DECISIONS

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Decision Content

State - General Administration, Decision 8087-A (PSRA, 2003)

STATE OF WASHINGTON

BEFORE THE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION

In the matter of the petitions of:

 

STATE OF WASHINGTON – DEPARTMENTOF GENERAL ADMINISTRATION

CASE 17422-E-03-2830

DECISION 8087-A - PSRA

Involving certain of its employees claimed by

CASE 17573-E-03-2845

DECISION 8174 - PSRA

WASHINGTON FEDERATION OF STATE EMPLOYEES

ORDER VACATING

CERTIFICATIONS

Pamela VanSpoor, Labor Relations Manager, for the employer.

Gladys V. Burbank, Director of Activities, for the union.

On April 9, 2003, the Department of General Administration (employer) filed a petition with the Public Employment Relations Commission under WAC 391-25-096, questioning whether the Washington Federation of State Employees (union) had abandoned representation of a bargaining unit of mail service employees. (Case 17422-E-03-2830.)A motion for dismissal filed by the union was denied by a formal order issued on May 28, 2003,[1] and the union filed and served a response to the petition on June 23, 2003.

On June 4, 2003, the employer filed a second petition with the Commission under WAC 391-25-096, this time questioning whether the same union had abandoned representation of a bargaining unit of architectural and engineering employees. (Case 17573-E-03-2845.)The union filed and served a response to that petition on July 17, 2003.

Based on records transferred to the Commission from the Department of Personnel (DOP),[2] employer allegations which are not contested by the union, and the union’s responses, the Executive Director concludes that the bargaining relationships questioned in these cases had ceased to exist by the time these petitions were filed. The certifications under which the union claimed status as exclusive bargaining representative are vacated.

BACKGROUND

The employer is a state general government agency that is subject to both the State Civil Service Law, Chapter 41.06 RCW, and the Personnel System Reform Act of 2002 (PSRA), portions of which are codified in Chapter 41.80 RCW.

The union is a viable employee organization which has been, and continues to be, the exclusive bargaining representative of various bargaining units of state civil service employees.

On June 15, 1988, the DOP certified the union as exclusive bargaining representative of a bargaining unit of employees working in what was then called a “messenger service” operation and is now the employer’s “Consolidated Mail Services” operation.

On April 9, 1998, the DOP certified the union as exclusive bargaining representative of a bargaining unit of employees working in the employer’s architectural and engineering operations.

THE APPLICABLE STATUTE AND RULE

Some PSRA provisions took effect on June 13, 2002, including a transfer of authority concerning unit determination and representa­tion cases to the Public Employment Relations Commission. The PSRA provisions currently in effect include:

RCW 41.06.340 UNIT DETERMINATION, REPRESENTATION AND UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO CHAPTER. (1) With respect to collective bargaining as authorized by RCW 41.80.001 through RCW 41.80.130, the public employment relations commission created by chapter 41.58 RCW shall have authority to adopt rules, on and after the effective date of this section, relating to determination of appropriate bargaining units within any agency. In making such determination the commission shall consider the duties, skills, and working conditions of the employees, the history of collective bargaining by the employees and their bargaining representatives, the extent of organization among the employees, and the desires of the employees. The public employment rela­tions commission created in chapter 41. 58 RCW shall adoptrules and make determinations relating to the certifica­tion and decertification of exclusive bargaining repre­sentatives.

RCW 41.80.070BARGAINING UNITS – CERTIFICATION. (1) A bargaining unit of employees covered by this chapter existing on June 13, 2002, shall be considered an appropriate unit, unless the unit does not meet the requirements of (a) . . . of this subsection. . . . [A] unit is not appropriate if it includes:

(a)Both supervisors and non-supervisory employees . . . .

(2)The exclusive bargaining representatives certified to represent the bargaining units existing on June 13, 2002, shall continue as the exclusive bargaining representatives without the necessity of an election.

(emphasis added). The Commission adopted rules to implement the PSRA as follows: Emergency rules were adopted in June and October 2002; permanent rules were adopted in January 2003.

