Ben Franklin Transit, Decision 13249 (PECB, 2020)

STATE OF WASHINGTON

BEFORE THE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION

TEamsters local 760, Complainant, vs. ben franklin transit, Respondent.

CASES 132878-U-20, 132899-U-20 DECISION 13249 - PECB findings of fact, conclusions of law and order

David W. Ballew, Attorney at Law, Reid, McCarthy, Ballew & Leahy, L.L.P., for Teamsters Local 760.

Shannon E. Phillips, Attorney at Law, Summit Law Group PLLC, for Ben Franklin Transit.

These consolidated cases involve allegations that Ben Franklin Transit (employer) interfered with employee rights during an organizing campaign conducted by Teamsters Local 760 (union). On June 22, 2020, the union filed with the Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC) a representation petition in case 132847-E-20 in which it sought to represent a bargaining unit composed of transportation supervisors employed by the employer. The union filed unfair labor practice complaints on July 1 and July 15, 2020, alleging the employer violated RCW 41.56.140(1) and several provisions of chapter 391‑25 WAC. An unfair labor practice manager issued preliminary rulings for both cases, finding causes of action.[1] The cases were consolidated for hearing. The undersigned examiner conducted a hearing via videoconference on September 2, 2020. The parties filed briefs on October 9, 2020 to complete the record.

Issues

The complaints, as framed by the preliminary rulings, raise the following issues:

1.                  Did the employer interfere with employee rights in violation of RCW 41.56.140(1) and WAC 391-25-140(2) by failing to maintain the status quo concerning the take-home car policy during the pendency of a representation petition?

2.                  Did the employer interfere with employee rights in violation of RCW 41.56.140(1) and WAC 391- 25-130 by failing to provide the list of petitioned-for transportation supervisors as requested by the Commission?

The employer violated RCW 41.56.140(1) when, within hours of the union’s filing of a representation petition, the employer eliminated its long-standing practice of permitting certain employees to take home employer-owned vehicles. Although the change may have been set in motion prior to the petition, it had not been communicated to employees. The conduct disrupted the laboratory conditions necessary for processing representation petitions and interfered with employee rights. The employer’s failure to timely submit the list of employees covered by the petition to PERC, although a technical violation of WAC 391-25-130, did not unlawfully interfere with employee rights under chapter 41.56 RCW. The delay in providing the list was temporary, and there is no evidence that employees were aware of the employer’s actions.

Background

The employer provides regional bus services throughout Benton and Franklin counties in Washington State. The services include both fixed-route and Dial-a-Ride operations. Gloria Boyce is the employer’s general manager. Director of transit operations Ayodeji Arojo reports to Boyce. Assistant director of transit operations Steven Davis reports to Arojo.

The employer employs approximately 10 transportation supervisors.[2] The transportation supervisors are responsible for a range of duties. These include assisting operators with problems on their routes and responding to various incidents and accidents. Prior to June 5, 2020, they reported directly to Arojo. Since June 5, they have reported to Davis.

The majority of the work performed by the transportation supervisors occurs away from the office. As a result, they are each assigned an employer-owned vehicle. They use the vehicles to respond to incidents where they occur throughout the employer’s geographic area of operation.

Take-Home Car Policy

Historically, the transportation supervisors have been permitted to take their employer-owned vehicles home at the end of their shift. The practice has been seen by the employees as a benefit of the position and has been in existence for many years. Not only were they not required to utilize a personally owned vehicle to commute to and from work, but they also started their shifts the moment they left their residences, rather than upon arriving at the employer’s main facility.

Arojo began working as the employer’s operations manager in January 2020. Based on his experience working in the passenger transportation industry, he determined that the employer’s practice of permitting transportation supervisors to take home the employer-owned vehicles was not in line with industry standards. Arojo also believed it resulted in increased costs to the employer. In light of these considerations, in May 2020 Arojo approached Boyce about the possibility of ending the practice. Boyce did not object to his suggestion.

