ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

Puro & Haynes, by George Cleve Haynes, Attorney at Law, for the petitioner.

Hafer, Cassidy & Price, by John Burns, Attorney at Law, for the union.

Christopher T. Bayley, King County Prosecuting Attorney, by Richard W. Elliott, Deputy, Civil Division, for the employer.

This matter is before the Public Employment Relations Commission on a petition for review filed by the petitioner. The Executive Director concluded from the petition and the affidavits filed in support of the petition that no issue of material fact existed; and concluded, pursuant to WAC 391-21-900, that the petitioner had not asserted facts which, as a matter of law, could constitute a basis for a ruling in his favor.

POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES

The petitioner asserts that the “beliefs” on which he claims exemption from the obligations of a union security agreement are “religious in nature”, and that the religious beliefs of one individual are sufficient under the laws and the Constitution of the State of Washington and the United States to require petitioner’s exemption. The petitioner asks the Commission to address the constitutional issues, and distinguishes the beliefs advanced in three previous cases as personal, non-religious beliefs.

The union asks the Commission to sustain the decision of the Executive Director. It directs attention to the “bona fide religious tenets or teachings of a church” language of the statute, and contends that the petitioner is not within the scope of the exemption created by RCW 41.56.122. The union argues that the statute contains a constitutionally acceptable accommodation of recognized religious beliefs of a type required by the Courts.

The County announced its intention early in the processing of the case to take no active part in the matter. It has filed no brief on review.

DISCUSSION

This is a case of first impression before the Commission. The issue is the eligibility of the petitioner to make payments to a charity as an alternative to payments of initiation fees and dues to Public Safety Employees Local 519. There is no question of membership. The collective bargaining agreement provides, in section 2 of Article II:

“It shall be a condition of employment that all regular, full-time employees shall become members of the union and remain members in good standing ... Timely payment of regular union dues will constitute membership in good standing for the purposes of this article.” (Emphasis supplied)

There follows a proviso which meets the requirements of RCW 41.56.122(1), which provides in part:

“A collective bargaining agreement may: (1) Contain union security provisions: Provided, That nothing in this section shall authorize a closed shop provision: Provided further, That agreements involving union security provisions must safeguard the right of nonassociation of public employees based on bona fide religious tenets or teachings of a church or religious body of which such public employee is a member. Such public employee shall pay an amount of money equivalent to regular union dues and initiation fee to a nonreligious charity or to another charitable organization mutually agreed upon by the public employee affected and the bargaining representative to which such public employee would otherwise pay the dues and initiation fee. The public employee shall furnish written proof that such payment has been made. If the public employee and the bargaining representative do not reach agreement on such matter, the Commission shall designate the charitable organization.

The statute is implemented by WAC 391-21-900. The petitioner does not now belong to any church or religious body.

Chapter 41.56 RCW as we now have it is the product of several legislative actions since 1967. Amendments enacted in 1969 created an interim committee on public employees collective bargaining to evaluate collective bargaining practices and to make recommendations to the legislature on necessary or desirable changes of the law. That committee reported a number of proposed amendments, including the union security and religious exemption concepts now contained in RCW 41.56.122(1). Although many specific differences are to be noted, the system of relationships and collective bargaining created and regulated by RCW 41.56 is patterned after the system of collective bargaining existing in the private sector under the National Labor Relations Act.

Union security is a well-defined and operative concept in private sector collective bargaining relationships. Private sector law and practice does not provide a general exemption from union security financial obligations based on individual conscientious objections. When the legislature amended RCW 41.56 in 1973 to add RCW 41.56.122(1), it had before it the National Labor Relations Act with years of interpretation and application, as well as two specific recommendations from the committee created by RCW 41.56.400. We interpret the statute as expressing the basic intent of the legislature to authorize union security agreements in public employment under RCW 41 .56 on a basis generally similar to union security practices prevailing in the private sector. The “religious” exception contained in RCW 41.56.122(1) is interpreted as a limited exception to accommodate the doctrines of churches or religious bodies of which public employees may be members. Union security for public employees has withstood constitutional tests in both the United States Supreme Court, Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) and in our own Supreme Court, Capitol Powerhouse Engineers v. State, 89 Wn2d 177 (1977). If there is any defect in the statute, it is in the attempt to create an exception rather than in the basic authorization of union security agreements.