The Commission’s general rule on employer-initiated representation petitions states, in pertinent part:

WAC 391-25-090PETITION FILED BY EMPLOYER. (1) Where an employer has been presented with one or more demands for recognition of an exclusive bargaining representative of previously unrepresented employees, it may obtain a determination of the question concerning representation by filing a petition under WAC 391-25-070. Instead of a showing of interest under WAC 391-25-110, the employer shall attach copies of any written demand(s) for recognition or other correspondence pertaining to the claimed question concerning representation.

(2) Where an employer disputes the majority status of the incumbent exclusive bargaining representative of its employees, it shall obtain a determination of the question concerning representation by filing a petition under WAC 391-25-070.

(a) Instead of a showing of interest under WAC 391-25-110, the employer shall attach affidavits and other documentation as may be available to it to demonstrate the existence of a good faith belief that a majority of its employees in an existing bargaining unit no longer desire to be represented by their incumbent exclusive bargaining representative. . . .

(emphasis added). That general rule had existed in some form since the Commission’s “consolidated” rules were adopted in 1980, but was amended in 2000 to preclude the use of a controversial tactic which was being used in the private sector and which had been attempted in the public sector: Employers were refusing to bargain as a method to test a union’s majority status, thereby shifting debate from the pragmatic representation case process to litigious unfair labor practice proceedings. [3]WAC 391-25-090 became a subject of debate, however, in connection with the adoption of rules to administer the PSRA.

On June 14, 2002, the Commission adopted WAC 391-25-096 as a special rule making WAC 391-25-090 completely inapplicable to bargaining units of state civil service employees. [4]The proponents of a variance for state civil service employees cited RCW 41.80.070(2), and argued that the enactment of the PSRA was not intended to create an open season for employers to upset existing bargaining relationships.

On October 8, 2002, the Commission amended WAC 391-25-096 to allow employer-initiated petitions under limited circumstances. The concise explanatory statement for that rule filed under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Chapter 34. 05 RCW, included:

WAC 391-25-096Special provision - - State civil service employees.

REASONS FOR CHANGE: Emergency rule adopted in June amended to allow employer-filed representation petitions where exclusive bargaining representative of a bargaining unit has become defunct or has abandoned representation of a unit. On June 14, 2002, the Commission adopted a . . . proposal completely banning employer-filed repre­sentation petitions, and did not adopt a . . . proposal to allow employer-filed representation petitions under limited circumstances. Upon further review of the PSRA, the Commission concurs that some limitation on employer-filed representation petitions is appropriate, because of language in RCW 41. 80. 070(2) which went into effect on June 13, 2002 and carries over existing certifications of exclusive bargaining representatives without need for an election. There is, however, need for a procedure to “clear the air” in the circumstances addressed by the [second] proposal. Different from other laws adminis­tered by [the Commission], there are (and will be) no voluntarily recognized bargaining units of state civil service employees. Prior to June 13, 2002, the [WPRB] abolished a number of bargaining units which remained on its books, even though they had no exclusive bargaining representative. Amendment permits a PSRA employer to file a petition with [the Commission] if it has basis to believe that the organization certified as exclusive bargaining representative of a bargaining unit is defunct or has abandoned the bargaining unit. [The Commission] would provide notice to the union, and the union would have an opportunity to demonstrate that it was still a viable entity. References to a “question concerning representation” in the [second] proposal seemed to suggest an election, but that would have created a “certification bar” which would have delayed the exercise of statutory bargaining rights by the employees through another organization. Amendment simply vacates the certification if the union is found to be defunct or to have abandoned the unit.

The Commission re-adopted the October language as the permanent rule in January 2003. Thus, the rule governing these cases is:

WAC 391-25-096 SPECIAL PROVISION--STATE CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES. (1) WAC 391-25-090 is inapplicable to bargaining units of state civil service employees.

(2) Where an employer claims that an employee organization previously certified as the exclusive bargaining representative of state civil service employ­ees has become defunct or has abandoned representation of a bargaining unit, it may file a petition under WAC 391-25-070 to obtain a determination as to whether the employee organization continues to represent the bargain­ing unit. Instead of a showing of interest under WAC 391-25-110, the employer shall attach affidavits and other documentation as may be available to it to demon­strate the existence of a good faith belief that the employee organization has become defunct or has abandoned representation of the bargaining unit. The documentation provided under this section shall not include signature documents provided to the employer by employees.

