The complaint charging unfair labor practices filed in the above-entitled matter on March 19, 1991, by Public School Employees of Manson, alleges that the Manson School District committed certain violations of Chapter 41.56 RCW. The complaint came before the Executive Director for a preliminary ruling pursuant to WAC 391-45-110. The complainant had divided its original statement of facts into two portions, under the headings "first cause of action" and "second cause of action", and problems were noted with both groups of allegations. A letter was issued to the parties on May 3, 1991, requesting further information from them within a 14 day period.

Additional information was received from the employer on May 20, 1991. No further information has been received from the union. The matter is again before the Executive Director for preliminary ruling under WAC 391-45-110. At this stage of the proceedings, it is presumed that all of the facts alleged in the complaint are true and provable. The question at hand is whether the complaint states a cause of action for unfair labor practice proceedings before the Public Employment Relations Commission.

The "First Cause of Action"

The first portion of the complaint contained an allegation that the employer made a unilateral change to the school calendar in December, 1990, without first giving notice and opportunity to bargain either the decision or its effects to the exclusive bargaining representative. An additional allegation in this section claimed that the superintendent of the school district refused a demand to bargain made by the exclusive bargaining representative on December 10, 1990.

RCW 41.58.020 (4) declares "final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties" to be "the desirable method" for resolving disputes concerning the interpretation and application of an existing collective bargaining agreement. It has been the practice of the Commission to "defer" to contractually created or adopted dispute resolution processes where it appears that issues disputed in an unfair labor practice case are susceptible to resolution through the contract procedures, and there is no reason to believe that the use of the contractual procedure could not or would not resolve the issues in a manner compatible with the purposes and policies of the applicable collective bargaining statute. Stevens County, Decision 2602 (PECB, 1987). Inquiry was made of the parties to this proceeding as to the propriety of deferral to their contractual grievance machinery, in light of Stevens County. The response received from the employer indicates that the grievance procedure contained in the collective bargaining agreement between the parties does not have a provision for final and binding arbitration of grievances. The employer also indicated that, should a grievance be initiated by the union, it would assert procedural defenses based on the timeliness of the filing of such a grievance. For both of these reasons, deferral of the "first cause of action" is deemed to be inappropriate. The allegations of the "first cause of action" are found to state a cause of action, and will be referred to an examiner for further proceedings.

The "Second Cause of Action"

The second portion of the complaint concerns a number of instances in which the employer is alleged to have engaged in a variety of illegal actions. The time frame for the alleged misconduct was only specified as "during the past two years". The attention of the complainant was directed to WAC 391-45-050, which states, in pertinent part,

Each complaint shall contain, in separate numbered paragraphs ... clear and concise statements of the facts constituting the alleged unfair labor practices, including times, dates, places and participants in occurrences.

The preliminary ruling letter noted that specific information was necessary to determine whether the allegations stated a cause of action for further proceedings, because of the six-month statute of limitations contained in RCW 41.56.160.

The complainant's failure to respond to the request for further information is deemed to be an abandonment of the "Second Cause of Action". Consequently, those allegations are dismissed.

NOW, THEREFORE, it is

ORDERED

1.         The matters contained in the "first cause of action" alleging that the employer made a unilateral change to the school calendar in December, 1990, and refused a subsequent demand to bargain made by the union on December 10, 1990, state a cause of action and will be assigned to an examiner, when available, for further proceedings under Chapter 391-45 WAC.

2.         The matters contained in the "second cause of action" are hereby dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.

Issued at Olympia, Washington, this 17th day of July, 1991.

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION

[SIGNED]

MARVIN L. SCHURKE, Executive Director

This order may be appealed by

filing a petition for review

with the Commission pursuant

to WAC 391-45-350.