There is considerable difference between the testimonies of Arojo and Davis, on one hand, and transportation supervisors Michael Lohmann, Chris Lilyblade, and Julian Caiceros, on the other, regarding the extent to which Arojo explicitly informed drivers that the practice of permitting employees to take home employer-owned vehicles would end. Arojo and Davis generally testified that Arojo told drivers he had decided to stop permitting them to take employer-owned vehicles home. The employees, however, all testified that Arojo and Davis merely explained that it was a possibility and asked them for feedback. I credit the testimonies of Lohmann, Lilyblade, and Caiceros for the reasons discussed below.

The first communications Arojo had with the transportation supervisors about the possibility of ending the practice of allowing them to take home employer-owned vehicles occurred on May 27, 2020.

Transportation supervisor Julian Caiceros was at the employer’s main facility picking up paperwork when he was approached by Arojo. The two went into Arojo’s office where Arojo asked Caiceros what he thought about requiring employer-owned vehicles to be parked at the facility overnight. Caiceros explained his objections. He also noted that he had limited parking at his house and had given his personal car to a family member in order to accommodate the employer-provided vehicle. As a result, if any change to the policy was made, he would need some time in order to arrange for new transportation. Arojo did not tell Caiceros that a decision to end the practice had already been made.

The same day, Arojo and Davis drove to the employer’s transfer center on 22nd Street in Pasco, where the employer was sponsoring a food drive. Transportation supervisors Lohmann, Thad Pospical, and Gabe Martin were working at the event.[3] Arojo asked Lohmann for his opinion of changing the practice of permitting employees to take employer-owned vehicles home. Lohmann replied some time later during the food drive, explaining that the take-home cars were viewed as a perk by employees. He added that they also decreased the transportation supervisors’ response time to incidents. Although Arojo responded to Lohmann’s arguments, he did not explicitly inform him that the practice would be ending.

Neither Arojo nor Davis spoke to Lilyblade concerning the take-home cars on May 27.

I credit the testimonies of Lohmann and Caiceros concerning the May 27 conversations for several reasons. First, the testimonies of the transportation supervisors were reasonably specific and consistent. In contrast, Arojo was unable to recall much of the substance of the conversations in question. His testimony was also at times internally contradictory. For instance, when asked how many transportation supervisors he met with on May 27, 2020, to discuss ending the take-home car policy, Arojo testified at different times that he spoke with all, a majority, or some of the employees. Similarly, when asked how the transportation supervisors were notified that Arojo wanted to discuss the matter with them, Arojo first explained that he had his executive assistant invite the employees to his office and he would not have done so personally. He later testified that he also could have called the employees via either radio or on their employer-provided cell phones. He then later admitted that he did not have any recollection of how he contacted the employees. These are not minor inconsistencies on issues of little importance. Rather, they go to the heart of the issue of whether employees were reasonably put on notice that the take-home car policy would end.

I also find the testimonies of Davis and Arojo concerning the substance of the May 27 discussions to be implausible. Both witnesses explained that the point of the conversations with employees on May 27 was to explain that the practice of permitting employees to take home employer-owned vehicles was ending. At the same time, however, they also testified that they repeatedly asked employees for their opinions on the change. It is difficult to understand why Arojo and Davis would go to such lengths to solicit feedback from each employee individually concerning a policy change they had already firmly decided to make.

Following the conversations on May 27, Arojo scheduled via email a meeting for June 5 with all the transportation supervisors. The title of the meeting notification was “Supervisors Vehicle.” Arojo began the meeting by telling the employees that he did not think it was financially viable for the employer to allow employees to take vehicles home. Before he could comment further, however, he received a phone call. After ending the call, Arojo told the group the meeting was suspended. He then left the room. When Arojo left, Lilyblade told Davis he hoped the transportation supervisors would get an opportunity to have a conversation before any changes were made to the take-home car policy. Davis replied he hoped they would have that opportunity as well. Caiceros remarked that, because of his personal transportation situation, in the event a change was made he would like ample notice. Neither Davis nor Arojo explicitly communicated to the assembled employees that the employer had already decided to end the program. Arojo, in fact, did not make the final decision on the timing of his formal announcement that the program would end until at some point after the June 5 meeting.