(3) An employee organization named in a petition filed under this section shall be given a reasonable opportunity to respond and rebut the allegations in the petition. Ongoing activity as exclusive bargaining representative may be demonstrated by evidence showing that the employee organization has been holding meetings of its members, collecting dues, electing or appointing officers and representatives for the purposes of dealing with the employer, processing grievances, negotiating collective bargaining agreements, or similar activities for and on behalf of employees in the bargaining unit.

(4) If it is determined that the employee organiza­tion is defunct or has abandoned its responsibilities for and on behalf of the employees in the bargaining unit, the executive director shall vacate the certification of the employee organization as exclusive bargaining representative. An order issued by the executive director shall be subject to appeal under WAC 391-25-660.

(emphasis added). [5]The above-captioned cases are the first to apply WAC 391-25-096, and are decided together because of their similarities.

DISCUSSION

The employer petitions and union responses have been evaluated under a standard based on WAC 10-08-135, as follows:

A . . . summary judgment may be granted and an order issued if the written record shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that [a] party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Irrelevant facts are disregarded for purposes of this decision, but: (1) Relevant facts alleged by the employer that were admitted or not contested by the union are deemed to be true and provable; and (2) Relevant facts alleged by the union are deemed to be true and provable.

Scope of Unit Determination Unavailable

The employer points out that the scope of its mail operation has changed over the years, and that the civil service classifications used in that operation have also changed over the years. This proceeding under WAC 391-25-096 is not, however, a proper forum for addressing such matters.

The scope and description of a bargaining unit are only proper subjects for decision in cases where a union is seeking certifica­tion as exclusive bargaining representative of employees under Chapter 391-25 WAC, or where changed circumstances prompt the employer or incumbent union to seek modification or clarification of an existing bargaining unit under Chapter 391-35 WAC.WAC 391-25-096 contemplates a very limited type of proceeding within a “decertification” category. In any “decertification” proceeding, the Commission takes the unit as it presently exists. See WAC 391-25-210(1).

The Mail Service Unit - Case 17422-E-03-2830

Evidence Suggesting Abandonment -

Taken together, the employer’s petition and information extracted from the records transferred to the Commission by the DOP portray the following history:

                     June 15, 1988 - August 1, 1988: The union was the exclusive bargaining representative of the bargaining unit with no union shop or collective bargaining agreement in effect.

                     August 1, 1988 - May 16, 1990: The union had a union shop in effect as the result of prevailing in a union shop election conducted under RCW 41.06.150.

                     May 16, 1990 - April 10, 1991: The parties had both a collective bargaining agreement and a union shop in effect.

                     April 10, 1991 - May 16, 1993: The parties’ collective bargaining agreement remained in effect, but the union shop was decertified by an election under RCW 41.06.150. The employer alleges the union did not appoint stewards or engage in any labor-management meetings after the union shop ended.

                     May 16, 1993 - May 16, 1994: The parties would have had a collective bargaining agreement in effect only by reason of the first operation of an automatic renewal clause that had been contained in their 1990-1993 contract.

                     May 16, 1994 - May 16, 1995: The parties would have had a collective bargaining agreement in effect only by reason of a second operation of the automatic renewal clause.

                     May 16, 1995 - May 16, 1996: The parties would have had a collective bargaining agreement in effect only by reason of a third operation of the automatic renewal clause.

                     May 16, 1996 - May 16, 1997: The parties would have had a collective bargaining agreement in effect only by reason of a fourth operation of the automatic renewal clause.

                     May 16, 1997 - May 16, 1998: The parties would have had a collective bargaining agreement in effect only by reason of a fifth operation of the automatic renewal clause.

                     May 16, 1998 - May 16, 1999: The parties would have had a collective bargaining agreement in effect only by reason of a sixth operation of the automatic renewal clause.

