to participate in the
discussion
of the draft award.
The
neutral arbitrator tape-recorded the executive session
of the arbitration panel and
alerted them to the fact that
there would be a delay in issuing a
final report. Since
drafting
the tentative award, the neutral arbitrator had become
involved
in a highly complex 4.3 billion dollar subcontrac-
ting dispute affecting 19,000
jobs. It caused the arbitrator
to be in hearings on the East
Coast for large blocks of time
making it impossible to issue the
final award immediately
after the executive session. On
submitted a
written response to the arbitration panel about
the executive session, and it
dealt with specific data evalu-
ated
by the arbitration panel in executive session and also
stated a strong objection to
"the wholesale revisions to the
award suggested by Mr. Downs.
The
issues before the arbitrators are as follows:
(1) Term of agreement
(2) Wages
(3) Deferred compensation
(4) Structured hours.
II. THE
NATURE OF INTEREST ARBITRATION
A. An Extension of Collective
Bargaining:
Interest
arbitration in the United States historically
has served as an extension of the
collective bargaining
process. The design has been taken from private sector
negotiations,
and interest arbitration served as an adjunct
to the collective bargaining
process from the early days of
collective
bargaining in this country. As one
scholar
observed:
Throughout
most of the long history of interest
arbitration, transit was a private industry; and
interest arbitration in that era was voluntarily
accepted by an individual company and by an indi
vidual local union, in certain
situations, as an
acceptable alternative to the use of economic force.
Arbitration
in the private transit industry was
literally an extension of the collective bargain-
ing process. An arbitrator who served in an in-
terest arbitration involving a
privately owned
transit system was always probing for what we
term the 'area of acceptability.' He was trying
to define that area of wage increase and fringe
benefit change which, at best he could judge, would
approximate and would be in the ballpark of what
the parties themselves would have done had they
bargained to a conclusion.
(See, "Arbitration of
Interest
Disputes," Twenty-sixth Annual Meeting.
of the
emphasis added).
Interest arbitration does not occur in a
vacuum and is a part
of a continuing relationship
between the parties. It is part
of an arbitrator's obligation to
attempt to understand the
dynamics
of the collective bargaining relationship between
the parties. Being faithful to this relationship is one
way
that the arbitrator attempts to
meet his or her statutory
obligation. As one observer has stated:
It
is not the role of the arbitrator nor the pur-
pose of [interest arbitration] standards to alter
the ultimate balance of power between the parties.
Rather,
the role Is to resolve the issues in dis-
pute and, thereby, to restore the
disturbed balance
between them. (See, LaRue, 42 Arb.
J. 13, 21
(1987)).
B. Avoiding the Charade of
Comparability:
The
parties are in dispute about the appropriate wage
policy during the term of their
agreement. A major criterion
in their collective wage
determination has been equity and
fairness. They are in disagreement about how to define
"fair-
ness." A major factor in defining "equity"
in a collective
bargaining
relationship has been the wage rate paid other
workers
in the same industry. By using
comparisons as a wage
determinant,
workers have believed that the criterion of
equity was satisfiedi
and employers have believed that their
competitive
ability to retain and recruit a qualified work-
force has been protected. As the economist Veblen
pointed
out over a half century ago,
"the propensity for emulation--
for invidious comparison--is of
ancient growth and is a
pervading
trait of human nature." (See, Veblen, The Theory
of the Leisure Class, 6
(1934)). By using comparisons, a
worker is able to move toward or to
attain parity with those
whom he or she believes to be
comparable. One scholar has
suggested
that comparisons seem to offer a
presumptive test
of the fairness of a wage. (See, Feis,
Principles of Wage
Settlement, 339 (1924)).
In
interest arbitration, it is the task of an arbitrator
to render an award that applies
statutory criteria. If the
process
is to work correctly, it should not produce a result
that is substantially different
from what would have been
obtained
had the parties resolved the dispute at the bargain-
ing
table. Interest arbitration is an
extension of the
bargaining
process, and it is not a forum in which a party
should expect to obtain a novel
result. As an arbitrator has
observed
in an
Interest
arbitration is essentially a conservative
process. While,
obviously, value judgments are
inherent, the neutral cannot impose upon the parties
contractual procedures he or she knows the parties
themselves would never agree to. Nor is it the
function to embark upon new ground and to create
some innovative procedure or benefit scheme which
is unrelated to the parties' particular bargain-
ing history. The arbitration award must be a
natural extension of where the parties were at
impasse. The award
must flow from the peculiar
circumstances these particular parties have developed
for themselves. To do
anything less would inhibit
collective bargaining.
(See, Will county and
Sheriff
of Will county v. AFSCME Council 31, Local
2961 ,
Chair,
Aug. 17, 1988).
As
an extension of collective bargaining, the parties
are under an obligation to
proceed in the utmost good faith.
In interest arbitration, the requirement of
good faith means
that an arbitrator should exclude
unreasonable positions and
should expect the parties to submit
a clear-cut, defensible
rationale
for particular requests. The concept of
good faith
means that the parties should not
turn a useful method of
dispute
resolution into a legalistic, intensely adversarial
process
if it means that a concern for the public good has
has been excluded from the
parties' decision-making analysis.
As one scholar has observed:
The
parties must accept that their duty to the
arbitrators must rise to the standard of utmost
good faith and full disclosure. The parties can-
not discharge their duty to the arbitrators by dis-
charging their duty, narrowly perceived, to their
clients or constituencies, as they may in griev-
ance arbitration. In the arbitration of interest
disputes, that will not work. The distinction I
draw is not between bad faith and good faith; it
is between good faith and utmost good faith, and
in my view the circumstances of arbitration of
interest disputes . . . require adherence to the
duty of utmost good faith.
(See, Carrothers,
Proceedings
of the Thirtieth Annual Meeting of the
Interest
arbitration is a process that is not to be
encouraged
because of its impact on political democracy, but
it remains clearly the best
alternative to a negotiated
settlement. The parties want to avoid a self-fulfilling
prophesy
that interest arbitration is a necessary extension
of the collective bargaining
process. As the eminent Clark
Kerr, former Chancellor of the University of
California
System of Higher Education,
has stated:
Arbitration
of interests . . . sometimes may be
necessary. It is
never desirable. Arbitration
of interests, if it becomes the practice, instead
of the occasional exception, can become lethal in
the long run. It is
far, far better for the
parties, and for American society, that the
parties themselves write their own contracts.
They
know their own situations better than any
outsiders possibly can.
They must live with the
contract on a daily basis after the arbitrators
have left. It is also
better that the parties
take the responsibility, not only for the terms
of the contract, but also for its explanation--
where explanation is needed, and even for its
defense. It should be our contract, not the
contract of a third party.
(See, United States
Postal Service, 83 LA 1105, 1109 (1984)).
