Island County Fire District 1, Decision 9867 (PECB, 2007)

 

STATE OF WASHINGTON BEFORE THE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE FIGHTERS, LOCAL 4033,
Complainant,	CASE 20431-U-06-5205
vs.	DECISION 9867 - PECB
ISLAND COUNTY FIRE DISTRICT 1,
	FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER
Respondent.

Robblee Brennan & Detwiler, by Mark E. Brennan, Attorney at Law, for the union.

Chmelk Sitkin & Davis, by Richard Davis III, Attorney at Law, for the employer.

On June 1, 2006, the International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 4033 (union), filed an unfair labor practice complaint with the Public Employment Relations Commission against Island County Fire District 1 (employer), charging employer interference and refusal to bargain in violation of RCW 41.56.140(1) and (4). A preliminary ruling was issued on July 13, 2006, and a timely answer was filed August 1, 2006. On April 24, 2007, a hearing was held before Examiner Christy Yoshitomi and simultaneous briefs were submitted on June 22, 2007.

ISSUES PRESENTED

1.         Did the employer unilaterally change the employees' health care coverage and interfere with employee rights and refuse to bargain in violation of RCW 41.56.140(1) and (4)?

2.         If a unilateral change did occur, did the union waive its right to bargain by inaction?

3.         If a unilateral change did occur, did the union waive its right to bargain by contract?

Based on all the arguments and evidence submitted by the parties, the Examiner rules that the employer unilaterally changed and refused to bargain the employee medical benefit plan. The employer did not prove its waiver by contract or waiver by inaction defenses and therefore is found in violation of RCW 41.56.140(1) and (4).     

ISSUE 1: DUTY TO BARGAIN

Unilateral Change

The Public Employees' Collective Bargaining Act, Chapter 41.56 RCW, governs the relationship between the union and the employer. RCW 41.56.030(4) defines collective bargaining and requires parties to engage in good faith negotiations over mandatory subjects of bargaining:

Collective bargaining means the performance of the mutual obligations of the public employer and the exclusive bargaining representative to meet at reasonable times, to confer and negotiate in good faith, and to execute a written agreement with respect to . . . collective negotiations on personnel matters, including wages, hours and working conditions . . . .

The duty to engage in good faith negotiations over mandatory subjects of bargaining is enforced through the unfair labor practice provisions in RCW 41.56.140 and 150, and Chapter 391‑45 WAC. The Commission generally finds that any refusal to bargain violation under RCW 41.56.140(4) inherently interferes with the rights of bargaining unit employees and thus routinely finds a derivative interference violation under RCW 41.56.140(1) whenever a refusal to bargain violation is found. Skagit County, Decision 8746-A (PECB, 2006). Therefore, an employer violates RCW 41.56.140(1) and (4) if it implements a unilateral change on a mandatory subject of bargaining without having fulfilled its bargaining obligations.

The bargaining obligation differs between those groups that are eligible for interest arbitration and those that are not. To fulfill its bargaining obligation, bargaining units that do not have access to interest arbitration under RCW 41.56.430 are required to bargain to settlement or impasse before a unilateral implementation may be lawful. Skagit County, Decision 8746-A (PECB, 2006). Alternatively, bargaining units that have access to interest arbitration under RCW 41.56.430 must engage in the full negotiation, mediation, arbitration process, and a change can only be imposed by an arbitration panel. City of Seattle, Decision 1667-A (PECB, 1983).

The complaining party that alleges an unfair labor practice has the burden of proof that the responding party committed an unfair labor practice. WAC 391‑45‑270(1)(a). The burden to establish affirma­tive defenses lies with the party asserting the defense. WAC 391‑45‑270(1)(b).

In this case, the union alleges the employer made a unilateral change to a mandatory subject of bargaining. The union must prove four elements to establish the employer committed such an unfair labor practice:

(1)           the existence of a relevant status quo or past practice;

(2)           that the relevant status quo or past practice was a mandatory subject of bargaining;

(3)           that notice and an opportunity to bargain the proposed change was not given or that notice was given but an opportunity to bargain was not afforded and/or the change was a fait accompli; and

(4)           that there was a change to that status quo or past practice.

