Clark County PTBA (C-TRAN), Decision 8489-A (PECB, 2004)

Richard Pringle appeared pro se.

Summit Law Group, by Elizabeth R. Kennar, Attorney at Law, for the employer.

This case comes before the Commission on a timely appeal filed by Richard Pringle, seeking to overturn an order of dismissal issued by Unfair Labor Practices Manager Mark S. Downing. The Commission has considered the matter and affirms the dismissal.

BACKGROUND

Clark County Public Transportation Benefit Area (C-TRAN) and Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 757 (union) were parties to a collective bargaining agreement that was effective from September 1999 through August 2002. On May 23, 2000, C-TRAN and the union entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU 00-05) to deal with financial hardships experienced by coach operators who were affected by run cuts.

Pringle was employed by C-TRAN until August 15, 2003, as a coach operator apparently or impliedly within the bargaining unit represented by the union. For the period between May 11, 2003 to September 13, 2003, he bid for and received an “Extra Board B” position that required him to be available Mondays through Fridays, and identified his “available days off” as Saturdays and Sundays. When C-TRAN assigned Pringle to shifts on Sunday, August 3, 2003, and Saturday, August 8, 2003, Pringle refused to work either of those shifts. Pringle asserted that those shift assignments violated the collective bargaining agreement. C-TRAN nevertheless terminated Pringle’s employment for his absence without leave.

On September 29, 2003, Pringle filed a complaint charging C-TRAN with multiple unfair labor practices.[1] The Unfair Labor Practice Manager issued a deficiency notice on February 10, 2004, stating that it was not possible to conclude that a cause of action existed based on the facts presented in the complaint. Pringle filed an amended complaint on March 2, 2004, but here he merely restated his original complaint and offered responses to the deficiency notice. On April 6, 2004, the amended complaint was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.[2]

DISCUSSION

Pringle asserts that the State of Washington has delegated authority to this Commission to adjudicate all unfair labor practices, regardless of the source of the claim and the status of the individual filing the claim. He bases these assumptions upon his reading of RCW 41.56.160[3] and RCW 34.05.413[4] and advances the lines of argument discussed below.

Standard of Review

Because we are reviewing an order of dismissal issued at the preliminary ruling stage of case processing under WAC 391‑45‑110, we are confined to the assumption uniformly applied in that process: All of the facts alleged in the complaint are assumed to be true and provable. The question at hand is whether the complaint states a claim for relief available through unfair labor practice proceedings before this Commission.

This Commission Lacks Jurisdiction Over Contractual Claims

Refusal to Bargain in Good Faith Allegations -

According to Pringle, C-TRAN bargained in bad faith by altering the original “binding labor agreement” when they entered into MOU 00-05 in violation of RCW 41.56.140(1) and (4). The materials submitted with the complaint establish that these allegations are without merit. Pringle asserts that Article 42 of the agreement eliminated the employer’s right to bargain any changes to the 1999 agreement. Article 42 of the original agreement reads in relevant part:

The parties acknowledge that during the negotiations which resulted in this Agreement, each had the unlimited right and opportunity to make demands and proposals with respect to any subject or matter not removed by law from the area of collective bargaining, and that the understandings and agreements arrived at by the parties after the exercise of that right and opportunity are set forth in this Agreement. This Agreement constitutes the sole and entire existing agreement between the parties; provided nothing in this Article shall preclude the parties from, by mutual agreement, entering into a signed memorandum of understanding during the term of the Agreement. . . .

(emphasis added). Nothing in Article 42 prevents the parties from agreeing to alter the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement signed by the employer and the union. While it is presumed under WAC 391‑45‑110 that all of the facts alleged in a complaint are true and provable, neither this Commission nor the Unfair Labor Practices Manager are empowered to ignore obvious conflicts between the alleged fact and the substantive materials filed in support of a complaint. Bethel School District, Decision 6848-A (PECB, 2000).

As a general principle, individual employees do not have legal standing to file refusal to bargain charges against their employers. Clark County, Decision 3200 (PECB, 1989). It is well established that the collective bargaining agreement is between the employer and the exclusive representative, not employees individually. See City of Pasco, Decision 4197‑A (PECB, 1994). To allow individual employees the right to challenge an employer’s good faith in the bargaining process would frustrate the purpose of selecting a representative and create an untenable situation for contract negotiations.[5]

Pringle also asserts that this body must adjudicate his claim that C-TRAN’s unilateral change of his hours, wages and working conditions automatically violated RCW 41.56.140(4) to which he is entitled a remedy. This argument fails because this agency lacks the authority to remedy violations of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement. See City of Walla Walla, Decision 104 (PECB, 1976).[6] Although contract violations are not necessarily in themselves an unfair labor practice[7], this Commission has consis­tently refused to assert jurisdiction of contract violations with the unfair labor practice remedies. Employee schedules (such as the determination of days off) are mandatory subjects of bargain­ing, but when such provisions have been negotiated into a collec­tive bargaining agreement, the remedy for alleged violations of the contract must be pursued through the grievance and arbitration procedures provided for within the contract, or through the courts. Kennewick School District, Decision 6427-A (PECB, 1998).[8]

Facts Alleged Fail to Support Interference Claims

Applicable Legal Standards -

To establish an independent interference violation under RCW 41.56.140(1), a complainant needs to establish that a party engaged in conduct which employees could reasonably perceive as a threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit associated with their union activity. City of Seattle, Decision 3066‑A (PECB, 1989). WAC 391‑45‑050(2) specifically requires that an unfair labor practice complaint contain, in separate numbered paragraphs, a clear and concise statement of the facts constituting the alleged unfair labor practices, including times, dates, places, and participants in occurrences. City of Seattle, Decision 5852‑C (PECB, 1998), aff’d Apostolis v. City of Seattle, 101 Wn. App. 300 (2000). The facts set forth in the complaint "must be sufficient to make intelligible findings of fact in a ‘default’ situation." City of Seattle, Decision 5852-C. A skeletal "charge" will not suffice and will not be fleshed out by agency personnel. Jefferson Transit Authority, Decision 5928 (PECB, 1997).

Application of Standards -

Pringle asserts that C-TRAN threatened and coerced him to “accept an un-bargained position during the week of August 3, 2003.” None of the facts alleged by Pringle in his original or amended complaint support an interference with employee rights claimed under RCW 41.56.140(1). At most, the complaint depicts a workplace controversy of the type routinely resolved through contractual grievance and arbitration procedures.[9] An interference violation exists when an employee could reasonably perceive the employer's actions as a threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit associated with the union activity of that employee or of other employees. Kennewick School District, Decision 5632-A (PECB, 1996). Nowhere in his complaint does Pringle allege that his discipline was based upon union activity. The alleged interference charges were properly dismissed.

NOW, THEREFORE, it is

ORDERED

The order of dismissal issued in this matter by Unfair Labor Practice Manager Mark S. Downing is AFFIRMED.

Issued at Olympia, Washington, the 29^th day of October, 2004.

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION

[SIGNED]

MARILYN GLENN SAYAN, Chairperson

[SIGNED]

JOSEPH W. DUFFY, Commissioner

[SIGNED]

PAMELA G. BRADBURN, Commissioner