Snohomish County, Decision 7047 (PECB)

STATE OF WASHINGTON BEFORE THE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION
In the matter of a dispute concerning the obligations of:
DONNA KINUKO NOBORIKAWA	CASE 13323-N-97-2
Under union security provisions of a collective bargaining agreement between:	DECISION 7047 -PECB
SNOHOMISH COUNTY	FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER
and
WASHINGTON STATE COUNCIL OF COUNTY AND CITY EMPLOYEES COUNCIL 2, LOCAL 109-E

Loraine Nightingale, Attorney at Law, appeared on behalf of the claimant.

David M. Kanigel, Legal Counsel, appeared on behalf of the union.

On July 29, 1997, Donna Kinuko Noborikawa (claimant) filed a petition with the Public Employment Relations Commission under Chapter 391-95 WAC, seeking a ruling on her obligations under union security provisions of a collective bargaining agreement between Snohomish County (employer) and the Washington State Council of County and City Employees, Council 2, Local 109-E (union). A hearing was held before Examiner Martha M. Nicoloff on March 10, 1998. The parties filed post-hearing briefs.

The Examiner concludes that the claimant is entitled to assert a right of nonassociation under RCW 41.56.122.

BACKGROUND

The union is the exclusive bargaining representative, under the Public Employees’ Collective Bargaining Act, Chapter 41.56 RCW, of various employees of Snohomish County. The union and employer were parties to a collective bargaining agreement covering a bargaining unit that includes full-time and regular part-time employees of Snohomish County Planning and Development Services Department, excluding confidential and supervisory employees. Article 5 of that collective bargaining agreement contains a union security provision which provides, in part:

Section 3. It shall also be a condition of employment that all employees of new bargain­ing units who become subject to the terms and conditions of this Master Agreement during its term shall within thirty (30) calendar days become and remain members in good standing during the term of this agreement.

Section 4: If an employee;

A.                      For bona fide religious tenets, as per R.C.W. 41.56.122(1), does not desire to be a member of the Union, one of the following shall apply.

1.                 Pay each month a service charge equivalent to regular union dues to the Union.

2.                 Pay each month an amount of money equivalent to regular current union dues to the Union, who shall then transmit that amount to a non-reli­gious charity that is agreeable to the Union and the Employer.

B.                       Written authorization is necessary for the payroll deduction of union dues or alternative payments as set forth in sub-paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

Donna Kinuko Noborikawa was a full-time employee in planning and development services when this controversy arose. She began her employment with the employer as a temporary employee, in 1984, and was not required to join or pay dues to the union while in that status. In 1985, she became a permanent employee in a position covered by a collective bargaining agreement.

Noborikawa testified that she was asked to join the union by a union steward when she took the permanent position. Despite being told by the steward that she “had no choice” in the matter, she refused to join the union for what she stated were personal beliefs based on her “spiritual religious background”. At that time, she was not informed of (and apparently was unaware of) her statutory right to assert a right of nonassociation. Because her employment was not terminated, she thereafter assumed (but apparently did not verify) that union dues were deducted from her paychecks.

In 1987 or 1988, Noborikawa’s position was shifted from a “commu­nity development” office to a “planning and community development” office, as the result of a reorganization. Her position in the planning and community development office was not included in a bargaining unit. She was subsequently promoted to an unrepresented grating inspector position in an office later designated as “planning and development services”.

Following a campaign and a representation election, the union was certified as exclusive bargaining representative of employees in the “planning and development services” office, in August of 1995. Noborikawa’s position was included in that bargaining unit.

The issue of union membership resurfaced for Noborikawa in September of 1995. In a letter addressed to two union shop stewards under date of September 25, 1995, Noborikawa asserted a “right of nonassociation and designation of charitable organiza­tion”, based on her religious practice of Shinto. She also made reference to a book titled Shinto: The Kami Way, by Sokyo Ono (Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1962), in a letter which included:

My religious practice is Shinto. The three foundation principles of Shinto are:

1.                  To express gratitude for divine favor and the benefits of ancestors, and with a bright, pure, sincere mind to devote ourselves to the shrine rites and festi­vals.

2.                  To serve society and others and, in the realization of ourselves as divine mes­sengers, to endeavor to improve and con­solidate the world.

3.                  To identify our minds with the Emperor’s mind and, in loving and being friendly with one another, to pray for the coun­try’s prosperity and for peaceful co-existence and co-prosperity for the peo­ple of the world.