Val Vue Sewer District, Decision 8963 (PECB, 2005).

Element 1 - Existence of a status quo

The statute’s collective bargaining obligations require that the status quo be maintained regarding all mandatory subjects of bargaining. Chapter 41.56 RCW. The status quo is the existing wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment which must be maintained during negotiations for a contract. Val Vue Sewer District. An employer is prohibited from unilaterally changing mandatory subjects of bargaining except where such changes are made in conformity with the collective bargaining obligation or the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. City of Yakima, Decision 3503-A (PECB, 1998), aff’d, 117 Wn.2d 655 (1991). When reviewing contract language for an exception in a unilateral change case, the Examiner must look at whether the language allows for the alleged unilateral conduct. Bath Iron WorksCorp., 345 NLRB No. 33 (2005).

Analysis

In this case, the union and employer have had collective bargaining agreements since at least January 2001. In accordance with these contracts, the bargaining unit employees have been participating in a medical benefit plan under the Washington Fire Commissioners’ Association (WFCA). However, the particular medical plan in which the employees participate is not specified in the contract. In the midst of the parties’ previous 2001-2003 collective bargaining agreement, the parties agreed to move from the WFCA’s traditional plan to WFCA’s preferred provider option (PPO) plan beginning January 2003. Although the parties agreed to change plans, the PPO plan was not specified in the contract for the remaining year. When the contract expired, the parties engaged in negotiations for a successor contract and signed off on the same medical language as the previous contract. This language again did not specify a medical benefit plan, but rather stated, as before, that the employer would provide coverage under “the Washington Fire Commissioners’ Association (WFCA) medical benefit plan” (emphasis added). At the signing of the current contract extending from January 2004 to December 2006, the employees maintained participa­tion in the WFCA’s PPO plan. The contract language does not provide for an exception to the plan and therefore, the status quo is established as the WFCA’s PPO plan.

Element 2 - Mandatory Subject of Bargaining

It is well settled that health care benefits are alternative forms of wages, thus making them mandatory subjects of bargaining. Yakima County, Decision 9338 (PECB, 2006). In this case neither party disputes that medical benefits are a mandatory subject of bargaining.

Element 3 - Notice of Change and Opportunity to Bargain

The bargaining obligation allows for changes to be made in the midst of a contract, although in such an instance when the contract language does not authorize the change, the party making the change must first give notice to the exclusive bargaining representative and then provide that organization with a meaningful opportunity to bargain the subject. South Kitsap School District, Decision 472 (PECB, 1978). A party is not compelled to agree to a proposal or be required to make a concession unless required under RCW 41.56.030(4). Thus, the obligation to bargain does not include the obligation to agree, but solely to engage in a full and frank discussion with the collective bargaining representative in which a bona fide effort will be made to explore possible alternatives, if any, that may achieve a mutual satisfactory accommodation of the interests of both the employer and the employees. Port of Seattle, Decision 7271‑B (PECB, 2003).

Unlike non-uniformed personnel bargaining units, where an employer may implement a change after the parties reach impasse, a different standard applies for employees who are uniformed personnel eligible for interest arbitration under RCW 41.56.430. In City of Seattle, Decision 1667-A (PECB, 1984), the prohibition against unilateral changes found in RCW 41.56.470 was applied to issues arising mid-term in a collective bargaining agreement. For a unit of uniformed personnel, such as the employees involved in this case, the parties need to proceed through the negotiation, mediation, arbitration procedure of RCW 41.56.440 and 41.56.450, and the employer may only implement such changes as agreed to by the parties or imposed upon by an interest arbitration panel. RCW 41.56.430 states the purpose of the statute is:

to promote such dedicated and uninterrupted public service there should exist an effective and adequate alternative means of settling disputes.

