PORT OF PASCO, DECISION 3398-A (PECB, 1990)
IAFF, Local 3173 v. Port of Pasco
DECISION OF COMMISSION AND
CERTIFICATION
This case comes
before the Commission on timely objections filed by the Port of Pasco, pursuant
to WAC 391-25-590(2), to challenge rulings made by Executive Director Marvin L.
Schurke.
BACKGROUND
The union involved,
International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 3173, filed a representation
petition with the Commission on October 26, 1989. It sought certification as exclusive
bargaining representative of a bargaining unit it described as: "All personnel serving as fire fighting
personnel for the Tri-Cities Airport excluding supervisory
personnel". The employer objected
to the petition. It contended that the
correct description of those employees which the union sought to represent was
"maintenance workers or guards"; not "fire fighters".
After a hearing
before Hearing Officer J. Martin Smith on May 23 and 24, 1989, and the filing
of post-hearing briefs, the Executive Director determined that a bargaining
unit described as: "All full-time
and regular part-time non-supervisory rescue and fire fighting personnel
employed at the Tri-Cities Airport" was appropriate. He expressly refrained from deciding whether
the petitioned-for employees were "uniformed personnel" within the
meaning of RCW 41.56.030(7).[1] The Executive Director issued an order on
January 23, 1990, directing a cross-check of records to determine whether a
majority of the employees in that bargaining unit desired representation by the
petitioning union.
POSITIONS OF THE
PARTIES
The employer takes
issue with the Direction of Cross-Check for two reasons. First, it contends that a cross-check was
unfair, because of the delay that has resulted since membership applications
were signed. The employer believes that
such applications may no longer reflect the desires of the bargaining unit
employees. Only an election, it argues,
would provide a reasonably current expression of opinion from the bargaining
unit's membership. Second, the employer
objects to the fact that the Executive Director left unresolved the principal
issue advanced by both parties, i.e., whether the employees at issue
are, in fact, "full-time fire fighters" with all the rights that
terminology implies. The employer urges
that the omission leaves the parties headed to the bargaining table with no
clear idea as to their impasse rights.
The union agrees with
the Executive Director's decision, and urges the Commission to affirm it.
DISCUSSION
The "Full-Time Fire
Fighter" Issue
The Executive
Director recognized that the parties had devoted most of their energy to
arguing over whether the petitioned-for employees are full-time fire
fighters. The employer acknowledges that
the petitioned-for employees have a right to organize for the purposes of
collective bargaining, without regard to whether they are "uniformed
personnel". Nevertheless, it
strenuously objects to characterization of the bargaining unit as
"full-time ... fire fighting personnel". We can appreciate the employer's concern that
sidestepping the issue only postpones it for another day. There is a benefit in this case, though, to
doing that.
The principal reason
for the employer's sensitivity regarding the characterization of the bargaining
unit is a concern that the individuals therein will thereby qualify for
coverage under the Law Enforcement Officers and Fire Fighters (LEOFF)
retirement system established by Chapter 41.26 RCW.[2] The Public Employees' Collective Bargaining
Act, Chapter 41.56 RCW, defines "uniformed personnel" by reference to
the LEOFF statute.[3] It is obviously preferable that there be
consistency in applying the "fire fighter" definition. In close cases, it also seems preferable
that, whenever practicable, the issue first be presented to the agency or
official responsible for administering the statute from which the definition is
derived.[4] The bargaining process gives the parties time
to do that. Consequently, we find no
error in the fact that the Executive Director chose not to resolve the
principal issue advanced by both parties.
Bargaining units are
generally described in terms of the work performed by the employees at issue,
rather than by their specific job titles.
This is done to avoid subsequent jurisdictional problems in the event a
job title is changed. City of Seattle,
Decision 3131-A (PECB, 1989). In his
decision, the Executive Director found that the "community of
interest" which binds the petitioned-for employees together is their
"rescue and fire fighting" duties, skills and working
conditions. The record certainly supports
the finding that such duties are performed.