As such, I routinely volunteer my time and make contributions to various non-profit organizations that work towards the good of the community and nature.

Noborikawa requested that her union dues be paid to two non-profit organizations that “work towards the benefit of the community and nature”. Those organizations were Planned Parenthood of Snohomish County, Inc., in Everett, Washington, and Sarvey Wildlife Care Center in Arlington, Washington.

In January of 1996, the union and employer signed an addendum extending the coverage of their master collective bargaining agreement to include the bargaining unit in which Noborikawa worked. That put into effect the union security language of the Master Agreement.

Several months after the employer and union signed the addendum to their master contract, Noborikawa had several telephone conversa­tions and a lunch meeting with Staff Representative Tom Michel of the Washington State Council of County and City Employees. Noborikawa advised Michel of her desire for nonassociation based upon her religious and spiritual convictions, and she inquired about her rights under both the contract language and the statute referenced in that contract. The claimant and Michel clearly did not communicate well with one another at that meeting. The testimony reflects that Noborikawa understood Michel to have said she was not entitled to assert a right of nonassociation unless she could provide written examples of Shinto text declaring that joining a union is not an acceptable practice according to Shinto beliefs and principles. Michel testified that he requested that Noborikawa provide the union with written justification of her belief that she was entitled to assert nonassociation, and suggested that she find written court cases supporting her claim.[1] One undisputed fact is that Noborikawa told Michel that there is no written Shinto text on union membership.

Acting during 1996 at the behest of local union officers, Noborikawa set up an escrow account at a local credit union. She testified that she wanted to open that account because her objections to union membership were not related to the money involved, but to her spiritual and religious beliefs. Since that time, Noborikawa has deposited the equivalent of union dues ($31.60 per month) in the escrow account.

In a March 26, 1997 letter to Michel, Noborikawa asserted a right of nonassociation and designated a charitable organization to receive her payments in lieu of union dues. She outlined her religious and spiritual history, affiliations, and practices. She also provided an explanation of some of the principles of Shinto and Aikido[2]. That letter reads as follows:

I was raised in a family that practiced Shinto and Buddhism. My grandparents on both sides of the family had family shrines for both Shinto and Buddhist observances. And since my paternal grandfather lived with us, it was also in my childhood home. We participated in daily and annual observances for both reli­gions. I grew up believing that I should live my life in a certain way and I should work towards helping others, if they wished, to achieve that life also.

The foundation principles of Shinto can be described as expressing gratitude for divine favor and the benefits of ancestors, paying respects at shrine rites and festivals, real­izing our role as divine messengers through serving society and others by improving the world, being loving and friendly with one another, and praying for the country’s pros­perity and for peaceful co-existence and co-prosperity for the people of the world. In keeping with this, I routinely volunteer my time and make contributions to various non-profit organizations that work towards the good of the community and nature. My personal religious beliefs can be witnessed in my daily interactions with those around me at work and at home and in my Aikido practice. I am also a Reiki healer.

The Seikikai style of Aikido which I practice has a philosophy which is also in alignment with the practice of Shinto. The “way”, or do, that one should live is best summed up by the dojo kun which is the guiding philosophy of Aikido Seikikai. These are:

Jin.          Kindness. Always be kind to others.

Gi.           Correctness. Always do the right thing.

Rei.         Respect Always be respectful.

Chi.         Knowledge. Seek wisdom and use it for good.

Shin.       Faith. Have faith in your parents, teachers and yourself.

Chu.        Piety. Be obedient to superiors because it is the right thing to do, especially your parents.

Ko.          Meritorious service. Do good things for others in secret.

In my previous and present interactions with unions and in the news reports that I see and hear regarding union activities in general, I see evidence that union behavior is not in alignment with my personal religious beliefs. The unions do not foster a spirit of coopera­tion and partnership. They do not work toward creating an atmosphere of love and friendship or acceptance of differences. They do not work towards peaceful co-existence and co-prosperity. News reports routinely highlight the strife and hardship created by union activities and the brutalities that union members subject those not in agreement with them to. These types of activities do not serve society and improve the world. On a personal level, my different religious belief system has not been honored. I have been subjected to disparaging and threatening remarks because I wish to exercise a right that is protected by the Constitution, infor­mation about my rights has been withheld, I have been misled and lied to, and money from my paycheck has been illegally removed without my signature. And, while it was individuals that I was dealing with, the fact that the union hired and/or provided the training for these people that I dealt with implies that the union supports the type of behavior that I was personally subjected to. Because of all this I do not feel I should be forced to support behavior that is not in keeping with my personal religious beliefs.