                     May 16, 1999 - May 16, 2000: The parties would have had a collective bargaining agreement in effect only by reason of a seventh operation of the automatic renewal clause.

                     May 16, 2000 - May 16, 2001: The parties would have had a collective bargaining agreement in effect only by reason of an eighth operation of the automatic renewal clause.

                     May 16, 2001 - May 16, 2002: The parties would have had a collective bargaining agreement in effect only by reason of a ninth operation of the automatic renewal clause.

                     May 16, 2002 - May 16, 2003: The parties would have had a collective bargaining agreement in effect only by reason of a tenth operation of the automatic renewal clause.

The petition was filed to initiate this proceeding before an eleventh operation of the automatic renewal clause.

The Union’s Response -

Following denial of its motion for dismissal, the union submitted statements by Gladys Burbank and Joanne McCaughan, asserting facts in support of its claim that it had not abandoned the unit. The responses are aligned with the tests set forth in WAC 391-25-096:

The “holding meetings of its members” component of the tests for ongoing activity set forth in the rule is not addressed by the union’s response. Accepting the union’s claim that it contacted its members within the bargaining unit each year from 1998 through 2002, the backup documentation provided by the union suggests those contacts were only by means of written correspondence. There is no claim of any unit-wide meetings being held, or even of meetings between union staff members and individual bargaining unit members.

The “collecting dues” component of the tests for ongoing activity is not directly addressed by the union’s response. Indeed, the union has only addressed this subject by implication, by referring to a declining number of employees as being eligible voters on union affairs. Having some members is far from compelling in the context of RCW 41. 04. 230(6), which permits employees covered by the State Civil Service law to pay dues to a union of their choice, without regard to whether that union is their exclusive bargaining representative. Moreover, the ruling of the State Personnel Board in Washington Federation of State Employees vs. Department of Corrections and Washington State Corrections Employees Association, Cases 89-ULP-7 and 89-ULP-8, was that employees who desired to continue their membership in the Federation were entitled to have their check off of union dues continued, even though the Association had been certified to replace the Federation as exclusive bargain­ing representative of their bargaining unit. [6]

The “electing or appointing officers” component of the tests for ongoing activity is not addressed by the union’s response.

The “appointing . . . representatives” component of the tests for ongoing activity is addressed, but the union’s response ignores or minimizes the “for the purposes of dealing with the employer” portion of the same clause. Collective bargaining is a process of communications to be conducted by means of an orderly business relationship between an employer and an organization certified as the exclusive bargaining representative of its employees. An employer of union-represented employees is entitled to know who should be contacted for purposes such as opening negotiations on a collective bargaining agreement, providing notice of proposed changes giving rise to a duty to bargain mid-term in a contract, or allowing union representation for bargaining unit employees at investigatory interviews under precedents flowing from National Labor Relations Board v. Weingarten, Inc. , 420 U. S. 251 (1975). Although the union alleges that it has assigned staff members to this bargaining unit ever since it was certified as exclusive bargaining representative, and that Joanne McCaughan currently holds that assignment, the union’s response falls short of claiming the employer was ever given notice of those appointments. The union has thus failed to controvert the employer’s allegation of having no contact from the union in 10 or more years.

The “processing grievances” component of the tests for ongoing activity is addressed in the union’s response, by acknowledging that there have been no grievances in the period during which the automatic renewal clause has been permitted to operate.

The “negotiating collective bargaining agreements” component of the tests for ongoing activity is addressed only by operation of the automatic renewal clause. Apart from the fact that automatic renewals are not listed among the tests for ongoing activity in the rule, the union does not claim that it ever even notified the employer of its intentions on any of the occasions when the automatic renewal clause was to operate. Such an absence of communication is antithetical to the orderly business relationship that is supposed to exist between parties to a collective bargain­ing relationship. [7]

The “similar activities for and on behalf of employees” component is addressed in the union’s response by reference to situations in 2002 and 2003, but close examination of the documents provided does not establish ongoing union representation of the bargaining unit.

The primary focus of the statement of Joanne McCaughan is on a single transaction in 2002, after the employer announced a reorganization.