These
thoughtful principles teach us, among other things,
that data from comparisons must,
then, be studied in terms of
the relative bargaining power of
the parties. There must be
some effort to understand the
degree of satisfaction to be
derived
from achieving terms set forth in negotiation pro-
posals. This must be balanced against the probability
that
achieving
such terms would forestall the development of fur-
ther
conflict as well as what would occur in the case of an
actual confrontation between the
parties. It is recognized
that these concerns provide only
the broadest guidance for
making rough judgments about variables
during bargaining, but
the variables deserve some
consideration to the extent that
interest
arbitration is an extension of collective bargaining.
It is clear
that the standard
most often used
in public sector wage
determination is comparison with similar
occupation
groups in comparable locales. (See,
e.g., City of
(1970);
As Arvid Anderson,
past president of the National Academy of
Arbitrators, has commented:
Generally,
the whole concept of public sector bar-
gaining is based on the concept of comparability,
like pay for like work, and not on the proposition
that public employees must lead the parade. (See,
NAA
proceedings for the Twenty-seventh Annual Meeting,
61,
95 ( 1 974 ) )
The
parties in this case have disagreed robustly about
how to make appropriate
comparisons. Their disagreement has
made clear what
"comparability" does not mean.
It is clear
from
to use comparisons. It is logical to assume that state
legislators
wanted the parties to anticipate arbitral use of
comparison
by negotiating their own list of comparable juris-
dictions. The legislative purpose was not to turn a
good
process
into a bad game of forcing on each other result-
oriented
lists of allegedly comparable jurisdictions.
It is
reasonable
to conclude that the legislative intent was to
design a principle-based decision
making process, not a
charade
disguised as a scientifically objective system. There
might be an appropriate place in
collective bargaining for
game theory, but this is not one
of them. As one expert at
the hearing in this matter
stated:
I'm
an objective observer who, you know, inter-
prets, tries to interpret the
statute the best
one understands it, applies the criteria, and then
utilizes the numbers that are given to me. (See,
Tr. 94).
It is logical for the parties to negotiate
vigorously about
benchmark
jurisdictions of comparability. Then
they can
continue
their relationship by negotiating about applying
their benchmarks and about changes
affecting those guidelines.
Without negotiated benchmarks, the parties
fall back on a
highly adversarial use of technical
data to support opposite
viewpoints,
and interest arbitration becomes a search for
clarity
as it flows from parameters set forth in statutes
calling
for interest arbitration to take place.
C. The
Imprecision of Comparisons:
There
is no mathematically precise formula that can be
used for producing comparable
jurisdictions. Each case is
unique and must be handled
individually. Relevant criteria
are affected by the facts of the
case as well as by the manner
of presentation. Each advocate in this case did an excellent
job of detecting flaws in the
other's set of comparable
jurisdictions. Whether comparisons are made in terms of
occupations
or bargaining unit size or geographic location,
one soon finds that some seeming
similarities do not neces-
sarily
guarantee the similarity for which the evidence has
been set forth. A firefighter in one city might face quite a
different
assortment of duties than does a
firefighter in
another
based on the composition of the bargaining unit or
the use of volunteer firefighters
or the size and composition
of the service area. While recognizing their usefulness, the
imprecision
of comparisons has been noted by one scholar who
stated:
What
constitutes a comparable factor is often diffi-
cult to ascertain.
Public employees are necessarily
concerned with labor market factors, while police
and firefighters have stressed job similarity.
Geographical
boundaries, size of population and
similarity of urban problems should be jointly con-
sidered in selecting comparable
communities. How
is the appropriateness of a comparison group from
among other police and/or firefighters, other public
employees and/or private sector employees determined?
(See,
A Study of Legislated Arbitration, Cornell
University Ph.D. Thesis, 173 (1969)).
The
Association's expert witness recognized the impre-
cision
of comparisons when he stated:
Ideally,
one wants cities with identical size, iden-
tical makeup, with identical
cost-of-living. That's
what one wants, but one can never get it; so the
next best thing, what one then does is the next
best thing, to say, OK, let's look at some districts
which are fairly close in size and then make adjust-
ments for cost-of-living because
there simply aren't
enough comparable cities around just like us. (See,
Tr. 39).
Imprecision results when one attempts to
compare geographi-
cally
distinct areas like the
Washington.
As the Association's expert agreed, "there's a
lot of different things which are
going on in a metropolitan
area like Seattle/Tacoma that just
aren't going on here in
Ellensburg." (See, Tr. 71). He, then, stated, "You can't
compare
this area with probably where you live over on the
Coast where you have millions, virtually
millions of jobs
within a fifty mile radius, or
something." (See, Tr. 107).
Imprecision
is also caused by characteristics unique to
a particular area. For example, there was no rebuttal to the
assertion
that "
is the third largest city in the
State of
Tr. 70). Likewise, disputes about how to analyze the
data
create imprecision. Should one average the cost-of-living
figures
for
to set the appropriate figure
for
delete the Tri-Cities from the
computation? (See, Tr. 255).
If there is a college in the town, should
one compare only
with other cities having a similar
college or university?
Is it significant that one town with a
college has its own
fire department while another does
not? Should any weight
be given to a million dollar
judgment from a law suit when
appeal has been taken and there is a
reasonable prospect of
legislation
that will neutralize the verdict? (See, Associ-
ation's
post-hearing Brief, 24).
The
point is that most comparisons abound with ambiguity,
and one weighs them and the
respective methodologies used to
produce
comparable jurisdictions in an effort to bring the
bargaining
process to its logical conclusion. It is
not a
matter of choosing one party's
methodology over another.
Neither is impervious to challenge, and each
has provided a
source of guidance. The objective is to find some principled
standards
of comparison.
D. Standards of Comparison:
A
fundamental disagreement between the parties in this
case revolved around their effort
to pour content into the
concept
of comparability. This is a search that
has attracted
scholars
for many years. (See, e.g., Slichter, Basic Criteria
Used in Wage Negotiations, 8-9 (1947)). Every wage determina-
tion
is affected by a variety of market forces.
Perhaps the
most important is the rate paid
similar workers doing similar
work in similar locales. This principle has its roots in the
private
sector and has been absorbed in public sector interest
arbitration. As one arbitrator stated in a private sector
setting:
Prime
consideration should be given to agreements
voluntarily reached in comparable properties in
the general area. For
example, wages and condi-
tions in Milwaukee, the city of
comparable size
nearest geographically to
whose transit company is neither bankrupt, munici-
pally owned, nor municipally
supported, might
reasonably have greater weight than
Detroit,
both municipally owned and farther dis-
tant, or Omaha and Council Bluffs,
more distant
in miles and smaller in population Smaller and
larger cities, however, and cities in other geo-
graphical areas should have secondary considera-
tion. . . (See, Twin City Rapid Transit Co., 7
LA 848 (1947)).