The union electronically filed the representation petition in case 132847-E-20 on the morning of June 22, 2020. The union subsequently served Boyce with a copy of the petition via email at 8:21 a.m. Boyce forwarded the email she received from the union to Arojo at 10:46 a.m. that day.

At 2:11 p.m. on June 22, 2020, after receiving notification that the representation petition was filed, Arojo sent an email to all of the transportation supervisors with the subject “Supervisor Vehicles – Update.” In his email, Arojo explained:

“After further consideration, because of the current financial constraints and unknown variables that continue to impact [the employer] and our customers, a decision has been made effective today June 22, 2020, that supervisors assigned vehicles will be parked at MOA before and after all assigned shifts. Per our on-going conversations, this was a business decision that will benefit all and contribute to the future success of the agency.”

The change went into effect the beginning of July 2020. Since that time, the transportation supervisors have been required to commute to work using their personal vehicles. Rather than beginning their shift upon leaving their homes, they also now start their workday upon arrival at the employer’s main facility.

I credit the three transportation supervisors’ testimonies concerning what was said at the June 5 meeting as Arojo and Davis’ testimonies conflict with documentary evidence. Arojo and Davis testified that during the June 5 group meeting with the transportation supervisors, they reiterated that the practice of taking home vehicles was going to end. Handwritten notes taken contemporaneously by Lilyblade contradict this recollection. The notes indicate that, although Arojo may have begun to explain why he believed continuing the practice was not feasible, he was quickly interrupted by a phone call, after which he ended the meeting. The testimonies of Davis and Arojo, in which they explicitly informed employees the practice was ending on May 27 and/or June 5, also contradict the text of the email Arojo sent formally ending the practice several weeks later, on June 22. In the email, Arojo notes, “After further consideration . . . a decision has been made effective today . . . .” I am unable to reconcile this language (indicating that the decision was made at some point after June 5, after weighing employee feedback) with Arojo and Davis’ testimonies that they had previously communicated the decision to employees in unequivocal terms.

List of Employees for Representation Petition

PERC received the union’s representation petition on June 22, 2020. The following morning, on June 23, 2020, PERC staff emailed a letter to Boyce requesting, among other things, a list of all employees currently on the employer’s payroll in the petitioned-for bargaining unit. Consistent with WAC 391-25-130, the letter provided a 10-day deadline to submit the information. After receiving the request, Boyce forwarded the message to Wendi Warner, the employer’s director of human resources and labor relations.

The employer did not submit the list by the July 3, 2020, deadline. As a result, one of PERC’s representation administrators sent an email to the employer’s representative on July 7, 2020, reiterating the June 23 request. The second request from PERC was copied to the employer’s labor counsel. Shortly after receipt of this second request, the employer began preparing a response to the agency’s request for information.

The representation administrator followed up her July 7 request with another on July 15. The employer ultimately provided the information requested in the initial letter on the evening of July 15.

There is no evidence that employees covered by the petition were aware, or reasonably should have been aware, of the employer’s failure to timely submit the list.

Analysis

Applicable Legal Standards

Interference

It is an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their statutory rights. RCW 41.56.140(1). An employer may interfere with employee rights by making statements, through written communication, or by actions. Snohomish County, Decision 9834-B (PECB, 2008); Pasco Housing Authority, Decision 5927-A (PECB, 1997), remedy aff’d, Pasco Housing Authority v. Public Employment Relations Commission, 98 Wn. App. 809 (2000). An employer interferes with employee rights when an employee could reasonably perceive the employer’s actions as a threat of reprisal or force, or a promise of benefit, associated with the union activity of that employee or other employees. Kennewick School District, Decision 5632-A (PECB, 1996).