RCW 41.56.440 further reflects the requirement of the parties to engage in mediation if a settlement cannot be reached. “If an agreement has not been reached following a reasonable period of negotiations and mediation, and the executive director, upon the recommendation of the assigned mediator, finds that the parties remain at impasse, then an interest arbitration panel shall be created to resolve the dispute.” RCW 41.56.450.

Analysis

On October 13, 2005, at an informal labor-management meeting, the employer notified the union of its intent to change medical plans as of January 1, 2006. In this meeting it was explained that the reason for changing medical plans was due to WFCA’s discontinuance of its PPO plan.[1] In the alternative, WFCA was offering a COMP 1 and COMP 2 plan. During this meeting, discussion was pursued about the option of moving to either the COMP 1 or COMP 2 plan, the effects of such a change, and potential alternatives to offset the effects of changing the plan. This began the parties’ negotiations over the decision to change medical benefits and the effects of such a change.

Shortly after the labor-management meeting, the lead negotiators for the parties, union president Griswold and fire chief Ganz, met independently to discuss the medical benefits issue. Griswold informed Chief Ganz that “the group had tentatively agreed to change to the COMP 1 plan for their insurance, pending working out the other economic issues that were involved with it.” The discussion continued about potential options to offset the economic difference of moving from the PPO plan to the COMP 1 plan. Subsequently, on October 24, 2005, Griswold presented a formal proposal to the board of fire commissioners. This package proposal stated the union “found that the COMP 1 plan would be the most comparable with [their] current coverage,” but for moving to the COMP 1 plan, each employee would receive $164.57 a month to offset the employees’ cost for the change.

A day or so after the fire commissioners’ meeting, Chief Ganz explained to Griswold that the fire commission had not accepted the union’s proposal. He explained that they needed a legal opinion on the union’s proposal and would respond to the union once an opinion was obtained.

In the December 8, 2005, labor-management meeting, Chief Ganz followed up with the union and informed them that their proposal was “not acceptable to the district, and let them know of course that [the employer’s] attorney felt that [they] were within [their] current contract language, but that [they] were willing to explore and dialogue.” Discussion then ensued between the union and employer about possible alternatives to the effects of changing medical plans. These alternatives included looking at different medical programs such as the law enforcement trust plan, a flat fee such as that proposed earlier by the union, and a reimbursement program to offset the employees’ cost of moving from the PPO to the COMP 1 plan.

Despite the union’s insistence that the parties came to an agreement in this meeting to move to the COMP 1 plan with a medical reimbursement plan, it is clear that no agreement was reached. In the December 8, 2005, meeting, several options to the medical insurance issue were discussed and there was not a written agreement or signed tentative agreement between the parties indicating that an agreement existed. Although discussions included specifics of a potential way to offset the medical expenses, the employer informed the union that it needed to determine whether or not it could legally or logistically handle such a reimbursement plan. As no agreement was reached in this meeting, Chief Ganz was to return to the union with an update regarding the employer’s position on those specifics discussed.

Within a few days after the December 8, meeting, Griswold informed Chief Ganz that the union believed a reimbursement program to offset the cost in changing plans would be “acceptable and the body would go for that.” Chief Ganz did not realize that a vote had been taken among the membership and told Griswold that the employer was still looking into legal and logistic questions that had not been answered about employees being reimbursed for the medical expenses. The union believed there was an agreement between the parties to move to the COMP 1 plan along with some type of reimbursement to compensate employees for the cost of moving from the PPO plan to the COMP 1 plan. However, it was clear from the testimony that the employer was looking into the logistics and legalities of reimbursing employees for medical costs and had not agreed with the union’s position concerning the effects of the change.

Between April 21^st and May 16^th, the employer formalized a program based on feedback from the IRS and its attorneys to offset the cost of moving from the PPO plan to the COMP 1 plan for unrepresented employees. This plan was then presented to the fire commissioners. The union then inquired about its inclusion into the plan and was informed by Chief Ganz that the parties “had current contract language in place.” At roughly the same time, bargaining unit employees tried to submit their medical bills to the employer for reimbursement and their receipts were returned.