Given an opportunity, arbitrators
customarily have been more
persuaded
by comparisons geographically close than they have
been by jurisdictions farther
away.
In
addition to looking at similarly situated workers,
arbitrators in
public sector interest arbitrations of this
sort have also given considerable
weight to the populations
served by an employer. As one arbitrator has observed:
It
is clear that population served is generally
considered to be the most appropriate factor to
employ in selecting comparators pursuant to the
statutory criteria laid out in RCW 41.56.460(c)(ii).
(See, Beck, PERC Case No. 8420-1-90-191, p. 20).
Arbitrator Beck also observed that the
second most used
criterion
to select comparative jurisdictions is assessed
valuation. (See, p. 21).
In
making comparisons, it also has been customary for
arbitrators
to give some weight to comparison between indus-
tries or groups of workers, but
such comparisons have been of
far less significance than
comparing with similarly situated
employes. One should not expect wage uniformity between
diverse
groups of employes, and it is probably impossible to
compare
with any degree of accuracy job duties, seasonality
of work, and fringe benefit
packages. At the same time, such
comparison
provides some information about wage trends in a
community
and also about the impact of tax-based wage increases
on the citizenry. Admittedly, such considerations are a
secondary
aspect of the decision making process, but they
customarily
have not been ignored by arbitrators.
(See, e.g.,
Pittsburgh Railways Co., 14 LA 662 (1949)). Such information
is potentially more valuable in
smaller, less diverse com-
munities. All workers and employers tend to be more
affected
by the same local labor market.
III. COST
OF LIVING
Another
influence on wage determinations is of sufficient
importance
that state legislators expressly mentioned it in
the statute, namely, a
cost-of-living index. Such an index
allows the parties to link employe compensation to changes
in an index of consumer
prices. The linkage may be accomp-
lished
in several ways, such as increasing wages by a percen-
tage
amount in accordance with percentage changes in a price
index. It was out of a concern with such wage
adjustments
that the Bureau of Labor
Statistics began publishing a national
Consumer Price Index on a regular basis in
1921. In
fact,
until 1945, the CPI was
entitled The Cost of Living Index.
The purpose of a cost-of-living index is to
attempt to protect
the purchasing power of employe earnings from the full weight
of rising prices of consumer
goods and services. To accomplish
the objective, there is an
adjustment of wages in response to
the movement of an index of
consumer prices.
A
cost-of-living index must be distinguished from the
Consumer Price Index. A cost-of-living index helps one under-
stand what it will cost to buy the
same goods and services in
different
communities and what wage adjustment is needed in
order to do so. The Consumer Price Index provides the rela-
tive
cost of a market basket of goods and services which is
assumed
to be a representative market basket of the purchases
of most wage earners. Items in the basket are weighted for
their relative importance and are
priced at certain intervals.
Costs of the market basket, then, are
reported periodically
as index numbers. Changes in the purchasing power of wage
earners
can be computed as a change in "real" wages. This is
done by dividing actual money
earnings by the price index.
It is the position of the Association that
it needs an in-
crease of 33.97% in order to raise
wages of the bargaining
unit to the state average of
comparable workers. (See, Tr.
53-54).
The
Consumer Price Index has been calculated for two
distinct
groups, namely, urban wage earners and urban con-
based on the expenditures of urban
consumers who earn more
than half their income from
clerical or wage occupations.
The CPI-U is based on expenditures by all
consumers except
for farmers and Armed Forces
personnel. Both indices, of
course, price goods and services
with the same specifications.
There
was unrebutted testimony that the Employer has
used the CPI-U in wage
computations for recent labor contracts.
It is the index the parties used between
1985 and 1987. (See,
Tr. 349)
There is no persuasive reason to discontinue its
use at this point, and it is
reasonable to believe its use is
the result the parties would have
reached at the bargaining
table.
Use
of a cost-of-living mechanism as a criterion of wage
determination
has its roots in the work of Sidney and Beatrice
Webb almost three quarters of a century ago. They set forth
a doctrime
of vested interests which was premised on "the
assumption
that the wages . . . hitherto enjoyed by
any sec-
tion
of workmen ought under no circumstances to be interfered
with for the worse." (See, Webbs,
Industrial Democracy, 562
(1920)). Underlying the use of a cost-of-living
mechanism is
an ethical value which presumes
that real wages of a worker should
not be reduced by price changes
beyond an employe's control.
It was unrebutted that base wage rates paid by the
Employer have
kept pace with CPI-U increases. Each
member of
the bargaining unit has received
wage increases since the
individual's
date of hire that outpaced the CPI-U. On
aver-
age, wage increases for
bargaining unit members have exceeded
the CPI by approximately
52%. (See, Employer's Exhibit No. 2,
p.51). This is not to suggest that the
Employer's wage deter-
minations
have been made primarily to keep pace with the
cost-of-living. These wage increases may also be a result of
promotions
and new duties. The economic reality for
the
Employer, however, is that the average
payroll cost of bar-
gaining
unit members has. increased 52% since each person's
date of hire. Some employes have
fared better than others,
based in part on their length of
tenure in the department.
The data, nonetheless, are unrebutted that, on average, "base
hire" wages in the bargaining
unit since 1967 have exceeded
CPI increases by 52%.
It
is reasonable to believe that each bargaining unit
member deserves whatever wage
increase has been received,
but the economic data fully
support the proposition that the
Employer over the years has shifted
municipal resources in
order to fund reasonable wage
increases for bargaining unit
members. It is recognized that, due to experience and
train-
mg, bargaining unit members
serve the public more skillfully
and efficiently performing an
increasingly greater variety of
duties. Evidence submitted to the arbitration panel
made
clear that money allocated to wage
increases for the bargain-
mg unit has been well
spent. It also has been customary for
the Employer to use a wage
adjustment formula that calls for
80%, instead of 100%, of the CPI-U, with a
"floor" and "ceiling
for the formula, at least for the
last several labor contracts
between
the parties. (See, Tr. 347).
IV. SETTING
FOR THE DISPUTE
The
City of Ellensburg is located "at the center" of the
State of
and the City has a population of
12,361 people. There is an
airport,
but it has no scheduled service. (See,
Association 5
Exhibit No. 8, p. 2). There are five primary and secondary
schools in
the community with approximately 2000 students.
It is the home of Central Washington
University with a full-
time enrollment of approximately
6000 students. The fire
department
has a total staff of nineteen plus sixteen volun-
teers,
and the police department has a total staff of twenty-
one plus nineteen reserves.
Kittitas
County extends from the Snoqualmie summit to
the
county from the lower county. There was unrebutted
testimony
that most of the growth has been
in upper
the Cle Elum
and Roslyn areas. The City of Ellensburg
is
located
in lower
of
ference
between the eastern and western parts of the state.