To prove an interference violation, the complainant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s conduct interfered with protected employee rights. Grays Harbor College, Decision 9946-A (PSRA, 2009); Pasco Housing Authority, Decision 5927-A. To meet its burden of proving interference, a complainant need not establish that an employee was engaged in protected activity. State – Washington State Patrol, Decision 11775-A (PSRA, 2014); City of Mountlake Terrace, Decision 11831-A (PECB, 2014). The complainant is not required to demonstrate that the employer intended or was motivated to interfere with an employee’s protected collective bargaining rights. City of Tacoma, Decision 6793-A (PECB, 2000). Nor is it necessary to show that the employee was actually coerced by the employer or that the employer had union animus. Id.

Status Quo

Long-standing Commission precedent and the Commission’s rules require an employer to maintain the status quo with respect to the wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment of employees affected by a representation petition while it is pending before the agency. Klickitat County, Decision 5462 (PECB, 1996); WAC 391-25-140(2). The relevant status quo is determined as of the date of the filing of the petition. Val Vue Sewer District, Decision 8963 (PECB, 2005). Changes to wages, hours, and working conditions during the pendency of a representation petition may improperly affect the laboratory conditions necessary to the free exercise by employees of their right to vote. Clark County, Decision 5373 (PECB, 1995) (citing Mason County, Decision 1699 (PECB, 1983)), aff’d, Decision 5373-A (PECB, 1996). The obligation to maintain the status quo is premised on preventing employer interference in the election process in violation of RCW 41.56.140(1).

The Commission recognizes, however, that occasionally the status quo “is not static and the employer needs to take action to follow through with changes that were set in motion prior to the union filing a representation petition.” City of Seattle, Decision 9938-A (PECB, 2009) (citing King County, Decision 6063-A (PECB, 1998)). This concept is referred to as the “dynamic status quo.” Changes that are part of the dynamic status quo are not seen as disruptive to laboratory conditions in a representation proceeding, because the changes are already expected by employees. If the changes were set in motion and communicated to employees prior to the filing of the representation petition, employees should recognize that the changes are not related to the petition and therefore should not undermine support for a union. King County, Decision 6063-A. Operation of the dynamic status quo ensures that petitions do not block routine, nondiscretionary changes to employee working conditions. City of Seattle, Decision 9938-A.

Application of Standards

Change to Take-Home Car Policy

There is no dispute that prior to 2020 the employer had, for many years, maintained a policy permitting transportation supervisors to take home employer-owned vehicles. There is also no dispute that the employer began contemplating ending this practice in or around May 2020. The case turns on the extent to which the employer communicated its decision to employees prior to the filing of the petition on June 22, 2020. If the decision to require employees to park employer‑owned vehicles at the employer’s facility at the end of the day was made and clearly communicated to employees prior to the petition, it constituted part of the dynamic status quo. In contrast, if employees were not informed of the change, the employer’s actions ending the practice violated its status quo obligation.

The credited evidence establishes that Arojo did not clearly inform the employees that he made a final decision to stop permitting them to take home cars until after the petition was filed. On May 27, he spoke with some of the transportation supervisors about the possibility of ending the policy, soliciting their feedback. Asking for an opinion regarding a program is not equivalent to unequivocally announcing the end of that program. One clearly sets employee expectations; the other does not. Arojo and Davis’ communications to employees on May 27 were also incomplete. At least one employee, Lilyblade, did not have any personal conversations with the two managers regarding the take-home cars. Given the small size of the proposed bargaining unit, this discrepancy is not insignificant. Lilyblade may have heard through other employees that the employer was considering the possibility of ending the take-home car policy. The employer cannot, however, rely on the workplace rumor mill to establish the existence of a dynamic status quo.