The record also persuades us that the description of the bargaining unit
should be modified in one respect.
Since the Executive
Director expressly refrained from deciding whether the employees at issue met
the definition of "uniformed personnel" as full-time fire fighters,
we believe it is preferable to define the bargaining unit as "all
full-time and regular part-time non-supervisory personnel employed by the Port
of Pasco at the Tri-Cities Airport who perform rescue and fire fighting
duties". This description, subject
to the standard exclusions, eliminates reference to whether the "fire
fighting" duties are performed on a "full-time" basis, because
that is the very issue which the Executive Director chose not to resolve.
The Cross-Check Issue
Chapter 41.56 RCW
draws many of its provisions from the federal Labor-Management Relations Act of
1947 (Taft-Hartley Act), but there are also numerous differences between the
state and federal collective bargaining laws.
One such difference is in the methodology for determining questions
concerning representation. The statute
we administer provides:
RCW 41.56.060 DETERMINATION OF BARGAINING UNIT‑‑BARGAINING
REPRESENTATIVE. The commission, after hearing upon reasonable
notice, shall decide in each application for certification as an exclusive
bargaining representative, the unit appropriate for the purpose of collective
bargaining. In determining, modifying,
or combining the bargaining unit, the commission shall consider the duties,
skills, and working conditions of the public employees; the history of
collective bargaining by the public employees and their bargaining
representatives; the extent of organization among the public employees; and the
desire of the public employees. The
commission shall determine the bargaining representative by (1) examination of
organization membership rolls, (2) comparison of signatures on organization
bargaining authorization cards, or (3) by conducting an election specifically
therefor. [emphasis supplied]
RCW 41.56.070 makes
it abundantly clear that use of the cross-check is discretionary with the
Commission:
RCW 41.56.070 ELECTION TO ASCERTAIN BARGAINING
REPRESENTATIVE. In the event the commission elects to
conduct an election to ascertain the exclusive bargaining representative,
and upon the request of a prospective bargaining representative showing written
proof of at least thirty percent representation of the public employees within
the unit, the commission shall hold an election by secret ballot to determine
the issue. ... [emphasis supplied]
The Commission has
adopted standards for the use of the cross-check method, in WAC 391‑25‑391
and WAC 391‑25‑410. Arguably,
our authority to use the cross-check methodology is broader than we have
actually utilized.
The Commission has
recently had a series of cases come before it involving "cross-check"
issues. The statutory provision for
determination of a bargaining representative by cross-check, and the
Commission's standards for use of the cross-check method have been extensively
discussed in City of Centralia, Decision 3495-A (PECB, 1990) and City
of Winslow, Decision 3520-A (PECB, 1990).
As we noted in those cases, directed cross-checks have been infrequent,
because evidence of 70% support has been required as a pre-condition to
directing a cross-check.[5]
Where a union
demonstrates such substantial support, and the employer refuses to sign an
election agreement or cross-check agreement, Commission precedent indicates
that the Executive Director should order a cross-check within a reasonable time
after the "showing of interest" has been assessed and the description
of the bargaining unit has been established.
City of Redmond, Decision 1367-A (PECB, 1982). We see no reason to deviate from that
established precedent, particularly in light of actual cross-check results
showing that the union had the support of 100% of the employees in the
bargaining unit it sought to represent.
The employer argues
that decisions made at the time bargaining unit employees authorized
representation by the union are not, necessarily, the decisions they would
make now. We recognize there may be
occasions when employees change their minds regarding union representation. WAC 391-25-210 precludes withdrawal of
authorization cards for the purpose of diminishing a "showing of interest",
but we do not read that rule as precluding individual employees from
withdrawing their authorization cards for purposes of a cross-check. WAC 391-25-410 contemplates the possibility
of turnover or withdrawals of support, by permitting a union faced with losing
a cross-check to opt for the conduct of a representation election. In this case, no bargaining unit employee
sought to withdraw their authorization card.