Some even refer to the Cascade Curtain (the
Cascade Mountains)
as a physical barrier that
divides two distinctly different
regions
of the state. (See, Tr. 301).
Bargaining
history for this agreement began during the,
summer of 1990. The last agreement between the parties ex-
pired
on
to the Employer on
work on a new agreement. (See, Tr. 131). The parties had
five negotiation sessions from
August to November, 1990.
Then they moved to mediation and had four
sessions from
December to April, 1991. During these efforts to draft a new
contract,
the parties reached a number of tentative agree-
ments
but were unable to formalize a total contract.
(See,
Association's Exhibit No. 10). They now have proceeded to
interest
arbitration with the unresolved issues.
The
fire department in Ellensburg is organized to con-
sist
of three shifts of five people.
Additionally, there is
a fire marshal and a training
officer, plus a departmental
secretary
and the fire chief. There are seventeen
bargaining
unit members plus the chief and
his secretarial assistant.
There is a volunteer program with sixteen
part paid personnel.
(See, Tr. 439). Chief Alder testified that, on each shift,
there is a captain, a lieutenant,
and three firefighters.
They work 56 hour work weeks in rotating
shifts over a fifteen
day cycle. In reality, however, there are only four
people
on a shift. Chief Alder testified that on occasion there
might only be three individuals on
a shift. (See, Tr. 532).
There
has been little population growth in Ellensburg
during the last half century. There has been a growth of
approximately
628 people during the last decade to reach the
1990 census figure of 12,361 citizens in the
community. Nor
is there much projected growth
for the area during the next
decade, approximately half a percent
a year. (See, Tr. 286
and 299). Ellensburg is approximately 100 miles from
the
more vigorous growth of the
Seattle/Tacoma area. The City of
Spokane is approximately 180 miles away, and
the Tn-Cities
area is approximately 100 miles
from Ellensburg. Yakima is
about 35 miles away, and
Ellensburg. (See, Tr. 286).
The
Employer negotiates with exclusive representatives
for five bargaining units in the
city. The Office and Pro-
fessional
Employees
tions
in the city. The City operates its own
electric system,
and there is a bargaining unit
represented by the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. The Teamsters Union
represents
Public Works employes in the city as well as
employes
in the
Officers Guild, and
the International Association of Fire-
fighters
represents employes in the Fire Department.
Central
Washington University has a significant influence
in the city. During the academic year, the 6000 students
at
the University have an important
economic impact on the
community. There are approximately 2000 students at the
University during the summer. Approximately fifteen to twenty'
percent
of total calls for the Fire Department originate with
received a
small, symbolic payment for fire services from
Central Washington University, and that
matter is now in
litigation. The City has won an initial judgment which is
being appealed.
The
economic outlook for the community is not robust.
Evidence
submitted to the panel of arbitrators supports
a conclusion that Ellensburg,
although economically stable,
is not experiencing an expansion
of the local economy. Even
though some slight growth has
occurred more recently, economic
conditions
in the area are little different from those of a
decade ago. As the Association's expert witness stated,
"I
don't want to say that we have been
booming." (See, Tr. 369).
Unemployment in the city has increased in
recent months,
while there also has been a modest
growth in people getting
jobs, an increase of 1.4% from
January-November, 1991. (See,
Tr. 371 ). There have been no new industries that have
moved
to Ellensburg at least in the
last five years. (See, Tr.
373). There have been approximately thirty
building permits
issued during the last year with
approximately 30%-40% of
those related to
the City received approximately
3-2'% more sales tax revenue
than in 1990. (See, Tr. 412 and 418).
V. EXTERNAL
COMPARABILITY
The
Association seeks a 1991 wage increase of 10%, and
the Employer has offered a 3%
wage increase. The Association
also seeks a wage adjustment of
100% of the all
CPI-W in 1992. The City has offered an 80% adjustment in
1992 and 1993 of the CPI-U with a designated
"floor" and
"ceiling"
in the offer.
The
parties have premised their proposals primarily on
wage rates in what they believe
are comparable jurisdictions.
Using bargaining unit size as the most
important criterion,
the Association sought units
one-third below the size of the
Ellensburg bargaining unit and two-thirds
above, producing
a range of eleven to
twenty-eight bargaining unit members.
Using a multi-step process, the Association,
first, considered
departmental
size and, second, bargaining unit size.
Then,
the Association made a number of
adjustments, for example,
for hours worked, for excluding
the impact of fire districts,
and for limiting the impact' of
communities in the "
corridor." (See, Tr. 57). The Association made no use of
population,
assessed valuation, or medical premiums in its
selection
of comparable jurisdictions. (See, Trs. 75, 103
and 112). The Association's methodology produced the
follow-
mg jurisdictions which it
believes are comparable to the
City of Ellensburg:
Hoguiam Centralia
Port
Angeles Mercer
Island
Pullman Spokane
Airport
Moses
Lake Edmonds
Pierce
County No. 3 King County No. 40
Tumwater Parkland
Snohomish
Co. No. 7
Kitsap
County No. 1 Pierce County
No. 7
Kitsap
County No. 7 Pierce County
No. 10
Spokane
County No. 9 Snohomish County
No. 11
(See, Union's Exhibit No. 3, p. 9, Exhibit V).
Based on comparing itself with these
jurisdictions, the
Association has concluded that a top
firefighter in the City
of Ellensburg would need to
increase by the following percen-
tage
rates:
Actual
Earnings 30.76%
Adjusted
Earnings 41.67%
Real
Actual Earnings 23.68%
Real
Adjusted Earnings 33.97%
The
Employer has used a different set of comparable
jurisdictions. The Employer has focused on what it charac-
terized
as its isolation on the eastern side of the Cascade
Mountains; on the presence of a large
university in the city;
and on an economy that, at least
since 1983, has never really
been strong. (See, Tr. 294). The Employer also relied on
assistance
from its expert witness to produce measurements
for distinguishing cost-of-living
differences in communities
throughout
the state. The expert for the City used
the
American Chamber of Commerce Researcher
Association's cost-
of-living
index as well as Employment Security data on average
earnings
and average employment by county. As its
set of
comparable
jurisdictions, the Employer used:
Anacortes Toppenish
Cheney Moses Lake
Clarkston Pasco
Pullman
As
previously stated, the Association selected comparable
jurisdictions,
first, by seeking departments of comparable
size and, then, refined that list
in order to give appropriate
weight to the size of the bargaining
unit. Arbitrators
cus-
tomarily
have not relied only on one or two such limited
factors
as a basis for comparing similar jurisdictions in
order to make wage
determinations. An array of factors is
generally
used. It is especially unwise to give
the statute
a narrow interpretation when
the restrictive factors in the
formula
for selecting comparable bargaining units, ultimately,
are departmental size and size of
the bargaining unit.