                     The employer’s April 2 message to employees made only a fleeting reference to what is now called Consolidated Mail Services. After explaining that a risk management operation was being transferred to another agency, the employer official wrote: “However, the move of Risk Management means changes need to be made now for Consolidated Mail Services and the Motor Pool.” A paragraph on the second page indicated an intent to streamline other operations “and . . . move Consoli­dated Mail Services . . . to a new Statewide Operations Division.” Among a summary of changes is a paragraph that includes: “Statewide Operations (formerly Real Estate Ser­vices). . . . Motor Pool and Consolidated Mail Services will transfer to the new Statewide Operations Division. ”

                     On April 4, the union sent a letter to the employer, request­ing that the reorganization be delayed pending discussion by a labor-management committee. While the introductory sentence of that letter mentions the mail service among four bargaining units, there was no other reference to the mail service in that letter. The specific questions posed in that letter concern only “Capital Planning and Management functions” and work done by “DCF” employees, whether “revenue shortages in DRES/Zone 8" will be transferred, and whether “changes of contract management in OSP and EAS” will affect existing bargaining units. Thus, the introductory mention of the mail service was not a precursor to a demand for bargaining for that long-dormant bargaining unit.

                     On April 10, the employer sent a letter to the union in which it responded to the specific questions posed in the union’s letter. No specific mention of the mail service is cited or found in that letter.

                     The minutes of a labor-management meeting held on April 10 contain only a reference to the mail service that is discernable only by the references in other documents: “[T]he move of Risk Management . . . and the decision on what to do with the remaining two units from that division, were factors contributing to the need to reorganize. ”All detailed discussion in those minutes concerned the issues addressed in the employer’s letter of the same date.

                     The relevance of minutes of a labor-management meeting held on November 5, 2001, is not evident. No specific reference to the mail service is found in that document.

                     The relevance of a message sent by the employer to all employees in the department on November 7, 2001, is not evident. There is another fleeting reference to the mail service, but it is limited to: “Division of Transportation, Risk and Mail: [A budget reduction of] $460,000. This includes changes in the way mail is sorted and savings in postage. No permanent positions are affected at this time. ”There is no indication that the union ever contacted the employer about that message.

                     The relevance of agendas for meetings held on September 16, 2002, and on April 15, 2003, is not evident. Neither of them contains any specific reference to the mail service.

The union also cites discussion of a “New Driving Policy” at a labor-management committee meeting held on January 21, 2003, but close examination of the minutes of that meeting fails to disclose any specific reference to the mail service.

In the face of a decade of silence, to find these extremely limited contacts sufficient to constitute evidence of an ongoing collective bargaining relationship would stretch credulity. The union has been on notice of the potential for “abandonment” claims since the rules discussions in June of 2002, and has been on notice of the terms of WAC 391-25-096 since October of 2002. If this proceeding had been initiated by another employee organization, the facts set forth in the union’s response to this case would not have satisfied the requirements for intervention as an incumbent under WAC 391-25-170. The certification under which the union claims status as exclusive bargaining representative of this bargaining unit must be vacated.

The Architect/Engineer Unit - Case 17573-E-03-2845

Evidence Suggesting Abandonment -

Taken together, the employer’s petition and information extracted from the records transferred to the Commission by the DOP portray the following history:

                     April 9, 1998 - August 12, 1998: The union was the exclusive bargaining representative of the bargaining unit with no union shop or collective bargaining agreement in effect.

                     August 12, 1998 - February 10, 1999: A union shop was in effect as the result of prevailing in a union shop election conducted under RCW 41.06.150.

                     February 10, 1999 - February 10, 2000: The parties had both a collective bargaining agreement and a union shop in effect.

                     February 10, 2000 - May 8, 2001: The parties’ collective bargaining agreement remained in effect, but the union shop was decertified by an election under RCW 41.06.150. The employer alleges the union did not appoint stewards or engage in any labor-management meetings after the union shop ended.

                     May 8, 2001 - May 8, 2002: The parties would have had a collective bargaining agreement in effect only by reason of the first operation of an automatic renewal clause contained in their 1999-2001 contract.