Arojo’s brief statements to employees on June 5 also failed to sufficiently apprise employees that the take-home car policy would end. While he may have intended to make a formal announcement ending the policy, Arojo was interrupted by a phone call and he suspended the meeting before the announcement could occur. Davis’ comments to the employees after Arojo left the room regarding possible further dialogue about the policy contributed to the lack of clarity. The Commission has found a violation of the status quo obligation under similar circumstances. See Central Washington University, Decision 10967-A (PECB, 2012) (recognizing that although the possibility of a change was announced prior to the petition, post-petition implementation of change was unlawful). This fact also distinguishes the instant situation from that addressed in City of Bremerton, Decision 3168 (PECB, 1989), where the employer had clearly articulated its intent to make a change to the status quo to employees prior to the union filing a representation petition.

The fact that Arojo may have made the decision to end the take-home car policy prior to June 22 is not determinative. Adams County, Decision 7961 (PECB, 2003) (determining that although employer announced hours reduction pre-petition, actual changes were not made until after petition was filed on different schedule than previously announced and as a result unlawful). As the Commission has explained, “What sets the dynamic status quo in motion is the employer’s decision to which it is bound and at which point it no longer has discretion, and therefore, its action or inaction is expected by the employees.” Central Washington University, Decision 10967-A. This principle forms the basis for why the Commission has found step increases, but not annual cost of living adjustments, to constitute part of the dynamic status quo. Arojo retained the discretion to maintain, modify, or eliminate the take‑home car policy up until the point where he emailed employees his final decision on the afternoon of June 22—after the union filed its representation petition. The decision to eliminate the policy immediately after the petition was filed was thus not clearly expected by employees. The transportation supervisors could reasonably perceive the decision was related to the exercise of their collective bargaining rights. The employer’s action constitutes interference in violation of RCW 41.56.140(1).

In order to remedy the unfair labor practice, as ordered herein, the employer must restore the status quo and make employees whole, consistent with the Commission’s decision in City of Kalama, Decision 6853-A (PECB, 2000).

Failure to Timely Provide Employee List

After a representation petition is filed, employers are required under WAC 391-25-130 to submit to PERC a list containing the names and last known addresses of all employees in the bargaining unit described in the petition. The rules require that the list be provided within 10 days of the request. The agency uses this information to check the showing of interest accompanying the petition, as well as begin the process of identifying possible disputes concerning bargaining unit composition and eligibility. The failure of an employer to timely provide the employee list hinders PERC’s ability to expeditiously process representation petitions.

The employer submitted the requested information on the evening of July 15, 2020, which was 12 calendar days after it was due. There is no evidence that employees were, or reasonably should have been, aware of the employer’s actions. Without such evidence it is not possible to conclude that the employees would perceive the failure to timely submit the list of employees in the bargaining unit as a threat of reprisal or force, or a promise of benefit, associated with their union activity.

PERC expects parties in representation cases to comply with regulations established pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act. My finding that the employer’s delay in submitting the employee list here was not unlawful does not remove the ability of parties to enforce the Commission’s rules regarding representation cases. Even in the absence of enforcement through unfair labor practice proceedings under chapter 391-45 WAC, parties retain the right to file post‑election objections to improper conduct under WAC 391-25-590. Moreover, there may be situations where an employer’s failure to submit required information would constitute independent interference under RCW 41.56.140(1). A Commission unfair labor practice manager recognized this possibility in State – Revenue, Decision 10415 (PSRA, 2009); State – Social and Health Services, Decision 10417 (PSRA, 2009); State – Labor and Industries, Decision 10418 (PSRA, 2009); and State – Employment Security, Decision 10419 (PSRA, 2009). Under the circumstances here, however, there is insufficient evidence to establish a violation.

Conclusion

The employer maintained a long-standing past practice of permitting transportation supervisors to take home employer-owned vehicles. When it announced the end of that policy immediately after the union filed a representation petition seeking to represent those employees, the employer violated its status quo obligation and interfered with employee rights in violation of RCW 41.56.140(1).[4]

There is insufficient evidence to establish that the employer’s failure to timely submit the list of employees requested by Commission staff in connection with a representation petition similarly interfered with employee rights.

Findings of Fact

1.         The employer provides regional bus services throughout Benton and Franklin counties in Washington State. The services include both fixed-route and Dial-a-Ride operations. Gloria Boyce is the employer’s general manager. Director of transit operations Ayodeji Arojo reports to Boyce. Assistant director of transit operations Steven Davis reports to Arojo.