Per RCW 41.56.122(1), I would like to have my union dues paid to the following non-profit organization that works towards the benefit of the community and nature:

Sarvey Wildlife Care Center

13106 148^th NE

Arlington, WA 98223

Phone (360) 435-4817

I will initiate an automatic withdrawal from my paycheck to go to this organization.

She thus provided the union with an explanation of her perception of how unions conflicted with her personal religious beliefs.

Subsequent to the meeting between Michel and Noborikawa, the union prepared a memorandum of understanding for signature by Noborikawa and union officials. That undated document reads as follows:

In order to resolve the issue of Donna Noborikawa’s attempt to gain exemption from the union membership requirement of Article 5 of the Snohomish County Master Agreement, it is agreed that:

On or before August 20, 1996, Ms. Noborika­wa will submit to Chris Dugovich, President/Executive Director of the Washington State Council of County and City Employees with copies to the Local 109-E President, any information which she believes will support her claim to exemption “for bona fide reli­gious tenets, as per R.C.W. 41.56.122(1)” based upon her Shinto beliefs.

For each of the months of February throu­gh July, 1996, Ms. Noborikawa will deposit $31.60, (the amount being equivalent to one month’s dues) to an escrow account.

Upon determination of the Council 2 President, based upon information so provided by Ms. Noborikawa, the validity of Ms. Noborikawa’s claim for exemption, the depos­ited monies will be either remitted as dues to the Union, or directed by the Union to a non- religious charity that is agreeable to the Union and the Employer. Beginning with the August 30, 1996 paycheck Ms. Noborikawa’s payroll deduction will be directed in the same manner, based upon the President/Executive Director’s decision, which will resolve the matter.

It is agreed that Ms. Noborikawa hereby waives any and all rights to dispute the matter other than as described herein.

Noborikawa refused to sign the document drafted by the union. She testified that her primary objection to it was the language waiving her right to dispute a decision by the union’s president/executive director regarding the status of her union affiliation. The memorandum was never put into effect. Noborikawa thereafter filed the petition to initiate this non­association proceeding.

POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES

It is the claimant’s position that she has deep spiritual and religious convictions and practices that are the basis for her objection to compelled union membership or payment of dues to the union. She maintains that the religious and spiritual principles of Shinto and Buddhism, as well as her practice and observance of the guiding philosophies of Taoism and Aikido, are the foundation for that objection. The petitioner further asserts that her strength of character and code of conduct are consistent with her religious and spiritual beliefs, and that they preclude her from supporting or participating in unions. She contends that her observations of and experiences with unions have led her to a long-held conviction that unions operate in direct contradiction to her firmly-held religious and spiritual convictions.

The union argues that the claimant’s beliefs are secular and philosophical, or even political, rather than religious or spiritual in nature. The union asserts that the claimant’s beliefs do not satisfy the requirements of WAC 391-95-230, and that she has not established a nexus between her alleged spiritual and religious beliefs and her opposition to joining or paying dues to the union.

DISCUSSION

The Public Employees’ Collective Bargaining Act, Chapter 41.56 RCW, provides, in part:

RCW 41.56.122 Collective bargaining agreements — Authorized provisions. A collec­tive bargaining agreement may:

(1)                     Contain union security provisions: PROVIDED, That nothing in this section shall authorize a closed shop provision: PROVIDED FURTHER, That agreements involving union security provisions must safeguard the right of nonassociation of public employees based on bona fide religious tenets or teachings of a church or religious body of which such public employee is a member. Such public employees shall pay an amount of money equivalent to regular union dues and initiation fee to a nonreligious charity or to another charitable organization mutually agreed upon by the public employee affected and the bargaining representative to which such public employee would otherwise pay the dues and initiation fee. The public employee shall furnish writ­ten proof that such payment was made. If the public employee and the bargaining representa­tive do not reach agreement on such matter, the commission shall designate the charitable organization. ...

[Emphasis by bold supplied.]

Under Grant II, an employee can establish the right of nonassociation under RCW 41.56.122 by demonstrating either a bona fide religious objection based on the teachings of a church or religious body of which the employee is a member, or an objection based upon bona fide personal religious beliefs.