The mere possibility that employees could have had second thoughts does
not provide justification for finding the direction of a cross-check to have
been in error.
There was no issue
in Redmond as to the scope of the bargaining unit. The Commission's only concern about the
handling of the Redmond case was the delay caused by the hearing and
decisionmaking process on the "eligibility" issues.[6] Here, the description of the bargaining unit was
at issue, and the Executive Director properly waited until a ruling was made on
the unit dispute before directing determination of the question concerning
representation by cross-check. The
record well supports the Executive Director's conclusion that proceeding to an
election in this case would have unnecessarily and unduly delayed determination
of the question concerning representation with little likelihood of altering
the outcome. Subject to the modification
of the unit description, we therefore find no error in his direction of a
cross-check.
NOW, THEREFORE, it
is:
ORDERED
1.The findings of fact, conclusions of law and
direction of cross-check issued by the Executive Director are AFFIRMED, with
the modification described herein.
2.On the basis of the findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and the results of the cross-check conducted in this
matter, it is:
CERTIFIED
The employees in the
appropriate bargaining unit consisting of:
All full-time and regular part-time
non-supervisory personnel employed by the Port of Pasco at the Tri-Cities
Airport who perform rescue and fire fighting duties, excluding elected
officials, officials appointed for a fixed term, confidential employees,
supervisors, and all other employees of the employer,
have chosen:
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE FIGHTERS,
LOCAL 3173
as their exclusive
bargaining representative for the purposes of collective bargaining with their
employer with respect to wages, hours and conditions of employment.
Issued at Olympia,
Washington, the ______ day of December, 1990.
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONS COMMISSION
JANET L. GAUNT,
Chairperson
MARK C. ENDRESEN,
Commissioner
JOSEPH F. QUINN,
Commissioner
[1]Together with
law enforcement officers employed by the state's larger cities and counties,
paid fire fighters employed by various cities, fire districts and at least the
Sea-Tac International Airport operated by the Port of Seattle come within the
definition of "uniformed personnel".
Those employees are subject to the "interest arbitration" procedures
of RCW 41.56.430 et seq.
[2]RCW
41.26.030(4) defines "fire fighter" as:
(a) any
person who is serving on a full time, fully compensated basis as a member of a
fire department of an employer and who is serving in a position which requires
passing a civil service examination for fire fighter or fireman if this title
is used by the department, and who is actively employed as such;
(b) anyone
who is actively employed as a full time fire fighter where the fire department
does not have a civil service examination; ...
Chapter 41.26 RCW is administered by the
Department of Retirement Systems.
[3]RCW
41.56.030(7) specifies, in relevant part:
"Uniformed
personnel" means ... fire fighters as that term is defined in RCW
41.26.030, as now or hereafter amended.
[4]In this case,
the Director of the Department of Retirement Systems, which administers the
LEOFF statute, and the Director of the Department of Retirement Systems.
[5]The Commission
has processed more than 8900 cases since 1976.
Among those, our docket records show:
Only 120 (1.35% of all PERC cases) have
resulted in certification of exclusive bargaining representatives by
cross-checks;
Cross-checks were conducted in 34 cases
filed while the L&I-pattern rules remained in effect (0.38% of all PERC
cases; 28.33% of all cross-checks);
Cross-checks were conducted by
"consent" in 82 cases filed since the Commission-pattern rules on the
subject (0.92% of all PERC cases; 68.33% of all cross-checks);
Cross-checks
were "directed" in only 4 cases filed since the Commission
adopted rules on the subject (0.045% of all PERC cases; 3.33% of all
cross-checks).
[6]The Commission
held that the Executive Director should have conducted a cross-check before the
hearing on the "eligibility" issues.
Summary determinations of questions concerning representation are now
used, together with later determination of "eligibility" issues, in
such situations. See, Chehalis
School District, Decision 2019 (PECB, 1984).