Such
an approach is of mixed value, in part, because
there are significant differences
in the configuration of
departments
and bargaining units. Some bargaining
units
include
battalion chiefs, captains, and dispatchers, while
others do not. The configuration of the department as well
as the bargaining unit could
have a substantial impact on the
allocation
of duties and the nature of the work performed.
It is reasonable to conclude that such
assignments would have
an impact on wages and budgetary
allocations, especially with
regard to differential pay for
ranks. Recognizing a general
tendency
to standardize the work of firefighters; it, never-
theless,
is clear that, generally, the larger the departmental
size the more fragmented the
duties of bargaining unit
members.
Moreover,
fire departments vary in their use of a volunteer
workforce
to accomplish fire suppression duties.
Likewise
the Employer was most persuasive
about the impact of the
Seattle/Tacoma economic influence on Western
Washington
communities. Finally, clear and convincing evidence estab
lished
that the primary labor market of the City of
is on the eastern side of the
Cascade Mountain range and
there simply was no persuasive
evidence that the City of
Ellensburg and a majority of the
Association's proposed
comparable
jurisdictions compete in the same labor market.
Even the venerable Professor Elkouri has recognized that
rarely will any one or two standards
be used in isolation as
a means to select comparable
jurisdictions. As he observed,
arbitrators
generally apply a combination of standards, the
combination
varying from case to case." (See,
How Arbitration
Works, 805 (1985)).
Using
customary statutory factors applied by arbitrators
in interest arbitration, the
arbitrator initially constructed
a set of eight comparable
jurisdictions in
review of the data produced the
following chart of instruc-
tive
material:
Comparable Popul. Bargain- Assessed
Square Square Volun- Fire
cities Served ing Unit Valuation Miles Miles teer Fighters
for Fire Size Served Served Per
for Fire for
_______________________________________________________________
CHENEY 10,000 6 106M 2.5 2.5 25 1,666
PULLMAN 17,000 12 266M 6.2 480 12 1,416
TOPPENISH 6,560 5 78M 1.8 1.8 25 1,312
WALLA WALLA
25,000 41 490M 10 1400 6 609
_______________________________________________________________
AVERAGES
Excluding 15,166 15 309M 12.8 361 10 1,024
ELLENSBURG
_______________________________________________________________
ELLENSBURG 12,361 17 231 M 6 1,250 16 727
_______________________________________________________________
It
is possible to refine the comparability of these
jurisdictions
to Ellensburg so that one is able to
move from
the restrictive consideration of
only geographic remoteness.
Cheney, for example, is clearly
distinguishable from Ellensburg
in terms of its bargaining unit
size, assessed valuation,
square miles served for fire and for emergency medical
services. Walla Walla is
substantially different from
Ellensburg in terms of population,
bargaining unit size, and
assessed
valuation. Wenatchee constrasts
sharply with
Ellensburg in terms of its assessed
valuation. Yakima differs
noticeably
from Ellensburg in terms of its Population, bar-
gaining
unit Size, assessed valuation, and area covered for
emergency
medical services. Toppenish is
distinguishable in
terms of its assessed valuation and
service area. By process
of elimination, this leaves
as comparable jurisdictions in
Ellensburg.
If
one reviews Ellensburg's placement among the compar-
able jurisdictions with regard to
the shorter list of similar
cities, one finds that there is a
median population of 17,000,
compared
with Ellensburg's 12,361. There is a
median bar-
gaining
unit size of 12 compared with Ellensburg's 17.
There
is a median assessed valuation
of $269 million compared with
Ellensburg's $231 million. There is a median square miles
served for fire of 7.4 square miles
compared with Ellensburg's
6.
There is a median of 480 square miles served for emer-
gency
medical service compared with Ellensburg's 1250. There
is a median of 12 volunteers
used in comparable jurisdictions
compared
with Ellensburg's 16, and there is a median of 963
citizens
per capita for paid firefighters compared with
Ellensburg's 727.
If
one compares economic data with these comparable
jurisdictions,
it produces the following pattern of information:
Comparable Scheduled Scheduled Hourly Monthly Monthly
Total
Jurisdictions Hours Hours Salary Salary Medical
Compensation
a Week Annually costs
costs
_______________________________________________________________
PULLMAN 53 2,756 11.06 2,364 354.97
2,718.97
_________________________________________________________________________________
AVERAGES
excluding 51.67 2,686 11.71 2,421 334.16
2,755
Ellensburg
_________________________________________________________________________________
ELLENSBURG 56 2,912 11.23 2,231 491.01
2,722.01
If
one focused narrowly on the monthly salary, members
of the bargaining unit would
appear to be below the average
by approximately 821%, but it is
inappropriate to use only the
base wage if better information is
available. The data show
that members of the bargaining
unit are behind in terms of
total compensation (focusing on
salary and medical costs) by
only 1.21% It is reasonable to conclude that, at some
point,
the Association has chosen to
accept an unusually good health
plan in lieu of a larger wage
increase. The point is that a
wage offer of 3% from the Employer
is fair. The fact that it
is larger than 1.21% is
appropriate and should help offset
any statistical anomalies that
might have resulted from using
a relatively small sampling of
comparable jurisdictions. Such
a result is consistent with
internal comparability data. The
Employer maintained without contradiction
that a majority of
city employes
had received a 3% wage increase in 1991.
(See,
Tr . 415 )
A
comparison of wages in several smaller communities in
Western Washington supports a conclusion
that such communi
ties tend to experience the impact
of a different labor
market than Ellensburg and also
absorb the ripple effect of a
robust
are as follows:
|
Comparable Jurisdictions |
Index |
Hours Worked |
Assessed Valuation |
Population Served For Fire |
Population Served |
Real Adjusted Wages |
Bargaining Unit Size |
|
|
98.6 |
42 |
276 |
12,000 |
12,000 |
$3,967 |
16 |
|
HOQUIAM |
98.6 |
51 |
224 |
12,000 |
20,000 |
$2,939 |
24 |
|
TUMWATER |
98.6 |
53 |
318 |
8,500 |
155,100 |
$2,827 |
16 |
|
AVERAGES |
98.6 |
48 |
272 |
10,833 |
62,366 |
$3,244 |
18 |
|
ELLENSBURG |
98.0 |
56 |
229 |
11,500 |
20,000 |
$2,278 |
17 |
These
data suggest that workers in smaller communities
of
working
fewer hours for more money than is the case in
Ellensburg. While serving roughly the same size population
for fire with approximately the
same size fire department,
workers
in smaller departments of the western Cascade moun-
tains
are receiving approximately $1000 more a month than is
the case in Ellensburg. Recognizing that the data are fraught
with ambiguity, it is clear that
some economic or political
forces have produced a wage
structure noticeably different
from the one used in
Ellensburg. What the Association failed
to show was a persuasive
explanation for the difference, one
that mandates a change in
Ellensburg based on principles of
equity and economic justice. These communities might be much
like Ellensburg in all regards
except for the influence
brought
by the effects of
thousands
along I-5, but this is an impact that cannot be
ignored,
especially in the absence of empirical evidence
nullifying
the significance of this difference. The
Associ-
ation
needed to show that the substantial wage difference has
its roots in unfairness and not
in merely a rational response
of employers to different
economic realities.