On May 16, 2006, Griswold wrote a letter to Chief Ganz with an attached letter of understanding specifying the agreement he believed was reached between the parties in December. This letter of understanding indicated that the parties agreed that “[t]he Employer shall pay any cost difference between the old PPO Plan and the new COMP 1 plan . . .” It further specified that “[e]mployees will submit all their reimbursable receipts at the end of each calendar quarter. The Employer will verify each claim and make payment to the employee making the claim.”

On May 24, 2006, the employer responded in a letter to the union denying an agreement existed between the parties regarding medical benefits. The employer reiterated the fact that it believed Article 13 of the parties’ agreement relieved it from any obliga­tion to bargain regarding the change from the PPO plan to the COMP 1 plan. In addition, the letter referred back to the fire commission meeting held the previous week where it was stated that “inclusion of represented employees into any District Medical Reimbursement Plan would have to be formally negotiated under the new collective bargaining agreement,” which would begin January 1, 2007. In preparation for bargaining the medical benefits issue in the upcoming contract renewal, the employer stated it would put “together its negotiating team . . . and that it will be ready to begin bargaining in mid to late July.” Subsequently, the union filed this complaint on June 1, 2006.

It is clear that the employer provided notice and the parties bargained over the employees’ medical benefits. As stated above, parties must bargain to settlement or continue their bargaining obligation through mediation and arbitration if no settlement is reached. Here, the parties did not reach settlement nor did they continue their bargaining obligation into mediation and arbitra­tion.

The employer claims that the union abandoned bargaining in February at a labor-management meeting due to three aspects of its behavior in the meeting. First, the employer claims that the union abandoned bargaining because it stated that any discussions concerning proposed agreements needed to be addressed in a formal negotiation session. The union then created a formal negotiation team. This shows the union did not refuse to bargain or show a lack of interest in discussing the issue, but rather that they wanted the negotiations to continue in a formal manner. Second, the employer argues the union stated that any agreement not in writing was null and void and therefore abandoned bargaining on the medical issue because they believed an agreement had been reached. This argument also fails as an agreement regarding employees’ medical benefits had not been reached before that time. Lastly, the employer argues that the union stated it did not want to discuss the medical benefit issue in the meeting and that it should have raised the issue before April. While the employer argues the union did not want to discuss the issue, the union claims that the employer did not want to discuss the issue in the February meeting. Regardless of who did not want to discuss the issue, medical benefits was not discussed at the meeting. Previous to this February meeting, labor-management discussions were left where the employer was to respond to the union with its position on the medical reimbursement plan and had yet to do so. Because the union said it did not want to discuss the issue at that time, does not conclude that the union had abandoned the issue. These arguments are dismissed.

Although the employer claims the union abandoned bargaining, the employer actually abandoned bargaining with the union when it stated in a letter on May 24, 2006, that it would only negotiate the medical benefits under the successor contract and had no obligation to bargain the change in medical plans. At this point the employer abandoned bargaining over the change and both parties had an opportunity to file for mediation. Both parties failed to fulfill their bargaining obligation and proceed to mediation or arbitration to resolve their dispute. In response to the employers abandonment of the process, the union filed this unfair labor practice instead of pursuing mediation.

Element 4 - Change to the Status Quo

As mentioned above, the status quo was established as the WFCA’s PPO plan. In accordance with the notification provided by the employer, on January 1, 2006, the employees previous medical benefits PPO plan was terminated by the WFCA and therefore the employer enrolled the employees in the WFCA’s COMP 1 plan. Although the PPO plan was terminated on January 1, 2006, the WFCA reinstated the PPO plan on January 1, 2007. No evidence was presented to show that the employer returned the employees to the PPO plan after changing them to the COMP 1 plan.