The Commission adopted WAC 391-95-230 to codify the Grant II tests for nonassociation claims, and to put claimants on notice of what they are expected to produce at a hearing. It includes:

... The employee has the burden to make a factual showing, through testimony of wit­nesses and/or documentary evidence, of the legitimacy of his or her beliefs, as follows:

(1)           In cases where the claim of a right of nonassociation is based on the teachings of a church or religious body, the claimant employee must demonstrate:

(a)           His or her bona fide religious objec­tion to union membership; and

(b) That the objection is based on a bona fide religious teaching of a church or reli­gious body; and

(c) That the claimant employee is a member of such church or religious body.

(2) In cases where the claim of a right of nonassociation is based on personally held religious beliefs, the claimant employee must demonstrate:

(a) His or her bona fide religious objec­tion to union membership; and

(b) That the religious nature of the objection is genuine and in good faith.

Although proof of an institutionally-based objection requires more elements, it is often easier to document such claims.

Testimony of Other Witnesses

Apart from the correspondence, the parties questioned three witnesses at the hearing regarding their knowledge and understand­ing of both the claimant’s religious and spiritual beliefs and the history and rationale for her desire for non­association with the union:

George Rowe met the claimant through their employment with this employer, and has known her since 1989. He is currently her team leader, and has both a working and a social relationship with her. He holds the claimant in very high regard as a good worker who is honest, forthright, and absolutely committed to her religious and spiritual beliefs and activities. Rowe is a union member. He testified that he has had several discussions with the claimant regarding the union, including his urging her to participate in a leadership position in the union, but she has consistently refused while citing her personal religious beliefs as the reason for her refusal. Rowe testified that the claimant’s reasons for not wanting to join or participate in the union were based on strong personal religious beliefs that she holds “very dear”.

Howard Knight has worked with the claimant for three years and has been a union shop steward for over two and one-half years. He, too, has both working and social relationships with the claimant, and considers her to be a good friend. Their respective sons practice Aikido together. Knight testified of having had several conversations with the claimant regarding the union, both as a friend and in his role as a shop steward. He testified that he believes the claimant’s objections to the union are based on both her Shinto beliefs and her cultural background. He gave his understanding of some of the reasons the claimant believes that participating in the union would not comport with her beliefs, including that she did not want to be associated with a group that she felt did not respect her and her religious beliefs, and does not live up to the standards and code of conduct by which she lives based on those beliefs.

Sego Jackson has been employed in the public works department since 1990, is a member of the union, and counts himself as a union supporter. He testified that he has known the claimant since 1993, and considers their relationship to be of an entirely social nature.[3] Jackson and the claimant have worked together on various community projects, have taken classes together, and have fre­quently visited one another on a social basis. They have had many discussions about the claimant’s spiritual/religious beliefs and practices, as well as about her views on unions and union member­ship. Jackson testified that he has knowledge about some of the claimant’s religious and spiritual observances, including shrines and prayer flags in her home, seasonal and purification rituals, prayers before meals, and the practice of Aikido from a spiritual perspective.[4] While Jackson admitted that he is not familiar with the specifics of Shinto or Buddhism, he indicated that his many conversations with the claimant and his observations of the way she conducts her life have led him to an awareness of her objection to association with the union. He testified that his understanding is that the claimant’s objection is based upon:

[T]he tenets of her religion and relate to how people are to be treated and her feeling that the union has not ... followed the main tenets and basically are in conflict with those tenets ...

Jackson also testified that the claimant’s objection to the union is more than that of a sincere person who is unhappy with the manner in which the union may have treated her in one circumstance. Rather, he stated that:

It’s not because she’s a sincere person. It’s because I think she firmly believes that [the union] is contrary to her religious practice.

Jackson testified, further, that the basis for the claimant’s objection is that association with the union is in conflict with her religious beliefs.

The Claimant’s Testimony

The claimant gave detailed, and compelling, testimony regarding her cultural and religious background, her spiritual and religious beliefs, and her views about unions and union membership.

The claimant was born and raised in Hawaii, as a “third-generation Japanese”. Several generations of her family lived together in the family home, where her grandparents, parents, and she and her sibling practiced both Shinto and Buddhism. While she freely admits that neither faith has texts which specifically preclude practitioners from union membership or involvement, she testified that principles which were an integral part of her spiritual and religious upbringing are very much a part of her daily life in the present. She considers them to be a “belief system”, and a “religious system that’s been around way longer than anybody knows”. Throughout her life, the claimant has built upon her belief system by incorporating Taoism and the practice of Aikido (the founder of which was a Shinto priest) into her personal spiritual and religious “way of being”. She sees her religious convictions as a “continuum of spirituality, philosophy, and religion” that is “how you should be living your life”. She testified regarding her joining the union that:

It’s very deeply held personal beliefs that I have, you know, that there is just contrary to everything I was raised with, all the reli­gious spiritual upbringing that I had. It’s just not right.