2.         The employer employs approximately 10 transportation supervisors. The transportation supervisors are responsible for a range of duties. These include assisting operators with problems on their routes and responding to various incidents and accidents.

3.         The majority of the work performed by the transportation supervisors occurs away from the office. As a result, they are each assigned an employer-owned vehicle. They use the vehicles to respond to incidents where they occur throughout the employer’s geographic area of operation.

4.         Historically, the transportation supervisors have been permitted to take their employer‑owned vehicles home at the end of their shift. The practice has been seen by the employees as a benefit of the position and has been in existence for many years.

5.         Arojo began working as the employer’s operations manager in January 2020. Based on his experience working in the passenger transportation industry, he determined that the employer’s practice of permitting transportation supervisors to take home the employer‑owned vehicles was not in line with industry standards. Arojo also believed it resulted in increased costs to the employer. In light of these considerations, in May 2020 Arojo approached Boyce about the possibility of ending the practice. Boyce did not object to his suggestion.

6.         The first communications Arojo had with the transportation supervisors about the possibility of ending the practice of allowing them to take home employer-owned vehicles occurred on May 27, 2020.

7.         Transportation supervisor Julian Caiceros was at the employer’s main facility picking up paperwork when he was approached by Arojo. The two went into Arojo’s office where Arojo asked Caiceros what he thought about requiring employer-owned vehicles to be parked at the facility overnight. Caiceros explained his objections. He also noted that he had limited parking at his house and had given his personal car to a family member in order to accommodate the employer-provided vehicle. As a result, if any change to the policy was made, he would need some time in order to arrange for new transportation. Arojo did not tell Caiceros that a decision to end the practice had already been made.

8.         The same day, Arojo and Davis drove to the employer’s transfer center on 22nd Street in Pasco, where the employer was sponsoring a food drive. Arojo asked Lohmann for his opinion of changing the practice of permitting employees to take employer-owned vehicles home. Lohmann replied some time later during the food drive, explaining that the take‑home cars were viewed as a perk by employees. He added that they also decreased the transportation supervisors’ response time to incidents. Although Arojo responded to Lohmann’s arguments, he did not explicitly inform him that the practice would be ending.

9.         Neither Arojo nor Davis spoke to Lilyblade concerning the take-home cars on May 27.

10.       Following the conversations on May 27, Arojo scheduled via email a meeting for June 5 with all the transportation supervisors. The title of the meeting notification was “Supervisors Vehicle.” Arojo began the meeting by telling the employees that he did not think it was financially viable for the employer to allow employees to take vehicles home. Before he could comment further, however, he received a phone call. After ending the call, Arojo told the group the meeting was suspended. He then left the room. When Arojo left, Lilyblade told Davis he hoped the transportation supervisors would get an opportunity to have a conversation before any changes were made to the take-home car policy. Davis replied he hoped they would have that opportunity as well. Caiceros remarked that, because of his personal transportation situation, in the event a change was made he would like ample notice. Neither Davis nor Arojo explicitly communicated to the assembled employees that the employer had already decided to end the program.

11.       Arojo, in fact, did not make the final decision on the timing of his formal announcement that the program would end until at some point after the June 5 meeting.

12.       The union electronically filed the representation petition in case 132847-E-20 on the morning of June 22, 2020. The union subsequently served Boyce with a copy of the petition via email at 8:21 a.m. Boyce forwarded the email she received from the union to Arojo at 10:46 a.m. that day.

13.       At 2:11 p.m. on June 22, 2020, after receiving notification that the representation petition was filed, Arojo sent an email to all of the transportation supervisors with the subject “Supervisor Vehicles – Update.” In his email, he announced the take-home car program would end.

14.       Since on or around July 1, 2020, the transportation supervisors have been required to commute to work using their personal vehicles. Rather than beginning their shift upon leaving their homes, they also now start their workday upon arrival at the employer’s main facility.