Conclusion

The union met its burden to establish that a status quo existed and health benefits are a mandatory subject of bargaining. Although the employer provided notice to the union and the parties engaged in bargaining over medical benefits beginning in October 2005, neither party met its bargaining obligation. In this situation, both parties failed to request mediation when the employer abandoned bargaining with the union over the effects of the change to medical benefits. Although neither party met its bargaining obligation, the contract language does not allow for the employer to unilaterally change the status quo (the medical benefit plan) without fulfilling its bargaining obligation and therefore the employer is found in violation of RCW 41.56.140(4).

ISSUE 2: DID THE UNION WAIVE ITS RIGHT TO BARGAIN BY INACTION?

A union may waive, through inaction, its right to challenge a unilateral change in a mandatory subject of bargaining implemented by an employer if it was afforded notice and an opportunity to bargain upon the matter. Lake Washington Technical College, Decision 4721‑A (PECB, 1995). A waiver by inaction exists when an employer proposes a change in a mandatory subject of bargaining and the union does not make a request to bargain, or fails to advance meaningful proposals in a timely manner. Whatcom County, Decision 7643 (PECB, 2002). A specific and timely request for bargaining will generally support a finding that there has been no waiver by inaction, while union silence will generally support finding a waiver by inaction. Seattle School District, Decision 5755-A (PECB, 1998). Thus, where a party presents a proposal in a timely fashion after being notified of a change, no waiver by inaction will be found.

Analysis

Here, the employer placed the union on notice about the change to health benefits on October 13, 2005. Between October 13^th and October 24^th, the union met with Chief Ganz to negotiate over the change in benefit plans. On October 24, 2005, the union presented, directly to the district’s fire commissioner’s, a formal proposal from the union regarding the health care benefits. Thus, no waiver by inaction can be found as the union initially acted in a timely fashion to the announced change even though it also had an obligation to file for mediation later in the process when the employer abandoned bargaining.

ISSUE 3: DID THE UNION WAIVE ITS RIGHT TO BARGAIN BY CONTRACT?

The Commission has explained the object of the collective bargain­ing process is for the parties to conclude a written and signed contract to govern their affairs for a period of up to three years. Seattle School District, Decision 5755-A (PECB, 1998). Where agreements on a negotiated subject are set forth in a collective bargaining agreement, a waiver by contract will exist as to that subject for the life of the agreement. A party who asserts a waiver by contract has the burden of proof to show a clear and unmistakable waiver of its bargaining duty. Yakima County, Decision 6594-C (PECB, 1999). The Commission has consistently evaluated waiver by contract claims under the clear and unmistak­able standard, so that the contract language being relied upon must be specific, or it must be shown that the parties fully discussed the matter and that the party alleged to have waived its rights consciously yielded its interest in the matter. City of Wenatchee, Decision 8802-A (PECB, 2006). A party's unsuccessful effort to obtain contract revisions in the collective bargaining agreement during the course of negotiating for a successor contract is not tantamount to a “conscious yielding.” Equitable Gas company, 245 NLRB 260 (1979).

Analysis

The employer claims a waiver by contract exists concerning the employee’s medical benefits under Article 13.3 and Article 13.8 of the parties’ current collective bargaining agreement. Article 13.3 states:

The Employer shall pay one hundred percent (100%) of those premiums necessary to maintain coverage under the Washington Fire Commissioners’ Association (WFCA) medical benefit plan for enrolled employees during the term of this Agreement.

As admitted by the employer, the contract language here is “generic” and does not specify the WFCA benefit plan employees are participating. More importantly, this “generic” language does not include a clear and unmistakable waiver by the union that autho­rizes the employer to change plans under the WFCA.