She thus generally finds joining and contributing to an organiza­tion whose behavior she believes is not congruent with those beliefs to be wrong.

Noborikawa recounted some of her specific history with unions, to explain why she believes they are organizations that are not congruent with her spiritual and religious beliefs. She joined a union while employed in her first permanent job, when she was 25 years old and working at a State fish hatchery. She explained, however, that her employer told her that she had to join the union. Subsequent to moving to another position, the claimant began discussing union activities with her colleagues, and discovered that her former position had been under consideration for elimina­tion. She had not been informed of that possibility while working in the position, and was very disturbed upon concluding that the union had not been honest and forthright with her about its plans and activities. The claimant testified that her subsequent observations of unions in general led her to believe that unions behave dishonestly, that their relationships with employers and workers are antagonistic and deceitful, and that the harmonious cooperation she values as a part of her cultural and religious tradition is neither evident in her personal experiences with unions, or with unions in general. She came to believe that the way in which unions operate is contrary to the way she was raised and to the religious, philosophical, and spiritual beliefs that are an integral part of her world view and her life.

The “Personal Religious Beliefs” Test

The union maintains that the claimant’s objections to unions and union membership are philosophical (rather than religious) in nature, and that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show otherwise. That argument is not persuasive, however.

An employee can prevail on a claim of nonassociation under WAC 391-95-230 if the “religious nature of the objection is genuine and in good faith.” In Mukilteo School District, Decision 1323-B (EDUC, 1984),[5] the Commission discussed the distinction between religious beliefs and personal philosophy, quoting from a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, as follows:

United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) ... was one of three cases consolidated by the Supreme Court for argument, which required interpretation of the Universal Military Training and Selective Service Act. [statute citation omitted] ... Congress had defined “religious training and belief” as:

An individual’s belief in a relation to a supreme being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but not including essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.

The Washington State Legislature has not favored us with a definition of “religious” so we must assume that the word is used ... in its customary sense. The Random House Dictio­nary of the English Language, Unabridged Edition, 1979, defines “religious” as pertain­ing to or concerned with religion. The first definition of “religion” is:

Concern over what exists beyond the visible world, differentiated from philosophy in that it operates through faith or intuition rather than reason, and generally including the idea of the existence of a single being, a group of beings, an eternal principle, or a transcendent spiritual entity that has created the work, that gov­erns it, that controls its destinies, or that intervenes occasionally in the natural course of its history, as well as the idea that ritual, prayer, spir­itual exercises, certain principles of everyday conduct, etc., are expedient, due or spiritually rewarding, or arise naturally out of an inner need as a human response to the belief in such a being, principle, etc.

Despite the lack of any legislative definition of “religious” ... the Seeger opinion is helpful. The Court was trying to assist appeal boards in evaluating the claims for exemption which came before them. It said:

We recognize the difficulties that have always faced the trier of fact in these cases. We hope that the test that we lay down proves less onerous .... The test is simple of applica­tion. It is essentially an objective only, namely, does the claimed belief occupy the same place in the life of the objector as an orthodox belief in God holds in the life of one clearly qualified for exemption?

[Emphasis added.]

The Court went on to explain:

In such an intensely personal area, of course, the claim of the registrant that his belief is an essential part of a religious faith must be given great weight ... The validity of what he believes cannot be questioned. Some theologians, and indeed some examiners, might be tempted to ques­tion the existence of the registrant’s “Supreme Being” or the truth of his concepts. But these are inquiries foreclosed to the government. As Mr. Justice Douglas stated in United States v. Ballard, 322 US 78, 86, ... (1944): “Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real as life to some may be incomprehensible to others.” Local boards and courts in this sense are not free to reject beliefs because they consider them “incomprehensible.” Their task is to decide whether the beliefs professed by a registrant are sincerely held and whether they are, in his own scheme of things, reli­gious. ...

Thus, Seeger holds that while we cannot in­quire into the truth, reasonableness or plau­sibility of the claimed belief, we apply an objective standard to determine, as a question of fact, whether or not the belief is reli­gious.