Part
of the explanation for the considerable wage dif-
ferential
between the two regions of the state might be found
in the basic supply and demand
of what the evidence suggested
are, in effect, two different
labor markets. There also
might be special factors such as
taxes, technology influences,
or agglomeration economies that
help explain why regional
wage differentials have
developed. Some reasons for regional
wage differentials are found in
geographic and climatic char-
acteristics
special to an area. Another is the
difference in
housing
prices. Local government tax and
expenditure policies
may also have a significant
impact on such differentials. The
point is the Association failed to
show that wages received
by this bargaining unit are
unfair and inequitable merely by
proving
that wages of similar workers are higher in smaller
communities
located in the western area of the state.
There
are too many unexplained rational
variables to select unfair
ness as the reason for the
asymmetrical wage structures.
VI. AWARD
ON WAGES
Having
carefully considered all evidence submitted by
the parties concerning the issue
of wages, the arbitration
panel concludes that there shall be
a three percent (3%) wage
increase
over the 1990 top firefighter rate effective on
January 1, 1991. The 1991 wage adjustment shall be distri-
buted
within thirty days from the date when a majority of the
panel signs this report.
Effective
January 1, 1992 and again on January 1, 1993,
bargaining
unit members shall receive wage increases which
equal eighty percent (80%) of the
All
each year, using November-November
computations. The wage
adjustment
effective on
to members of the bargaining
unit within thirty days of the
date when a majority of the
arbitration panel signs the arbi-
tration
award. There shall be a minimum wage
increase of two
percent
(2%) and a maximum wage increase of five percent (5%)
during each year. This agreement and all tentative agreements
reached
by the parties during the negotiations and mediation
phases of bargaining for this
agreement shall become effective
when a majority of the arbitration
panel signs the award.
VII. DURATION
OF THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
The
Association proposed a two year agreement effective
from
proposed a
three year agreement from 1991 to 1993.
If
the new agreement between the parties is to expire
December 31, 1992, there would be a short
period of approximately
two months for a respite before
returning to the bargaining
table. The parties' 1989-90 agreement permits
neither party
to give written notification of
a desire to begin bargaining
five months before submission of a
budget to the Ellensburg
City Council. (See, Association I Exhibit No. 17, p. 14). The
City Council received a draft of the budget
for 1991 on October
22, 1990, and there is no reason to believe
a different pat-
tern would be followed in the
future. (See, Association's
Exhibit No. 36, p.7). This would permit the Association to
turn to bargaining on the 1993
agreement in June, 1992.
It
is not an efficient use of resources for the parties
to return to the bargaining
process so soon. Time is needed
to sort out the impact of the
current agreement This is the
first time the parties have used
interest arbitration as a
part of the collective bargaining
process, and more than two
months is needed to assess the
experience and to evaluate its
impact on the future relationship of
the parties and their
approach
to negotiation. Accordingly, it is
reasonable to
lengthen
the term of the parties' next agreement by a year.
The Association has Sought
a wage increase in the second
year of the agreement of 100% of
the All
effective
on
there be an 80% of the All
in 1992 and in 1993. The arbitrator has received no external
comparability
data on this issue, and it is necessary to rely
on available internal
comparability data.
The
Teamsters Union represents Public Works employes in
the City of
bargaining unit
of Public Works employes includes the formula
offered
the Association in this case.
Accordingly, it is
equitable
to apply the same formula here.
VIII. AWARD
ON DURATION OF CONTRACT
The
next agreement between the parties shall become
effective
as of the first day of January, 1991 and shall
remain in full force and effect
until the last day of
December, 1993
IX. DEFERRED
COMPENSATION
The
Association presented the following proposal with
regard to a deferred compensation
plan:
Local
1758 proposed that a new article Should be
added to the parties' collective bargaining agree-
ment in
which it would be stated that the City
was responsible for matching all voluntary employee
contributions to the deferred compensation
plan
which the City currently offers to its employees up
to an amount that is equal to two percent (2%) of
each employee's base wage rate per term during the
term of the parties' collective bargaining agree-
ment. (See, Association's Exhibit No. 16,
p. 4).
The Employer opposed the adoption of the
Association's
proposal.
Comparability
data failed to support the Association's
proposal. (See, Associationls
Exhibit No. 32 and
Employer's Exhibit No. 2, p 56).
Neither Moses Lake nor
paid by the employer Nor did the arbitration panel receive
data setting forth an equitable
justification for the
Association's proposal.
X. AWARD
ON DEFERRED COMPENSATION
The
next agreement between the parties shall not include
the Association's deferred
compensation plan.
XI. THE
ISSUE OF STRUCTURED HOURS
The
Employer submitted a novel proposal that would
add structured hours for members
of the bargaining unit
between
argued eloquently that the workday
needed to be extended
because
"we just don't have time" to do all the work that
needs to be done. (See, Tr. 466).
"Structured
hours" is a term of art for the parties.
According to Mr. Hanson, "structured
hours" has the fol-
lowing meaning:
Those
are the hours during the day that the City
would have us doing fire-related projects, assign-
ments. Basically, whatever they would like us to
do, we're obligated to do during that time. In
our department, that happens to be an
A.M.
to a 5:00 o'clock P.M. situation out of our
24
hour work shift. (See, Tr. 160-161).
There are also structured hours on Saturday,
Sunday, and most
holidays
for half a day. It is the Position of
the Employer
that an ernploye
has a total of 2912 duty hours, 2264 hours of
actual time on the job, and 549.19
structured hours (See,
Tr. 449).
Apart
from the fact that comparability data generally
failed to Support the Employer's
proposal, there are other
reasons
for not adopting it. In 1992, there are
eighteen
members
of the Department, but in 1973 there were twenty-two
members. (See, Tr. 504). There was no showing of a reduction
in the workload. It is reasonable to conclude that it is not logi-
cal to expect to accomplish the
same general amount of work with
fewer employes,
and it is understandable that some chores
might not be accomplished as
expeditiously as might be
desirable.
It
is not as though there are major flaws in the service
currently
being provided by members of the bargaining unit.
The Chief himself stated that "I think
we've got a very good
department." (See, Tr. 491). There exists a first-rate
training
program in the Department. As the Chief
stated:
I
think that our training program has evolved to a
point that I'm proud of.