The employer claims that during negotiations for the current collective bargaining agreement, the union waived its right to bargain any change in medical plans when it tried to include language in the contract to specify the PPO plan and the employer rejected such language. Again, the contract language does not expressly waive the union’s right to negotiate a change to the plan nor do the discussions that occurred during negotiations reflect that the union waived its right to negotiate a change to the medical plan during the term of the agreement. In fact the union believed it had come to an agreement with the employer that included language specifying that the parties would use the PPO plan although they signed language that did not include such specificity.[2] The fact that the union tried and was unable to obtain language in the contract to memorialize the specific PPO plan in negotiations does not mean it consciously yielded its interest in bargaining over any change to the medical plan. Article 13.3 does not show a clear and unmistakable waiver on the union’s behalf.

The employer also claims that Article 13.8 enables it to offer a non-comparable medical benefit plan unless it changes insurance carriers. Article 13.8 states:

The employer reserves the right to change group insurance carriers at any time provided a generally comparable level of benefits is provided. In the event that a State or Federal mandated comparable group medical and/or dental program is available at a lower cost to the Employer during the term of this Agreement, the Employer shall have the right to implement such plan upon its availability.

The employer argues that the above language requires the employer to provide a comparable benefit plan if it changes carriers and that otherwise, the employer has the right to provide a benefit plan that is not comparable to the PPO plan. The contract language is clear and unmistakable that the employer has the right to change carriers, but it makes no mention as to its right to change plans under the current carrier, which is the issue here. Article 13.8 does not show any contractual waiver for the employer to unilaterally change plans under the WFCA.

CONCLUSION

Although, both parties failed to fulfill their bargaining obliga­tion to proceed to mediation and further arbitration, the employer unilaterally changed a mandatory subject of bargaining and abandoned bargaining after the change to medical plan had been implemented under the argument that they had such a right under the contract. The employer failed to prove its two affirmative defenses and show that it had the right to unilaterally change the employee medical benefits through a waiver by inaction or waiver by contract. Therefore, the employer is found in violation of RCW 41.56.140(1) and (4).

REMEDY

In unilateral change cases, restoration of the status quo ante is a common remedy. Although the Commission has exercised some creativity when crafting remedial orders, such orders must be consistent with the purposes of Chapter 41.56 RCW. Community College District 13, Decision 8117-B (PSRA, 2005). The Commission closely scrutinizes unilateral changes to mandatory subjects and expects the employer to fulfill its bargaining obligation before any changes may occur. Skagit County, Decision 8886-A (PECB, 2005).

Due to the dynamic nature of health care benefits, the availability of plans and the timing to enroll in plans, the remedy here will only require the employer to make whole any expenses it cost employees to move from the PPO plan to the COMP 1 plan up until the time where the parties come to an agreement on the medical benefit plan. The employer is required to maintain the current medical plan in effect until the parties reach agreement or a decision is imposed by an arbitration award. If an agreement has been reached by the time of this award, the employer is required to make the employees whole from January 1, 2006, the time of the unilateral change, to the time the parties reached agreement on the medical benefit plan.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1.         Island County Fire District 1 is a public employer within the meaning of RCW 41.56.030(1).

2.         International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 4033, a bargaining representative within the meaning of RCW 41.56.030(3), is the exclusive bargaining representative of all regular full-time uniformed fire and emergency medical service employees of Island County Fire District 1.

3.         The union and employer have been parties to a collective bargaining agreement since January 1, 2001. The parties are currently engaged in negotiations for a successor agreement to the collective bargaining agreement which extended from January 1, 2004, through December 31, 2006.

4.         Article 13.3 of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement states:

The Employer shall pay one hundred percent (100%) of those premiums necessary to maintain coverage under the Washington Fire Commission­ers’ Association (WFCA) medical benefit plan for enrolled employees during the term of this Agreement.

5.         Article 13.8 of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement states:

The employer reserves the right to change group insurance carriers at any time provided a generally comparable level of benefits is provided. In the event that a State or Fed­eral mandated comparable group medical and/or dental program is available at a lower cost to the Employer during the term of this Agree­ment, the Employer shall have the right to implement such plan upon its availability.

6.         When the parties entered into their agreement beginning January 1, 2004, the bargaining unit employees were enrolled in WFCA’s preferred provider option (PPO) plan.