The petitioner does not allege that he falls within the limited exception which we find in the statute. His claim would broaden the exemption in a manner which would tend to destroy the basic intent of the legislature. The decision of the Executive Director is affirmed.

DATED at Olympia, Washington, this 3rd day of May, 1979.

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION

[SIGNED]

PAUL A. ROBERTS, Commissioner

[SIGNED]

DON E. OLSON, JR., Commissioner

DISSENTING OPINION

I respectfully dissent from the decision reached by my colleagues. Like the Executive Director and my colleagues, I would not propose that this administrative agency should decide the constitutionality of the statute which it administers. However, we have an obligation if at all possible to interpret that statute in a manner which will make it constitutional.

Interpreted in the disjunctive, the statute specified an exception for “religious tenets” or “teachings of a church or religious body of which such public employee is a member”. Having “religious tenets” does not require membership in a church or religious body.

The statute also states, in the disjunctive, that the alternative payments be made “to a non-religious charity” or “to another charitable organization mutually agreed upon by the public employee affected and the bargaining representative”. Apparently, the employee is free to choose a “non-religious charity” but must reach agreement on any other (including “religious”) charity.

In the instant case, the petitioner contends that his objections are based on bona fide religious tenets. He does not now belong to any church or religious body. His petition is supported by affidavits of eminent citizens based on their personal observation of the petitioner.

In his affidavit of August 29, 1978, petitioner affirms his belief in God, a Supreme Being which is the source of all goodness, and in the Christian Trinity. He believes that Jesus was the son of God on earth. He has been baptized as a Christian. Although he has resigned from the Methodist church, his Christian religious feelings are strong. He attributes this strength to God and his perception of moral right which enters him through his human conscience. He consistently seeks to know what is morally right and wrong and believes that God enters into his life and fills the darkness of doubt and wonder with the light of truth. His objection to affiliation with Local 519 stems directly from his belief in God, the spirit of truth and goodness which is in everyone. That truth tells him that he cannot support the policies of organizations because he has no control over them. He believes that no police officer should belong to any organization that could influence his decision-making on the job. He believes that membership in Local 519 would jeopardize his ability to do his job. He believes that a Christian does that which is right and rejects that which is wrong. This direction, he indicates, comes from God and is often subtle. To know God’s will, he studies the Bible and meditates.

In the petitioner’s search for divine direction, he has the promise of the prophet Isaiah:

“And thine ears shall hear a word behind thee, saying, This is the way, walk ye in it, when ye turn to the right hand and when ye turn to the left.” Chapter 30, vv. 21 (King James Version)

Many will find the petitioner’s rejection of any other influence outside the duties, responsibilities and orders imposed on a deputy sheriff narrow and absolute. Alfred, Lord Tennyson, reminded us that

“... God fulfills himself in many ways, Lest one good custom should corrupt the world.”

Mort de’Arthur

But such reservations do not detract from the essentially religious basis of the petitioner’s objection to supporting organizations over which he as an individual has little influence and no effective control. Even William Wordsworth invoked “duty” as

“Stern Daughter of the Voice of God!”[1]^/

The Master Christian is quoted in the Gospel according to St. Matthew as saying:

“Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment. And the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets. Chapter 22, vv. 37-40 (King James Version).

While not admitted as evidence at this stage in these proceedings, the several affidavits filed in support of the petition indicate the availability of testimony on behalf of the petitioner as to the “bona fide” nature of his religious beliefs. Government must tread lightly when it considers a person’s religious tenets, and must construe statutes requiring such consideration so as to avoid constitutional questions. I would find that bona fide religious tenets of an individual are within the exception provided by RCW 41.56.122(1).

Serious doubts must also be raised as to the constitutionality of a provision requiring “mutual agreement” on a “religious” charity or governmental selection between “religious” charities. While this seems an invasion of the employee’s freedom of religion, it is not necessary to reach that issue at this stage in this case.

DATED at Olympia, Washington, this 3rd day of May, 1979.

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION

[SIGNED]

MARY ELLEN KRUG, Chairman