When the standards articulated in Seeger, in United States v. Ballard, and in Grant II are applied to the evidence in this case, the union’s claim must be rejected.

In evaluating the bona fides of the claimant’s beliefs, the Examiner notes that:

•                     Her objection to union membership was asserted very early on in her employment with this employer.

•                     She has consistently stated objections based on her religious and spiritual beliefs.

•                     She outlined some of those principles and beliefs in her letters to the union in September of 1995 and March of 1997.

•                     There is absolutely no evidence that the claimant has ever been fraudulent or deceitful in describing or applying her religious beliefs.

•                     Testimony from three entirely credible witnesses confirmed the claimant’s sincerity regarding her beliefs, her consistent practice of her beliefs in her daily life, and the religious nature of those beliefs.

The record thus supports a conclusion that the claimant’s assertion of the right of nonassociation is based upon bona fide personal religious objections to union membership that are genuine and in good faith.[6] As indicated above, the union’s initial response appears to have been based on an incorrect understanding of the statute and its interpretation by both the Commission and the courts. The union has not undermined either the bona fides or the religious nature of the claimant’s request for non association safeguarded in both RCW 41.56.122 and the applicable collective bargaining agreement.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1.                  Snohomish County is a political subdivision of the State of Washington, and is a public employer within the meaning of RCW 41.56.020 and RCW 41.56.030(1).

2.                  The Washington State Council of County and City Employees, Council 2, and its affiliated Local 109-E, a bargaining representative within the meaning and coverage of Chapter 41.56 RCW, and is the exclusive bargaining representative of certain employees of Snohomish County.

3.                  The employer and union were parties to a collective bargaining agreement containing a union security provision. The contract safeguards the right of nonassociation of public employees based on bona fide religious tenets.

4.                  Donna Kinuko Noborikawa is an employee of Snohomish County, working in a position within the bargaining unit represented by the union. She is subject to union security obligations under the collective bargaining agreement between the employer and union.

5.                  Prior to her employment with this employer, Noborikawa was subject to union security obligations while employed by another employer. She gave credible testimony that she became a union member because that employer required her to do so, and that she became disillusioned with that union and unions in general upon concluding that union was fraudulent or deceitful in its dealings concerning her position.

6.                  From the time of her initial employment by this employer within a bargaining unit represented by this union, Naborikawa has voiced objection to union membership based upon her “spiritual religious background”. She subsequently worked in positions not represented by this union.

7.                  Promptly after her position was included in a newly-certified bargaining unit represented by this union, Naborikawa asserted a right of nonassociation based on personal religious beliefs. In subsequent correspondence with the union, she cited her beliefs and practices related to Shinto, Buddhism, Taoism, and Aikido. The union rejected her request for non-association, and this proceeding was commenced.

8.                  The claimant has provided testimony and documents establishing that her objections to union membership are sincerely held and religious in nature, based on her personal religious beliefs and practices related to Shinto, Buddhism, Taoism, and Aikido.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.                  The Public Employment Relations Commission has jurisdiction in this matter under RCW 41.56.122 and Chapter 391-95 WAC.

2.                  The claimant has sustained her burden of proof to establish that her objections to union membership are based upon bona fide personal religious beliefs that are genuine and in good faith, and she is entitled to assert the right of nonassociation under RCW 41.56.122(2).

ORDER

1.                  Donna Kinuko Noborikawa shall be permitted to make alternative payments, in lieu of paying union dues, as follows:

a.                   The alternative payments shall be in an amount equal to the periodic dues and initiation fees required for membership in the union.

b.                  The alternative payments shall be made to Sarvey Wildlife Care Center, 13106 148^th NE, Arlington, WA 98223. Noborika­wa shall furnish proof to Washington State Council of County and City Employees that such payments have been made, in accordance with the union security provisions of the collective bargaining agreement between that union and Snohomish County.

2.                  If no notice of appeal of this order is filed with the Public Employment Relations Commission within 20 days following the date of this order, the funds held in escrow in regard to this proceeding shall be released and paid to the charitable organization designated above.

3.                  If a timely notice of appeal of this order is filed with the Public Employment Relations Commission, such filing shall automatically stay the effect of this order pending a ruling by the Commission.

Issued at Olympia, Washington, the 4^th day of May, 2000.

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION

[SIGNED]

MARTHA M. NICOLOFF, Examiner

This order will be the final order of the agency unless a notice of appeal is filed with Commission under WAC 391-95-270.