We have accomplished many,
many things. (See,
Tr. 454)
Chief Alder believes that most of the
bargaining unit is able
to Perform duties of a
firefighter as if it were "second
nature." (See, Tr. 467). It is a department that deserves
validation
and one of which the Chief is proud.
Evidence submitted to the arbitration panel
suggested
that the Chief wants training time
to prepare members of the
bargaining
unit for certification requirements that may some
day become law. The National Fire Protection Association has
adopted a
guideline described as NFPA 1500. It is
far more
specific
than the vertical standards currently set forth in
Washington law, and the Chief, who is
actively involved in
professional
associations related to fire protection, is
anticipating
the adoption of some form of the guideline.
The arbitrators, however, received no
evidence that the fire
department
in Ellensburg is not in full compliance with rele
vant
administrative regulations, and the Chief endorsed the
conclusion
that the department is technically competent and
highly skilled in Performing its
duties. To the extent there
was an increase in accidents in
1991, the vast. majority of
them were driving accidents and
insignificant ones in terms
of the amount of damage. (See, Tr. 459 and 516). Even with
nine driving accidents in 1991,
the local experience rate for
setting L
and I industrial insurance rates for 1992 are less
than the base rate for the state,
allowing the City to save
money on insurance premium
payments (See, City's Exhibit
No. 2, p 119(A)).
Finally,
there is some ambiguity about whether or not
management
currently is using all the hours available to it
for accomplishing structured duty
assignments. At one point,
Chief Alder indicated that structured time
on weekends begins
at
(See, Tr. 441 and 548). The parties' collective bargaining
agreement
has been clear about the fact that structured duty
hours on weekends have been from
to
at
Producing approximately 900 additional
structured hours for
bargaining
unit members on a 56 hour shift.
Moreover, the
Employer already has new structured duty
hours on holidays
as a result of a tentative
agreement reached by the parties
in conjunction with settling
this agreement.
The
Chief is pursuing a laudable goal of trying to pro-
vide his community with more and
better service, but his
approach
is inconsistent with the American economic system
He seeks a way to accomplish additional work
he believes needs
to be done without increasing
the size of the workforce.
There has been no hint at all that members of the bargaining
unit are not working as hard as
they have always worked, and,
in fact, the Chief has stated
that he is proud of their pro-
duction. At the same time, there is more that needs to
be
done. He would lengthen the workday in order to
accomplish
his objective What this approach does is hide the impact
of
paying for additional work from the
taxpayers. Our economic
system teaches that a consumer
should be given information
about the product so that an
individual can decide whether or
not to make a purchase. Instead of letting taxpayers decide
whether
services the Chief proposes to provide merit addi-
tional
revenue for the Fire Department's budget, he seeks to
increase
the workload of the existing complement of employes
According to Chief Adler, this is not a
problem unique to the
City of
The
work isn't getting done that I want to get
done, and the industry standard, the professional
ties I've had around the state is that it's not
getting done in other departments either. And
this is exactly what everybody is looking at
doing, is lengthening the structured time. And
it's not just a problem in Ellensburg. It's a
problem every place else.
(See, Tr. 547).
Despite its being "a problem every
place else," there was no
evidence
showing that other employers aside from
extended
the workday into the evening as Chief Adler proposed
to do.
XII. AWARD
ON STRUCTURED DUTY HOURS
The
Employer's structured duty hours proposal shall
not become a part of the next
agreement between the parties.
XIII. CONCLUSION
In
the interim since the parties presented their respec-
tive
cases to the arbitration panel in this matter, the
Department of Commerce has announced
seasonally adjusted CPI-U
data; and the Consumer Price Index
remains low. The CPI-U
rose a seasonally adjusted 0.3% in
June for a twelve month
period ending in June of 3.1%. The prediction is that in-
flation
will remain subdued during the remainder of 1992 with
only slight price increases in
1993. While any proposed wage
level must take into account an
economic need to adjust pay
structures,
it is also appropriate to consider whether general
economic
conditions are such that an employer is dealing with
a large budgetary surplus.
Most
importantly, data submitted to the arbitration panel
with regard to economic conditions
in the area are only rough
approximations
of what, in fact, occurred with regard to the
cost of living in this particular
city. The duty of the arbi-
tration
panel is to reach a result that most closely approxi-
mates what a voluntary agreement
between the parties would
have produced had they bargained
to a negotiated settlement.
In an effort to do so, the panel has
considered all statutory
factors
and based its decision on data submitted to the arbi-
tration
panel at the two and a half days of hearing in this
matter. The award has flowed from the circumstances
these
parties
have developed for themselves, and the evidence
submitted
by the parties supports the various components of
the decision in the case.
XIII. SUMMARY
A. Award on Wages
Having
carefully considered all evidence submitted
by the parties concerning the
issue of wages, the arbitration
panel concludes that there shall be
a three percent (3%)
wage increase over the 1990 top
firefighter rate effective
on
tributed
within thirty days from the date when a majority
of the panel signs this report.
Effective
bargaining
unit members shall receive wage increases which
equal eighty percent (80%) of the
All
for each year. The wage adjustment effective on January
1, 1992 shall be distributed to members of
the bargaining
unit within thirty days of the
date when a majority of the
arbitration
panel signs the arbitration award. There
shall
be a minimum wage increase of
two percent (2%) and a maximum
wage increase of five percent (5%)
during each year. This
agreement
and all tentative agreements reached by the parties
during the negotiations and mediation
phases of bargaining
for this agreement shall become
effective when a majority
of the arbitration panel signs
the award.
B. Award on Duration of Contract
The
next agreement between the parties shall become effec-
tive
as of the first day of January, 1991 and shall remain
in full force and effect until the last day of December, 1993.
C. Award on Deferred Compensation
The
next agreement between the parties shall not include
the Association's deferred
compensation plan.
D. Award on Structured Duty Hours
The
Employer's structured duty hours proposal shall
not become a part of the next
agreement between the parties.
Respectfully
submitted,
_________________________
Neutral
Chairperson
Professor
of Law
_________________________
Ms.
Glenna Bradley-House
City's
Party Appointed Arbitrator
Date:
_________________________
Mr.
Danny Downs
Association's
Party Appointed
Arbitrator
Date:_____________________
In
the Matter of Interest Arbitration
International Between
Association of Fire Fighters Local 1758
and
Dissenting
Opinion
In this instant
case, Arbitrator Snow has indicated
the
historical
importance comparability has played in determining wage
rates paid workers in the same
industry. It is without surprise
then that since the
Employment Collective Bargaining Act
R.C.W. 41.56 in
1974, to
provide
interest arbitration as the method to be used by fire
fighters
and some law enforcement personnel as final resolution of
impasse
in collective bargaining, that comparison with other fire
fighters
in the state has been an important consideration for fire
fighter
bargaining units when determining wages.
The
issue of comparison becomes even more important when one
studies
the language of the Public Employment Collective Bargaining
Act R.C.W.