15.       PERC received the union’s representation petition on June 22, 2020. The following morning, on June 23, 2020, PERC staff emailed a letter to Boyce requesting, among other things, a list of all employees currently on the employer’s payroll in the petitioned-for bargaining unit. Consistent with WAC 391-25-130, the letter provided a 10-day deadline to submit the information. After receiving the request, Boyce forwarded the message to Wendi Warner, the employer’s director of human resources and labor relations.

16.       The employer did not submit the list by the July 3, 2020, deadline. As a result, one of PERC’s representation administrators sent an email to the employer’s representative on July 7, 2020, reiterating the June 23 request. The second request from PERC was copied to the employer’s labor counsel. Shortly after receipt of this second request, the employer began preparing a response to the agency’s request for information.

17.       The representation administrator followed up her July 7 request with another on July 15. The employer ultimately provided the information requested in the initial letter on the evening of July 15.

18.       There is no evidence that employees covered by the petition were aware, or reasonably should have been aware, of the employer’s failure to timely submit the list.

Conclusions of Law

1.                  The Public Employment Relations Commission has jurisdiction in this matter under chapter 41.56 RCW and chapter 391-45 WAC.

2.                  By the actions described in findings of fact 4–14, the employer interfered with employee rights in violation of RCW 41.56.140(1) by failing to maintain the status quo during the pendency of a representation petition.

3.                  By the actions described in findings of fact 15–18, the employer did not interfere with employee rights in violation of RCW 41.56.140(1) by failing to timely submit a list of employees requested by this agency in connection with a representation petition.

Order

The complaint charging unfair labor practices filed in case 132899-U-20 is DISMISSED.

In connection with the complaint charging unfair labor practices filed in case 132878-U-20, BEN FRANKLIN TRANSIT, its officers and agents, shall immediately take the following actions to remedy its unfair labor practices:

1.                  CEASE AND DESIST from:

a.                   Making changes to the status quo concerning wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of employment of employees who are the subject of a representation petition pending before the Commission.

b.                  In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their collective bargaining rights under the laws of the State of Washington.

2.                  TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION to effectuate the purposes and policies of chapter 41.56 RCW:

a.                   Restore the status quo ante by permitting employees to take home employer-owned vehicles at the end of their shifts, which existed for the employees in the proposed bargaining unit prior to the change found unlawful in this order.

b.                  Make all employees in the proposed bargaining unit whole for their expenses for commuting between work and home during the period from the effective date of termination of the take-home-car policy on or about July 1, 2020, until the effective date of the reinstatement of the take-home-car policy by payment to them at the business mileage rate(s) in effect at that time under regulations of the federal Internal Revenue Service multiplied by their round-trip mileage.

c.                   Contact a compliance officer at the Public Employment Relations Commission to receive official copies of the required notice for posting. Post copies of the notice provided by the compliance officer in conspicuous places on the employer’s premises where notices to all bargaining unit members are usually posted. These notices shall be duly signed by an authorized representative of the respondent and shall remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of initial posting. The respondent shall take reasonable steps to ensure that such notices are not removed, altered, defaced, or covered by other material.

d.                  Read the notice provided by the compliance officer into the record at a regular public meeting of the Board of Directors of Ben Franklin Transit and permanently append a copy of the notice to the official minutes of the meeting where the notice is read as required by this paragraph.

e.                   Notify the complainant, in writing, within 20 days following the date of this order as to what steps have been taken to comply with this order and, at the same time, provide the complainant with a signed copy of the notice provided by the compliance officer.

f.                    Notify the compliance officer, in writing, within 20 days following the date of this order as to what steps have been taken to comply with this order and, at the same time, provide the compliance officer with a signed copy of the notice the compliance officer provides.

ISSUED at Olympia, Washington, this  20th  day of October, 2020.

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION

Michael Snyder, Examiner

This order will be the final order of the
agency unless a notice of appeal is filed
with the Commission under WAC 391-45-350.