                     May 8, 2002 - May 8, 2003: The parties would have had a collective bargaining agreement in effect only by reason of a second operation of the automatic renewal clause.

                     May 8, 2003 - May 8, 2004: The parties would have a collec­tive bargaining agreement in effect only by reason of a third operation of the automatic renewal clause.

The petition was filed to initiate this proceeding before an fourth operation of the automatic renewal clause.

The Union’s Response -

The union submitted a statement by Gladys Burbank, asserting that it has not abandoned this bargaining unit.

The “holding meetings” and “collecting dues” components of the tests for ongoing activity are addressed by the union’s startling admission that it has NO members in this bargaining unit. The rights conferred by collective bargaining laws such as the PSRA belong to the employees, and the focus of collective bargaining is on the representation of employees in their dealings with their employer. A collective bargaining relationship cannot exist between an employer and union in the abstract, apart from the employees in the bargaining unit. Just as proof that a union continues to collect dues from a majority of the employees in a bargaining unit would be a compelling basis for dismissal of a petition under WAC 391-25-096, the union’s admission that it has no members in this unit provides a compelling basis to vacate the union’s certification.

The “electing or appointing officers and representatives” component of the test for ongoing activity inherently suffers from the same lack of union communication with the employer in this bargaining unit as is noted above for the mail service bargaining unit. The union’s response for this unit goes farther, essentially admitting that there has been no effort to represent the employees since they withdrew from membership in the union.

The “grievances, negotiating . . . similar activities” components of the test for ongoing activity are the subject of the union’s response in this bargaining unit only by citation of the contract signed in 1999, together with the existence and operation of the automatic renewal clause. Activities by the union in connection with its ongoing representation of other bargaining units of employees of this employer do not avoid the lack of union activity concerning this particular bargaining unit. The certification under which the union claims status as exclusive bargaining representative of the architect/engineering unit must be vacated.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1.                  The Department of General Administration (employer) is a general government agency of the State of Washington, and is an employer within the meaning of Chapter 41. 06 RCW and Chapter 41. 80 RCW.

2.                  The Washington Federation of State Employees (union) is an employee organization within the meaning of RCW 41. 80. 005(7).

3.                  In 1988, the union was certified as exclusive bargaining representative of a bargaining unit consisting of employees in a mail service operated by the employer.

4.                  The employer and union were parties to a collective bargaining agreement covering the mail service bargaining unit which was signed in 1990 and effective for a period of three years through May 16, 1993. From August 1, 1988, to April 10, 1991, a union shop was in effect based on a vote of the bargaining unit employees.

5.                  Accepting that the union solicited input from its remaining members within the mail service bargaining unit between 1998 and 2002, there is no claim or evidence that the union actually held meetings of those employees.

6.                  Accepting that the union assigned members of its staff to the mail service bargaining unit on or after April 10, 1991, there is no claim or evidence that the union notified the employer of such assignments.

7.                  Since May 16, 1993, the only contractual relationship between the parties to this proceeding for the mail service bargaining unit has been by operation of an automatic renewal clause contained in the collective bargaining agreement described in paragraph 4 of these findings of fact. There is no evidence of the union processing any grievances or negotiating any collective bargaining agreements on behalf of the employees in that unit.

8.                  Accepting that the union made reference to the mail service bargaining unit in the introductory sentence of a letter sent to the employer in April 2002, there is no evidence of the union engaging in any related discussion of substantive issues specific to the mail service bargaining unit.

9.                  In 1998, the union was certified as exclusive bargaining representative of a bargaining unit consisting of employees in the employer’s architect and engineering operation.

10.              From August 12, 1998, to February 10, 2000, a union shop was in effect based on a vote of the bargaining unit employees.

11.              The employer and union were parties to a collective bargaining agreement covering the architect/engineering bargaining unit, which was signed in 1999 and effective through May 8, 2001.

12.              The union acknowledges it has had no members in the archi­tect/engineering bargaining unit since the union shop ended.