41.56, in
particular the following section, R.C.W.
41.56.460, Uniformed
Personnel Interest Arbitration Panel - Basis
for determination.
In
making its determination the panel shall be mindful of
the legislative purpose enumerated in R.C.W. 41.56.430
and as additional standards or guidelines to aid it in
reaching a decision, it shall take into consideration the
following factors:
(a) The Constitutional and statutory
authority
of the employer;
(b) Stipulations of the parties;
(c) (i) For
employees listed in R.C.W.
41.56.030(7)(a) and 41.56.495, comparisons of
the wages, hours, and conditions of employment
of like personnel of like employers of similar
size on the west coast of the
(ii) For employees listed
in R.C.W.
41.56.030(7)(b),
comparisons of
the wages,
hours, and conditions of employment of the
personnel
involved in the proceedings with the
wages, hours, and conditions of employment of
like personnel of public fire departments on
the west coast of the
when an adequate number of comparable
employers exist within the state of
not be considered,
(d)
The average consumer prices for
goods and
services,
commonly known as the
cost of
Iiving;
(e) Changes in any of the foregoing
circumstances during the pendency of the
proceedings; and
(f) Such other factors, not confined to the
foregoing, which are normally or traditionally
taken into consideration in the determination
of wages, hours, and conditions of employment.
It
is clear, as indicated by the differences between (c)(i)
and (c)(ii) of R.C.W. 41.56.460
that the legislature separated fire
fighters
from other uniformed employees, with the intent that their
comparisons
be made with like employees of similar size public fire
departments. It clearly differentiates between
similar size
employers
in (c)(i) and similar size public fire departments in
(c)(ii). It is also clear that the comparisons
are to be made to
public fire departments in the State
of
number of comparables exist in the
state.
Arbitrator
Snow has clearly ignored the legislative guidelines
when
selecting
fire departments to
be used as
comparables.
Arbitrator Snow was apparently taken in by
the City's plea that it
was somehow isolated from the
rest of the State of
though the city is
located at the intersection
of Interstate
Highway 90, the primary east-west route through
the state, and
Interstate Highway 82, the second major
north-south route in the
state.
Arbitrator
Snow refers to the impact of travel on Interstate
Highway 5, which some of the fire departments proposed by the
Association are located beside, but failed
to recognize any impact
from the major interstate highways
intersecting at the City of
Ellensburg.
Arbitrator
Snow also has chosen to reflect as the Associations
proposed
comparables, in determining the award, a list of all fire
departments
in the
State of similar size, which fit the size
universe
utilized by the Association, rather than the finalized,
pared
down
list of comparable
departments offered by the
Association which excluded all fire district
departments and those
city departments in the
area.
When
one looks at the Unions exhibit No. 3, Page 9, titled
exhibit
5, one finds that the
actually
as follows:
Hoquiam Tumwater
Port
Angeles Centralia
Pullman Spokane
Airport
Moses
Lake
Based on the
comparables proposed by the Association,
Ellensburg Top Paid Fire Fighter rates would
need to be adjusted as
follows
to be comparable.
Actual
Earnings 19.32%
Adjusted
Earnings 31.04%
Real
Actual Earnings 18.81%
Real
Adjusted Earnings 30.51%
Information
on Assessed Evaluation
and populations served or
EMS and fire were presented in Union exhibit
No. 12. When one
applies
the Assessed Evaluation and population as Arbitrator Snow
appears
to suggest on page 22 of this award, the following cities
evolve as close reasonable
comparisons to the City of
Population Sq. Mi.
Comparable Served Bargaining Assessed Served
Cities For Fire Unit
Size Valuation
For For For
Fire
Pullman 17,000 12 226 6.2 480
Hoquiam 12,000 24 224 30 52
Tumwater 8,500 16 318 11 758
_________________________________________________________________________________
Ellensburg
11,500 17 229 6 1250
_________________________________________________________________________________
Arbitrator Snow has
eliminated Hoquiam,
Tumwater as reasonable comparables because
they are "West of the
Cascade Mountains," but has included
the City of Pasco, one of the
Tri-Cities, which comprise the fourth
largest metropolitan area in
the State of
Also,
in comparison to the above listed cities, Pasco clearly
falls outside this group as
indicated by the statistics above.
Arbitrator
Snow has used bargaining unit
size for
obtained
from
outdated information supplied
by the City
and
rebutted
by the
If
one uses the set of cities identified above for comparison
Ellensburg
Top
Paid Fire Fighters
are 8% behind
in total
compensation,
rather than 1.21% as proposed by
Arbitrator Snow
using only three comparators
including the City of
Arbitrator
Snow has also suggested that bargaining units may
contain
employees of different ranks in different jurisdictions and
therefore,
may greatly vary the work of fire fighters in different
jurisdictions. This is not correct, and no evidence was
produced
to support this
supposition. In fact, the rank of top
fire fighter
has been used extensively for
comparison purposes in arbitration
primarily
because of the overall standardization of work performed
by people of that rank
throughout the State, whether the department
is large or small. In the instant case, rank differential, which
may vary with different
department structures, is not an issue.
Arbitrator
Snow has erred in analyzing employer exhibit No. 2,
which would try to indicate that
the City has given wage increases
which on the average have exceeded
the CPI-U by 52% from the date
of hire. The statements that
"The economic reality for
the
employer,
however, is that the average payroll cost of bargaining
unit members has increased 52%
since each person's date of hire,"
and "The data, none the
less, are unrebutted that, on average base
hire' wages in the bargaining unit
since 1967 have exceeded CPI
increases
by 52%," are simply not true.
To
even attempt to compare step and promotional increases,
which are compensation for heavier
work loads and additional skills
to CPI increases is comparing
apples and oranges. In reality, pay
increases
given to members for rank promotions do riot normally
increase
the cost to the employer because most promotions only
replace
individuals who were receiving pay for the higher position
and who have vacated the
position. Thus, cost must be compared on
increases
in defined positions to have an accurate assessment of
cost increases to employers, and
not be gauged over increases to an
individual
over the span of his/her career.
The
City did not provide any data or evidence substantiating
that
the Association
"at some point has
chosen to accept
an unusually good health plan in
lieu of a larger wage increase, "
suggested
by Arbitrator Snow.
In
fact, it would appear more reasonable that the city has
higher health care costs because it
has agreed to other health
plans with other bargaining units
in the City, reducing the number
of people in the plan covering
the non-union city personnel and the
fire fighters, thus increasing
premiums for said group.
In conclusion,
I believe the
award on wages
given by
Arbitrator Snow to be based on false assumptions
arid incorrect
assessments
of the evidence provided. The
Association should have
been awarded an increase which
would have moved their wages closer
to comparable departments in the
State of
_________________________
Danny T. Downs
Association-appointed Arbitrator