7.         On October 13, 2005, the union was notified of the employer’s intent to change the bargaining unit employees medical benefit plan as of January 1, 2006, due to WFCA eliminating the PPO plan. The parties began to negotiate over the change to the medical benefit plan and the effects of that change.

8.         On October 24, 2005, the union presented a formal proposal to the employer regarding the change to the medical benefit plan.

9.         On January 1, 2006, the WFCA PPO plan was discontinued and the employer placed the employees into a different medical plan.

10.       On May 24, 2006, the employer informed the union it did not have the obligation to bargain the change to the medical benefit plan and that the parties could negotiate the issue during negotiations for the successor contract.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.         The Public Employment Relations commission has jurisdiction in this matter under Chapter 41.56 RCW and Chapter 391-45 WAC.

2.         As described in findings of fact six above, the status quo is the WFCA PPO plan. RCW 41.56.140(1) and (4).

3.         As described in findings of fact four and six above, medical benefits are a mandatory subject of bargaining. RCW 41.56.140(1) and (4).

4.         Based on findings of fact nine and ten above, the employer failed to meet its bargaining obligation by unilaterally implementing the change to the medical benefit plan and discontinuing bargaining without reaching settlement or pursuing mediation. RCW41.56.140(1)&(4).

5.         The contract language in findings of fact four and five above does not constitute a waiver by contract. RCW 41.56.140(4)

6.         By making a proposal to the employer as described in Finding of Fact eight above, the union did not waive by inaction its right to bargain. RCW 41.56.140(4)

7.         Island County Fire District 1 interfered with employee rights in violation of RCW 41.56.140(1) and refused to bargain in violation of RCW 41.56.140(4), by unilaterally changing and refusing to bargain over the medical benefit plan.

ORDER

Island County Fire District 1, its officers and agents, shall immediately take the following actions to remedy its unfair labor practices:

1.         CEASE AND DESIST from:

a.                   Unilaterally changing employees medical benefit plan.

b.                  In any other manner interfering with, restraining or coercing its employees in the exercise of their collec­tive bargaining rights under by the laws of the state of Washington.

2.         TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION to effectuate the purposes and policies of Chapter 41.56.140(1) and (4) RCW:

a.                   Before making any changes to the current medical benefit plan, negotiate in good faith with the International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 4033, over the medical benefit plan. If the parties are unable to reach agreement, parties must engage in mediation and arbitra­tion as provided for uniformed employees in RCW 41.56.430-905.

b.                  Reimburse the employees represented by the International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 4033, for any amount above that which the employees would have paid for the PPO plan for the period between January 1, 2006, and the time at which the parties come to agreement or an award is imposed upon the parties by an arbitrator regarding the medical benefit plan.

c.                   Post copies of the notice attached to this order in conspicuous places on the employer’s premises where notices to all bargaining unit members are usually posted. These notices shall be duly signed by an authorized representative of the respondent, and shall remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of initial posting. The respondent shall take reasonable steps to ensure that such notices are not removed, altered, defaced, or covered by other material.

d.                  Read the notice attached to this order into the record at a regular public meeting of the fire commissioners of the Island Fire County District 1, and permanently append a copy of the notice to the official minutes of the meeting where the notice is read as required by this paragraph.

e.                   Notify the complainant, in writing, within 20 days following the date of this order, as to what steps have been taken to comply with this order, and at the same time provide the complainant with a signed copy of the notice attached to this order.

f.                   Notify the Compliance Officer of the Public Employment Relations Commission, in writing, within 20 days follow­ing the date of this order, as to what steps have been taken to comply with this order, and at the same time provide the Compliance Officer with a signed copy of the notice attached to this order.

ISSUED at Olympia, Washington, this 3^rd day of October, 2007.

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION

[SIGNED]

CHRISTY YOSHITOMI, Examiner

This order will be the final order of the agency unless a notice of appeal is filed with the Commission under WAC 391-45-350.