13.              Since May 16, 1993, the only contractual relationship between the parties for the architect/engineering bargaining unit has been by operation of an automatic renewal clause contained in the collective bargaining agreement described in paragraph 11 of these findings of fact. The union acknowledges that, since February 10, 2000, it has not elected or appointed officers or representatives, has not processed any grievances, and has not had any dealings with the employer as the representative of that bargaining unit.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.                  The Public Employment Relations Commission has jurisdiction in this matter under RCW 41. 06. 340 and Chapter 41. 80 RCW, and under Chapter 391-25 WAC.

2.                  The union’s inaction and lack of contact with the employer since April 10, 1991, as described in paragraphs 5 through 8 of the foregoing findings of fact, constitute abandonment of the mail service bargaining unit under WAC 391-25-096.

3.                  The union’s inaction and lack of contact with the employer since February 10, 2000, and its admitted lack of any members, as described in paragraphs 11 through 12 of the foregoing findings of fact, constitute abandonment of the bargaining unit under WAC 391-25-096.

ORDER

1.                  The status of the Washington Federation of State Employees as exclusive bargaining representative of employees in the mail service operation of the Department of General Administration is VACATED.

2.                  The status of the Washington Federation of State Employees as exclusive bargaining representative of employees in the architect and engineering operation of the Department of General Administration is VACATED.

Issued at Olympia, Washington, on the 17th day of September, 2003.

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION

[SIGNED]

MARVIN L. SCHURKE, Executive Director

This order may be appealed by filing a notice of appeal with the Commission under WAC 391-25-660.



[1]          State - General Administration, Decision 8087 (PSRA, 2003).

[2]          Records accumulated by the DOP in its administration of collective bargaining rights conferred by the state civil service law, Chapter 41.06 RCW, have been transferred to the Commission under an agreement made under RCW 41.80.902, in anticipation of the transfer that will be required when RCW 41.80.901 takes effect July 1, 2004.

[3]          In Pasco Housing Authority, Decision 5927-A (PECB, 1997), a public employer that refrained from filing a representation petition under the then-existing version of WAC 391-25-090 was found guilty of unfair labor practices for other tactics it used to question a union’s majority status. The Commission’s representation case rules were reviewed in 1999 under Executive Order 97-02, with the assistance of a focus group of labor and management representatives. In the context of the long-standing precedents that unit determination and representation questions are not subjects for bargaining in the usual mandatory/permissive/illegal sense (under City of Richland, Decision 279-A (PECB, 1978), aff’d, 29 Wn.  App. 599 (1981), review denied, 96 Wn. 2d 1004 (1981) and Spokane School District, Decision 718 (EDUC, 1979)), the consensus recommendation of the focus group was to make WAC 391-25-090 the exclusive method for employers to question the continued existence of bargaining relationships. The Commission amended the rule accordingly.

[4]          This left employers having a good faith doubt free to refuse to bargain to question the existence of a bargaining relationship of state civil service employees.

[5]          WSR 03-03-064, § 391-25-096, filed 1/14/03, effective February 14, 2003. With omission of the mandatory aspect that was added to WAC 391-25-090 in 2000, the permissive language of WAC 391-25-096 may still permit the use of other means for employers which have a good faith doubt to question whether a union continues to enjoy majority support in an existing bargaining unit.

[6]          Proof that a union challenged under this rule continues to collect dues from a majority of the employees in a bargaining unit would be a compelling basis for dismissal of a petition under WAC 391-25-096, perhaps to the exclusion of other components of the test. This union has not, however, asserted any such claim here.

[7]          This discussion of automatic renewal clauses does not constitute a prediction or ruling that such clauses will be valid under the PSRA. Although it appears that automatic renewal clauses were permitted in contracts negotiated under the “limited-scope” collective bargaining procedure within the State Civil Service Law, the same cannot be said for other statutes administered by the Commission: Within the Public Employees’ Collective Bargaining Act, RCW 41. 56. 070 outlaws automatic renewals or extensions; within the statute covering academic faculty of community and technical colleges, RCW 28B. 52. 035 expressly limits collective bargaining agreements to three years. Although the question is not squarely presented or decided in this case, it is noted that the durations of collective bargaining agreements under the PSRA are to be aligned with the state’s fiscal bienniums beginning July 1, 2005.

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